By Georges van Hoegaerden

I covered the systemic risk of Venture Capital (VC) many times (see in my previous article "Less is more") and emphasized how the passion to create disruptive innovation is the driving force of our great nation, an asset the rest of the world looks up to and I aim to protect with everything I have.

I came to this country some 15 years ago to pursue my entrepreneurial endeavors and despite my successes have seen the effects of a debilitating venture business restrict the dreams and bright future of others.

Even some of my entrepreneurial work could have yielded better financial returns, were it not for the subprime nature of some VCs (and their entourage) of whom, in an in-transparent business (read "How to fix VC once and for all"), it is often impossible to establish their real merit (and character) ahead of time.

The Venture Dilemma

Limited Partners (Pension funds, Endowments, Family trusts etc.) who supply their money to VC in capital-calls are faced with the harsh reality that venture (the venture capital sector) has produced less than 10% IRR for the last ten years and are now asked again to buy into the rhetoric from General Partners (GPs) at the VC firm that none of this was their fault, and renew 10-year multimillion and sometimes billion dollar commitments. The question for the Limited Partner (LP) arises; should I stay or should I go?

Many Prime VC Firms have Turned Subprime Too

Top quartile performance (a meaningless definition in its own right) by one VC fund is unlikely to rescue the plethora of under-performers nor yield much higher than 10% IRR in total LP sector returns. And even the performance of classic top-tier VC funds leaves a lot to be desired.

Mayfield Fund appears to have no regret admitting “classic bubble” mistakes and “bringing in big company management”, non-market risk mistakes that do not belong to a seasoned investor. Sequoia Capital issued a dramatic cutback message at first dawn of the economic crisis to its portfolio companies, in essence communicating that their companies are not disruptive enough to withstand economic aberrations. From public reporting by a public pension fund, Draper Fischer Jurvetson does not appear to be knocking it out of the ball-park either. Rumor has it that another top-tier firm, Benchmark Capital is the only firm in Silicon Valley to produce more than a 1x return on all of its funds. This is totally unacceptable performance and behavior of venture firms we collectively tend to think of as top quartile. Are they?

Many of the top-tier funds that flourished in strong winds and made even turkeys fly, have diluted their teams with general partners who simply lack the relevant operational experience (read "Why VCs really need relevant operating experience, now") needed to prevent them too from sliding into the overwhelmingly subprime venture ecosystem.

The Threat to Innovation

Clearly LPs have alternative options of deploying money into other asset classes (liquid or illiquid) and not buying into the feeble VC (and their lobbying organization) arguments will by default yield to a significant reduction of funding for innovation if not cause the industry to spiral further down to inappropriately applied risk and deal commoditization (we refer to as subprime VC).

At least ten years of subprime VC continues to attract subprime entrepreneurs which in turn creates more subprime performance and turns venture capital into micro private equity (PE). The erosion of the venture sector is well on its way and LP assets meant to be deployed to high-risk/high-yield innovation have instead slid down to high-risk/low-yield scale. LPs who meant to invest in venture, have instead invested in micro-PE.

Technology is Not the Risk

Fragmentation and further diversification at the VC level is not the answer to an ailing venture business. While it is exciting for the unknowing entrepreneur to see new angels attempt to fulfill the role VCs are not; such as Jason Calacanis, Adeo Ressi from The Funded, and other new angel groups, the early stage technology trials (as I prefer to call them) continue to deploy the wrong risk and continue to pull the venture business further into the swamp of subprime innovation. As I described before (also read my reference to Vinod Khosla's model of investing), technology development is not the investment risk of the venture business.

Smart LPs Look for a New Breed of GPs

Those LPs who do not want to flee the venture sector and realize that technology still has a bright future ahead better not make the same mistakes twice. The dating service of innovation (VC) may not be working correctly, but the real asset holders in the marketplace of innovation (see my article on the innovation marketplace) are eager and aplenty to monetize a new world of change.

New VC fund requirements need to be established to reintroduce risk-taking Venture Capital to the technology sector which subsequently attracts entrepreneurs that have the capacity and drive to change the world.

LPs need to:

• Establish new GP qualification criteria. Money without merit is not likely to yield outlier results.
• Re-evaluate Private Placement Memorandums to focus on market risk rather than technology risk
• Drive defragmentation and accountability of the investment thesis
• Implement merit based GP remuneration, including downside

Financial marketplace imperfections aside, the miserable performance of the venture sector has nothing to do with the economy and has everything to do with the risk we as early stage investors deploy to attract truly groundbraking innovation.

I have been called taking cheap shots at VC when they are down - by one VC titan I reached out to. But for some reason I do not feel bad demanding excellence from people driving their Maseratis and Porsches from the mostly public money that feeds them. It is not personal, but we owe it to our economy to return merit-to-money.

Limited Partners are in full control of their own destiny in venture, by virtue of how they commit. And now is the time to commit to venture with more discretion and expertise and hit the VC reset button.

Tags: Limited Partners, VC, Assets, Transparency, Subprime, Marketplace, Meritocracy

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I could not help but chuckle (again) when Oracle's 30-year-running CEO, Larry Ellison (full disclosure) fiercely yelled out the words from the title of this blog, referring to the artificial arbitration of innovation applied by Venture Capitalists (VCs) we talk about in this blog so often.

Sand Hill Road, for those unfamiliar is the street in Menlo Park, California where the majority of Silicon Valley VC enjoy some of the most expensive office rent in the country and invite their often starving entrepreneurs to "beg" for money. The area is considered the birthplace of Venture Capital.

Larry goes on to say that Venture Capitalists think that innovation is like coming up with a new technology buzzword, expressing his specific dismay with the term cloud computing (watch the Churchill Club interview on YouTube, skip to 47:53 min if you don't like boating).

The reason why I bring that up is four-fold:

1. Entrepreneurs are subject to this artificial arbitration (that is applied with the seasonality and commonality of fashion) as the primary method to get their high growth company funded. Entrepreneurs think that "wisdom" leads to success, yet deplorable VC returns prove otherwise.
2. Limited Partners (LPs) seem to respond commensurate with their limited allocation in venture (usually less than 15% of total allocation) and their natural inclination is to rest with the excuses (we debunked) from VCs, who never fail to reiterate that cyclical behavior of the financial markets and the economy are to blame for the deplorable returns in venture.
3. VCs are downplaying the systemic risk of this artificial arbitration (applied by the venture investor cartel) to our government, stating that $200B of venture investments pose less systemic risk than other asset classes, while completely ignoring that their behavior kills the meritocracy and innovative culture our country was founded upon.
4. Other VCs in the country (and around the world) copy the tactics of Silicon Valley investors, with similar results awaiting them.

But feel free not take my word for it. Agreeing with Larry Ellison, Mike Moritz, one of Silicon Valley's most lauded VCs was recently heard saying the Venture Capital business has been broken for twenty years. So do similarly successful venture peers Vinod Khosla and Greg Lamond, who believe - like we do - that when the risk is sucked out of investing, one should not expect great returns.

Still not listening? Stanford, Yale, Harvard and Princeton universities all appear to be suffering from significant losses to their endowment as a result of investments in "alternative" assets, which includes venture capital. To combat, according to PE Hub, Stanford has just raised a $1 billion in a bond offering last April in case of a “true emergency".

By the way: with those Ivy League universities having bred the most renowned economists and professors in entrepreneurship does anyone question whether their expertise is worth the tuition? Are the experts really what they claim?

How much exactly of that depressing news can be contributed to the performance of Venture Capital is not clear to me today (Hedge funds and Private Equity are the most common other assets) yet reports from both CalPERS and CalSTRS pension funds suggest a lackluster contribution of VC across the venture spectrum.

Deaf? Many of my peers in executive positions at Apple, Cisco, Oracle, HP, eBay refuse to enter the venture fray in which the equilibrium of entrepreneur and investor is completely out of whack. The cyclical nature of the downward sub-prime spiral continues to rear its ugly head. The only entrepreneurs that submit to sub-prime investments today are as sub-prime as their investors, incapable of building great fund performance.

The alarm bells are ringing. Limited Partners need to wake up, simply because of the loud reverberation of a vast preponderance of circumstantial evidence. It is time for LPs to listen, not to popular opinion from the people who got them in this financial debacle in the first place, but to people who offer ideas that simply serve entrepreneurs better. The time for change is now.

Passively waiting for consensus on data driven views is guaranteed to lead us to what Larry referred to as an L-shape recovery in the venture business.

