The Venture Company: Everyone is entitled to Georges' experience-driven opinion.

Silly Venture, surfing the waves

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-03-09T20:31:27-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Without being brutally honest I believe it is difficult to build a great company or a sector (that creates sustainable jobs and value), and now with artificial borders collapsing everywhere around us, only a high degree of authenticity can prevail. No longer can people, tucked in institutions continue to make false promises or hide behind the skills of others. The merit of the individual will soon start to prevail over the bravado of institutions.

Sex, lies and videotape

The lies are everywhere in an industry as young and as quickly emerging as technology. Just like the infamous rush for gold during the Wild West, technology has become the breeding ground for more pandemonium than value. On the buy-side and sell-side of technology.

Honesty is a hard nut to crack in California, where the authenticity of silicone boobs is as vigorously defended as the authenticity of silicon valuations. Years of people making good money on riding "the system" yields a formidable defense for its impending change.

Yet the result of the lies in Venture are starting to surface, directly by virtue of its performance and indirectly by smart people leaving the "marketplace" and turning the remainder sub-prime. And just like in any eroding segment a surge of bottom-feeders takes care of the many scraps, making money off of anything that has the hope and desperation to stay alive. With the overhang of a wonderful past, those still in it keep holding on to what once was.

Fuel to the fire

I have been in Venture for more than 15 years (and technology for 30) and personally witnessed from my backyard in Palo Alto how it has destroyed itself, by not being honest, greedy, a lack of discipline or simply by not demanding the best. A mediocrity we aim to fix, systemically.

Here is a small collection of what I perceived, based on multiple observations described in one example, as adding fuel to the fire of an already troublesome Venture sector that is in need of a major overhaul:

Valuations without value

I witnessed a large company acquire a startup for more than $500M and after doing a post-close deep dive into its financials (ignoring strong political discourse) its actual acquisition value should have been around $100M (at best, using the same multiple). What is disturbing about this is that the mis-formed exit valuation creates the perception that the initial VC investment in the startup had merit. Its shareholders profited handsomely, have gotten themselves positioned for life, and Venture Capitalists tout their horn - all because the corporate development overlords have not been paying really close attention. A good reason why private companies should not be private in terms of how they report earnings. Private should refer only to what type of investors can participate, not its lack of transparency. Examples abound.

Desperation

I heard from a very reliable source in a company I know well that an acquisition of a $100M-plus startup occurred because the VCs in the deal got nervous, one of the executives at the company described it as "if our last two quarterly numbers were simply flipped, we would not have been forced to sell". With heavy dilution for the entrepreneurs (not smart enough to protect their own turf) and the external board members (with some "top brand" VCs) owning the company, sub-optimal exits are common to save already fragile VC portfolio returns. Even if it means selling for less than 2x. This is clear indication of how even the "best" VCs have become subprime.

Price-setting

I also heard from a very reliable source how two large Silicon Valley acquirers called each other and discussed that they did not want to compete with each other on the proposed acquisition price, and one really wanted it more than the other. So, they settled on a price (without the appropriate auction battle) together, informing the entrepreneurs at which price and by who the company was going to get acquired. Not only does this process not provide the best value for entrepreneurs, it produces a deflated return for Limited Partners (LPs) who rely on great returns to re-commit to Venture.

Spinning wheels with no traction

Many entrepreneurs confuse the pulse of Silicon Valley with what creates value. While it is noteworthy for publications like VentureBeat to record all the innovation and deals that are being done, we need to remember more than 97% of all investments in the last 10 years have not led to producing any lasting public value. That in turn means that more than 97% of what is described as "hot" is really not. And thus new entrepreneurs should not base and bias their ideas on what is described in such publications. They are much better off in following their own compass and experience. Statistically entrepreneurs are better off doing the opposite of what is in those publications.

Group-think

Hundreds of Technology trade-shows like DEMO and the AlwaysOn series (I have been to both once) amplify the problem of institutional VC and "entrepreneurial" group thinking even more. They harvest so-called innovation by technology segment, mimicking the intake criteria of many sub-prime investors. It is exactly for the reason Chris Anderson of TED describes in his introduction video why filling a magazine like Business 2.0 to the size of a telephone book is in no indication of the prosperity or capacity of the industry. TED is so different from the previous conferences because it highlights the outliers of innovation, without categorization, and amplifies its macro-economic impact and value.

False hope

As can be surmised from my blog I am a steadfast critic of the role of Venture Capital, having turned predominantly subprime. So, it would be easy for me to align with The Funded in its attempts to rate VCs. And while The Funded is an interesting attempt to start making VCs a little bit more accountable and it has succeeded in erasing the worst of blatant VC misconduct, The Funded is really like a photography site where the ratings of who likes a photograph is in no way in correlation to how well a photograph sells. So, the portrayed VC transparency (to unsuspecting onlookers and participants) and rating is not just a little more transparent; it is wrong. Even more wrong because deal performance is no indication of the viability of producing real success down the road (see how dating doesn't produce a healthy child) or the health of the sector, especially not when the majority of VCs have become sub-prime and so have the entrepreneurs who glowingly fall into their trap.

Venture Capitalists that are not

I have written about the lack of relevant entrepreneurial experience of VCs, many of whom have never crossed any chasm in their own lives to be in a position to help their portfolio companies calculate the risk of doing the same. While the previous is debilitating in its own right, many VCs are also poor economists who cannot even articulate the basic fundamentals of free-market principles. That matters because it means VCs cannot see and evaluate macro-economics adequately (which supplies most of its disruptive value), nor establish the proper funding requirements of a company that depends on it, as the funding requirements of a startup company driving a free-market model is so fundamentally different from those pursuing a proprietary market strategy. So, again, to quote Einstein, "the quality of your theorem defines what you observe", and what VCs have observed and produced the last 10 years is therefor challenging their theorem.

Angels that are not

I have done angel deals (as well as VC) and applaud them for taking the extraordinary risk of not only being an active investor but being their own LP at the same time. It gives them more credence but not necessarily more merit. Many of them made their money when turkeys could fly or side winds blew in their favor. Very few earned their money the way a startup intends to, by having an outlandish vision and doing all the hard work yourself to turn it into success. Groups of angels are springing up every quarter now, nobly compensating for the lack-luster investment pace of VC, yet turning technology Venture even faster in a more fragmented sub-prime business than it already has become. Because of the lack of seamless runway support and deflation and fragmentation of risk, more technologies will be built that yield even fewer companies with even less macro-economic relevance.

The experts that are not

Better hindsight does not translate to better foresight. Especially not in disruptive innovation, where hindsight is considered toxic waste. Time and time again do I see the people with a crafty description of how the world works today, quickly become the heralded experts of how it should work. Forgetting that a better understanding of the way the world works today, especially in Venture, is no indication how it should and actually eroding the opportunity for groundbreaking innovation. That valuations are no indication of the health of our sector, and that the number of deals done are not, nor the number of VCs, nor the number of startups. The only thing that matters is a fruitful alpha (portfolio return) for LPs, who supply their asset (money) to the VC. A journalist who takes the reports from Thomson and dissects it earlier than others, is not an expert in Venture because of it. A General Partner who is part of a brand name VC firm, and created the problem in VC to begin with, hanging on to a rambling attachment of external factors should not be crowned the expert in fixing it. With the sector in the dump, it is time to look for solutions elsewhere.

The need for alpha to produce alpha

Now all these aspects seem as impossible to overcome as a dog biting and barking at everyone and everything, but it is not. A dog needs an alpha-model to submit to, in the same way Venture needs the discipline of a new financial system to keep sane. For the last 20 years LPs have let VCs run around like wild dogs, and their performance now dictates that they need to be reigned in.

The existing improprieties in Venture only exist because we have deployed a piecemeal market model, reminiscent of the aforementioned Wild West. Most problems in Venture will be resolved by curing its systemic disease, and by implementing a new free-market system that does not exist in Venture today.

The financial system we propose implements free-market principles that facilitates the removal of bottom-level diversification, the deployment of responsible risk and the reliance on marketplace transparency to all marketplace participants to (re)define merit of innovation (as defined in our primer).

Only alpha-model discipline can produce the alphas LPs are looking to generate. Venture is not too big to fail, and without that new discipline it will, to the detriment of us all.

A new, modern financial system to fix Venture is coming

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-03-06T10:46:06-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I have disclosed in "How to fix VC once and for all" one important aspect of how to fundamentally change the financial system in Venture, and that is to change it into a real marketplace. A free-market in which marketplace transparency to all participants will establish the true merit of all participants; Limited Partners (LPs), Venture Capitalists (VCs) and Entrepreneurs alike.

Without that marketplace transparency, Venture Capital will continue to slide down the sub-prime investment slope it has been on the last 10, if not 20 years, leaving a growing opportunity of disruptive innovation under-financed and starving. Unchanged, the deployment of LP dollars will continue to fragment and yield even lower public value and trust than it has produced over the last 10 years.

Top-level Venture reform

The systemic failure of the financial system in Venture is why its output does not generate enough value (M&A, IPO etc). Venture Capital needs to become more agile, risk-taking, transparent and accountable (turn prime) in order to consistently attract entrepreneurs with a value that can change the world.

Its financial system is what turned Venture Capital sub-prime, not the lack of entrepreneurs, developers, visas, too many regulations, sarbox, FAS157 etc.. Once we change Venture into an efficient free-market marketplace I can assure you many of the current restrictions, born out of an artificially regulated market, will simply dissipate or become irrelevant.

Today, Venture performance is severely hindered by its black-box, under-the-table, institutionalized, monolithic operations. Lack of marketplace transparency (amongst many other deficiencies):

allows walking dead VC firms to crush the dreams of (unknowing) entrepreneurs
prevents competition between VCs, leading to a demi-cartel and a commoditized investment thesis
allows GPs to hide behind the (often outdated) brand of their aging VC institutions
clouds the difference between money and merit

Take me serious

Building a new financial system for the sake of re-empowering innovation through Venture is "my new startup", and as is typical to innovation, many first ignored me, then they ridiculed me, then they fought me, and then I win (Ghandi quote).

I win because Venture reform is the right thing to do for our country (not because I have an axe to grind). I win because the sector has lost serious money. I win because the opportunities in Venture have never been better. I win because the systemic failure of VC proves they are wrong. I win because there are no more bubbles for VCs to ride. I win because VCs are running out of excuses and time. I win because VCs (by virtue of their selections) have abused the trust of public markets. I win because entrepreneurs are unhappy with whom they partner and how they are being treated. I win because both asset holders in Venture are unhappy with the derivative. I win because I have identified the systemic failure in Venture and have a solution to fix it all in one fell swoop. We all win because that solution gets us all to a better place, including VCs with merit.

LPs own the problem

LPs are becoming aware of VC dysfunction and have started calling their Fund-of-funds and VCs based on my individual conversations with them and my blog, some VCs have confessed to me. LPs are at the top of the food-chain and can no longer deploy money without verifying the merit of the underlying financial system, top-to-bottom. The behavior of the dog is the responsibility of its owner, and so is the performance of VC the discipline of the LP.

LPs now start to realize that great performance in Venture comes from establishing discipline. Not just to who, but how they deploy money matters, and what the impact is on the rest of their value chain and the sector. How it affects VCs and how its finds the outliers of innovation that can produce substantial value. Only that discipline can fundamentally and consistently lead to great performance.

Smart LPs in Venture understand how to rely on a real marketplace in which merit and real competition (not the artificial one Tim Draper defines as "I have respect for all my competitors. We co-invest together.") thrives to find the outliers of innovation.

Inappropriate measures

It still baffles me how some LPs continue to recommit to Venture without a change to the underlying financial system and marketplace characteristics. But perhaps I shouldn't be surprised: a sector that has previously managed to sell the delusion of cyclical performance, measured against irrelevant market indices, and attracted the improper influence of the macro-economy, is very capable of producing new promises to maintain its position.

LPs should just not expect those promises to come true, not again. That would be the definition of insanity.

What is not a solution to Venture is cutting management fees. Changes in fees and carry structures are not going to change a sub-prime VC to prime. You cannot train or coax sub-prime VCs to become prime, in the same way you cannot train or coax people to become entrepreneurs. You are or you are not (by virtue of your DNA and life experiences). And just like VCs need to focus on the creation of upside, not the protection of downside - so do LPs need to focus on the upside with VC, established by merit, rather than protecting downside.

Lift the veil off my plan

But marketplace transparency is just one aspect of my plan. The Venture reform described in the (for customers only version of the) acclaimed presentation "2010: The State of Venture Capital" resolves all of the aforementioned issues in Venture, including:

reduces ten levels of diversification by more than half
eliminates bottom-heavy diversification
employs far less fragmentation of risk
establishes a meritocracy of GPs
creates natural competition between GPs
de-commoditizes the investment thesis
allows for the discovery of the outliers of innovation
provides better support for entrepreneurs
deploys real venture capital
builds more stable companies
builds more disruptive value

First movers advantage

Prior to Apple entering the music arena, many VCs invested in music without producing any lasting public value. Now in Venture I am about to deploy a winner-takes-all Venture platform that leaves the LP laggers with artificial Venture marketplaces behind. Venture, the way it works today can never function nor scale, because the market model is simply incompatible with the discovery of the outliers innovation.

I invite the LPs who see the wide-open greenfield opportunity in Venture, to hop on board and use a brand new mower that is indeed capable of harvesting the hay that is ready for the taking. Innovation is by no means dead, and neither is the fantastic new opportunity to monetize it.

Why VC is such a bad date

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-02-25T08:48:07-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Today's Venture Capitalists (VCs) have often qualified innovation as a buyer's or a seller's market (in publicly discussing valuation trends) and that communicates so well how they view innovation; as a commodity.

No wonder they fail miserably in generating meaningful alpha (portfolio returns for Limited Partners, or LPs). It is impossible to find and attract outliers of innovation by comparing and compressing valuations. And commodities never outgrow their peers.

Disruptive innovation is never a commodity and is always a seller's market (with the company selling its stock to investors). So, the minute innovation becomes a buyer's market, that innovation has just been "crowned" a sub-prime entity and so have both buyer and seller.

Finding the perfect date

As a VC, finding the right type of innovation to monetize is like finding the perfect date, they are few and far between. And to a founder of a startup finding the right General Partner (at a VC firm) is similarly daunting.

A unique match between two people (the General Partner and the CEO) is something that takes more than glowing at the prospect of having a baby together (i.e. build a new prosperous company) and discussing the financial projections and terms of the deal.

Most of us can dream, but can we make it happen together is the real question.

Higher standards

The reason why many people are such bad daters is because they do not hold on to their own standards, those that make them happy and those that make them strong. They confuse money, power and perks with merit and hope sheer proximity will someday rub some off to them. But it never does, you need to do the hard work yourself to reap its precious reward. You get what you put in.

I do not consider myself a pretty boy, yet never had a problem dating because I know what I want and especially stand firm on what I do not. Standing firm allows you to stay true to yourself and often has the additional benefit of weeding out sub-prime parties quickly and thus avoid unmanageable disaster further down the road. (That is my happy date-turned-wife in the picture.)

Stay authentic

I cannot tell you how many times I have spoken to entrepreneurs that have banged their heads against the doors of VCs, and selectively served as their dutiful psychologist to help them not to bow down to sub-prime standards.

Most entrepreneurs become nervous and afraid to negotiate, because this VC may just be the only interested party they have, and if you are a tough negotiator those investors may frighten others that you are "hard to work with". But a choice of one investor is not a choice.

Even before any commitment to invest is reached, entrepreneurs frequently let VC change their business model, use-of-proceeds, valuation and everything else, in the hopes of landing a round of funding. Not realizing that this VC can have whatever opinions it wants, but as an entrepreneur you are the only one responsible for making it happen. Do not accept an infinite monkey theorem, that you then need to turn into a work of Shakespeare in your startup.

So, don't be afraid to lose. Because losing from a sub-prime VC really is a win.

Marriage does not make a person

Getting laid is not a recipe to produce a happy child, a healthy marriage is. So, even if an entrepreneur lands an investment, raising Venture Capital alone does not make a successful company. With so many sub-prime VCs, statistically and empirically the odds are still not in your favor.

Success, in the latter case, is defined by the company's ability to produce public value, either by serving the public directly or indirectly by getting them to invest by way of IPO (or acquisition).

So, both parties need to demonstrate that they are experienced, skilled, agree and contribute to achieving that (early) public value for the company. In other words, a marriage needs to be consummated in which the assets, principles and goals of raising a happy child (the company) is shared. And that means that while both parties supply different assets, one cannot overpower the other (like Pimps and Hoes) and force its agenda.

A priori, an equilibrium needs to be established that is healthy and promises minimal friction down the road.