Tags: Oracle, VC, Silicon Valley, Innovation, Limited Partners, Subprime

By Georges van Hoegaerden

[The article has been supplemented by a more recent "Why VCs really need relevant operational experience, now"]

I frequently get asked by individual Venture Capitalists (VCs) whether I really think General Partners (GPs) need operating experience to be more effective (as if my blog is not clear about that). And just recently HP's Venture Group seems to agree with me.

That topic was also recently challenged by Daniel Primack from Reuters' PEHub (I know he likes a good debate) who decided to make a statistical point that there is no correlation between fund success and GP operating experience.

Yet my short answer is: "yes, but it depends".

What my answer does not depend on is Daniel's statistical analysis of the Forbes Midas List and loosely matching credentials to his sample. With more than 90% of VC not making a real profit (above the asset class expectation of it), the 10% Midas sample can hardly be called statistically representative. And even if it would, a highly inefficient market (created by the ineffective "dating service" VCs currently provide) does not statistically represent the workings of the efficient market we wish for. And the majority of the Midas List GPs have their "success" firmly rooted in a timeframe when "turkeys could fly". Should I go on?

But most importantly, statistics are derivatives - not drivers - of market behavior, in the same way liabilities and assets are opposites (read "Rich Dad, Poor Dad"). It is unwise to apply a derivative (statistic) as a driver for market decisions. All experienced entrepreneurs know that.

So, my answer depends on whether you reference the actual or supposed workings of VC.

In today's VC

In today's venture capital ecosystem it is very important for every GP to have relevant operating experience, with the emphasis on relevant. Relevant experience as that of an early-stage CEO in tough times, still producing success.

Many GPs can only flaunt past experience from behind the confines of a large brand name conglomerate, rather than the experience of an early-stage CEO, investing his own money, defining a unique company ecosystem, living on borrowed time, raising a few rounds and selling the company. The VCs with that level of operating experience are hard to find and so are their successes.

Why is VC operating experience important:
1/ Many venture funded companies today are built with what I coin as the sub-prime VC model. Amongst many things it means founders need to prove a lot of technological capabilities (see my Khosla reference) before they see an investment dime, and when so, usually receive too little money to hire an experienced CEO. As a result, the board (of investors) runs the startup and thus their relevant operating experience becomes pivotal to the success of the startup.

2/ Relevant operating experience matters, not just any operating experience. Successful startups rely on a clear definition of a unique ecosystem (with divisional expenditures and conversion rates). The last thing an entrepreneur needs is a group of investors who can barely deviate from their business school thesis to meet reality and a world that is in flux.

3/ GPs need to be entrepreneurial to recognize and weigh one. The success of a technology startup is not just dependent on how cool the technology is but requires an operational assessment to figure out whether the business model is sustainable, and whether the application of that technology to a demographic makes economic sense. Operating experience is crucial to validate the combined value of operations and innovation.

I can name probably a hundred other reasons, but that would extend beyond the artificial limit of this blog and your patience.

In new VC

In a new VC structure I would argue for a more balanced makeup of economic managers and operational managers. But that structure can only work when all GPs share responsibility for every deal, rather than today's norm of every GP managing his own subset of companies within the portfolio. Many more things need to change in order for VCs to accurately calculate startup risk, snippets of which I've covered elsewhere in this blog and will cover extensively in my upcoming LP seminar "The Inconvenient Truth of Venture Capital".

Alignment with the entrepreneurs

So, until we change the fundamental workings of VC are we bound to hire GPs with relevant operating experience, those that combine that operating experience with the ability to accurately calculate upside risk and align with the entrepreneur.

But a VC firm without relevant operating experience is a risky investment (for LPs) and a bad strategic partner for the entrepreneur. The great difference between Private Equity and its sub-class Venture Capital is that the latter can create massive returns, albeit with GPs that are capable of recognizing a diamond-in-the-rough and performing a little bit of heavy lifting when needed or desired; by applying experience and influence.

That, as an operator, makes Venture Capital so much fun for me.

Tags: Eco-systems, Subprime, PE Week, Innovation, Experience, VC, Business Model, Limited Partners, Entrepreneurs

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The biggest complaint I hear and agree with is that Venture Capitalists (VCs) just don't get it and in the words of a VP at Apple, VCs simply don't line up with the needs of entrepreneurs.

Real innovation has no precedent and leaves many VCs, with their platitudes and an army of analytics in the dark in coming up with a reliable reason to invest. I personally had a VC become teary-eyed about the prospect of having to convince the rest of his team about an investment I presented, and I subsequently got it funded elsewhere.

With monetary assets being equal, it takes a visionary or a black swan (whichever classification floats your boat) to separate the good investor from the bad. Great investors have a strong belief that finds solace in an internal compass that is fine-tuned by years of risk-taking. Risk-taking in entrepreneurship or personal life, whichever one shaped that core competency. We have many VCs with strong beliefs, but few of those beliefs are founded on relevant experience.

So, entrepreneurs (and LPs) take note of what is the most important ingredient to look for in the bios of General Partners (GPs). With few exceptions, a GP (General Partner) that has never been a CEO at a startup, responsible for developing and executing its unique ecosystem, is not a great candidate to become a VC. Neither is the GP who has never challenged him/herself personally.

Venture Capital is government

But not only are those investors hard to find, the physical makeup and workings of the current VC construct is diametrically contradicting the decision-making for groundbreaking innovation. As long as the meritocracy at the VC level of the investment pyramid that started Venture Capital is not restored, the artificial arbitration of the current aristocratic model will continue to erode high yield returns.

Here is how VC acts like government:

1/ You (still) need to be in Silicon Valley

Just like you need to be in DC to make an impact on politics, do you need to be within 20 minutes of Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park to be on the radar of investors.

2/ You need an intro to the VC

In DC you need lobbyists to get anywhere, in Silicon Valley you need to find similar lobbyists that can introduce you to the investor you want to talk to. Most GPs simply refuse to talk with entrepreneurs they have not met before. Entrepreneurs who contact VCs directly will find themselves debating the vision with an academic white swan, dramatically improving their chance to get rejected.

3/ Investment decisions require internal consensus

Politics is based on consensus. Likewise, if the entrepreneur is lucky to convince one GP of their proposition, the next monday morning meeting at the VC firm is spent on getting other GPs to agree (except if the first GP is of John Doerr stature). In essence it means a unique invention is shoved through a democratic (government) filter to be validated with chances of a majority vote rapidly approaching zero.

4/ Deal syndication requires external consensus

Many VCs don't have the balls (excusé les mots) to make independent contributions to companies and look for syndication to mitigate the risk. Just like in DC where politicians look for peers to join their charter, before they stick their necks out.

5/ Lack of accountability

VCs can hide behind the size of the portfolio to select one or two successes to brag about. Just like politicians that hide behind a party and associate themselves with many initiatives and get credit for the few that worked. Quite opposite to the devotion of an entrepreneur.

6/ Lack of transparency

To understand politics you need a graduate degree in the subject matter, to understand VC you need to be (or have been) one. Just because the type of businesses VC invests in are private, that doesn't mean VC needs to be.

7/ Far removed from its constituents

Not only physically but spiritually many politicians are far removed from their constituents when they enter into office. So are the VCs who prefer to congregate more with each other than with entrepreneurs to develop unique support for disruptive innovation. VCs are oblivious to the many "false negatives" (as described in my previous blog) they don't even get to see, just as many politicians forget that many americans don't vote at all.

8/ Fewer real innovations are born here

DC (at least before Barack) is not the place to get anything done, and Silicon Valley choking on a vast supply of sub-prime VC is not the place to get anything really disruptive done. The real world is the market, not the current VC interpretation of it.

9/ Long incubation periods

Just like in politics, once the GP secures a fund with the LP the performance of the fund is in limbo for 5-10 years. That is a more secure job than the presidency of the United States. Many GPs stack funds or jump ship before it is about to go under, picking up new management fees under a different fund and LP structure. Another 5-10 years of GP safety lies ahead.

10/ External circumstances

Just like in politics, VCs blame their underperformance on anything else but their own decision making. The state of the economy is their welcome excuse, even though startup economics are quite resilient to macro economic aberrations.

So, the point of this blog is to emphasize that in order to get VC to create high yield returns we not only need to take a close look at the GPs that take the risk but change the mechanics of VC from a "government" based system to a meritocracy at the VC level of the investment pyramid. That is the message I will develop further (and more constructively, I've hammered on VC enough) in helping individual LPs develop new relationships with VC firms.

Tags: VC, Limited Partners, Risk, Funds, CEO, Entrepreneurs, Subprime

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The debate is heating up about the impending regulations from the government applied to Private Equity (PE) and its sub-class Venture Capital (VC), fought by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) and reluctantly supported by the Private Equity Council (PEC). The latter stating that private equity does not represent a systemic risk. Perhaps not, if the council excludes VC from its membership, but VC as Private Equity poses a systemic risk as the gatekeeper to innovation.

Why the government is forced to step in

The government has decided to step in and we, as participants in the ecosystem should present our government with the facts (good and bad) so it can make informed decisions going forward. If we give the government self-serving information, rather than the facts, we will get punished by regulations that miss their intended target. So, now is the time to separate greed from honesty and shape the regulations that will be bestowed upon us.

The most rational explanation as to why the government is tightening our private equity belts came from Bob Grady, Managing Partner at The Carlyle Group (who worked for the government for a while) at the recent IBF conference. He suspects that the government simply wants to reduce the size of the financial services industry as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

Not unreasonable, considering the collapse of our financial system and the discovery of an endless supply of imploding derivatives (and vice-versa). Simply put, the equilibrium between people who create products and those that capitalize on them is out of whack. We need more innovation with fewer derivatives attached to them.

VC is a systemic risk

The creation and growth of the Internet (and all the components around it) could not have existed without the faith and dollars from Limited Partners (LP), deploying their assets through VC firms. Kudos to people like IBF life-time award winner Bill Draper who started Venture Capital by literally knocking on the door of an interesting company, buying his first shares for $20,000. But the last nine years have been dismal for VC performance, almost 900 U.S. VCs producing less than 10% IRR, tarnishing the technology ecosystem and prompting LPs to look around to reallocate money to a different asset class.

Why VC needs to work

While venture-backed companies represent around 0.02% of GDP prior to exit, post exit they represent about 18% of GDP (according to the NVCA) and 9% of jobs in America. So, the decision-making process by a VC of what company to invest in is vital to building a healthy economic conversion rate. And I predict information technology will claim a larger stake of GDP as it continues to mature from its infancy. So while VC is a small percentage of the total Private Equity pie invested, it has proven its ability to produce a healthy stimulus to the economy.

What has changed

We can look at the statistics from the NVCA and debunk those statistics with reality, but common sense tells us that most of us would be hard pressed to name ten ground-breaking technology innovations in the last ten years. So, if 900 VCs produce this few real innovations, the billowing smoke is sufficient indication of a fire. On top of that companies like Apple show us how to invest in categories (like music) VCs had unsuccessfully invested in for the last 10 years, challenging VC fundamentals to its core.

Proper assessment of investment risk

The problem with VC is that it is inherently risky (more than other forms of Private Equity) and with the wrong people running VC firms, the asset - risk - that produces great returns is being sucked out of the investment equation.

Smaller funds, feverish syndications, easy exits are all instruments that create more rather than less derivatives to the creation of disruptive value. VCs now sell to LPs a similarly ill-fated pattern of risk as sub-prime lenders sold to their investors. Hence our frequent use of the sub-prime VC classification throughout this blog.

As a result of a lack of meaningful segmentation and guard rails by many me-too VC funds, LPs have actually invested deep rather than wide in information technology (as the included chart points out). For the last nine years that has created a massive number of false positives and false negatives and a continued downward spiral that attracts only entrepreneurs that comply with this risk-deflated investment mold, rather than attract entrepreneurs with truly disruptive ideas (that hold their value in any economy). So, for the last 9 years LPs have invested deep in a risk-averse technology sector while they expected their 10-15% venture share of total allocations to be applied to the inverse.

Moving forward

Many LPs are ready to cut all but their top quartile VC funds from their portfolio by flushing them through (i.e. letting them run their course without re-upping new commitments). That means over the next 5 years we are going to see many VC firms disappear, some replaced with new VC firms with more relevant entrepreneurial pedigree and investment models that are as unique as the strategies of the entrepreneurs.

New regulations by the government and tougher practices by LPs will make our industry more transparent and aim to create a platform in which the old aristocratic VC model will be replaced by a model that supports a meritocracy at every level of the investment pyramid. That is a fantastic development for entrepreneurs and VCs who are attracted by - and deserve - the merit.

Big stakes, big returns, fewer players, better innovation

LPs expect bigger returns (before larger commitments) from their allocation in venture and the only way to get it is to deploy risk. VC is designed to be the intermediary between the LP and the entrepreneur to mitigate that risk for LPs. Yet because of the aforementioned commoditization of VC investment strategies the VC model has failed to produce.

With LPs retrenching (to perhaps another asset class), the VC firm that wants to survive better articulate a clearly differentiated investment strategy with new GPs that can recognize and attract more disruptive (and sustainable) innovation, knows how to commit and helps make its portfolio companies work.

A new day

To create better returns for LPs, VCs need to rethink how to pick better companies with more disruptive (and sustainable) innovation and invest in upside rather than downside. The smart entrepreneurs are out there (we talk to them), waiting patiently for the right investment climate to light up their flame. Remember, great innovation can afford to be patient.

Venture Capital as the derivative in the investment pyramid between the assets of the LPs (money) and the assets of the entrepreneur (innovation) needs to provide a better service to both parties (or else it will be tossed out as a "dating service").

Until we fix VC, will it remain a systemic risk to our asset class, economy and frankly our reputation as the most innovative country in the world.

Tags: Limited Partners, VC, Apple, Subprime, Innovation, Funds, NVCA, GDP, Commodity, Investment, Integrity

By Georges van Hoegaerden

That's how one of the many CEOs that contact me recently described his colleagues who submit to Venture Capital (VC).

This alternatively funded CEO describes other CEO’s that seek VC funding as idiots – with a 1 in a 1000 shot at a lousy valuation (52% Round A, 25% Round B and 15% Round C). He continues that many of the serial entrepreneurs trumpeted by VC’s have no money themselves despite “successful” previous exits.

He is not alone about the ineffectiveness of Venture Capital, I frequently hear from other successful entrepreneurs about it. And the situation may get worse before it gets better. The economy is offering VCs even more excuses to turn the screws, and control of companies is gained in more ways than a simple equity stake.

I believe technology investing today is largely a sub-prime asset class as described in a plethora of sub-prime articles in this blog, and find many entrepreneurs discouraged by both the process as well as the outcome of fundraising, even when that yielded a round.

Because of the ineffectiveness of VC and the rampant false positives and false negatives I refuse to believe VCs (and the NVCA collectively), who suggest that the sum of Venture Capital equals the sum of technology innovation. We see great entrepreneurs actively pursuing more creative investment vehicles (high-net-worth individuals, private equity firms, investment bankers, sovereign funds...anyone with money), and rightfully so.

In the meantime, oblivious to recognizing their own flaws, VCs are further descending down the sub-prime spiral by restricting investments to compliant entrepreneurs, evidence that they remain clueless about the fundamental risk management of high yield returns.

Smart CEOs should simply refuse to work with many technology investors for the following reasons:

- Exorbitant loss of upside
Great entrepreneurs are known for their passion to pursue their dreams at virtually any cost, and sub-prime VCs smell their blood and desperation. Those companies become owned by VCs quickly and because of the investors' lack of relevant operating experience yields a further deflation of the valuation of the company. We've seen many companies with end-game founder stock way below 5%, which is unlikely to become life-changing. So, why would you take the scrutiny of the CEO job with that outcome in mind?

- Indirect loss of control
Voting rights as well as other fine print in the termsheet severely impact your ability as a CEO to disrupt a market. While in the beginning the founders may still own the majority of the shares, the dependance on further runway support gives VCs the ammo to press their preferred operational trajectory and leaves operational decisions at the mercy of its first investors.

- Restrictive expenditures
The powers of the CEO are further restricted by clauses on expenditures in either the articles of incorporation, termsheets, voting rights or other legal documents. We've seen restrictions requiring board approval for expenditures as little as $5,000. That means a CEO can't make pressing decisions until a next board meeting or when there is an ability to call an impromptu session. These restrictions are further evidence that a CEO does not have the trust of the board.

- Insufficient ecosystem control
Investors typify investments in technology waves (witnessed by their mindless herding at technology focused events) and blindly allocate certain expenditure expectations to R&D, marketing, business development and sales divisions. But the ecosystem of every company, regardless of segment, is unique to that company. CEOs who let VCs determine or validate the ecosystem expenditures will spend the subsequent board meetings explaining why they deviated from that, a waste of precious time.

- Deal with undeserved authority
Many VCs do not have the credentials and relevant operating experience to lead an experienced CEO. Yet it behooves the CEO to listen to the idiosyncrasies of the VC in order for them to endorse a CEO's leadership. Nothing is worse for a company's future than having to wait for the investor to validate every step along the way.

- Micro-economically sandwiched
Technology founders and VCs are often focused on building technology, very few investors pay close attention to the macro-economic differentiation (and valuation), leaving intelligent CEO left to drive a more sustainable big picture strategy with limited board and back-end support.