Bad starts make for bad endings

Without an organic fit and chemistry, a venture deal that starts off wrong usually ends wrong. For the VC that damage is diversified, for the entrepreneur it is often crushing. So, the dating process is not just a way for the VC to check the entrepreneur out, but for the entrepreneur to gauge if the proposed equilibrium (mentality, experience, skills, term-sheet, vision) is authentic, attainable and healthy.

Here is how many VCs set themselves up wrong for the dating game and why entrepreneurs deserve better (in this context "the date" is the VC, and "you" is the entrepreneur):

The date wants to know everything about you but won't tell much about himself.

VCs demand to know a lot about the entrepreneur, but what does an entrepreneur really know about the VC's merit? GP merit hides behind ten levels of diversification and a fuzzy Private Placement Memorandum (PPM, the business plan for LPs) that leaves plenty of room for "creative" post close re-interpretation. Whether the GP is a great gambler or skillful is impossible to assert. What we do know is that many GPs have never themselves crossed the chasm, a trait that makes them almost certain a bad dating partner.

The date wants to date other people at the same time.

VCs diversify their risk by investing in other (hopefully not competitive) companies at the same time and hedge their bets, they do not often hedge their often ill-informed opinions upon the entrepreneur. Expect many to do a John Edwards on you when your future suddenly looks like cancer.

The date does not want you to date someone else too.

VCs diversify their risk, but watch their reaction when you do the same. They'll get mad, because you have just told them that VC money is a commodity (and disruptive innovation is not) and now they need to step it up and prove their value-add. Right where you want them.

The date wants to have a threesome, and takes his pick.

VCs are more worried about downside risk than upside risk and try to find an accomplice, and syndicate early to avoid risk. They often finagle a sweet syndication deal with a partner under the table that is unlikely to be in your advantage. VC is a demi-cartel.

The date thinks that his money compensates for lack of empathy.

Many VCs lack entrepreneurial experience, which according to a Dutch saying means "they've heard the church bell ring, but they don't know where the sound came from". Money does not make up for in-experience and lack of skills, especially not in the boardroom of an early stage company.

The date wants you to tell him exactly what you are bringing to the table, without him doing the same.

Entrepreneurs are asked to make elaborate predictions about growth trajectories, and stick to them. But have you asked the VC to provide full runway support in return?

The date discusses divorce before you even start dating.

You want to change the world, the VC wants to target exits. Foolishly the sub-prime VC does not realize that changing the world creates a much more reliable exit than an early "delivery" could ever promise.

The date wants to know whether you want children, but withholds his wishes.

Real entrepreneurs want to change the world, not just to exit. VCs however will change their mind depending on how the rest of their portfolio is doing and whether at that time they can get themselves in the top-quartile. I know many companies that have been pushed to early "delivery", to the chagrin of their founders.

The date never really commits and keep all options open.

Entrepreneurs are forced to submit to funding rounds that are designed purely to minimize downside risk for VCs. While you commit to the marriage all the way, a VC can decide to bail out at any time, leaving you hanging (with a strategy that may not be yours, a cap-table that is destroyed and a runway that may no longer be viable).

The date needs the approval of all his cousins before he can get married.

Seldom can the opinion of one GP secure the deal. He has to push an outlier proposition through an elaborate socialist process with other GPs in the firm to close. Simply an incompatible process that should be banned.

The date requires a prenuptial to engage.

VCs structure elaborate ownership agreements, by way of voting rights, valuations, bylaws - you name it. Forgetting that rudimentary control plus the ability for the company to develop itself gives it the highest probability of succeeding. If as a VC you don't believe that, you should not engage in the deal to begin with. Elaborate downside protection means you simply do not believe in the upside.

The date wants full control over your purse.

Excessive controls on money means there is no trust between VC and entrepreneur. It is necessary to verify trust, but not giving it in advance means the entrepreneur is not giving the VC his trust either. A CEO needs to be able to run the company and not be bogged down by distracting and bureaucratic spending rules as long as he stays within the use-of-proceeds.

The VC institution needs to be fixed first

Now, I can make a similar list about people that chase sub-prime investments. More than 10 years of sub-prime investments has attracted a lot of people to that sub-prime thesis, the majority without the attributes needed to become a successful entrepreneur. With a still growing number of sub-prime VCs at play, certain corporations have become better custodians of disruptive innovation, able to stimulate entrepreneurs more effectively.

The only way, in my view, we can fix Venture is to change the model by which we deploy the matchmaking services between the assets of the LPs (money) and the assets of the entrepreneurs (ideas). With a more discretionary VC intermediary we will automatically attract more disruptive ideas (by stimulating entrepreneurs to look at Venture as a prime venue for innovation again) and create more meaningful value.

By the way, I do not dislike many VCs personally, I just despise the institution they represent - because it performs so poorly. That hurts LPs and their dissatisfaction will have a devastating effect to the innovation in this country.

I am working feverishly on getting VC fixed by changing the economic model that allows LPs to be taken for a ride. Disruptive innovation can wait until they start implementing my economic system. And in the meantime, dear entrepreneur, if you think you have what it takes now, keep your foot down and your head up and keep looking for that discretionary VC in the haystack.

Happy dating! Je maintiendrai!

There never was a Tech bubble

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-02-23T12:13:43-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Part of the discovery of coming up with a permanent fix to Venture came not from an endless debate about what happened to Venture (although I am more than willing to do so on occasion) but to envision what should happen to Venture if one were to erect the sector now (something emerging economies are actively pondering).

That is perhaps the reason why the only one who could come up with a permanent fix to Venture is an entrepreneur. Because as an entrepreneur you are born with the gift not to analyze existing market deficiencies (with loads of statistics) until you are blue in the face, but to reconstruct and imagine a new and much bigger opportunity from your (perhaps idealistic) view of how the world should work. And then to develop such a robust new system so the bad things from the past find automatic resistance (not manual labor or government regulation).

And boy, do I believe in a big opportunity in Technology Venture. I even believe it scales.

Is this working for you?

I use the previous phrase from Oprah a lot as it communicates so well that regardless of anyone's rational for the prospects of innovation, the current system under which we deploy it simply does not work. And I pity the LPs who with blinders on, continue down this road expecting a different result. Good luck!

To reiterate again, over the last 10 years (some technology celebrities say longer) we, as participants in the sector have generated less than 10% IRR to Limited Partners (LPs, who disseminate their money through VC), wasted about $1.9 Trillion in funds that never produced any public value and have left LPs and entrepreneurs severely disillusioned about the value, viability and path of innovation.

All the while, many Venture Capitalists, as the derivatives (without assets) in this marketplace pride themselves being in the top quartile (a meaningless definition in its own right), or the survivor of "the fittest" of an underperforming sector with little value. They continue to stuff their pockets with a fat-and-happy management fee that allows them to retire for life (sometimes after just one 10-year try and vintage), publicly comforting themselves that the world has changed so much that it is now time for new investors to step in. Thanks a lot, after having taken Venture for a very comfortable ride without producing real returns, and worse, soiling the pool for the rest of us.

The real asset holders in Venture, LPs with money and entrepreneurs with ideas have been fooled (many times over). But by who really?

Who's bubble is it?

As you can tell from the last paragraph I am often irritated by the lack of integrity of many human beings, especially of those who do anything to make a buck. Because VCs with integrity could solve their own issues in Venture without the need for a complete Venture overhaul. But that would require their ability to be self critical (they have done nothing but blame external factors) and people who are confident enough to cannibalize their own position for the greater good. Too idealistic perhaps. And so a new system in Venture needs to include not just measures to provide better upside but a concerted and immediate eradication of those intermediaries that do not perform.

But we need to fix the disease not merely fix the symptoms and the following quote from Einstein comes to mind:

"Mistrust of every kind of authority grew out of this experience, a skeptical attitude toward the convictions that were alive in any specific social environment — an attitude that has never again left me, even though, later on, it has been tempered by a better insight into the causal connections." - Albert Einstein

Which I parlay in Venture to:

"I mistrust many venture capitalists for good reason (their lack of merit), but have learned that the casual connection is the dysfunctional financial system that allows them to take it for a ride." - Georges van Hoegaerden

Just like the behavior of a dog is the responsibility of its owner, so is the performance of the VC the responsibility of the Limited Partner. And VC does not perform (and unchanged will not) because it selects companies that are sub-prime innovations that do not have a strong potential to yield public value. And that is because many VCs themselves are sub-prime and therefor unable to spot disruptive innovation to begin with. On top of that we have an in-transparent financial system that allows for bottom-heavy diversification of more than ten layers deep (see "2010: The State of Venture Capital"), that is far removed from an efficient marketplace in which LPs and entrepreneurs can verify the merit of the ideal VC matchmakers.

Blame where blame is due

And so the real owner of the bubble is (again) our financial system that allows sub-prime operators (VCs without entrepreneurial merit) to slip in and mess up the initial success of the venture sector that was so beautifully crafted by Bill Draper and the likes.

So, the 2001 implosion was not a tech bubble, but a finance bubble and a clear warning of what is to come to other sectors that deploy the same economic model to their respective domains (I have spotted the pattern).

We need entrepreneurs to think bigger (not more restricted) and unabashed to find the next innovation that can change the world. But only an economic system that deploys prime matchmakers will be able to cherry-pick those prospects. So, in the end we cannot really blame the current crop of sub-prime VCs for getting picked, and they will continue to sit on their throne (a ten year vintage) until time runs out anyway, but we need to change our economic system so we prevent them from entering in the first place. And changing management fees (that some focus on) alone does not turn a sub-prime VC into prime.

With our financial system eleven times the size of production, it is time for the foundation of our economic system to get an overhaul. And Venture would be a great place to start.

Does Venture Scale?

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-02-22T13:43:15-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Last week, through a long string of conversations with a CalPERS board member and some trusted peers, I ended up speaking with Joe Dear (Chief Investment Officer) and other members of his Venture team at CalPERS in Sacramento, the largest pension fund in the United States with $200 Billion in total Assets Under Management and single largest investor in the Venture sector (as a Limited Partner, or LP), with an allocation of around $20 Billion in direct and indirect (fund-of-funds) alternative investments (which includes venture).

Joe expressed specific concern about the ailing Venture sector, a message we as participants in the Venture ecosystem should all take very seriously. I do, because I hear it all the time, and it worries me how devastating a withdrawal of CalPERS (10% or so of all U.S. Venture and the consequent ripple) from Venture would be to Silicon Valley and to our country.

Such withdrawal would be devastating to our entrepreneurial capacity and drive to which we owe our statue in the world. We still have many parasites (some quite well known, and not too anxious to be found out) who are too busy deploying ingenious methods to suck this ecosystem dry while it lasts, unable and unwilling to see the dark clouds forming above their heads.

Yet, we all need to pay attention to the discomfort of LPs, and resolve those - not with a new set of lies and promises - but with a breakthrough systemic solution to improve the performance of Venture Capital.

Late to the table in 1988 as portfolio manager Jesús Argüelles explains, CalPERS made up for it in the 90s followed by disappointing performance today. Joe questioned the sector's viability as a whole, by rhetorically asking me (amongst other topics):

Does Venture Scale?

Before I answer that question it is important to note how ignorant the many players in Venture are to the impending threat this question poses.

At this public event, I recognized only two Venture Capital (VC) firms that where present. If as a VC I really wanted to make money for my LP in these turbulent times, I would show up to offer whatever support I can muster. I did: to represent the unwavering value of disruptive innovation.
No-one of note from the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) was present according to the attendee listing handed out at the event. Rather than to focus on helping CalPERS generate upside, I guess it prefers to spend its time protecting its members' downside to lawmakers. The VC lobbyist needs to rethink its leadership focus.
The dismay of LPs in the Venture sector is in sharp contrast to the incessant, blind, self-serving and false optimism of many Venture participants, journalists and investors who continue to suck entrepreneurs dry and leave a subprime Venture pool behind that clouds the opportunity for serious investors and serious entrepreneurs.
No-one (except we) in the Venture community is truly acknowledging, with a plan of change, how the performance in Venture can systemically be improved. Better times, with more of the same is what many wait for, but hope is not a plan.
If we do not take the subtle message from CalPERS serious, more than 10% of Venture investments in the United States could suddenly disappear, with many other LPs quickly following suit. And that means that (once again) the deployment of an incompatible financial system destroys the innovative capacity of those that deserve better.

My answer

So, my short answer to Joe's loaded question was:

"Sub-prime Venture does not scale, but Prime Venture does".

The currently deployed economic model of Venture will never scale, and here is why:

Ten levels of diversification with multiple (hybrid) relationships from LP to startup investment makes it impossible to identify the real merit and performance of VCs and the validity of their investment thesis.
A (loosely coupled) commoditized investment thesis can never outgrow its peers, and thus is incapable of generate meaningful alpha.
Sub-prime VC systemically destroys the trust of Public Markets by pushing so-called innovations through the funnel, soiling the opportunity for more discretionary value.

The necessity to produce public value

It is a bad idea to ignore the public's perception of Venture Capital. With a large sum of Venture money (roughly $1.9 Trillion) over the last 10 years producing no substantial public value by way of IPO, sub-prime VC has lost the confidence of the public that does not only supply the money to VC (indirectly through the public pension funds, endowments etc.) but is also expected to buy post-IPO stock on the public stock market.

So, rather than to continue with "the models for success that have worked for our industry in past decades" as many of the NVCA cohorts continue to preach, we need to rely on a new economic model that fundamentally changes Venture Capital to its core.

Our proposal in the presentation "2010: The State of Venture Capital" will do so and it scales because:

Our Venture model removes the diversification at the bottom of the Venture equation, exposing VC matchmaker merit and accountability.
Our Venture model employes dynamic marketplace merit, not static institutional merit.
Our Venture model attracts unique investment theses that have the ability to find the outliers of innovation.

Incompatible financial systems

The problem with Venture is that traditional financial systems (stemming from more conservative asset classes and times) are incompatible with the risk and returns that early stage Venture has to offer. Over time the old financial system has steadily suffocated, and worse alienated disruptive innovation, by forcing sub-prime innovation through an exit funnel that as a result left a trail of eroded trust.

Venture has lost trust with public markets, but even more so with the outlier entrepreneur. Truly disruptive ideas do not even show up at the doorsteps of many VCs any more, because certain corporations have become better custodians of innovation than venture capital (remember those ludicrous buyers/sellers-market arguments of VCs).

Change the dating service

But just because VC is broken does not mean innovation is. We need to re-establish the merit and definition of disruptive innovation and stimulate the creative and intelligent minds that can spawn it. The Internet provides a massive opportunity to tap into the buying power of 5/6th of the world population that is still technologically disenfranchised.

But if we leave the Venture Marketplace functioning the way it does today, less money-in will not change the alpha (portfolio returns) for Limited Partners. Survival of the fittest in a dysfunctional market is a worthless asset.

Superior Economics

Smart Limited Partners stay committed and realize that Technology Venture has superior economics, that with the right economic construct has the ability to outperform any other asset class.

Technology feeds the brain in the same way water feeds the body. Technology can be served up in many ways to produce, share and monetize knowledge, just like water can be used to produce soup, coffee, tea or anything else you can think of. We have all the ingredients in this country to make lovely dishes, all we need is a better economic system to attract the right chefs with scrumptious recipes.

The new size of Venture Capital

So, stop making statements about whether Venture Capital should be smaller or larger. It's a futile discussion. The size of an inefficient marketplace is irrelevant and thus by definition wrong. First we need to deploy an efficient marketplace (that is designed to find the real merit of innovation), before we can make educated guesses about how to best support it with a proper financial system and size. Lowering the commitment to Venture Capital does not create more efficiency, changing the marketplace does.

So, LPs need to deploy a new economic system that systemically roots out sub-prime. The solution that scales to its authentic potential is here today.

How LPs in Venture have been fooled, many times over

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-02-05T10:45:28-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

A fantastic television ad by Ally Bank, in my view best describes how Limited Partners (LPs) as the investors committed to Venture have been fooled.

In the event you have not seen the video, it shows a slick man in a business suit sitting cosily around a kids table with two little girls.

The suit then asks one girl if she would want a pony. When she replies yes, he hands her a toy pony. He then moves on to the second girl and asks her if she wants a pony, and then calls in a real pony. Clearly the first girl is upset that she did not get a real pony and complains, upon which the man replies, "well, you didn't ask."

What pony did you ask for, by virtue of your actions?

That is exactly what has happened to LPs in Venture who did not ask the specific questions that could have led to their success in Venture. In many cases those LPs failed to generate impressive returns in Venture because they did not know they had to ask specific questions and should have taken control of the situation in order to get the results that the sector is able to generate.

Many LPs, glowing at the early return profiles of Bill Draper, Vinod Khosla and other early illuminaries, simply said "yes" to General Partners (GPs) who asked LPs if they wanted Venture returns, without even asking how much (see the many PPM's that do not even have clear return targets).