- Forced syndicates
Investors with early stakes can essentially force the company to engage with other VCs in subsequent rounds that favor the initial investor, rather than the entrepreneur. Many VCs huddle together in like-minded "vulture" strategies in the hopes of maximizing their often ill-performing portfolio.

- Damaging to reputation
The valley is so small and ignoring the advice from an investor can have detrimental effect on a CEO's future career. The "you will never work in this town again" syndrome is not unique to Hollywood, it is alive and well in Silicon Valley. The word spreads quickly when you challenge VCs and don't accept their terms, a reason why they tell you not to shop valuations around - it will actually hurt you.

- Sticky lawyers
We've inherited bad ones in companies we ran and found some good ones. But in many cases lawyers in Silicon Valley pretend they actually created the companies, simply because they filed their incorporation paperwork or attended board meetings. They mingle with the money sources and make the introduction to VCs that secure their billing runway. They end up getting cosy with the major shareholders and tilting the balance even further away from the CEO who signs their checks. Another entity to keep in check as a CEO.

- Low salary
Opportunity rather than salary is top of mind to entrepreneurs, but that changes quickly when they struggle to support their families and pay mortgages. $175K is not a salary that leaves much on the table, especially not when you live in the expensive area around Sandhill Road. And VCs are challenging those salaries even more while they are raking in astronomical fees associated with their large funds and sitting pretty for the next ten years. The risk/reward equation between VC and entrepreneur is completely out of whack.

- Poor severances
Board-run companies leave CEOs in a vulnerable state once its collective wisdom does not pan out. The blame for that failure is usually generously applied to the CEO, while the decision making power was not. An early stage CEO should consider himself lucky if the company can still honor its pre-negotiated severance obligation.

Pimps and Hoes

The current venture climate reminds me of the fascinating HBO documentary Pimps Up, Hoes Down in which the undeserved authority of Pimps is applied to the Hoes who do all the (dirty) work.

No self respecting CEO should accept the constriction deployed by sub-prime Venture Capital as described above. The outcome of the current entrepreneurial restrictions is not only highly predictable but has thankfully reached the balance sheets of fund-managers and Limited Partners, who fund the VCs and are starting to question the role of the VC as the intermediary.

The downturn in the economy masks the unrelated impending implosion of Venture Capital. No VC should use the economy as the excuse for the restrictions above and as a CEO you should read its deployment for what it is; a diminished faith in you and the company.

So, unless you can reach a great VC independently or with help from others quickly, my suggestion is to wait with testing your CEO skills until Venture Capital, not the economy recovers. If you can.

In the meantime I'll do my best to help fund-managers revive Venture Capital. It is about time the fund-managers hear the entrepreneur's point of view. That has become my new mission.

Tags: NVCA, CEO, VC, Valuation, Limited Partners, Economy, Subprime, Macro-economics

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As regular readers of my blog you are aware of my criticism towards the current operators of the Venture Capital (VC) microcosm.

I often liken todays Venture Capital business to the sub-prime lending business where too many people without the skills to assess risk accurately, put the whole technology ecosystem at risk.

My comments can be perceived as negative, yanking the chain of 700+ U.S. venture capitalists of which many use sub-prime tactics. Or they can be perceived as positive, with the majority of those investors looking the other way now is a great time to start a new investment vehicle (more on that later) that returns to Limited Partners (LPs) the allocation in the technology asset class they were promised.

A new group I see springing up are the people who use the negative interpretation to chastise the US as a whole, extrapolating that the US is "losing ground internationally on multiple technological fronts". That is where, with my international experience (an expat ready to naturalize) in tow, I need to put a full-stop to the criticism against this country.

Here is why:

1/ Not only does the U.S. represent a great breading ground for investing in innovation but more importantly, the US represents a societal curiosity to adopt and purchase those unproven innovations like no other country in the world. Technology investments will collagulate where the early buyers are.

2/ The U.S. has the uncanning ability to bounce back because in essence, every citizen is an entrepreneur (forced perhaps by the lack of safety nets). It may not be easy to bounce back but adaptability is part of this country's DNA - not so elsewhere.

3/ Investors in the U.S. have a short term memory, they need to put their money "to work". Technology remains a very interesting asset class because of its early potential, low cost, quick impact and large scale. So, with new risk assessment criteria for VC funds in place, new investments will flow again quickly. BTW: those investors (LPs) are not just american, the amount of sovereign funds investing in U.S. technology is significant and growing (not in the least because of bullet 1).

The United States will remain at the forefront of technology innovation if it acts on critical opinions that lead to improved self-regulation. We, collectively need to turn the current technology "investment club" into a free-market that embraces the curiosity and meritocracy that this country was founded upon.

The VC business will re-invent itself, either by people like me who aim to expose and correct its current flaws or (a few years later) by the Limited Partners who invested in VC firms with suboptimal returns. Either way, no innovation exists without induction of significant pain or gain.

Have no doubt that like many other innovations globally, the reinvention of the VC business will start right here in the U.S. and produce a whole new batch of disruptive and exciting innovations.

Tags: VC, Innovation, Funds, Free-market, Risk, Subprime, Startup, Limited Partners

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Pierre Lamond, a Silicon Valley legend who has been a Sequoia partner at the Menlo Park, Calif.-based Venture Capital (VC) firm since 1981 has decided to join Khosla Ventures, primarily to do what Venture Capital was designed to do, take risks again.

Having hit on subprime VC for a few years now, his reasoning resonated with me and I looked back at Vinod Khosla's "New old-fashioned" model for Venture Capital, he describes in his 2002 presentation as "Funding to Milestones", as depicted below:



Now compare the above chart with the one right below, the VC model practiced by the majority of current Venture Capitalists today, which I refer to as subprime VC:



What quickly becomes apparent from the latter chart (derived from actual pitches between entrepreneurs and VC) is that supported by the excuse of lower development costs related to web2.0 technologies, the investors have pushed down the majority of the risk onto the entrepreneur.

We all know by know that Web2.0 is not a business and still requires the definition of a disruptive business that does not fundamentally yield lower operating cost, but much more disturbing is how investors have reduced their risk and delayed their active participation with a company that, in the end, actually produces lower exits (investors are now satisfied with a 2x rather than 10x return) and no IPOs. We explained in our previous blog how that strategy cannot save Venture Capital funds.

While statistically we can time-shift the sub-prime chart to the left and assume nothing has changed by holding up the Moneytree reports, anyone who has walked around in Silicon Valley as long as I have, knows what is really going on under the hood.

Unlike people like Vinod Khosla who can assess technology risk before it is build, the majority of investors can't envision an opportunity until they spot it in their rearview mirror. Today, investors demonstrate by their actions (or lack thereof) what is fundamentally flawed in Venture Capital; the lack of people that can accurately assess risk. In 5-years our economy will be in better shape than it has been, leaner and meaner. Technology opportunities are and will be abound, as it is in the early stages of penetration. This is indeed a time for aggressive investing, rather than a time for crawl-back we see some VCs do.

The sub-prime VC problem will remain when the economy recovers, if it is not aggressively perforated by people with real early-stage operating experience who understand that risk is the lifeline of Venture Capital - and join the investment fray.

Stop blaming the economy and take a risk, everyday. Only then will you get better at it.

(I will explain the sub-prime chart in more detail later)

Tags: Subprime, VC, Valuation, Risk, Startup

By Georges van Hoegaerden

About one year ago I attended a great session with Limited Partners (LPs) to VC firms, the Carlyle Group's Bob Grady and fund managers from Hamilton Lane and SFERS in San Francisco.

At the time I was impressed with the rationale behind a deliberate slowdown in new VC fund investments, yet every fund manager assured that the technology asset class remained an interesting one that LPs cannot afford not to participate in. The group as a whole emphasized that the new VC funds being deployed must prove substantial differentiation in its investment strategy, not unlike an entrepreneur needs to prove a similar aggressive differentiation to win market share.

With that in mind you may just be as amused as I am to see the "duh" investment strategy explained in this private placement memorandum (PPM) from a triple digit fund in early 2000:

• Market capitalization at IPO of $1 billion or more
• Rapid growth and very large potential market size
• Leveraged customer acquisition strategies: the business is able to take advantage of established customer bases, “network” economics, or powerful “viral” strategies to acquire customers at modest up-front cost
• Scalable business models
• Robust economic models: significant margin generation with potential for self-funding in year 3 or before.
• Significant competitive advantages based on such factors as proprietary technology, establishment of industry standards, customer investment in applications and/or user interfaces, or winner-take-all economics (i.e., the market is a natural monopoly)
• The opportunity to create leverage vis-à-vis suppliers and customers by virtue of efficiency advantage, neutrality, scope of business, and hard-to-replicate investments

I have seen quite a few other PPMs since and the resemblance is remarkable. No surprise that VCs have had the flexibility to latch-on to every new technology acronym, using whatever allocation per company they desire and invest in virtually any technology company that comes their way. And so they did.

They all did. In pretty much the same way, as lemmings are known to do. So now, we are over-invested in the same deal constructs (deep, see the investment atrophy described here), and under-invested in the full scope of technology innovation. As a result, large technology companies (such as Apple) are eating early-stage disruptive innovation for lunch, leaving the little deals for the bottom-feeder (sub-prime) VCs that count themselves blessed investing in "capital efficient" deals with little disruptive value, let alone IPO prospects.

No longer can fund investments be made using a single yard-stick.

LPs need to take better control of the segmentation in the technology asset class especially since maturing technology evolution will have its feet in every market segment, including crossovers to other asset classes.

VC funds need to be pushed apart to yield less overlap and provide complementary investment strategies rather than an 80% overlap. That, with the requirement to start new VC funds with GPs that actually have had early-stage CEO operating success, allows VCs to better align with the needs of the entrepreneur and fundamentally improve the chances for high-yield returns.

Tags: Limited Partners, VC, Subprime, CEO, PPM

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Sub-prime Venture Capital is akin to the sub-prime lending market and we predict the bottom will soon fall out of sub-prime VC too, spurred by the fear of economic pressure and the depressing returns of expiring post 911 venture funds.

Just like working for Carnival Cruise looks glamorous but is not the way to explore the world, unsuspecting young entrepreneurs who fall for sub-prime investors will soon find out that building those technologies has all the glamour but few of the rewards associated with innovation. Regardless, many chasing the mighty dollar will fall for it.

Here is how entrepreneurs can recognize a sting from subprime VC:
Step 1: We like the idea, but before we invest please finish the product some more, then come back
Step 2: 6 Months later, you finished the product. Great, now prove it works by getting 100,000 daily users, then come back
Step 3: Fantastic, now we'll take 60% of your company for $1M

Ouch, that hurts.

Here is why sub-prime tactics hurt our innovative ecosystem, just like sub-prime lendings have a negative effect on the housing market as a whole.

ad 1/ Technology development is the investment risk we understand quite well, timely applicability to a market is the real issue. So, proving that the entrepreneur can build a product can easily be derived from the entrepreneur's vision, knowledge and credentials in that space, juiced up with some kitchen-sink prototyping. On top of that a 6-month self-funded development timeframe with 2-3 developers can hardly yield a sustainable competitive advantage anyway, so R&D development proves nothing.

ad 2/ In many cases it is impossible to land 100,000 users before you have a critical mass of product capabilities. That critical mass comes from an R&D investment that generates substantial differentiation, and rarely from tip-toeing into the marketplace. Marketplaces, for example, only grow when a critical mass of both supply and demand are lured in and participate, which often requires a bolstering of technology to support all constituents, rather than minimizing it. Already, too many technology products enter the market unfinished as a result of underfunding and yield false negatives.

ad 3/ Control and valuation of the company are a direct indication of the future success of an early-stage company. The vast majority of technology success stories are derived from retained majority control by its founders and CEO (Facebook, Google, Twitter, eBay etc). Investors are terrible operators (no surprise given their background and experience) and should not want to own a majority stake in their companies, simply out of self-preservation.

Additionally, the danger of these tactics deployed by sub-prime investors (many of the large venture funds deploy fashionable sub-prime tactics too) is that it marginalizes technology innovation and provides a very unstable breeding ground for the fund performance as well:

a/ Venture Capital is meant to stimulate the high-risk / high-yield asset class as defined by its Limited Partners, the sub-prime strategy described here (anecdotally) serves nothing more than low-risk / low-yield segment of the technology asset class.

b/ No fund larger than $100 Million can support the management attention needed to spur these tiny injections along. As a result sub-prime investors just constricted what they thought of interesting innovation with too little time and too little money to provide critical market entry.

c/ Very few low cost entry deals yield the disruption that prices out favorably to makes any dent in the return of the fund as a whole. Venture funds need few big returns to keep LPs coming back for more.

The only early-stage investors who may be able to turn sub-prime deals into prime are the investors who:
- have proven to be successful operators themselves
- support the vision before the product is there
- have great syndicates to support the full runway of a disruptive market entry going forward.

Investors that can turn sub-prime into prime can be counted on one, maybe two hands. People like Marc Andreessen with his new AZ (Andreessen-Horowitz) fund come to mind. But entrepreneurs who are not stung by these visionary investors may just as well hop on that cruise ship and enjoy life some more.

The economics of big technology plays have not suddenly changed, the cost of developing technology may have declined slightly but simultaneously competition has increased exponentially. So, we prefer to focus on plays that are high-risk and high-yield simply because only they create the disruptive innovation that can keep VC firms in business.

The challenge for early-stage entrepreneurs remains the same, to create unbridled and disruptive innovation that finds only one investor that believes in it. If many more do, believe me, the technology is just not disruptive enough. So, be ready for some controversy.

Finding the right investor, amongst 700+ firms in the U.S. requires that entrepreneurs understand and can read the dating game. If they don't, we'll be happy to help. But get to us before you've been stung 217 times.

Tags: Subprime, VC, Innovation, FaceBook, Google, Twitter, Startup, Investment Banks, EBay, Revenues, Valuation, Disruption, LP, Funds

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Retail store decorations reminded me that easter is approaching and that set off the memory of an easter egg chart (on the right) I received from an early stage entrepreneur who had been trying to raise money over the past 12 months. In many ways the chart indicates how the Venture Capital (VC) world is filled with the wrong operators (not a lack of money), incapable of assessing risk; I will clarify later.

The enclosed chart includes the names of every investor (VC and Angels) the entrepreneur has spoken to face-to-face (in dark green), conversed through e-mail (in light green) and is scheduled to connect with (in orange).

Needless to say the 217 investors (whom I will not disclose yet, to protect the entrepreneur) that bothered to meet face-to-face include pretty much anyone who means anything in the VC business.

Helped by a tiny amount of seed money and introductions from a well known and respected investor, most investors responded enthusiastically (according to the entrepreneur), yet virtually none have bothered to provide the valuable feedback (or responded back with a decent no) that could lead to a line-of-sight of a term-sheet.

So, we conclude from this painstaking process the entrepreneur went through the following:

- Fundraising takes time, a lot of time
Even with the introduction from a well known VC, carve out one year of your life to raise virtually nothing (a million or so). Most entrepreneurs chase a dream that is chiseled from years of experience dealing with inefficiencies, only to discover that at fundraising time they don't understand (and don't want to understand) the VC microcosm that holds "innovations" hostage. We recommend entrepreneurs to start socializing the idea with VCs the minute they start writing code, to establish a clear target list of investors that can and should do the deal 9 months to a year later. One year ago I would have recommended the entrepreneur to sell his house and raise money that way, easier and better retention of control in the company.

- Investors don't treat entrepreneurs with the respect they deserve
Not responding to the entrepreneur (even when they share valuable connections together) as the majority of the investors on the enclosed chart did is the lowest form of disrespect imaginable. I have written about obnoxious VCs in this blog many times before (reinventing VC, subprime VC, LPs fooled, curse of subprime VC, investors to avoid) and would tell you that those over-inflated personalities contribute that I have no interest to belong to the current VC club (I have been asked). Clearly not everyone was raised by a grandfather (and co-founder of the Mentos candy) who taught us early on that you can be hard-nosed, respectful and successful all at the same time.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are numb
As you notice from the linkages in the chart (hard to see at 6% of original size), many investors have provided referrals to others. But referrals only happen when investors believe "there is something there" (one of their favorite phrases) and pass it along to another investor who may better understand the proposition. In an effective investor ecosystem and regardless of their belief in the proposition, the chart would never grow to be as large as it is. When investors don't like the proposition they will not pass it on, and when they do they will keep it to themselves and work out a deal. So, the sheer size of this chart communicates really well how clueless our current VC microcosm is.