And of course now, many LPs are utterly disappointed and mistrust the GPs (and worse the sector), similar to how the little girl in the video now mistrusts the man.

Ask the right questions

To help make clear to LPs what questions to ask I have added a new section to the wildly popular presentation 2010: The State of Venture Capital, the Prelude (posted on Slideshare) describing how an LP thought his commitment would be applied, and how it was in reality. See for yourself:

We pride ourselves on a solid and no-nonsense understanding of the Venture ecosystem, top-to-bottom, which is crucial in leading to a permanent fix in Venture and to improve its performance. So, we back up our rational on the right side of the previous slide with the observations of how the Venture business really operates today. And here is how the rubber meets the road:

The bottom line is simple. It is okay to deploy your money as an LP through GPs as the arbiter, but just like many Hollywood stars have found out, if you are not signing your own checks, know what they are being spent on and how - don't be surprised your money will be taken for a ride. It is the nature of letting go of financial control (and really, you should not be surprised).

Today's Venture pipes are still being pumped full with subprime deals, which means the ten-year outlook for Venture will not look much different from its miserable ten-year past. So, the time to act is now if you expect a different outcome in ten years.

Take control

The Venture business needs to be reigned in, with controls put in place so it can no longer be taken for a ride.

The sector has a bright future ahead, with massive market-pull from the majority of people in this world who still crave technology solutions to improve their lives. The only way we, as the most innovative nation in the world can screw it up is to deploy a piece-meal financial system that misses its intended target.

That has to stop, right now.

Dear LP, a permanent fix to Venture, by way of a new economic system you can deploy, is waiting for you. Act now or forever hold your peace.

2010: The State of Venture Capital, now public

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-31T11:26:51-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Top presentation of the day recognition on Slideshare. New slides added Feb 22nd, 2010.

More than 150 money managers (including some VCs) have received a controlled prerelease of the previously announced 2010: The State of Venture Capital.

What this presentation is not:

• This is not another numbers deck: clearly not everything that can be counted, can be counted on...
• This is not yet another self-written report card from venture capital lobbyists
• This is not a blind prayer for hope of a better future

What this presentation contains:

• This is a reflection of the effectiveness of Venture Capital from the point of view of a successful entrepreneur; first hand observations
• This is a top-down analysis of the Venture ecosystem for Limited Partners
• This is a permanent fix to Venture and a methodology for LPs and Fund-of-funds of how to re-commit (TVC customers only)

The Prelude to the permanent fix of Venture Capital is available right here (click Full for a full-screen version):

2010: The State of Venture Capital, Prelude (Updated)

View more presentations from Georges van Hoegaerden.

The underlying arguments to support the slides may not be clear unless conveyed personally, and I would be happy to set up a conference with more stake holders in the venture business that have the interest and capacity to change it.

Feel free to make comments, ask questions by using the online form, e-mail us or contacting us by telephone.

The top-down fix to Venture Capital is reserved to Venture Company customers, embodies a new market system and provides fundamental differentiation to Limited Partners and Fund-of-funds managers and a permanent solution to the malaise in venture.

The world of monetizable innovation has changed, and we need to change with it. Venture should be and can again be, with a restructuring, the best performing asset class (sector) to money managers.

The problem with Venture: no true Alpha and no true North

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-29T10:48:38-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I am talking to a lot of Limited Partners and Fund-of-funds managers these days and the reputation of venture as a viable asset class (sector) is really bad (even though the opportunity dictates it shouldn't be).

Few people at the top of the investment food-chain seem to have a good sense of what it going on down below (with General Partners at VC firms), and even fewer believe a further commitment to venture makes sense. Our government adds to that mistrust by not even acknowledging venture as a viable instrument to resurrect innovation.

No True Alpha

But can we blame them? The returns (of the portfolio of investments, some money managers represent by a formula that yields "alpha") in the venture business have been deplorable from many angles:

From a Limited Partner (or Fund-of-funds) perspective; with less than 10% IRR over the last 10 years and less than 3% of $2 Trillion invested yielding public value.
From an economic perspective; more than $1.9 Trillion of (mostly) public money has been wasted in the last 10 years on so-called innovations by venture that never generated any public value.
From an entrepreneurial perspective; the definition of innovation has severely eroded by the subprime nature of the investment thesis that makes it unattractive for meaningful innovation and real entrepreneurs to be discovered.
From a consumer perspective; we have created no more than a handful meaningful innovations with an army of 800 Venture Capital firms chomping at the bit. We have eroded the trust of the people we aim to serve and those we rely on to spawn a high-flying public offering.

No True North

No True Alpha is the result of a defective compass of the Venture Capitalists (VCs) - arbitrating the money-flows - that is no longer pointing towards True North, but rather Magnetic North. In this context Magnetic North defined as a gamble with someone else's money, a very lofty salary and no downside for the next 10 years. Should we really be surprised that without transparency and accountability Magnetic North is much easier to achieve than True North?

Other temptations of Magnetic North are misleading VCs even further:

Target acquisitions: many startups are funded and built with improper expectations. While exciting in nature for many, the past bull-market flurry of acquisitions misleads VCs to believe that they can target one. Yet most acquisitions of early stage technology companies are completely erratic (I can tell you many buy-side tales), because they are primarily based on internal corporate struggles rather than somewhat predictable, external market indicators.
Exit at underperformance: we are soiling the acquisition pool. Acquisitions, in the majority of cases do not work out for the acquirer and are very often overpriced, overhyped and under-deliver (I can talk about many experiences here too). Usually not by design, but simply because they lack macro-economic value to begin with. And while money is money, every acquisition that does not deliver deflates the valuation of the next innovation that deserves better and therefor negatively impacts portfolio returns.
Stay away from IPOs, the window has closed. I always smile at that popular phrase by VCs and reply: if I want fresh air I will open a window. The public mistrust we have created by pushing subprime innovations through the IPO funnel for the last 20 years, has quickly developed an innate scrutiny to invest only in what the public understands and what matters to their life. Macro-economic impact of innovation is the only value that can pass these days and VCs have restricted their thesis to the extent that they just do not know how to find and fund those. Our focus should be on building real companies, not technology gimmickry.
Inappropriate deployment of risk: their lack of relevant market experience forces VCs to focus on the only thing tangible to them, the technology implementation. And that while the creation of technology is the least of the risks in a technology venture. What matters, again, is the application of technology to a viable marketplace. And so the risk is in identifying and fully addressing the needs of the marketplace, with whatever modern technology does the trick.

There are many other magnetic distractions that keep VCs from reaching or ever pursuing True North, some of which I have covered in other places in my blog, but that laundry list would go beyond the patience of my readers.

From isolate to insulate

The point I am making here is that no-one should be surprised that venture is not performing. The LPs were there to allocate the money, the entrepreneurs were there to dream up innovation, and the public is still yearning for technology innovation to substantially improve their lives.

The problem in Venture is the derivative, the Venture Capitalist who without economic viability has no political leg to stand on to stay in business. We have isolated the problem: the "referee" is in trouble, not the players nor the game. Now we just need to insulate the problem, and the controls are solely in the hands of discerning LPs and Fund-of-funds that need venture to perform.

A simple fix

The solution to a healthy Venture climate is simple (in the same way e=mc2 is simple, its discovery took me and Einstein a while); change the construct of venture investing so it mimics the meritocracy of innovation that can produce uniquely disruptive value.

The impetus of that new model can be found here, the actual fix by contacting us here.

New York, an empire state of mind

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-21T10:30:59-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I always love being in New York and last tuesday I attended the AAAIM 2010 Investment Themes event in New York (a fairly closely held affair, thank you Brenda Chai) with a keynote from John Liu, newly appointed New York City comptroller (closely guarded by his security detail) and other luminaries from the New York investment world, including Kelly Williams from Credit Suisse Customized Fund Investment Group, Marcos Rodriguez from Palladium Equity Partners, Jimmy Yan from New York City Employees' Retirement System and Peter Marber from HSBC.

All speakers (and attendees) manage multibillion (double and triple digit) dollar funds and what struck me was how little these top managers know about venture, except to frown or stay away from the sector given its miserable performance and reputation for the last 10 years (we describe in my blog often).

There is clearly more work needed and opportunity to be gained to resurrect the face of venture and to establish new faith and trust. That trust of-course can only come from being honest and critical about past venture performance and offering a clear rational and remedy to resurrect it. Exactly what our focus has been for the last few years.

Now, I am not a journalist and I am not going to go into the many personal conversations I have had with regard to venture investing, yet I do want my readers (specifically those interested in venture) to understand how some of the financial pressures will impact venture directly, indirectly or potentially, as could be surmised from the speeches of the public speakers.

And, the more every venture marketplace participant knows about its dependencies (especially from the Limited Partners at the top of the venture food-chain), the more we can each respond to and secure a better future for a sector that, in my view and with my venture model, deserves much more commitment than 10-15% of overall LP commitments.

The State of the City

Both New York City and New York State have raked up sizable budget deficits. New York Sate has a $7B deficit and New York City as the nations 4th largest government with a budget of $60B has incurred a $4B deficit. If comptroller John Liu has his way the deficit will not be hidden under the rug by borrowing money, but lowered by cutting expenses and/or raising taxes to erase the deficit of about 1/5th of the flexible $25B part of the total budget. The City is looking for creative ways to achieve those savings objectives.

A question from the audience raised about increasing taxation on $25B of newly issued Wallstreet bonuses was quickly and politically sidestepped by forecasting its prospective value to only yield $0.5B, assuming those bonuses were all distributed in liquid form. In addition the comptroller stated he prefers to find more long-term solutions to erase the deficit, essentially leaving the contentious issue of dealing with Wallstreet up to the President.

Limited Partners

John Liu is also custodian/board member of 4 of the New York pension funds (including NYCERS with $35B under management), comprising of $100B in assets. No mention of fund performance (we know from other sources more or less what is going on) but he expressed specific interest in widening the network and making it easier for small new asset managers, with unique industry experience and merit to participate in the deployment of diversified assets.

As you can imagine, after having written for years about the lack of verifiable investor merit at the bottom of the food-chain, I was enthused to hear the comptroller usher rudimentary free-market principles as its new goals in deploying monetary assets. The proof of-course is in the pudding and I hope to meet with his people soon to exchange my macro-economic views on how financial systems aught to work.

Globalization

Another highlight of the evening was a great overview on emerging markets by Peter Marber who runs emerging market investments for HSBC. Peter stressed the need for a renewed focus on emerging markets, supported by some interesting statistics and the use of "The Mac Theory" (I've heard before), not a macintosh this time but a MacDonalds Big Mac. He simplified the value of a currency by comparing the price of a Big Mac in a country with the price of a Big Mac in the US. The difference yields a fairly accurate view of the expense of doing business in the juxtaposed country.

According to Peter, emerging markets cover 6 Billion people who cover 77% of the global landmass. He sees new opportunities in what he calls shifting democracies, with Japan's economy growing at a 4% rate versus a growth rate of 2.5% for the US. Emerging market debt has grown by 171% and global equity growing by 82%, while US equity has declined 24%. BTW: Just yesterday it was reported China's GDP grew a stunning 10.7% in the 4th quarter of 2009.

Peter comes across as savvy asset manager with his feet still firmly planted in the ground, a practicality we can never have too much of. Peter's global viewpoints are well put and he expects that venture will remain (for now) a US dominated opportunity as long as the products we build have (immediate) global market impact. I concur, as long as we free innovation from the choke hold of our current venture system.

New York, your lights continue to inspire me.

A new way in is the way out of Venture

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-11T08:21:43-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Many Limited Partners are contemplating getting out of the venture sector altogether and end their commitments to Venture Capitalists (VCs), no surprise given the sector's miserable performance of less than 10% IRR the last ten years and no more than 3% of moneys invested producing real public value.

Flight is a natural, but inappropriate response

The technology sector has a long way to go in supplying 5/6th of the world with meaningful technology applications. And with more (global) entrepreneurs at the ready to tap into that wide open greenfield the pain in the venture business is not with supply and demand, but with the arbiter in the venture business - the venture capitalist.

I often use a simple analogy to make this clear: just because the performance of eHarmony (a leading dating site) is down, does not mean we necessarily have fewer potential marriages. It just means the marketplace (see our new Venture Primer) where those connections are being made is inefficient. Smart participants will seek to explore new marketplaces where the arbitrage fits their requirements and so should Limited Partners.

Expect absolute, not relative Venture performance

Many VCs who smell the impending cannibalization of their cushy, no downside position throw anything at Limited Partners to make them recommit for another ten years at the expense of public money.

VCs continue to use any tactic in the book to persuade Limited Partners that none of the malaise in venture was their fault. Aided by the conglomerate resources of their lobbying organization, the NVCA (the National Venture Capital Association) they drum up every statistic and external market factor known to man to hold on to their position in this ailing sector.

The mere existence of a lobbying organization (with international branches and replicas) alludes to the deployment of artificial market forces and should be a wakeup call to those depending on it.

But great performance in the venture business should not be measured relative to other VC funds (using meaningless self-serving top quartile accolades), or worse be measured against public market indices, but should be measured against the opportunity to monetize the penetration of technology in its global greenfield.

To use another analogy:

The best athlete is not one that wins the race, but the one that becomes the fastest man on earth.

The best of the worst

Now, I know the job of Limited Partners is to deploy assets (surplus cash) and get the best possible yield for a given time period on that commitment and lockup, without a loss and better, a significant yield. To the Limited Partner it is a game of responsible diversification to a spread of asset classes in which not the individual performance matters, but the yield of all assets under management.

Venture, as one of the avenues with an average allocation of between 10 and 15% of total assets under management has been for many Limited Partners just the "icing on the cake", a nice to have but not a necessity. Until the other asset classes started imploding. Hence the reason why many Limited Partners first were reluctant to criticize VC and now suddenly debate to leave the sector altogether.

Some VCs have gone out on a limb and publicly cheered that on, forgetting that - using our previous analogy - a select few may have won the last ten year's race but that their absolute performance still does not make for a great spectator sport. Especially not since their reason for winning is comparable to a winning streak in Vegas, sheer luck and unsustainable.

Technology Venture should outpace any other asset class

In any economy, Technology Venture should outpace any other sector or asset class for Limited Partners with a ten year horizon, simply because of the following reasons:

Technology is a low cost production business (not a derivative) that capitalizes on the unwavering intellectual brainpower of global entrepreneurs to tap into existing macro-economic needs.
Technology taps into a massive greenfield consisting of 5/6th of the world population, and is only at the beginning of its exploration.
The internet provides a zero cost distribution channel that feeds relevant new technology directly and instantly to massive market pull.
The fluidity of technology implementations allows disruptive technology to quickly respond and become resistant to economic aberrations.
Technology relies on nothing but itself to create and maintain instantaneous value, the only volatility in venture is venture itself.

A new way in

What is broken in venture is the VC as the arbiter, who claims to have the ability to spot disruptive innovation but has not delivered, some say for the last twenty years. The commitments from Limited Partners are still flowing and so are the unwavering ideas from entrepreneurs. All that is needed is a different arbitrage that has proven to spawn highly monetizable innovation against the (absolute) spectrum of a massive technology greenfield.

The existing crop of VCs may not get there, as cannibalization of a complacent position will be painful. But I am sure that if we replace every VC today with an experienced former startup entrepreneur (with successful company growth under his belt) we will quickly produce results far better than the last ten years. The past is the past, so let's not dwell - but get rid of it.

I can't think of any asset class with a better risk profile that within a ten year vintage has the propensity to deliver stellar results. But only with a few new rules of the game and referees that have the wherewithal and experience to make it happen. The instruments of change in its tremendous rewards are in the hands of Limited Partners who remain committed to technology venture.

So, we should treat Venture for what it is: the fastest athlete in the world. And recruit trainers who can get it there.

Why Einstein would be a better VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-06T12:06:05-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I think about the future of Venture Capital a lot (day and night, can you tell?) and how we can continue to drive and fund innovation. And I have said many times that "the quality of the deal intake is only as good as the quality of the investor", which specifically in venture means that an investor needs to have the experience and foresight of an entrepreneur to support others.

Raise the (public) value of innovation

Clearly with truckloads of money from Limited Partners over the last ten years, more highly skilled global entrepreneurs than ever, and 5/6th of the world population still void of essential technology applications, VC has done a deplorable job in the matchmaking process between the assets of the Limited Partner (money) and the assets of entrepreneurs (ideas), which should have tapped into that massive greenfield more aggressively.

Less than 10% IRR for more than 10 years, or to use another worrisome statistic: less than 3% of dollars invested in VC over the last ten years leads to the production of any public value by way of IPO (Initial Public Offering), as 10 years of VC investing at $200B/year (give or take) x 10 generated $66B in IPOs (per Dan Primack, PEHub). No wonder the Limited Partners who fund VCs scratch their heads at what just happened to their money.