- The current crop of early-stage investors simply don't understand the technology business
The fact that this entrepreneur is thrown around like a rag-doll by some of the biggest "experts" in the VC business says it all. The investor's indecisiveness is an indication of their lack of knowledge and vision that has earned them such a prominent role in the innovation of our industry. But, the best investors weigh risk, they do not need to deliver vision. Experienced entrepreneurs do not need investors to hold their hands in understanding the technology business and just need their investors to get out of the way.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are cowards
There is nothing, I repeat, nothing wrong with a VC saying no, whatever the investor's rational. But this chart shows how none of them can decide on their own - either way. These investor cannot stand to lose a deal they may miss out on (and not saying no will keep that door open), and don't have the guts to take the risk if they thought otherwise. It takes a strong character to be a VC, not an insecure and arrogant one.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are lemmings in rudeness
We knew that they were lemmings already, but now we know they will not only decide to jump off the cliff together but also share incredible rudeness. A sad state of being. No entrepreneur should sign any of these people on to their boards, because if they were not rude to them yet, that behavior will undoubtedly pop up when they least expect it.

- Entrepreneurs need a professional agent
Talking to this many investors and not yielding any takers is creating the smell of a dead fish in the venture community. While great successes like Skype required talks with reportedly about 40 investors and I did 20 on one of mine, the entrepreneur should have forced an early feedback loop with some investors before proceeding to talk to any more. The entrepreneur should pick an advisor or agent that does not allow this to go on for so long. It is sad that we are beginning to look an awful lot like Hollywood to become effective.

Now, notice that I have not discussed the specific proposition of the entrepreneur here and we may actually side with the VCs unable to extract razor-sharp focus from this entrepreneur's broad tale (but we will have the courtesy to tell him that directly). But the validity of the proposition is beside the point made here. Entrepreneurs, while they eat away their family's life savings and make considerable personal sacrifices, deserve the straight talk to help them plan their resources.

It is even more appalling that without any serious feedback the only response from a few VCs is to come back later, build the base technology first (which the entrepreneur has done) and get a critical number of customers. As if at that time the entrepreneur is in need of any fair-weather friends. The true character of the sub-prime VC is shining through again, but I am surprised it includes so many investors I thought better of. No wonder people like Umair Haque become even more enraged, describing VCs asleep at the wheel of creative destruction.

I would suggest the LPs (Limited Partners) to pull back from 80% of their current VC commitment (that are not producing returns anyway) and re-allocate the majority of that money to the creation of new VC firms that target more fundamental diversification in the technology asset class. I hereby offer my services to the LPs that want to take a hard look at that. And I would love to see the remainder of the current "prime VCs" be forced to re-invent themselves by this new influx in the same way entrepreneurs are all the time.

The only way to grow technology innovation is to force the VC business out of its current sub-prime mode and challenge the behavior of the crypt-keepers by making them highly accountable for their performance.

In the words of Ron Conway (a prominent angel investor) who recently stated "it is time for a new crop of entrepreneurs", we surmise "it is time for a new crop of investors" that attracts better innovation.

Tags: Fundraising, Disruption, Entrepreneurs, Subprime, Innovation, Investment, Digital Asset Management, Transparency, VC, Startup

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I am responding to an article written by Dan Primack at Reuters PEHub (where some of my articles are syndicated), pondering the question as to how to radically reinvent Venture Capital. To start offering a solution, we should look at the original promise of Venture Capital (VC).

Let’s not forget: Venture Capital exists by virtue of great entrepreneurs building highly monetizable innovations.

With that in mind it may sound weird that many VCs are obnoxious, pompous, rude and anything but transparent to entrepreneurs (even after they invest).

But it is really not such a big surprise. Subprime VC attracts subprime entrepreneurs ready to cash in on the hype and hence an overwhelming amount of pitch noise drowns out the music, leaving investors numb and unable to separate the two. And now, most of those VCs are debating whether a new VC firm structure or deal mechanics can fundamentally change the outcome of the game. It will not.

Since the beginning of 2000 VC performance is under water and that hurts. But just like un-inspirational politicians who can’t get legitimate voters to vote for them, un-inspirational VCs waiving an outdated rule-book around cannot attract great entrepreneurs. But don’t for a moment think the american entrepreneurial spirit is dead. It is not.

My top 3 (but I could easily list more) ways of how VC should change:

1/ Invest in macro-economics
Rather than invest in mindless technology classifications, certain macro-economic behaviors engrained in society for hundreds of years can be harvested with technology. Think premium “market” and free-market models, each has great potential depending on which product or service is being sold. The cyclical behavior of adoption can prohibit the success of either, no matter how good the technology. Studying the model and the reason for its receptiveness will be the first clue towards a fundable business.

2/ Invest in inefficient supply and demand
Regardless of technology, many technology segments that we discard off-hand as too difficult have not even reached maturity or dominance by a single player (achieving over 30% “market” share). Even the well publicized Personal Computer segment consists of over 40% fragmented ownership, let alone an untapped market of roughly 5B people on this planet that don’t use a computer today. But fragmentation is the ultimate indicator of under-served potential, it simply means the current capability is ineffective, opening new opportunities for a new solution (iPhone computer anyone?). So, get your facts straight.

3/ Invest in the application of technology
Many new lines of businesses can benefit from the infusion of technology innovation. If the application of technology yields dramatic bottom-line impact, and provides a sustainable roadmap, then how it is build (with what flavor of technology) at the moment of entry merely indicates the cost to improve the upward trajectory further. So, stop investing in technology, but invest in application of technology.

Those three points alone require a completely different assessment of the risk factors associated with innovation than the one I see Silicon Valley VCs apply today. Most investors have become risk adverse and invest based on cost rather than opportunity.

So, to reinvent venture capital we need to reinvent the people behind it. The mechanics and size of government is irrelevant if it does not affect the behavior of politicians that inspires people to vote. Similarly, the effectiveness of VC will not improve by changing fund size, deal staging, etc. (or escaping to a green-tech “bull” market, for that matter) unless the investors change their behavior that inspires the right people to innovate.

We need to bottom up VC. Investors need to become truly complimentary to great entrepreneurs and practice similar ethics, transparency, and perseverance traits to become valuable contributors to the innovative process that allows them to reap the rewards. Teams that can consistently yield a path to trustworthy IPOs will be charmed into even more lucrative acquisitions along the way.

It is a “buyer’s market” only for those investors who buy mediocre innovation. And mediocre innovation will not produce great fund returns. So, in the end, innovation remains a “seller’s market” - or no market at all.

Let’s not sit back and wait to find out which one it is going to be, as the writing is already on the wall. The time for VC to change and attract different innovation and entrepreneurs is now.

Tags: Subprime, Markets, IPhone, VC, Funds, Green Tech, Investment, Innovation, Limited Partners

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The subprime investment tactics by Venture Capitalists has a damaging impact on the returns provided to Limited Partners (those who provide the funds to the Venture Capital firms, such as pension-funds, university endowments, insurance companies etc.) and on the technology asset class as a whole.

We predict that as a result - and within 2 years, when the gestation period of the post 911 VC funds has expired LPs will dramatically reduce the inflow of moneys in the technology asset class, disappointed by unfavorable returns. To no fault of great entrepreneurs in this great country.

Here is how subprime VC fools LPs:
1/ The LPs believe they are investing in a premium technology asset class but in reality they are investing in an artificially constricted commoditized asset class we call bootstrapped innovation.
2/ The LPs believe they are investing in a high-risk high-yield asset class yet the VCs operate using low-risk (almost investment banking style) tactics with inherently low yields.
3/ The LPs believe they are spreading the risk by investing in multiple VC firms, not realizing that the majority of them invest using the same rule-book and therefor identical risk patterns. The LPs unknowingly are investing deeper rather than wider.

So, just like when my daughter behaves badly (rarely) and I need to take control of the situation, so must the LPs take control and tighten the leash with VC firms that are behaving “badly”. The behavior of my daughter (or dog if you consider that your child) is my responsibility, the behavior of VCs is an LP responsibility.

Here is what every LP should do right now:
1/ Bring every invested VC firm in and re-assess whether the invested amounts, category and valuations per portfolio company match the initially stated investment thesis and more importantly, your current risk profile across all assets.
2/ Ensure the spread between the investment in technologies versus the application of technologies to markets aligns with renewed opportunities and your current risk profile. The impact of technology has dramatically changed (rather than reduced), and many VCs are still stuck in the past.
3/ Hire an operational partner that establishes continuous oversight into the VC investment allocations (get one here) based on the risk and identity associated with each participating fund. That oversight should prevent the fund from investing outside the pre-established criteria.

Now is the time to reassess the investment opportunities in our technology industry. We believe the opportunities are abound, just not with the current investment tactics.

As Cesar Milan, a.k.a. the dog whisperer teaches us: its not too late to rescue any dog - as long as we can change the behavior of its caretaker. Similarly, it is not to late to improve entrepreneurialism if we change the behavior of its investors.

Tags: Subprime, Private Equity, VC, Entrepreneurs, Limited Partners, Subprime, Fundraising

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The subprime investment tactics by Venture Capitalists has a damaging impact on the returns provided to Limited Partners (those who provide the funds to the Venture Capital firms, such as pension-funds, university endowments, insurance companies etc.) and on the technology asset class as a whole.