It's all about the Benjamins (and the quality of people behind the money)

I referred to Albert Einstein before (way back in 2006) and an amuzing article from Dave B Lerner turning Sherlock Holmes into a VC reminded me how the principles of Einstein should be held against the selection process for General Partners (GPs) at a VC fund.

Quotes from the Genius

So, with Einstein's Wikipedia encyclopedia at hand let's roll out some of his famous quotes and see how the current state of venture stacks up:

"Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world".

So why do GPs demand to see a product demo before they can decide to invest, is it because they have no imagination? Perhaps we should encircle a world of innovation that is bigger than Silicon Valley?

"For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution. It is, strictly speaking, a real factor in scientific research".

Why a SuperBowl ring is so much more valuable than an Ivy League ring, in any job in the venture business.

"A new idea comes suddenly and in a rather intuitive way. But intuition is nothing but the outcome of earlier intellectual experience".

Why relevant entrepreneurial experience is such an important attribute to a VC investor, intuition not analysis drives the selection of rewarding investment decisions.

"Whether you can observe a thing or not depends on the theory which you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed".

Silicon Valley has commoditized the investment thesis (or what we refer to as the-same-difference investment thesis), no surprise that it cannot detect disruptive innovation even if it would show up at their doorstep.

"Falling in love is not at all the most stupid thing that people do — but gravitation cannot be held responsible for it".

GP should not be afraid to feel passionate about their companies and make independent investment decisions (that may not find other syndicates), but the gravity of investment commoditization can not be held responsible if they do not.

"It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience".

Customers need simpler technology solutions, not more complex. As investors that means we should not invest in technology, but the application of technology to meet customer needs. But not so simple that it has no macro-economic and public relevance (IPO).

"Humanity has every reason to place the proclaimers of high moral standards and values above the discoverers of objective truth".

A higher moral standard in the venture business would ensure that we deploy free-market principles to the support for innovation. We are far removed from deploying transparency to the venture business that would expose the true merit of investors with the true merit of entrepreneurs. Only then will the truth reveal itself.

"A happy man is too satisfied with the present to dwell too much on the future".

GPs locked up into 10-year fund vintages are fat and happy, too happy to dwell to much on the malaise in venture.

"The state of mind which enables a man to do work of this kind is akin to that of the religious worshiper or the lover; the daily effort comes from no deliberate intention or program, but straight from the heart".

Great convictions from the heart lead to great investments and financial returns in venture. The investor who is content with the current investment program will soon meet his maker.

"I am by heritage a Jew, by citizenship a Swiss, and by makeup a human being, and only a human being, without any special attachment to any state or national entity whatsoever".

We are citizens of our world, so perhaps we should start investing that way. We need to get away from Sand Hill Road more often and tap into global resources, not just to fund entrepreneurs but also to experience and understand what drives global marketplaces.

"Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them as unalterable givens. Their excessive authority will be broken".

Just because we have constructed the relationships between Limited Partners and VCs in a certain organized fashion does not mean we should accept them. Especially not when performance proves the vast majority of those relationships do not work out to satisfaction.

"Great spirits have always encountered violent opposition from mediocre minds. The mediocre mind is incapable of understanding the man who refuses to bow blindly to conventional prejudices and chooses instead to express his opinions courageously and honestly".

Entrepreneurs should expect to receive violent opposition from mediocre VCs (who focus on technology builds), but entrepreneurs should remain courageous and honest. Courageous in their entrepreneurial ideas and honest about their ability to build them.

"The important thing is not to stop questioning; curiosity has its own reason for existing".

Many people take for granted what has been imprinted in their brains from childhood, but you would be surprised to learn how many of those things are actually false. Not by design, but by interpretation. Drill deep in what you have been told as the truth and you will find new opportunities for innovation.

"Nature shows us only the tail of the lion. But I do not doubt that the lion belongs to it even though he cannot at once reveal himself because of his enormous size".

A Long Tail without a Torso is meaningless.

"What is thought to be a "system" is after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide up the world objectively so that one can make statements about parts".

Markets do not exist, as I have stated many times before. Only marketplaces do, in which the choices of individual participants with unique ideas are married.

"Few people are capable of expressing with equanimity opinions which differ from the prejudices of their social environment. Most people are even incapable of forming such opinions".

The social environment on Sand Hill Road that has perpetuated the mediocrity in venture is preventing GPs from expressing opinions about how it should change. In fact, none of the Limited Partners I spoke to have received a viable plan from VC as to how to combat the venture malaise we are in.

"My political ideal is democracy. Let every man be respected as an individual and no man idolized".

When you do not belong to the (subprime) "venture club" or play their game, you are not let in and respected. So why should we repay that homage back with idolization?

"The really valuable thing in the pageant of human life seems to me not the State but the creative, sentient individual, the personality; it alone creates the noble and the sublime, while the herd as such remains dull in thought and dull in feeling".

Meritocracies are created by transparency, and we have none in venture. No surprise it is dull in thought and dull in feeling.

"My passion for social justice has often brought me into conflict with people, as did my aversion to any obligation and dependence I do not regard as absolutely necessary".

Free-markets are created by meritocracies that rely on transparency. The social justice of a meritocracy is hard to grasp for those who hide behind walled gardens to protect their own insecurities.

"Mistrust of every kind of authority grew out of this experience, a skeptical attitude toward the convictions that were alive in any specific social environment — an attitude that has never again left me, even though, later on, it has been tempered by a better insight into the causal connections".

I mistrust many venture investors for good reason (their lack of merit), but have learned that the casual connection is the dysfunctional financial system that allows VCs to take it for a ride.

"Everyone is aware of the difficult and menacing situation in which human society -- shrunk into one community with a common fate — now finds itself, but only a few act accordingly".

Waiting, talking and reporting about the malaise in venture is one thing, offering solutions to it is another.

"The economic anarchy of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the real source of the evil".

That is of course because the only form of capitalism we practice today is far from a meritocracy. Capitalism spawned by meritocracy is a wonderful thing and builds opportunity for all people with merit (within the Long Tail and the Torso).

No need to be Einstein to become a VC

Einstein himself did not think he was special and neither should a VC. All you need to become one is solid early stage experience and a vivid imagination of how the world should work.

Yet to make venture work, Limited Partners need to start by deploying money to GPs who themselves have proven how those crucial attributes helped them cross the chasm, before those GPs are allowed to tell other entrepreneurs how to do the same.

My investment and drive is for democracy, meritocracy and capitalism to work hand-in-hand to produce the powerful innovation that enhances the lives of people around the world. Until that happens, I leave you with a last quote from the Genius himself: "To punish me for my contempt of authority, Fate has made me an authority myself".

Happy New Year!

Predicting the future is why macro matters

info@venturecompany.com — 2010-01-05T02:54:59-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As an investor, and especially a venture capital investor you need to have the ability to predict the future within an acceptable degree of accuracy. And that is exactly a skill many venture capitalists (VCs) so miss out on and generate such mediocre returns. The value of their innovation is simply not meaningful enough.

Venture Capital differs fundamentally from (other forms of) Private Equity in that it requires an extraordinary level of foresight and prescience. After all, one needs to believe in something that does not already exist and little proof exist it ever will - or is there?

It is impossible to predict what technology will prevail

VCs today are still too focused on technology, even though many proclaim to understand markets (more on that later). The reality is that rarely any business without a technology demo gets funded these days. Yet popular technology flavors change frequently (every three years or so) and betting on technology is a foolish game. We should know by now.

Driven by the urge to produce results within ten year vintages and complicated by the (we claim, self induced) lack of IPOs and M&A, the majority of VCs have retracted to a short term investment focus, massive diversification and fragmentation of investment dollars. Quite the opposite of what should have happened to the venture business.

But how do you tell someone to step into the circus ring to tame a tiger, without having had the confidence and prior experience to do so. It is just not going to happen. Change in the venture business needs to come from the top.

Limited Partners who do not refresh their VC commitments and requirements now, are bound to lose big-time on venture pipelines stuffed with sub-prime investments with no place to go.

It is easy to predict what macro-economics will prevail

Warren Buffett said it right in a recent interview with Charlie Rose in that the future long term is a lot easier to predict than the short term. Or the way I tell my wife; I don't know where I'll be during the day, but you can count on me coming home for dinner.

In business, long term value does not discount the need for short term planning, but short term without long term (or macro) is a loosing gambit. Here are some examples of the lack of macro-economics and its failures :

- The venture ecosystem

The venture capital ecosystem consists of ten(!) layers of diversification before the dollars from a Limited Partner lands into the bank account of the company of an entrepreneur. No matter what your views on the venture business, but anyone who has attended business school should know that this kind of over-diversification leads to a morass of accountability and in-transparency of results. Without fundamental change to the way venture works today, venture is poised to become more mediocre than its today. Venture is macro-economically broken. The reason why we provide a solution for Limited Partners here.

- The VC intake model

Most venture capitalists sit impatiently through an entrepreneur pitch, checking their blackberry's until the product demo. Not only does this communicate the VC has no empathy for the macro-economics, it also communicates that technology risk is the only risk they think they can assess. Per previous analogy, those VCs are the wives who call their husbands twenty times per day, just to know where you are. They demonstrate a lack of understanding and lack of faith in macro-economics and an improper assessment of investment risk.

- Entrepreneur pitches

Perhaps dumbed down by the only pitch process that leads to getting money from (sub-prime) VCs, many entrepreneurs pitch technology without understanding the macro-economic forces at work that prevent a pure technology play (albeit perhaps better) from having access to paying customers. When a large incumbent owns the access to the majority of customers through perception, a proprietary business model or otherwise, technology innovation without a fundamental disruption of the business model is worth very little. Entrepreneurs need to think business and include macro-economics.

- Marketing experts

Markets do not exist. Yep, I said it (and yes, I have worked in "marketing" too). Market definitions are stale and artificially extrapolate people that once exhibited a common purchasing decision into individuals that from then on behave the same way going forward. They don't.

We all know instinctively that every individual is different (even when that individual represents a company), that none of us like to be put in a box and that our reason for purchasing is unique and more than simply price/performance ratios. In addition we participate in multiple competitive and complimentary marketplaces in whatever order we deem appropriate. And any attempt to put marketplace participants in a fixed market bracket is therefor hopelessly self-serving.

Markets do not exist, but marketplaces do. The impetus to participate is extremely complex, complex to quantify yet not complex to qualify. A simple need for improved relevance and better value - based on individual needs and objectives. Marketplaces are no longer one-to-many, but have become many-to-many, with social networks emphasizing and echoing those individual requirements. The long tail of supply is met with a long tail of demand.

So, macro-economically the basis of marketing is flawed. Product success is not driven by marketing, but rather by how true the product is to its promise. And that means marketers who make product decisions based on market numbers are wrong and so are the investment decisions derived from market analyses.

Be ready for the swing test

Macro-economics really matter as it defines whether you have a chance of making it big, but not without careful micro-economic fulfillment. As an entrepreneur "dating" the right investor you need to be prepared for the swing test that goes roughly as follows:

Explain the vision, explain the product experience, explain the business model, explain the technology, explain the scalability, explain the product requirements, etc. etc. going back and forth between macro and micro until the swing comes to a halt with no questions left unanswered. Now, investor and entrepreneur have a common understanding of the risks involved for the road ahead.

A new investment focus

As experienced technologists we know we have many technology options to support a macro-economic need, and technology development is the least of our risks. The real question is whether the application of technology makes acute macro-economic sense. And surprisingly enough and again in agreement with Buffett, macro-economically we are not much different from a hundred years ago.

We like to play music, iTunes anyone? We like to stay connected, Facebook anyone? We enjoy free-trade, eBay anyone? Many other macro-economic desires remain unfulfilled with technology. Opportunity abound.

Fulfilling support for that macro-economic need is what Venture Capital should be all about. And it will again when we as Limited Partners tell the referees (the VCs) that the rules for investing have changed. That our expectations for VC are to chase macro-economic impact, rather than to allow the mindless technology herding to continue.

Endless opportunity for great returns

Supporting existing macro-economics with a more meaningful technology experience that meets the needs of 5/6th of the worlds population, that still does not use a meaningful internet application, makes for a fantastic and highly scalable investment thesis. One that we should allocate more-not-less money to as Limited Partners.

But we need to change our tune, now, before it all comes crashing down on us.

Introducing The State of Venture Capital

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-12-17T10:37:57-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

*** Update: The Prelude to 2010: The State of Venture Capital is now available for public viewing on this site here ***

I am close to finishing up a brand new presentation on The State of Venture Capital going into 2010. This presentation contains the new compass for Limited Partners interested to (continue to) invest in Venture Capital. It is written in a language Limited Partners can understand.

This presentation is ready for deployment on January 3rd, 2010 and geared to Limited Partners and equally useful to Venture Capitalists who want to stay in business. Much of the underlying arguments can be found throughout my blog, yet this presentation - for the first time - stitches many of those arguments together in a succinct action plan that withstands economic aberrations.

For those interested, please fill in the form on the contact page and select 2010: State of Venture Capital. Enter valid contact information and an e-mail address so you can be contacted for further instructions on how to receive the presentation.

What this presentation is not:

What this presentation contains:

• This is an honest reflection of the effectiveness of Venture Capital from the point of view of a successful entrepreneur; first hand observations
• This is a top-down analysis of the Venture ecosystem for Limited Partners
• This is a plan of how to re-architect and re-commit to Venture Capital

Happy Holidays!

Capitalism Without Merit Is a Bold Lie

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-12-15T14:40:55-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

And socialism without merit is a lie too, a hollow lie. So do not even try to juxtapose capitalism and socialism here, not the point. Neither is the "rich" man's black-or-white argument that the mere thought of criticizing capitalism defaults into sudden socialism.

Putting our economies in a box is the last thing we should be doing, it separates us further in an increasingly global marketplace that requires the opposite. The real issue here is how to revive our economy, knowing we have powerful capitalistic assets and an unending innovative drive in our back pocket.

We need to be ready to challenge the status quo, let go (yet not discard) of the past and endure the rigor of change if we want to prevent the bottom from falling out from under our economy or face worse in ten years from now. Hope is not a strategy, change is. So, hang in there with me to redefine economic change.

The Lies We Tell Ourselves

We cannot change our economy for the better if we keep lying. And as a former leader of this country has proven, reiterating lies do not make them come true. The biggest lie is that we claim that we are more free than any other country in the world. As a polyglot immigrant I can refute that argument flat out, that is if we use the same definition of "free".

Freedom is the foundation of free-markets that ensures that every willing-and-able participant can become an integral building block of our economy. While there will never be total freedom, the lies we tell ourselves prevent even rudimentary freedom from taking hold.

Our Freedom Is a Lie

Freedom is not your compliance to your boss's expectation to dress-up to go to work every day, nor your inability to challenge his leadership for fear of losing your job, health insurance, pension contribution and other financial perks.

Freedom is also not a financial system eleven times the size of production that turns running a company into a Las Vegas gamble, demanding a focus on investors that precedes and overshadows the needs of customers. Freedom is also not an aging stock exchange (copied around the world) that promotes the financial agenda of short sellers and forces companies to adopt a short term agenda, rather than to build long term sustainability (or however the company prefers to be measured).

Freedom is not the inability to really say or write what you want, for fear of retribution from a bulging legal system that makes it so easy to file bogus claims, such as defamation of character. Freedom is also not our cunning ability to segregate the rich from the poor, the native americans (in today's indian reservations) from the rest, or blacks from whites (I should know, I am part of an interracial family).

I can go on for a while, but I think you are getting my point. We are lying.

The Freedom To Abuse Freedom

Just because all 400 million of us live in the same country, does not mean we enjoy the same freedom. Many of us are disenfranchised by freedom; the freedom to abuse freedom and to create whatever walled gardens are needed to keep others out. And that is the freedom I am so against.

Our Government's Delicate Role

We cannot really blame Apple that it signed an exclusive arrangement for the iPhone on AT&T's network to yield focus and produce higher margins, but it is the Federal Communications Commissions' (FCC) fault, asleep at the wheel that allowed device-to-network locking before the iPhone was even conceived (device locking was contrary to what the GSM standard was designed to do; I was free to use and roam my european GSM phone on any european network more than 20 years ago).

We cannot blame public companies to drive a short term strategy, as the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implicitly dictated that a string of positive quarterly earnings reports are the predominant way to measure company performance and respectively its CEO. And we should not be surprised that a temporal decline in revenues is then quickly followed by staff reductions to make those quarterly numbers still look good on paper. Are quarterly earnings really an accurate reflection of company performance for a company that has been in business for twenty years or more?

We also cannot really blame Venture Capitalists (VCs) for taking advantage of the blind faith (and now delayed response) from Limited Partners if the SEC continues to treat participants and investments in private companies as under-the-table transactions, hiding important transparency from marketplace participants.

Cure the Disease, Not the Symptoms

But the delicate role of our government is not to regulate the symptoms but to prevent the disease. It is impossible for government to keep tabs on the impurities of symptoms in all marketplaces, but rather it should aggressively work towards enforcing the definition of free-market principles to each domain that poses what it deems a direct or indirect systemic risk to our economy (I can think of about ten depending on granularity, possibly all boiling down to a single driver: our financial systems).

I do not want our government to tell banks how to describe their interest rates to customers, but I do want our government to require banks to file and freeze (for a certain period) their lending terms in a central database, so its customers can query a single website to get the rates from the bank that meet their needs.

The role of government is to establish the marketplace principles, not to establish what is merit. The marketplace participants will sort the latter out quickly.

Relevant Transparency Builds Merit

Transparency is becoming a buzz-word and similar to the buzz-word "experience" means nothing without the preceding adjective relevant. What is relevant is that all participants have immediate access to the transparency of marketplace transactions (between supply and demand) in order for that marketplace to be driven by merit. And that means that the performance of marketplace participants is measured solely by the nature of their unique offering in the marketplace, not a complex myriad of stifling walled gardens and derivatives.

The beauty of relevant transparency is that all marketplace participants become watchdogs. That the signals of impropriety are detected instantaneously by many rather than by a few who choose to pay attention. That must be the reason why the Romans preferred a flock of geese over a single dog to protect their property.

Economic Growth is Defined by the Merit of Marketplace Transactions

No longer will merit be built by the posturing and decibel marketing of the supply side of a marketplace, that without transparency can make virtually any claims it wants. Merit will also not be built by the endless expression of desires from the demand side. What creates economic growth is the merit of the completed transactions between unrestricted supply and unrestricted demand.

So, to come full circle on our financial systems; our stock exchange needs to evolve into a free-market. Where the supply of stock will reflect the strategy by-and-of the company (not by the bourse), and the purchasing of stock is based on investors buying into that strategy. Venture Capital needs to change from a closed market to a free-market in which the transparency allows Limited Partners and entrepreneurs to find VCs who have the merit to pick, build and monetize truly groundbreaking innovation.

Free Ourselves and The Rest Will Follow

Relevant transparency builds free-market principles that leads to merit, in every economic circumstance.

Relevant transparency of our education system will improve the much needed individual merit of teachers and the individual opportunities for children. Relevant transparency of our financial system will improve the merit of investors and the innovative companies they spawn.

Relevant transparency of our economy will improve the opportunity for all people with merit. And all people do have merit. Many people, stifled by the constriction of artificial marketplaces have simply not discovered it yet. Opening up our marketplaces to become more free will allow each participant to discover and hone their own merit and produce better customer value.

The world will be a much better place when every person can participate and validate their own intrinsic merit in a thriving marketplace. So, let's stop lying and demonstrate to the world what real freedom looks like.

Why Venture Capital will not simply recover when the economy does

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-12-04T11:24:13-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I saw an article a few days ago from an enthusiastic young General Partner (GP) declaring that "Venture is Back" and it reminded me how frighteningly naive some people in the venture business are.

A naiveté that gives entrepreneurs (and Limited Partners) false hope. And we do not need more false promises in the venture business.

Believe me, I want nothing more than to leave this horrible decennium of venture behind and start a new one afresh, but I cannot get excited about the mere sound of a spinning engine that gets the car rocking back and forth. Frankly, the car is still stuck in the sand with spring breakers drinking the kool-aid and cheering it on.

Spinning the wrong wheels

I too see the statistics on the venture pace going up and down and depending on whose reporting of an in-transparent venture business you believe, you can pick your pill of the day.

But how fast Venture Capitalists spin their wheels is irrelevant to the performance of the venture business. And even how many deals are done and how many exits are produced is irrelevant. Short of any transparency in the venture business those metrics are poor derivatives to report on its ups and downs.

What matters is fund returns

But what really matters to Limited Partners is how much money goes into the VC fund and how much comes out at vintage (after the 7-10 year life-cycle of the fund). Only a fund return that outscores any other asset class a Limited Partner (LP) invests in, can count on receiving continued commitments that add to the growth of the venture sector. And the venture sector is far from growing.

Why venture remains broken

There are much more fundamental reasons as to why in the years between 9/11 and the economic crisis of 2009 venture funds have not shown dramatically better performance while the wind was blowing in the sails of VC who had their LP commitments lined up (see how we counter the hope-and-pray philosophy).

Here is my top 3:

- Flawed deployment of risk

The majority of VCs today rely solely on what I call "technology grazing" as the method to extract greater business value. While that not only reduces potential upside it also deploys a flawed risk profile to the creation of early stage companies.

Venture Capital has died and resurfaced as micro-PE (Private Equity) that deploys an inappropriate risk model to innovations that are supposed to set the world on fire. To the many VC funds larger than $100M, chasing companies that have access to less than $1B in monolithic revenue opportunity and less than a $300M exit opportunity is simply a waste of time.

But the GPs have done so in droves anyway, because God forbid if they would have to give money back to LPs unable to find truly disruptive innovation and forego some of their management fees.

- Too many cooks who can't cook

The vast majority of VCs in the venture business today have never themselves crossed the chasm that would allow them to find the outliers and arbitrate innovation accurately. While GPs in Private Equity may get away with rudimentary skills to accelerate growth, the venture sector relies on specialist GP skills to turn early ideas into highly relevant innovations.

And even then, outliers are usually detected by outliers themselves, not by people who merely followed an educational trajectory cum laude. From a dissection of their bios on their websites you will find the evidence that most General Partners have no merit in judging how and when an early stage company should make the transition from an early adopter to a mass market and with what kind of an investment.

Experienced entrepreneurs are like discerning food lovers, they have a choice and stay away from bad restaurants.

- Endless diversification without accountability

Excessive multi-level diversification does not work and leads to more fog than clarity of purpose. Everyone and everything becomes a derivative, with no line-of-sight to accountability.

First the LPs diversify their risk by deploying a mere 10-15% to alternative assets (which includes venture, relying on other assets to produce the majority of LP returns), then they diversify to commitments in a multitude of venture firms, who then diversify into multiple funds, that then diversify to multiple GPs, who then diversify in multiple startups, who then diversify investments in multiple rounds, and then syndicate with multiple VC peers.

Hence my reference to a venture soup. And the asset holders, LPs and entrepreneurs are not liking the way it tastes.

The real fix

The underperformance in venture is similar to the car driving in the sand with the wrong tires and without locking differentials. The size of the engine (VC fund) does not matter, nor does it matter how fast you sped away on other roads. Only the way you apply the power to the current surface does. And so what matters is to what risk the moneys of a VC fund are applied.

So, unless the VC funds are setup and mandated to chase different risk, I do not expect to see any positive sustainable change in venture performance.

Yes, macro-economic confidence will increase investment pace and even improve the pace of mergers and acquisitions, but as long as we keep filling the pipe with sub-prime investments, we will not see more than sub-prime returns. We simply keep producing insufficient innovative disruption to significantly outpace other prime LP asset classes.

Over the next couple of months our government should instill free-market principles to the financial industry that through transparency can expose the real merit of investors in the venture business. But before that each individual LP can make immediate changes to their VC commitments now, to stave off the lingering curse of subprime VC.

The good news is that the future of the venture business is solely in the hands of the LPs, who by virtue of more discretionary VC selection are able to enthuse the outliers of innovation who, because they have more options, are currently patiently lying in wait.

Why Cash is Not King, but You Are

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-12-01T16:07:59-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Even though Venture Capital has produced no more than 10% IRR for the last 10 years and has lost the confidence of the public markets (lack of IPOs) and public companies (lack of M&A, except for a few "garage" sales), many entrepreneurs keep chasing the mighty dollar from VCs who will not let entrepreneurs challenge their merit, at all or ever.

Even the top VC brands appear not what they look like on the outside. What more evidence do entrepreneurs need that cash clearly is not king?

Hope is the current VC strategy

Entrepreneurs still dive head first into a thick, dark and in-transparent venture soup that predominantly relies on a strategy of hope (if you listen to the rhetoric of its lobbying organization, the NVCA). Hope for better external factors, improved financial markets and a hope that those markets will forget how they were fooled before. That many valuations had no value, and that many high-priced acquisitions did not work out nor pay off (Skype anyone?).

And even when financial markets forget, the fact remains that investor validation does not lead to customer validation. Instead, financial markets are derivatives of real marketplace constituents; dutifully paying customers. And therefor entrepreneurs better make sure they have an investor who has proven to drive a successful transition from idea to innovation themselves. An investor who has already crossed the chasm and knows that the trajectory of an investment may be a variable (and has the patience to ride it out financially), while the outcome is not. That macro-economically the innovation has merit, and the investment is just-in-time; not too early and not too late.

Attach Merit to Money

So why would you marry a person of whom you cannot verify merit? Do you as an entrepreneur really think that getting money from a rich investor makes you rich? And why would you spend more time with your company and listen to investor directions than with your spouse and not verify the merit of your investor with the same vigor?

Sure, not every investor's past may be squeaky clean, or be a natural progression to where they are today. And neither does it need to be, investing in early stage innovation is a risky business. But the merit of how they combined their passion with their actions is important to assess in order to worry less about their future behavior. The investor's passion, foresight, drive and success are crucial in conquering a myriad of adversity that will come the entrepreneur's way.

The Questions to Ask

Now, I understand that the chances of finding an investor that wants to listen to your proposition in the first place is not easy. And once an entrepreneur finally does find a willing VC, entrepreneurs are often ready to kneel down and accept whatever comes their way. But let me remind the entrepreneur: doing so means you are sitting in front of a sub-prime VC who has just knighted you a sub-prime entrepreneur. The outcome of that trajectory is very predictable - just look at the past.

A smart entrepreneur knows that the only way to become successful is to make customers happy, and that the method that they envisioned to get there is a method your investor can and wants to support.

Since the bottom is falling out of many VC firms, listening to the advice from a VC without verification of merit is therefor extremely foolish if not self-destructive. Here are a few starting questions entrepreneurs should ask a VC, and should get answers on without hesitation or a blink of the eye:

- Which fund are you thinking of making this investment out of?

It is important to discern that entrepreneurs get a verifiable answer that prevents them from talking and listening to one of the many "walking-dead" VC firms. I would not attach a lot of credence to opinions from "walking-dead" firms.

- What is the size of the fund?

This question leads to the ability of the VC to support the runway of the company. It can indicate how soon entrepreneurs need to be looking for syndication rounds with new investors and ensure the flexibility of the terms to make it attractive to do so efficiently.

- What is the vintage of that fund?

The importance behind this question is to understand in how much of a hurry VCs are. I have seen many companies being pushed to an early (low ball) exit to demonstrate to a Limited Partner (LP, the investor in VC) an acceptable fund return (to raise a new or stacked fund), rather than preserve the best outcome for the entrepreneur.

- How much of that fund is current invested, how much remains unallocated?

Not just fund size but the room left in the fund often determines the behavior of an investor. How much is unallocated and at what stage of the vintage can also determine the authenticity of answers given to previous questions as it pertains to their support for other companies.

- How much are you allocating for my company?

How much do you think you need to support your runway to profitability or exit. Can and will this investor support you monolithically (unlikely) or with how much fragmentation of syndicate rounds. Fragmentation of rounds is generally not desired as it consumes a lot of time to put together (fundraising) and to maintain (board meetings).

- What makes you the right General Partner for my company?

What in the past or his foresight makes this GP the ideal partner on the board. The merit of his performance will be an indication of how nervous the GP will become when the trajectory of your innovation appears different from the trajectory predicted at the outset. This GP's answers will elude if he can see the forest through the trees.

- What is the performance of the fund?

How well are the other companies in the VC fund doing? Is your company going to be their first expected win, do the GPs have a fund strategy that is working? Does their fund strategy have merit?

- What is your performance as to the overall performance of the fund?

Not so much the performance of the fund is important to you (it is to the LP) but the performance of the GP relative to other GPs in the fund. Is that GP truly respected or will you find yourself with a new board member as a result of uneven dynamics.

- What example of crossing the chasm can you talk to that match mine?

What is the merit of a GP statement, who tends to do deep dives in operational matters, without the necessary operational experience of having crossed the chasm himself, in life and/or business? What business has the GP demonstrated transitional success in that can act as the operational transition your company will need to go through.

- How many other companies are you on the board of?

Darting in and out and dropping bombs is what overloaded GPs tend to do. Prevent that at all cost, ask them how many board seats he intends to take on and how much time he allocates for every company and yours to make a serious impact.

- How many active funds are you a GP in?

GPs of older or larger VC firms have an array of funds they invest out of, some of which are stacked. Meaning they invest simultaneously out of different funds, from the same or different LPs, to mitigate their risk or provide early-to-late stage runway support. It is important to understand how many hats your GP is wearing and how fragmented his mind will be.

- How are your other funds doing?

Previous fund performance is an indication of the future, as disruptive innovation is resistant to economic aberrations. Do not buy into the external factors to blame for under-performance of a fund, in the same way your GP will not let you blame your under-performance on the same issues.

You are King

Nothing but the unique assets of the company determines its success. Every early stage company needs a CEO, one that builds the big picture, maintains the unique ecosystem and has the fiduciary responsibility to protect unnecessary dilution of shares. Do not raise money that does not allow you to deploy one nor rely on the Investors who think that their unique value add is better suited to make the company work in the early stages. Investors are not incented and ill-equipped (time wise) to be CEOs, let alone in most cases have no merit to be a CEO.

What entrepreneurs need from investors is the foresight, freedom and ability to think big and unabashed. Together, entrepreneur and investor should plot a trajectory, milestones and financial requirements to go from today's reality to where massive customer dominance lies. The future is in the hands of the entrepreneurs by virtue of who they select as their investment partner.

So, pick right and remain the King of your own destiny, or keep searching until you do. No amount of money can turn a bad marriage into success, unless of course if you are into it for the prenup.

Venture Capital needs a reset, my message to LPs

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-11-19T13:20:11-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I covered the systemic risk of Venture Capital (VC) many times (see in my previous article "Less is more") and emphasized how the passion to create disruptive innovation is the driving force of our great nation, an asset the rest of the world looks up to and I aim to protect with everything I have.

I came to this country some 15 years ago to pursue my entrepreneurial endeavors and despite my successes have seen the effects of a debilitating venture business restrict the dreams and bright future of others.

Even some of my entrepreneurial work could have yielded better financial returns, were it not for the subprime nature of some VCs (and their entourage) of whom, in an in-transparent business (read "How to fix VC once and for all"), it is often impossible to establish their real merit (and character) ahead of time.

The Venture Dilemma

Limited Partners (Pension funds, Endowments, Family trusts etc.) who supply their money to VC in capital-calls are faced with the harsh reality that venture (the venture capital sector) has produced less than 10% IRR for the last ten years and are now asked again to buy into the rhetoric from General Partners (GPs) at the VC firm that none of this was their fault, and renew 10-year multimillion and sometimes billion dollar commitments. The question for the Limited Partner (LP) arises; should I stay or should I go?

Many Prime VC Firms have Turned Subprime Too

Top quartile performance (a meaningless definition in its own right) by one VC fund is unlikely to rescue the plethora of under-performers nor yield much higher than 10% IRR in total LP sector returns. And even the performance of classic top-tier VC funds leaves a lot to be desired.

Mayfield Fund appears to have no regret admitting “classic bubble” mistakes and “bringing in big company management”, non-market risk mistakes that do not belong to a seasoned investor. Sequoia Capital issued a dramatic cutback message at first dawn of the economic crisis to its portfolio companies, in essence communicating that their companies are not disruptive enough to withstand economic aberrations. From public reporting by a public pension fund, Draper Fischer Jurvetson does not appear to be knocking it out of the ball-park either. Rumor has it that another top-tier firm, Benchmark Capital is the only firm in Silicon Valley to produce more than a 1x return on all of its funds. This is totally unacceptable performance and behavior of venture firms we collectively tend to think of as top quartile. Are they?

Many of the top-tier funds that flourished in strong winds and made even turkeys fly, have diluted their teams with general partners who simply lack the relevant operational experience (read "Why VCs really need relevant operating experience, now") needed to prevent them too from sliding into the overwhelmingly subprime venture ecosystem.

The Threat to Innovation

Clearly LPs have alternative options of deploying money into other asset classes (liquid or illiquid) and not buying into the feeble VC (and their lobbying organization) arguments will by default yield to a significant reduction of funding for innovation if not cause the industry to spiral further down to inappropriately applied risk and deal commoditization (we refer to as subprime VC).