We predict that as a result - and within 2 years, when the gestation period of the post 911 VC funds has expired LPs will dramatically reduce the inflow of moneys in the technology asset class, disappointed by unfavorable returns. To no fault of great entrepreneurs in this great country.

Here is how subprime VC fools LPs:
1/ The LPs believe they are investing in a premium technology asset class but in reality they are investing in an artificially constricted commoditized asset class we call bootstrapped innovation.
2/ The LPs believe they are investing in a high-risk high-yield asset class yet the VCs operate using low-risk (almost investment banking style) tactics with inherently low yields.
3/ The LPs believe they are spreading the risk by investing in multiple VC firms, not realizing that the majority of them invest using the same rule-book and therefor identical risk patterns. The LPs unknowingly are investing deeper rather than wider.

So, just like when my daughter behaves badly (rarely) and I need to take control of the situation, so must the LPs take control and tighten the leash with VC firms that are behaving “badly”. The behavior of my daughter (or dog if you consider that your child) is my responsibility, the behavior of VCs is an LP responsibility.

Here is what every LP should do right now:
1/ Bring every invested VC firm in and re-assess whether the invested amounts, category and valuations per portfolio company match the initially stated investment thesis and more importantly, your current risk profile across all assets.
2/ Ensure the spread between the investment in technologies versus the application of technologies to markets aligns with renewed opportunities and your current risk profile. The impact of technology has dramatically changed (rather than reduced), and many VCs are still stuck in the past.
3/ Hire an operational partner that establishes continuous oversight into the VC investment allocations (get one here) based on the risk and identity associated with each participating fund. That oversight should prevent the fund from investing outside the pre-established criteria.

Now is the time to reassess the investment opportunities in our technology industry. We believe the opportunities are abound, just not with the current investment tactics.

As Cesar Milan, a.k.a. the dog whisperer teaches us: its not too late to rescue any dog - as long as we can change the behavior of its caretaker. Similarly, it is not to late to improve entrepreneurialism if we change the behavior of its investors.

Tags: Subprime, Private Equity, VC, Entrepreneurs, Limited Partners, Subprime, Fundraising

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Subprime VC, as described in a previous blog is easily recognizable, here are some of my metrics. Run for the hills when the investor...:

1/ ...seems more interested in how it is built rather than what the disruptive business proposition is.
Innovation becomes successful when it marries macro-economic value with micro-economic (technology) execution. Technology risk is the least of our worries in Silicon Valley, yet fundamental disruption is crucial and should take up the majority of the discussion.

2/ ...seems more worried about cost of development than cost of greenfield customer acquisition.
Capital efficiency is a buzz-word investors love to throw around. In most cases they want you to be as cheap as possible. But capital efficiency is relative to the cost and value of customer acquisition. Not all venture capital deals start with a seed round below $250K, more disruptive innovation usually costs more to build well (think iPod, iPhone, iTunes, eBay, etc).

3/ ...talks about valuations before you’ve explained the value of becoming the market leader.
A favorite trick of investors is to value the company based on its present accomplishments and many entrepreneurs fall for it. Their companies become undervalued and underpriced which leads to early loss of control to investors. And when investors run a company, statistically the chances of success have diminished significantly. Early stage companies should be priced based on the value of the idea and accomplishments along the trajectory of market leadership. Your glass should be seen as half-full not half-empty.

4/ ...seems more occupied with categorizing the investment than understanding its unique business value.
When investors start categorizing investments in technology categories and subsequently base their investment decisions on them, that means they clearly missed the fact that you business proposition could have value regardless. Again, technologies are not the business, application of technology to a market segment is.

5/ ...talks about capital efficiency without probing market inefficiency.
Again, capital efficiency is a relative term. When a large market is extremely inefficient it probably means that the absolute cost to enter is high (otherwise someone else would have entered it before you). So, the cost to enter the market is a function of its current inefficiency. Many investors are less versed in inefficiencies than you and therefor misjudge the price it takes to enter. As the entrepreneur you will be faced with the inequitable consequences if you decide to bow down and take the investors’ word for it.

6/ ...doesn’t question market entry risk, but focuses on cost.
Investment risk is what should be top of mind to investors, but many of them think they have the operational experience to challenge the assumptions of the entrepreneurs. In many scenarios market entry risk can be mitigated by developing a better product, but a better product costs more money to build. At any time would I rather spend a dollar on R&D to make the product better, than spend a dollar on marketing expenses to try and make a “cheap” product land better. So, the right amount of money (not cost) is imperative to disrupt a market.

7/ ...doesn’t ask about the runway to profitability, but the initial round to get in.
Most companies require multiple rounds of funding. Those rounds are not there for you as the entrepreneur, but for the investor to establish milestones to make him more comfortable. An investor that does not allocate sufficient runway, is effectively selling short on the promise of your company and will cost you months of fundraising efforts at every round.

8/ ...asks you which other investors you’ve spoken to.
Investors are lemmings, and so you should not disclose who you talk to until you have all their term-sheet on the table. Force them to make their assessment of your company independently. Usually each investor has a different risk analysis of your company and last thing you want to do is add up all the negatives before there is a buying signal on all sides. Herd the positives.

9/ ...asks you to talk with his associates first.
As discussed in this blog many times over, associates are graduates that should be used to perform due diligence, not to discover a black swan. Many investors will use associates as a way to offload the workload created by the noise inherent to our industry. The minute you get the associate, you have become noise.

10/ ...asks you more about your education than your work experience.
Building innovation that is truly unique requires an analytical mind and ignorance to anything else but bottom-line results. Education teaches you how to respond to prescribed scenarios, innovation requires the opposite; an ability to respond adequately to a myriad of circumstances that have never presented itself to you, in that composition before. Any investor that focuses on your (or his) business school accomplishments has a warped view of what innovation really is.

Never forget that a great entrepreneurial idea sponsored by the wrong investor yields nothing but failure. Keep searching for the right partner and don’t bow down to subprime investment tactics.

Tags: VC, EBay, IPhone, Growth, Capitalism, Subprime, Startup

By Georges van Hoegaerden

It continues to amaze me how VCs point to the economic downturn as a reason for sluggish investing. We all know that at this point they should do exactly the opposite (and a few good ones do).

Information Technology is here to stay as we clearly have not reached the saturation point of its practical implementation, even though short-term M&A and IPO windows have pretty much closed - for now.

But I am especially dismayed by the fact that VCs seem to completely ignore responsibility for the fact that their investments strategies can’t seem to weather the storm and how they continue to hide behind the economic downturn to avoid the disclosure of their bad choices. Reminds you of anyone?

I don’t believe the VC model is broken, in the same way I don’t believe mortgage lending is broken. We will continue to buy new houses - and technologies. Both represent sizable investment returns for years to come. But the risk profile associated with lending money for a home has been miscalculated and I contend the majority of VCs are fundamentally miscalculating the risk of early-stage investing. Birds of a feather.

Here are some of the similarities:

1/ The sheer number of lenders entering the mortgage arena forced an artificial expansion into the low-end. In the technology industry about 790 US investors force a similar artificial expansion down into the low-end. Most entrepreneurs are forced to comply to the “capital efficiency” rule-book or, as I call it, subprime VC.

2/ The majority of people working at the mortgage bank cannot accurately assess the risk profile, neither can the majority of people working at a VC firm. The associate in a VC firm (or worse the General Partner), fresh out of school is simply not able to detect disruption. Schools are, by design, setup to teach students about white-swans, not the black swan that usually spawns real innovation.

3/ The lenders took advantage of uneducated buyers, without sufficiently reminding them that buying a house yields a debt, not an asset. Similarly, entrepreneurs are often made to believe they are successful when they land a round of funding, mistaking that for an asset (instead of a liability) and subsequently not paying enough attention to the acquisition of its real assets; new paying customers.

4/ The majority of home-buyers should not have qualified. Similarly, most technology ideas should not. Innovation is only meaningful when it monetizes ideas. So investing based on technology classifications is the wrong qualification of innovation.

As the included chart attempts to depict, the investment strategies in the 1990s and even the exuberance in 2000 produced better variance and returns than the atrophy created by the current VC rule-book. Now, too many investors herd (syndicate) around the same investment strategy, diminishing its returns and making it increasingly less attractive for smart entrepreneurs who refuse to submit themselves to subprime investment rules.

An artificial VC rule-book, subprime valuations, lower founder salaries, fewer M&A and zero IPO makes for a very unattractive entrepreneurial playground. If we don’t throw the VC rule-book out of the window, we should expect nothing more than sub-prime M&A and subprime IPOs, even when the economy recovers.