At least ten years of subprime VC continues to attract subprime entrepreneurs which in turn creates more subprime performance and turns venture capital into micro private equity (PE). The erosion of the venture sector is well on its way and LP assets meant to be deployed to high-risk/high-yield innovation have instead slid down to high-risk/low-yield scale. LPs who meant to invest in venture, have instead invested in micro-PE.

Technology is Not the Risk

Fragmentation and further diversification at the VC level is not the answer to an ailing venture business. While it is exciting for the unknowing entrepreneur to see new angels attempt to fulfill the role VCs are not; such as Jason Calacanis, Adeo Ressi from The Funded, and other new angel groups, the early stage technology trials (as I prefer to call them) continue to deploy the wrong risk and continue to pull the venture business further into the swamp of subprime innovation. As I described before (also read my reference to Vinod Khosla's model of investing), technology development is not the investment risk of the venture business.

Smart LPs Look for a New Breed of GPs

Those LPs who do not want to flee the venture sector and realize that technology still has a bright future ahead better not make the same mistakes twice. The dating service of innovation (VC) may not be working correctly, but the real asset holders in the marketplace of innovation (see my article on the innovation marketplace) are eager and aplenty to monetize a new world of change.

New VC fund requirements need to be established to reintroduce risk-taking Venture Capital to the technology sector which subsequently attracts entrepreneurs that have the capacity and drive to change the world.

LPs need to:

Establish new GP qualification criteria. Money without merit is not likely to yield outlier results.
Re-evaluate Private Placement Memorandums to focus on market risk rather than technology risk
Drive defragmentation and accountability of the investment thesis
Implement merit based GP remuneration, including downside

Financial marketplace imperfections aside, the miserable performance of the venture sector has nothing to do with the economy and has everything to do with the risk we as early stage investors deploy to attract truly groundbraking innovation.

I have been called taking cheap shots at VC when they are down - by one VC titan I reached out to. But for some reason I do not feel bad demanding excellence from people driving their Maseratis and Porsches from the mostly public money that feeds them. It is not personal, but we owe it to our economy to return merit-to-money.

Limited Partners are in full control of their own destiny in venture, by virtue of how they commit. And now is the time to commit to venture with more discretion and expertise and hit the VC reset button.

Why VCs really need relevant operating experience, now

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-11-05T10:27:39-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I keep getting questions from Limited Partners (LPs) and Journalists all over the world as to why and what relevant operating experience is needed to become a successful early stage investor or Venture Capitalists (VCs).

The easy answer is: well, if you are building a house you better know something about architecture, design and construction.

But the reason for the return of those questions is probably because I covered this topic before (see: "Why VCs need relevant operating experience") and left the door open to less operationally savvy investors in a new world of investing. After all in a new free-market of innovation (see: "How to fix VC once and for all") the merit of the investor, whatever that merit is composed of, defines the reputation of an effective marketplace participant.

If only we had arrived at that glorious point already.

Since we do not have a free-market of innovation today and Limited Partners are asking me for new fund selection criteria now, I give them the following reason as to why technology Venture Capital's General Partners need relevant operational experience:

1) Venture investing requires different skills than Private Equity

Investing in early stage companies requires a solid understanding of how to turn a vision into a thriving business. As Geoffrey Moore pointed out in his book Crossing the Chasm, successful innovation requires from entrepreneurs an understanding of how to cross the chasm and I demand from VC an understanding of when and how to help entrepreneurs make them do so.

VC should make the appropriate assessments alongside the entrepreneur and support the transitions with appropriate funding levels in which selling to early adopters and visionaries turns into selling to much larger demographic on the other side.

That means Venture Capitalists who claim value-add in their Private Placement Memorandum (PPM: the business-plan from VC to LP), better demonstrate that they know how to cross that chasm and better yet, can prove to Limited Partners that they themselves have done so successfully. Not at a time when turkeys could fly, but when the wind was blowing in the wrong direction.

VCs with only impressive corporate backgrounds very often fail to be aware and understand what it takes to cross the chasm. It is easier to have earned stripes on the right side of the chasm, than it is to have earned them from the left-to-right.

Private Equity investors spend their time on the right, successful Venture investing requires an understanding and experience from the left-to-right of the chasm.

2) Ecosystem performance defines company success

In a perfect world a startup would build a perfect product with support from the perfect investor that relies on the enthusiasm from satisfied users and their word-to-mouth to become successful.

The reality is that tip-toe funding combined with downside investment strategies the success of a company is dependent on many more attributes than merely product development, especially in subprime VC.

Limited funding forces companies to push out product early (many times too early) and relies on "decibel" marketing, business development, and customer support to compensate for product deficiencies in-market.

A great CEO is the ultimate orchestrator of the unique ecosystem of his company, one that requires continuous tuning to run like a well-oiled money-making machine. A Venture investor who drills deep into the performance of a company and make judgements on ecosystem parameters, should have knowledge of and experience in each of those ecosystem parameters and better, have been a CEO at an early stage companies having made such an ecosystem work against-all-odds.

Separate relevant from irrelevant experience

Thanks to the Internet, anyone can do the following exercise: go to a VC website and look at the relevant experience of the General Partners and hold them against the two criteria described above. The outcome will not surprise their performance.

A product manager at the GAP, a financial analyst in Hong Kong, a VP of Marketing in a large hardware company, a CEO at an IT consulting company, a large-cap consultant at Bain - all combined with impressive ivy league education makes for nice resumes in a PPM, but delivers no relevant credentials to lead the early stage innovation that our country depends on.

My advice

Limited Partners should stop doing business with people who have never crossed the chasm and never operated as the CEO of an early stage companies having successfully managed its ecosystem. And entrepreneurs should thoroughly review the relevant operating experience of its prospective board member, before they take their money.

If we do not pay attention to these things, the technology sector is poised to become the next auto-industry: a business we invented but lose in the end. The time for change is now, if we want the technology sector to be in a better position in five years from now.

Why do we keep listening to VC as the barometer of innovation?

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-11-03T09:41:20-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

It baffles me how the representatives in Congress keep listening to, and some media stay enthralled with the self-serving circumstantial excuses of Venture Capitalists (VCs) that also still manages to keep some Limited Partners (LPs, their bosses) tuned in. I predicted five years ago, with my declaration of sub-prime VC that Venture Capital was at the brink of disaster, so what is the hot news now?

VCs continue to demonstrate their lack of foresight as they only now, when the statistics of their performance are rolling in, seem able to "predict" their demise with remarkable accuracy. And that while foresight should be one of the most important traits of early stage investors. They still do not understand that an underperforming artificial market leads to one of two outcomes: cannibalization or replacement.

The VC benchmark

News to me is that one of Silicon Valley's most renowned VC funds; Benchmark Capital is rumored to be the first and only VC firm scrambling to produce at least a 1x return on all of its funds. Is such best-of-the-worst really a crowning achievement to be proud of and listened to? Such top-quartile performance is not going to save the reputation of venture sector (even if it does Benchmark's), which relies on the deployment high risk to promise high rewards.

Let me juxtapose why VC should have performed much better than any other time in history:

Technology has moved from hardware, to software, to software services with immediate market recognition and impact, allowing for simple business models and reduced risk with regard to customer adoption.
The Internet with its ever increasing penetration provides a boundless addressable market for technology that a successful proposition can tap into at almost no additional expense.
Until this year (thankfully LPs are now waking up) there have been truckloads of support from Limited Partners to the Venture sector, allowing VCs to pick their preferred fund size and implement their ideal diversification strategy.
We produce more highly skilled local students and have access to a much larger petri-dish of (global) entrepreneurs than every before, that should account for a much larger supply of disruptive ideas and development resources.
The penetration of applications to vertical markets (healthcare, oil and gas, real estate, etc.) remains pretty much untapped, leaving low hanging fruit investment opportunities unserved.
The deployment of macro-economic principles with the application of technology to drive more efficient marketplaces remains untapped, leaving winner-takes-all investment opportunities unserved.

So no, I do not buy into the excuses from the current VCs who point to irrelevant market indices or anything else they can hang their hat on to justify why they should be allowed to deploy a fundamentally flawed risk profile for another 10 years.

The Venture business should continue to outperform other asset classes by a long shot, by virtue of

its long-term commitments from LPs, and
its never ending (long-tail) supply of entrepreneurs, and
its resistance to economic aberrations (as monetization of disruptive monetization happens typically at the end of the funding runway)

And VCs who do not, should be ashamed of themselves and be pushed out of the business. LPs should no longer accept anything but bottom-line results, regardless of the state of the economy. Playing with someone else's money requires merit, just as much merit as we demand from entrepreneurs to help their companies grow. It is time we hold VC to higher standards and make them accountable.

Free this marketplace

VCs spin their rhetoric and mask that for too long they have deployed not Venture Capital but micro-PE (Private Equity) to innovation, a fundamentally flawed risk/reward investment thesis applied to the early stage sector. And they continue to do so under the cover of darkness (to the marketplace participants).

No improvement in the economy, except for the implementation of free-market principles (see "How to fix VC once and for all") will change the outcome of the Venture Capital sector.

Congress and government should worry less about the symptoms of its considerable systemic risk and stop applying useless post-mortem regulatory checks to the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), but instead deploy macro-economic principles so the "disease" will not continue to percolate and the marketplace of innovation will self-regulate based on transparency and merit.

It is time to demand from VC not relative, but absolute performance. And stop listening to those who are going to be cannibalized or replaced. All the ingredients for an efficient marketplace for innovation are here, and with newly established free-market principles at its foundation we can finally let the real cooks emerge.

Less is more; moving regulations from government to the marketplace

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-11-18T15:10:51-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

For the first time I listened in on a live interview by members of Congress with members of the Private Equity and Venture Capital community recently. I was surprised and-then-not that Congress, who closed its eyes and ears to the malaise of our financial systems for so long, is now also buying into the arguments from the participants of that malfunctioning marketplace that there is no systemic risk in Private Equity's Venture sub-sector. Duh!

Massive systemic risk, financial and spiritual

Congress and the majority of VCs are (again) so wrong. Do we really need more evidence to justify change?

Less than 10% IRR produced by VC for the last 10 years makes many Limited Partners wonder why they should put their money in Venture Capital, and rightfully so. The result of some of the LP's withdrawal results in a lack of support for the sector, even if miraculously VC would get its act together. The cultural advantage we have to produce an endless stream of innovation is (and has been, some argue) suppressed by an underperforming financial system that sits on top and squeezes the air out of it. Our competitive advantage as a nation is at stake.
$2.9 trillion in spin-out revenues (as reported by Polaris Ventures in its public address to Congress) produced by VC over the last thirty years is about to significantly deflate as a result of lack of exits over the last ten years. The Venture business has produced very few real companies in the last 10 years or so, resulting in a massive erosion of spin-out revenues.
Roughly $297B in yearly venture commitments is hoping on "external factors" to recover, ignoring that sub-prime (or micro-PE) VC tactics are preventing the intake of truly disruptive innovation that would have had the potential to create significant returns. And that while early stage innovation is very resistant to economic aberrations and in many cases thrives because of it.
We agree with some of the titans in the VC business (Mike Moritz, Vinod Khosla, etc.) that Venture Capital has been broken for 20-years, meaning we are steadily amassing a deficit of 40 years of investing in the wrong innovation, further deflating our competitive advantage as an innovative economy.
The participants in the venture business (see "How to fix VC once and for all") with real assets, the Limited Partner (money) and the disruptive entrepreneur (idea) are unhappy with the artificial arbitration of Venture Capital, yielding a departure and declining entry of both. So, despite great spin-stories and self congratulatory statistics from VC lobbying organizations (such as the NVCA) we are witnessing the net outcome of a severe decline in venture job creation and value.
It is dangerous for Congress to rate our systemic risk low because of the sheer size of our financial system, proudly described by one member of Congress to be larger than that of China, India and Europe combined. I surmise that is because our financial system is bloated with derivatives, currently eleven times the size of production. We have become a nation of gamblers in derivatives rather than direct investors in the creation of disruptive innovation. The size of our in-transparent and mostly derivative financial system is an unstable and unsustainable foundation to our economy.

If I had the resources of The White House at my disposal I could come up with a much larger laundry list of negative spinout from the underperforming venture business for those who still need it.

Does Congress matter?

Clearly Congress does not understand the venture business, as it interviewed in that recent session only the derivatives of the venture business, the VCs who hold no assets. If congress had read my blog "How to fix VC once and for all" as some of its peers in Washington have, it would have invited the real asset holders, Limited Partners (money) and Entrepreneurs (innovation) to verify the actual effectiveness (see "Why do we keep listening to VC as the barometer of innovation?") of the matchmaking service we call venture capital.

Congress has again allowed protectionists to write their own report cards, just like it allowed the auto companies to make false new promises. Maybe we should just not expect real leadership from Congress.

Healthcare reform has been on the books for a long, long time until a new and smarter president (Barack Obama) decided to pull it through the bureaucratic system and deploy free-market principles that expose merit and long-term save us all a ton of money. The (often hidden and recurring) cost of an ineffective artificially arbitrated market is much higher than the cost of transforming it into a free-market once and for all. But there is a cost nonetheless, the cost of change.

I count on the President

It is the same leadership that finally allows us to transform the healthcare system to a free-market and expose the merit of its participants that is needed to expose the merit of the venture business and our financial system as a whole. Our dependency on a bloated financial system, riddled with derivatives and artificial arbitration is what blurs the creation of real value.

I do not believe Venture Capitalists are bad people. But the venture business has simply adopted a financial system, with all its impurities, that overarched it and allowed it to get away with unverifiable merit for too long.

Less regulation is more

As we can learn from Cesar Milan (The Dog Whisperer on National Geographic) that the behavior of a dog is the responsibility of its owner, so is the behavior of our financial system the responsibility of our government. Just like any dog can be rescued, so do I believe our financial system can be. That is, if we have a pack leader.

Our government needs to institute free-market principles (a few simple filing regulations maintained in a central database) as described in my blog "How to fix VC once and for all" so we can ensure that transparency exposes merit. The merit of which VC (by General Partner denomination) is truly the expert in spawning and monetizing disruptive innovation he claims to be and at what expense. The transparency of the investments to all marketplace participants (including Limited Partners and Entrepreneurs), will quickly and continuously separate the weed from the chaff. And like free-markets are known to do, they create unique marriages between the outliers of innovation and the outliers of investors.

When the free-market of innovation is in place, and only then, should we evaluate getting rid of costly regulatory compliance such as Sarbanes-Oxley, FAS and others that were created to curtail the bad behavior of the old artificially arbitrated market. With the erection of free-markets, less regulation can then indeed be more.

A free country is built on free-markets

Capitalism without verifiable merit simply means we are fooling each other, and the bottom is falling out of our economy because of it. I believe we can rejuvenate and re-authenticate capitalism by deploying free-market principles in our financial system, starting with the venture business. In a free-market those who have merit will become the capitalists, who will then be able to discover and support others with merit. The engine of innovation is revving up again.

I am at your service, Mister President.

What Silicon Valley can learn from the Shark Tank

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-10-23T05:31:44-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The currently running TV show The Shark Tank on ABC produced by Mark Burnett is an amuzing, dare I say reality show in which five investors confront entrepreneurs with direct investment decisions into fledgling startup companies.

What the investors on the Shark Tank have in common with Silicon Valley is that their seed funding rounds range from $50,000 to $1M, yet often in more than pure technology plays.

While the title of the show sounds harsh, and some of its investors are, its actual workings is much better and more sincere than that of Silicon Valley:

Investors with relevant operating experience

Kevin O'Leary, Barbara Corcoran, Robert Herjavec, Daymond John and least impressive Kevin Harrington have earned their stripes in running very successful businesses with exits to boot. They demonstrate their knowledge and experience in making impromptu investment decisions and their ability to deliver their value-add to entrepreneur. So unlike Silicon Valley.

Transparency of decision making

Not only is the investment decision occurring almost immediately (or declined at the same pace), the reasoning of such decisions is happening right in front of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is able to respond, interject and argue a refusal to invest if he believes the arguments are invalid, and worth rebutting. Transparancy of decision making allows for a better alignment between entrepreneur and investor. So unlike Silicon Valley.

Open competition between investors

Once the interest in a startup has been established, the key investors Kevin, Barbara and Robert publicly fight over the deal like lions devouring a kill. Kevin cannot help but expose his unruly personality and because of it never gets his way, which reminds me of many Sand Hill Road investors. Robert is the more level headed investor who keeps his cool and his smarts at every turn, and Barbara perhaps the shrewdest of them all, waits silently until the boys have finished argueing and often walks away with the grand prize. All while the entrepreneur enjoys a steady increase in valuations and moneys invested. So unlike Silicon Valley.

There are many aspects of the show that are compelling and an interesting watch for entrepreneurs. The Shark Tank demonstrates why Silicon Valley needs the transparancy, that leads to a meritocracy that leads to the discovery of truly disruptive innovation (as described in "How to fix VC once and for all"). The show also points out how badly Venture Capital treats entrepreneurs and how it has stooped below the tactics of the Sharks in Nature's pyramid of investing.

Bottom feeding comes to mind.

The importance of being free-and-earnest

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-10-20T13:47:02-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I have had several discussions and e-mail conversations with entrepreneurs, journalists and venture capitalists (VC) about the free-market principles described in my blog "How to fix VC once and for all". In that blog I propose to apply free-market principles to the marketplace of innovation, in connecting the assets of the Limited Partner (LPs): money, with the assets of the entrepreneur: ideas.

What struck me most is how few people are familiar with those macro-economic principles that beyond consumer benefits have a significant impact on how an entrepreneur goes to market and how VCs fund them.

VC feedback

Especially eerie, short and dismissive was the interaction with one of the most well-known VC czars of Silicon Valley, who publicly proclaims to be a proponent of free-markets (that is exactly why I contacted him) yet does not seem to understand their basic premise. He brushed off my marketplace-for-innovation plan as just more creeping Socialism.

I am of course the fool, for telling the old-boys club to now support a meritocracy, and dump the walled gardens that made it fat-and-happy in the first place.

I knew that switching to free-markets will unleash the protectionist stance in many VCs. But what worries me more is that the opinions and decisions made by this General Partner (GP) impact startups whose successes are predicated on a firm understanding of macro-economics. His responses mean that this GP would simply brush off platform investments that embody free-market principles (eBay and the Apple AppStore for example) as socialistic movements. History proves that is not a good idea.

And that dear reader, is what the rest of the world (and the majority of Silicon Valley) looks up to. We blindly copy methodologies that no longer work in the hopes that 20-years of underperforming past behavior is not indicative of future behavior. It is all someone else's fault.

Start praying.

Debunking free-market myths

But where there is smoke there is fire (aptly considering the many other fires in California) and it is important for the marketplace participants, LPs (money) and entrepreneurs (ideas) who bring real assets to the table, to get a good understanding of free-market benefits. So, let me debunk some free-market myths:

Myth #1: free-markets are socialistic movements

A free-market is a self-regulatory instrument that ensures that a true meritocracy prevails, destroying artificial walled gardens such as geography, demography, old-boy status, first-mover advantage etc. A free-market ensures that the quality of the authentic value-add by each participant is evaluated based on its independent merit. A free-market therefor is the ultimate in capitalism, those who build earnest value will prevail.

Myth #2: free-markets require a lot of governance

More and different regulation than none, for sure. But the regulation will not come from government but from the marketplace participants (see my blog "Why innovation needs regulation"). When transparancy to all participants (a requirement of free-markets) is implemented, all participants benefit from the exposure and individual merit becomes the governor.

Myth #3: free-market transparency is unwanted

Transparency promotes competition, and competition based on merit is good for LPs, VCs and entrepreneurs. Merit yields better value to the detection of outlyers who lay at the foundation of disruptive innovation. LPs will benefit because in the formation of new funds, they can proactively bid to get in on a VC fund they previously only had access to when approached. New LPs can enter the fray and compete at an equal level. Small LPs can bid alongside large LPs. Entrepreneurs gain precious time in dealing with VC that have proven merit, and achieve more attractive valuations and secure better runway support - reducing the infant death syndrome as a result of investor lock-ins. VCs who are comfortable that money is not the only value they offer should feel confident their role is secured by the merit of their value-add.

But even if you are not convinced that the current VC performance is a systemic risk, a move to a free-market mechanism that (if nothing else) offers the transparency to all participants, is the fastest way to prove the other side of the argument wrong.

My hope is that we, in the venture business, establish these free-market principles voluntarily and without intervention from the government. But the feedback to my query as witnessed by the protectionist answers from VCs does not hold a lot of promise.

With a systemic risk of $2.9 trillion of innovation-spin-out revenues quickly deflating, we face a similar overruling by the government as healthcare, where rather than a voluntary free-market, a free-market with arbitrage from the government will be forced upon us.

Take your pick.

How to fix VC once and for all

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-10-11T06:40:34-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The venture business needs an overhaul, and below is my low-burden / high-impact plan for change.

Problem

Venture Capital (VC) is a systemic risk to our innovative culture, to $200B in direct asset allocations and to $2.9 trillion in spawned revenues (since 1970, per IHS Global Insight report). Yet VC has produced less than 10% IRR for the last ten years promoting a fear/flight response by Limited Partners (LPs), on the verge of pulling their money out of the sector and investing it elsewhere.

Top technology and investment experts, like Larry Ellison, Vinod Khosla, Greg Lamond and many other illuminaries now subscribe to the mediocrity of the current state of venture, with Mike Moritz (GP Sequioa) stating venture has been underperforming for 20 years. I agree.

Direct and circumstantial evidence suggests that the venture business needs a major overhaul, to ensure that the assets of the Limited Partners (money) are effectively lined up with the unwavering assets of the entrepreneur (innovation). Just because the intermediary "dating" service (VC) is broken does not mean we should lead to conclude supply (LP) and demand (entrepreneur) side participants are.

LPs are still looking to deploy high-risk/high-yield commitments and entrepreneurs are still coming up with highly disruptive ideas. The economic marketplace where those transactions occur is simply structurally ineffective.

Opportunity

Technology venture should be producing premium returns because of:

Its infancy, 5/6 of the worlds population is not connected via broadband, exposing a massive greenfield of new unexplored market opportunities.
Relatively (compared to other sectors) low cost of production, software applications and services require no physical manufacturing.
Low cost of distribution, the internet distribution is effective and low cost (as long as the product is good enough).
Immediacy of customer fulfillment, the impact of internet applications is instant.
Independent ownership of the complete value-chain from idea-to-customer means the risk to success is highly predictable.

I cannot think of a better asset class or sector where the development of an idea can lead so quickly to immediate and widespread customer impact. Unlike biotech or greentech, the attributes of technology venture are such that they will produce returns compatible with the 5-10 year lifecycle of those funds. That is if the market intermediary makes the right choices, guided by relevant experience.

Solution

We can all argue until we are blue in the face as to what is a great venture investment strategy, and I certainly have my opinions. But none of that matters. What matters is to create success for those that put assets to work, financial success to the LP and entrepreneurial success to the inventor. What matters is merit not rethoric.

Venture investing needs to move from an artificially restricted market to a free-market in which the transparency of, and to all participants identifies and perpetuates the ever changing meritocracy of innovation.

That means all participants need to adopt free-market principles so that the merit of their work, not an artificially privileged status distinquishes them from others. Such is the necessary, sustainable and thriving foundation for innovation and capitalism.

No one will be able to hide, and the marketplace as a whole will automatically give preference to those participants and their transactions that build real success. Only capitalism based on merit is sustainable long-term.

Above is a simplified chart that depicts the venture marketplace. For those unfamiliar: LPs invest in VC funds who, by virtue of a lead GP invests in the startup of an entrepreneur. LPs set aside a predetermined commitment to the VC fund and GPs make capital calls when required by their investments into startups. GPs allocate a certain runway for startups and at funding time stage their investment in investment rounds to mitigate risk. At M&A or IPO cash is returned to the VC in exchange for the equity position and VC returns a part of those funds (minus management fees and other reserves) back to the LPs.

Transparency leads to meritocracy

To enable a meritocracy the marketplace needs to enforce full transparency to all of its participants. At the transaction level by GP, not by VC firm. More important than to feed the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the marketplace itself (not a government agency) will then govern its own success:

LPs need to disclose their commitments, how much is drawn, when, running returns and include the fund maturation date
GPs need to disclose which companies they invest in, how much and at what valuation
Entrepreneurs need to disclose what exit returns they produce

I realize that type of transparency will get VCs all riled up, they recently testified to congress as such. As protectionists of their current walled-gardens they fear that such disclosure would challenge their competitive stance. Exactly, and that is what we want.

Because today the cartel VCs have formed around their collective wisdom, outdated execution and dismal returns prevent really smart entrepreneurs from participating in venture transactions to begin with. If VCs believe so firmly in the proprietary value-add of their services to the investment process, why would they be afraid to disclose everything but their secret sauce. Investment dollars into a company can be derived from other sources, but is very cumbersome if not impossible to retrofit to the exact origination and source in the marketplace model.

LPs would have less of a problem disclosing such information and many, like pension funds, already do. But they will need to firm up that reporting to the standards of the marketplace, not an incomplete disclosure that does not match up with that of its peers.

Not public is not private

Economically and to minimize abuse, all companies should be transparent to some extent, including private companies at least to meet the above described marketplace requirements.

Not all transparency is created equal, in a marketplace the transparency needs to be provided to all participants; LPs, VCs and entrepreneurs in the same fashion. Not just in case of suspected abuse and post-mortem to the SEC, since that kind of transparency does little to promote marketplace merit.

In the same way banks are supposed to report certain transactions above $5,000 should we disclose the investments in private companies above a certain threshold. In other places outside the U.S. (such as Europe) private companies already need to abide to certain disclosures, paving the way for meritocracy.

Entrepreneurs are often proud to disclose how much money their idea generated were it not for acquirers, who afraid of competition often press for non-disclosure. Yet those numbers will now come out of the new marketplace, and competition as a vital ingredient for exits is re-established as well.

Once we have the fundamental transparency of the marketplace in place, the following benefits will surface almost immediately (especially when we apply this transparency retroactively):

We will know which VC actually has money to deploy, and entrepreneurs will not be wasting precious cycles
We will know which VC actually has a reputation of building successful companies
We will know which GP actually has earned the reputation to sit on a board
We will know which GP actually has the foresight and credentials to invest in upside rather than downside
We will know the merit of GP vision, specialties and domain experience
The meritocracy of investments will support the long-tail of ideas rather than regurgitate its commodization

The merit of all participants will be disclosed, by virtue of their investment in success.

Low burden change, immediate impact

The goal of this plan is to serve the risk/reward needs of LPs and connect that with highly disruptive innovation from great entrepreneurs. No drastic changes need to be made to the current investment model. No drastic change in the investment pace needs to take place until the meritocracy demonstrates otherwise.

Transparency to all participants will act as the dynamic referee in an ever changing venture business. Compared to the past, merit will now closely follow and support the change of innovation, rather than remain stale and outdated. And the meritocracy of the marketplace will also determine whether or not the venture business is too large, too small, or just right. But it would be highly inaccurate and irresponsible to make those decisions based on the workings of the venture business today.

How you can help

I am already working with individual LPs to familiarize them with the specific rollout of this plan, and I invite others to participate (contact us here). I also extend a hand to VCs, some of whom have responded, to become be part of the solution. I would like nothing more for us, as participants to the venture business to solve our own problems, without the need for government intervention.

The venture business is too important to our economy (for the reasons mentioned above) and we owe it to the entrepreneurs (across the world) to build a financial system that supports the merits of their intellectual brainpower.

Join me in this effort and feel free to spread the word, syndicate this blog (with proper attribution and link-back) and retweet. Let's make positive change happen.

The telephone-game of derivatives

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-10-05T10:28:48-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

One of the most important traits of a great person, great CEO and great investor is the unrelenting pursuit of the truth and a firm ignorance for anything else. The truth in a world that is full of smoke and mirrors, stemming from an unconnected era in which the creation of heaps of walled gardens would go unnoticed to unsuspecting participants.

Even though we don't like to admit it, we as grownups still play the telephone game frequently, in which a chain of derivatives regularly degrades the truth.

But those days are slowly coming to an end, as the internet with the free-market principles it aims to deploy, and social networking as its unforgiving arbitor is steadily eroding misplaced authenticity and trust (see Trust is the currency of success).

Most people reading this blog will think of derivatives as a financial instrument first, but our world is chockfull of others that invade our lives from every corner. The dictionary definition holds a clue:

adjective : imitative of the work of another person, and usually disapproved of for that reason
noun: something that is based on another source, an arrangement or instrument (such as a future, option, or warrant) whose value derives from and is dependent on the value of an underlying asset

Sound decision-making comes from a clear understanding of the difference between fact and derivative. Below are examples of everyday derivatives and the impact they have on their surroundings. Some may be shocking, but I promise will yield incredible new focus and progress if simply ignored.

Markets

Markets don't exist, we covered a whole blog about it. Read it please. Customers do not buy products because they associate or belong to a derivative descriptor of a market. They buy because the marketplace (a mechanism to buy) offers the best opportunity to serve their (often complex) individual needs. So, go ahead and thrown away your industry and market segmentation or market-share leapfrog strategies. They are worthless.

Venture Capitalists

In the investment equation between the assets of a Limited Partner (money) and the assets of the entrepreneur (idea), venture capital is merely a dating service (with no assets to speak of) that establishes the transaction of the marketplace, a financing round. While Venture Capital (VC) behaves as if it is the originator of assets and the creator of value, LPs are actually the ones that deploy the commitments to the creation of value by the entrepreneur. Contrary to their testimony to congress, VCs did not create millions of jobs, LPs did by deploying their monetary assets. While VCs force entrepreneurs to buy into their (steadily commoditizing) investment wisdom, more than 90% of those wisdoms do not pan out. An entrepreneur is better off to ignore VC advice altogether and pursue the creation of real value to its customers. Fundraising is a lot easier that way.

Psychologists

Many people seek solace in the interaction with a psychologist to solve relationship problems or otherwise. While an outside perspective may be liberating at times, a sustainable solution based on a derivative opinion is highly unlikely. Spend more time with the people you have relationship problems with, than your psychologist. Because the stories you tell him are themselves derivatives.

TV Journalists

CNN today is a prime example of a network that has gone from reporting the news (expensive) to regurgitating the news with hordes of consultants (inexpensive), delivering derivatives of the news rather than the news itself. CNN has moved from a real new source to a commodity entertainment channel, eroding and consistently being beaten at its home turf. Ignore the regurgitation by derivatives and you'll save precious time of your day.

The Stock Market

The stock market is an exchange but not a marketplace in the free-market definition of it. As if the performance, long and short, of a company can be derived from something as simple as price-to-earnings ratios. Public CEOs know how to dance the dance, market to those numbers and become short term focused to meet Wall Street expectations. Yet long term and macro-economic differentiation that requires investments (expense) is arguably more important than meeting the quarterly drill of meaningless earnings reports. The performance of stock is a derivative of the short-sellers view of the performance of the company, and by definition inaccurate. And so are the investment decisions derived from them.

Money

The dollar is not worth the paper it is written on. It merely communicates the value of trust attached to that piece of paper. And even though that money can buy you great things, it matters whether it is acquired from a foundation of trust. Cash is not king, trust is. Easy money has a way of punishing its acquirers in un-expecting and fleeting ways, hard earned money amplifies itself consistently. So, money is a derivative of trust, and someone with a lot should not automatically be confused with authenticity and trustworthiness. Earn money the hard way and you'll be rewarded for life. Money can be a derivative of trust, but with financial derivatives eleven times the size of production should not be confused with trust itself.

There are many more derivatives I can talk about. But the purpose of this blog is to make you think. Hopefully the next time you spend time with someone, you will ask yourself the following question: is that person claiming to be the authority of derivatives or the authority of truth. The answer will define your success.

The nitwits on Sand Hill Road

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-10-02T03:02:04-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I could not help but chuckle (again) when Oracle's 30-year-running CEO, Larry Ellison (full disclosure) fiercely yelled out the words from the title of this blog, referring to the artificial arbitration of innovation applied by Venture Capitalists (VCs) we talk about in this blog so often.

Sand Hill Road, for those unfamiliar is the street in Menlo Park, California where the majority of Silicon Valley VC enjoy some of the most expensive office rent in the country and invite their often starving entrepreneurs to "beg" for money. The area is considered the birthplace of Venture Capital.

Larry goes on to say that Venture Capitalists think that innovation is like coming up with a new technology buzzword, expressing his specific dismay with the term cloud computing (watch the Churchill Club interview on YouTube, skip to 47:53 min if you don't like boating).

The reason why I bring that up is four-fold:

Entrepreneurs are subject to this artificial arbitration (that is applied with the seasonality and commonality of fashion) as the primary method to get their high growth company funded. Entrepreneurs think that "wisdom" leads to success, yet deplorable VC returns prove otherwise.
Limited Partners (LPs) seem to respond commensurate with their limited allocation in venture (usually less than 15% of total allocation) and their natural inclination is to rest with the excuses (we debunked) from VCs, who never fail to reiterate that cyclical behavior of the financial markets and the economy are to blame for the deplorable returns in venture.
VCs are downplaying the systemic risk of this artificial arbitration (applied by the venture investor cartel) to our government, stating that $200B of venture investments pose less systemic risk than other asset classes, while completely ignoring that their behavior kills the meritocracy and innovative culture our country was founded upon.
Other VCs in the country (and around the world) copy the tactics of Silicon Valley investors, with similar results awaiting them.