The concern is that we are creating fewer companies that someday have the financial wherewithal to acquire its smaller innovative brethren and like the lending market, are stuck with “innovation” that no-one wants to buy. I wrote about that starting more than 3 years back (here, here, here). We need VCs with the ability to spot disruptive business opportunities rather than perpetuate technology gimmickery.

Perhaps we can put the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) to work on something better than mindless self congratulating statistics of the past and misleading videos of the actual workings of venture capital today. It could instead create more transparency of its members, to stave off tougher selection and regulation from the Limited Partners (pension funds etc.) that are otherwise unavoidable.

We, as collective contributors to the technology ecosystem - not the elusive economy - are responsible for the performance of our industry and our ability to produce real value that can weather any storm, and that means we need to get out of subprime VC quickly.

Tags: VC, Investment, NVCA, Integrity, Innovation, Risk, Limited Partners, Startup, Subprime

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Not for a second do I buy into the doom-and-gloom spread by early stage investors citing the state of the economy as the reason for cutbacks. While the economic situation is worrisome, much of it is generated by supposed financial and business experts that are not. To say the least.

Sounds familiar? We have a few of those in Silicon Valley too. When money is involved, some people just can’t help themselves (or rather the opposite).

Investors still have plenty of overhang to invest with and their portfolio companies are on a 5-7 year trajectory to exit, meaning the viability of their choices is determined by the value at the end, not the value in the middle or the trajectory. The macro-economic value of a startup should remain intact in an economic downturn. So, the behavior of your investor will tell you whether you “married” well.

Very few startups should be materially impacted by the state of the economy, because:

1/ Their early stage market penetration is immaterial to the overall addressable “market”, leaving enough room for growth in any economy.

2/ The majority of (consumer focused) startups generate income through indirect monetization such as click-thru advertising, which is somewhat resilient to economic aberrations (even though purchasing may not).

3/ In early stage development, monetization is secondary to land-grab, and smart operating plans have very conservative and immaterial income projections built-in.

So, the fact that investors strike fear in the minds of entrepreneurs is the same as a president of a country at war expressing similar fear; not productive. Sure you need to be cautious and count your chickens, but great investors see this as a fantastic opportunity to double-down on their investments and amplify the market differentiation rather than restrict it.

Access to capital is a serious barrier to entry that can keep competitors out. So, if you are being restricted by your investor at this point it means he’s just not that into you and is doing you more harm than good.

Tags: VC, Markets, Investment, Economy, Consumer, Subprime, Startup

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I recently watched an interview on Charlie Rose with Nassim Nicholas Taleb and decided his “Black Swan” theory accurately describes the fundamental problem in early-stage technology investing (and innovation in general).

To paraphrase Taleb; the cultural assumption is that all swans are white (and therefor black swans could not exist). So you think.

Taleb (a partner at an investment firm) believes that scientists, economists, historians, policymakers, businessmen, and financiers are victims of an illusion of pattern; they overestimate the value of rational explanations of past data, and underestimate the prevalence of unexplainable randomness in that data.

The proof that Silicon Valley suffers from the white swan syndrome lies amongst many in the foolish behavior of investors, the predetermined investment allocations based on the tagging with ambiguous acronyms (such as web2.0, SOA, Cloud computing, CRM etc.) and the mindless herding of primarily unsuccessful ideas (or copies of a few successes) at the many popular technology conferences.

I am inclined to take Taleb’s theory a bit further: I believe the majority of people are victims of an illusion of pattern, established by years of (often irrelevant) education infused with the technology Kool-Aid that confined their thinking to a predetermined direction and scope. It prevented entrepreneurs and investors from ever being able to identify true innovation until it had become part of their past. Hence the rampant number of false positives and false negatives.

Taleb further adds that black swans are actually the ones that change the industry, and that the so-called “unexplainable” events (that have no single precedent in time) redefine the future of the whole industry. And so, the search is on, not just for the investor with the right macro-economic views, morals and personality, but also the vision to spot innovation that has no precedent - the black swan.

The noise in our industry is still drowning out the music. We need to change the way we invest and improve our ability to spot black swans or otherwise we will lose the entrepreneurs that can build them. Our excuse today is not the economy but our own performance in producing truly disruptive value that can withstand the test of time. We need to put real entrepreneurs on a pedestal and throw the copycats to the curb, quickly.

Albert Einstein was right all along: imagination is more important than knowledge. That applies to investors too.

Tags: VC, Innovation, Macro-economics, Einstein, Subprime, Startup

By Georges van Hoegaerden

For over 10 years I’ve built and managed growth for early stage innovation in Silicon Valley and more than ever do I believe that building real disruptive customer value is more important than trying to time an acquisition opportunity. You may too, unless of course you are a gambler and firmly believe that the $3 red-white-blue slot machines in Vegas consistently yield the greatest returns. I will not argue the outcome.

Acquisitions remain nothing more than a welcome diversion on your way to building the largest technology empire. And even now when IPOs have dried up any focus away from building your empire is damaging. Real disruptive innovation is resistant to economic aberrations and a consistent focus on customer value remains your only rescue.

I believe that IPOs for technology companies will return (and subsequently spur more pre-IPO acquisitions), albeit not with the same players. Real companies can only be built by real entrepreneurs, with real disruptive products supported by real investors. New participants (on both sides) with higher moral values will be the ones to restore trust in the technology industry and subsequently public stock markets that want a piece of it.

Today, the VCs are stuck with a product of their own aristocratic making. Commoditization of investment philosophies since the 1990s has generated technologies that can best be described as sexy-cool rather than disruptive and meaningful (with a few exceptions). It paved the way for get-rich-quick entrepreneurs that are skilled in feeding the dogs the dog-food, rather than support the real entrepreneurs that have a dissenting view of the world.

So, assuming you as an entrepreneur are for real, how would you recognize an investor that is not. Here are some of my anecdotal recommendations:

1/ Avoid an investor who blames his quick response on ADD
Attention Deficit Disorder is an illness, not a skill. Recommend the investor to consult a doctor.

2/ Avoid an investor who does not carry (or seriously considers) an iPhone
The iPhone is the biggest innovation in consumer electronics in my lifetime (so far) and if your potential investor does not understand its ramification to the technology ecosystem as a whole, it is unlikely he will get yours.

3/ Avoid an investor who cannot price your company ahead of you.
Any technology investor should be able to price the value of your disruption. Ask the investor for the valuation and if he is close to your target, you can share with him your cost model and where you are today on the trajectory. Cost model and stage (the risk) are a discount to the disruptive value, the ability to build the technology is merely a commodity. In Silicon Valley technology is not the risk, but market entry with sufficient disruption is. Walk away from investors that incorrectly evaluate the risk model.

4/ Avoid an investor whose partners you can’t stand
Investors in a fund make decisions collectively, they need partner consensus before they can invest - just like in politics (more on that later). A firm with a partner you don’t like should be taken off your VC prospect list, as you cannot risk the influence of the bad apple to your company’s future. Develop your personal blacklist (as we did) based on fundamental people principles.

5/ Avoid an investor who wears his education on his sleeve
Wearing a Super Bowl ring means you made it in the real world, wearing an Ivy League ring does not. I wholeheartedly agree with Craig Venter that later stage education (without operating experience) in general is a deterrent to creativity and innovation or the ability to spot and spawn it. The majority of Silicon Valley investors are remnants from a bull market, echoing beliefs that are founded on skewed business principles.

6/ Avoid an investor who asks really dumb questions and is proud of it.
I never thought dumb questions existed until I ran into one investor who proudly blogged about how other entrepreneurs simply walked away from him, making his life easier. We walked away from him too.

7/ Avoid an investor who thinks he knows your industry better.
Even in the unlikely scenario he does, you should still walk away. Investors that know industries better than the entrepreneur should have become one. So either the investor is better informed (which should send you back to the drawing board) or he thinks he does (which becomes a pain in board meetings). Investors see a lot of things that don’t work, rather than discover the opportunities that do.

The bottom line is that we recommend entrepreneurs not to squander their great ideas with the first investor that waves money in their face. Real disruption does not become extinct quickly and so you literally have years to find a great investor out of the 790 firms that exist in the United States.

Thankfully the get-rich-quick money schemes in technology are drying up, so make sure you, as the entrepreneur, also have the integrity to build real disruption that spawns real and lasting customer value for years to come.

I look forward to helping develop new investor 2.0 and entrepreneur 2.0 strategies with you.

Tags: IPhone, VC, Investment, Commodity, Entrepreneurs, Subprime, Startup