But feel free not take my word for it. Agreeing with Larry Ellison, Mike Moritz, one of Silicon Valley's most lauded VCs was recently heard saying the Venture Capital business has been broken for twenty years. So do similarly successful venture peers Vinod Khosla and Greg Lamond, who believe - like we do - that when the risk is sucked out of investing, one should not expect great returns.

Still not listening? Stanford, Yale, Harvard and Princeton universities all appear to be suffering from significant losses to their endowment as a result of investments in "alternative" assets, which includes venture capital. To combat, according to PE Hub, Stanford has just raised a $1 billion in a bond offering last April in case of a “true emergency".

By the way: with those Ivy League universities having bred the most renowned economists and professors in entrepreneurship does anyone question whether their expertise is worth the tuition? Are the experts really what they claim?

How much exactly of that depressing news can be contributed to the performance of Venture Capital is not clear to me today (Hedge funds and Private Equity are the most common other assets) yet reports from both CalPERS and CalSTRS pension funds suggest a lackluster contribution of VC across the venture spectrum.

Deaf? Many of my peers in executive positions at Apple, Cisco, Oracle, HP, eBay refuse to enter the venture fray in which the equilibrium of entrepreneur and investor is completely out of whack. The cyclical nature of the downward sub-prime spiral continues to rear its ugly head. The only entrepreneurs that submit to sub-prime investments today are as sub-prime as their investors, incapable of building great fund performance.

The alarm bells are ringing. Limited Partners need to wake up, simply because of the loud reverberation of a vast preponderance of circumstantial evidence. It is time for LPs to listen, not to popular opinion from the people who got them in this financial debacle in the first place, but to people who offer ideas that simply serve entrepreneurs better. The time for change is now.

Passively waiting for consensus on data driven views is guaranteed to lead us to what Larry referred to as an L-shape recovery in the venture business.

VC performance, a closer look

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-09-21T12:05:53-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I decided to do a little deep dive after I reviewed the CalPERS alternative assets performance posted by PEHub's Dan Primack, to help entrepreneurs get a better understanding of who they may be talking to when raising their next round of funding. While in the relationship between entrepreneur and VC the utmost transparency of the entrepreneur is demanded, VCs often bask in the glory of darkness.

For those who do not know, CalPERS is one of the largest state pension funds in the United States with a large alternative asset allocation (north of $53B over the last twenty years), the majority of it dedicated to venture investing, both directly into VC funds and indirectly through fund-of-funds.

Why half transparent is in-transparent

The CalPERS performance report may comply to the government's mandate for transparency, but still lacks the full transparency needed to understand whether or not CalPERS is making real money in the venture sector.

Here is why the numbers cannot be used to represent CalPERS performance:

Size of commitments may be larger due to exclusion of terminated relationships (no reason specified)
Actual yield may be inaccurate due to lack of standardized VC performance metrics
Actual yield may be inaccurate due to J-Curve and varying fund vintages
Actual yield may be inaccurate due to difference between commitments, cash-in and cash deployed
Actual yield may be inaccurate due to varying definition and timing of remaining value per fund
Actual yield may be inaccurate due to the exclusion of terminated commitments

What we can surmize is that the total size of commitments to the alternative assets as of March 31st, 2009 is at least the size depicted in the chart, and the yield percentage in my chart is a simple calculation based on the actual amount of cash put into the VC fund (unbiased by the remainder of commitments from CalPERS to the fund). Only the most "meaningful" returns, the returns from pre-2005 vintages have been included in this analysis.

So, while we cannot discern from the report how CalPERS is managing the alternative assets, we can get an overview of how CalPERS evaluates the performance of the commitments it has on the books.

Individual VC performance(*)

The simplest way to evaluate any financial performance is to calculate the difference of money-in versus money-out. We then calculate a yield as the difference between money-out and money-in as a percentage of money-in.

A positive yield means the fund is on track to return all of the money it has drawn, plus that percentage above zero. A negative yield means the fund is losing that percentage of the money drawn (yet depending on vintage it may still have enough capital commitment or return value left to recover from those losses).

The point I am making here is simple, just like VCs want entrepreneurs to explain their ups and downs in their career, it make sense that based on the reporting provided by CalPERS, entrepreneurs start asking questions about the ups and downs of VC as well. Bad money is rampant in the venture business and knowing who sits across the table is pertinent to the chances of success for an entrepreneur.

Furthermore, funds that remain under 10 or even 20% at the end of their vintage are subject to increased scrutinity by Limited Partners (LPs) as they do not outperform the other asset classes LPs can deploy money to. LPs do not need to take risk that is out of sync with the rewards or worse, they do not need to deploy money at all in certain cases. Apart from performance, entrepreneurs should also be aware of the fund vintage a VC General Partner is investing out of, to ensure an exit is not solely driven by the unilateral urge to produce desperate VC returns.

Entrepreneur, consider yourself informed:

(*) Performance numbers listed here are subject to change, depending on fund type, vintage and many other cash-flow reporting factors.

How to set and ask for valuations

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-09-15T02:12:51-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Everytime I see the quarterly reports from Fenwick & West on Silicon Valley valuations I cringe. Not because the report is wrong, but because I know how entrepreneurs and Venture Capitalists (VC) use the valuation medians (that have gone down again) in the report to establish their starting, or worse their ending negotiation positions. And they are both so wrong.

First off, valuations are never to be discussed by entrepreneurs before an alignment of the grand vision with the VC is established. Whether or not the VC is the right partner has everything to do with a shared vision of the upside potential of the company, at the outset excluding the potential of the newfound company's ability to execute on that promise.

No precedent

In many ways VCs discussing their allegiance to Silicon Valley medians is a testament of what a cookie-cutter business early-stage venture investing has become. Great investments (in truly disruptive innovations) have no precedents and neither do their valuations. Compliance to median valuations is an early detection of a sub-prime investor juggling with an equally sub-prime and subordinate entrepreneur.

Don't step up

Years of sub-prime investing (that has yielded equally sub-prime Limited Partner returns), by inexperienced technology investors have dumbed down the investment thesis to incremental rather than disruptive innovations. That is perhaps the biggest problem venture-investing faces today. The "step-up" approach to investing yields insufficient exit values and allows technology prospects (and acquirers) in less attractive economic circumstances (personal, local or global) to wait until the dust settles and delay their buying decisions for the next step of that incremental development.

As Ray Lane, former COO of Oracle and now partner at VC fund KPCB in remarkable honesty once declared: "[Oracle] customers would have been better of skipping client/server altogether" describing posthumously the problem of "step-up" innovations best.

Step-up innovations are highly unlikely to generate the $300M+ exits needed to build a decent VC fund return and leaves the VC after the "honeymoon" with a majority stake in the company, unwilling to wait for further miracles and because of the urge to produce cumulative vintage-fund-returns for LPs, to sell out at any price. Many subprime VCs hope that the sum of all tiny subprime returns still yields something of value, rather than chase the best outcome for each portfolio company independently. With a lack of exits (of their own making) those same VCs now use cumulative portfolio company revenue reporting to demonstrate to LPs that they are building value, and deserve another chance when "exit-markets" miracularly recover. Cumulative portfolio revenues is a poor man's defense of venture capital.

Think big, or go home

So, the first step to setting a great valuation for an entrepreneur is to ensure the idea is truly disruptive. Disruptive not from a relative perspective (compared to existing competitors) but an absolute perspective. Absolute disruption does not care about competitors, because there are none.

Absolute innovation relies on a greenfield of 5/6th of the worlds population that is not (efficiently) served with technology products today, but should. Low hanging fruit is the application of technology where a need is already defined, just not with the implementation of technology. Many ideas come to mind and marketplaces are fundamental, and I would love to hear about your ideas.

The unfortunate aspect of today's early-stage venture investment climate is that investors who recognize disruptive innovation are hard to find, not in the least because few fund structures are designed to chase them.

Glass half-empty valuations

Many venture investors (I should know, I lived in Palo Alto amongst them for 15 years) cannot detect innovation until they spot it in their rearview mirrors. Replicas or step-ups of a handful of sector investment success still creates an ocean of delayed me-too investments with mediocre exits, steadily decreasing the confidence in venture investing as a high yield asset sector for Limited Partners.

Smaller funds, lower valuations and risk averse investments have led to VCs and their syndicates huddling together in what I would classify as an informal investor cartel. An investment cartel that uses (the inappropriate) technology segmentation as an artificial standard for the lowest valution they can get away with. Hence the reason why entrepreneurs should not expect or shop around for higher valuations; you will be snitched on.

I refer to those investments as downside valuations, since they are based on the average choices and (lackluster) performance of past investments by all investors, not the unique marriage between the individual investor and entrepreneur. It is also a downside valuation because it is based on the lowest cost-to-entry, rather than geared towards the highest chance of success.

Downside valuations are easy to spot. Regardless of the problem the entrepreneur aims to solve, his company value is improperly correlated to the underlying technology architecture or technology categorization.

Glass half-full valuations

Truly disruptive innovation however, is priceless. If as an investor I believe an entrepreneurial idea can feasibly claim access to a monolithic $1B+ revenue opportunity, the difference between putting $10M, $20M or $50M in the runway and therefor the valuation is somewhat irrelevant (assuming the fund is big enough). The confidence required from both entrepreneur and VC comes from the words of Albert Einstein: "Imagination is more important than knowledge." Imagination, just like in Einstein's case, ofcourse guided by experience.

So when, and only when, the grand vision of the entrepreneur fits the imagination of the investor should further discussion take place around upside valuations. In our book not many of today's VC investments would fit the profile of disruptive innovation and so upside valuation calculations would not apply. Upside valuations differ in granularity and exact makeup for every investment opportunity but goes roughly like this:

Upside valuation = 30% of total-addressable-market divided by investment risk to get there.

Total-addressable-market is a subject I can write a book about. Most technology companies are embroiled in a short term rat-race (to feed quarterly earnings hunger to Wallstreet) and spend very little time on the wide open greenfield opportunities that take a little longer to plan. Lets take computer security software as an example.

Symantec and McAfee attempt to leapfrog each other in this space, with Symantec for now taking the top spot (primarily due to a plethora of acquisitions) from a revenue perspective. Yet by our latest estimate more than 40 spam and virus vendors exists, and on top of that, the majority of computer users do not use any security software at all. So the pursuit of delivering a truly effective product in a highly inefficient market makes a ton of sense, even though most investors would qualify the security market as saturated. Clearly it is not.

There are many examples of ineffectively served segments, many which current investors are unable to attract, by virtue of their structure, lack of relevant experience and operating credentials. The definition of investment risk in the aformentioned equation is multi faceted. Investment risk consists of the following broad stroke categories, in no particular order:

Inroads
Patents
Management team
Runway required
Business roadmap
Business model
Dependencies
Timing
Flex power
Customer experience
Product evolution

Without going into detail about each category (beyond the scope of this blog), the report card on those issues determines the amount of discount applied to the total-addressable-market. It simply discounts the probability of reaching market leadership (losely defined as 30% ownership), by the proprietary risk assessment of the investor.

Counter to the glass-half-empty valuations, the glass-half-full valuation method does not challenge the absolute value of the idea, it merely discounts the value with the work that needs to be done to build a real business out of it. In many cases, again assuming the idea is truly innovative, even an aggressively applied discount does not lead to a majority stake in the portfolio company, as it shouldn't.

In a modern world a great marriage means you do not own your wife, just like in a great investment you do not own the business. Neither of them work very well when exorbitant pressure is applied.

Upside valuations are applied to take calculated risk, the risk that makes Venture Capital as an asset class segment so different yet so much more rewarding than traditional Private Equity. Disruptive innovation is priceless and nowadays may consist of many other attributes that just a piece of code. Yet to achieve upside valuations entrepreneurs need to prove that the value of their idea is not the technology itself but the application of technology to a marketplace.

Ask, never give a valuation first

When an investor likes an entrepreneurial proposition they will invariably ask for a valuation, unless the pitch did not strike a chord. Under no circumstances should an entrepreneur mention a valuation first, as this is the entrepreneur's most powerful instrument to verify the authentic alignment with the assets, skills and imagination of the investor. Money talks.

Asking the investor for a valuation is like asking a customer to buy, crucial to the closing process. If the investor's valuation is out of sync (most commonly negatively) with the realistic, yet unspoken expectation from the entrepreneur it is time to walk away. The alignment on valuation speaks volumes about the entrepreneur's future and the equilibrium of entrepreneur and investor on a deal moving forward. It means that just like in marriage both parties are in it for the right reasons.

So, an investor who does not want to talk about the value of the upside is an investor from which you should expect nothing but a downside valuation, similar to the many others in his portfolio. Entrepreneurs should avoid getting stung by sub-prime VC at any cost (including shelving the idea for better times), because money from the wrong investor is a dead-end street anyway.

Valuations are fantastic instruments to gauge (from the beginning) if the entrepreneur and investor are meant for each other. The outcome should be like the innovation; priceless or else both parties are just wasting their time.

How to remove the systemic risk of our economy

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-09-10T17:14:46-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I was delighted to hear Barack Obama yesterday describe a marketplace mechanism as the platform for improving the meritocracy of healthcare, something I have talked about with regards to economies, venture investing and technology products for the last two years. I can only muse that the recent vists from Axelrod and Clinton to our blog delivered some inspiration for the change we need to undergo as a country. Perhaps one of my readers was right, I should be running things in Washington. But enough about me.

Our greatest assets

We should be proud to live in a country that has repeatedly earned its stripes as a staunch democratic and a fierce capitalistic nation at the same time. Each individually breaking new ground in creating building blocks for a more effective economy. We are blessed that way. Not all countries in the world have both assets represented in a single economy and their imbalance makes them more vulnerable.

More vulnerable than we are, for we can quickly swing either way and tap into those resources to correct a temporal imbalance that threatens our economy. With the rest of the world watching over our shoulder, learning from our resolve.

Artificial segregation is our biggest problem

Just like how we are still extremely racially divided (I should know) do we remain politically divided. We act as if we live under seperate roofs on a single property, sharing a bathroom through which we regularly flush the disdain for each other, in subtle and not so subtle ways. Whites against blacks, democrats against republicans, opponents of regulations against proponents of regulation, proponents of gun control versus opponents of gun control, etc. Idian reservations with autonomous rulings are a stark reminder of how we allow segregation to perpetuate.

We often take a hard stance by associating ourselves prematurely to an (artificial) association, without re-evaluting our actual stance based on the acute problem that is being presented. I could categorize myself in any of the aforementioned groups depending on the economic problem at hand and may want to change my mind at any time based on timing and perhaps my deeper understanding of the issue. The timing and situation would define my choices, not a party line.

We are all right

Monolithic democratic societies and monolithic capitalistic societies simply don't work, history has proven that out. Pure democracies (I should know given my country of birth) are known for their endless debates where everyone has a voice that eventually yields nothing but burgeoning baggage of complacency. Pure capitalistic societies are driven by classic neanderthal behavior, where the biggest stick gets rid of everything in its way and drives the majority of less fortunate and lucky to dispair.

For years have we benefitted from the surplus of democratic and capitalistic assets while ignoring the deficiencies in both. Now, the state of our economy forces us to illuminate and evaluate all the pluses and minuses.

Meritocracy = democracy + capitalism

We need our economy to be an organic reflection of the current opinions and capacity of our people, not a delayed distortion field of vintage parties, segments or groups. We need to combine the value of our democratic and capitalistic assets and get rid of the deficits of both.

Mathematically put: opinions plus actions minus complacency minus abandonement equals a meritocracy. And a meritocracy is the product of free-market principles (extensively described in my previous blogs). Free in terms of equal access to all participants, supply and demand.

Just like in the Venture business, politicians better prove that they accurately represent the meritocracy of opinions from the people (all people, not just the ones that vote). If not, replacement and removal of politicians will soon be upon them soon. They better stop bickering about party lines and start worrying about why the majority of people in the US still don't vote (36.8% voter turnout).

Perhaps technology can help shape up politicians by building a ballot marketplace in which for certain decisions, the house of representatives, senate and president can directly tap into the opinions from the people they represent.

Our financial system is not a meritocracy

Barack explained why healthcare is not a meritocracy yet needs to be, and if you read my marketplace blogs you would not be surprised to find that our stock-markets are not meritocracies either. Stock-markets, the way they work today, violate fundamental supply and demand rules associated with free-markets. The foundation of our financial system (copied around the world) is based on the same artificial arbitration as healthcare, posing a systemic risk to our economy.

Testament of the misalignment in our financial system is its size; an exorbitant 11-times the size of the businesses it represents (2008 Wikipedia). That means that the size, performance and characteristics of our financial system is far removed from the size, performance and characteristics of the underlying businesses. It also means we have become a nation built on gamblers rather than on value creators, and that too poses a high risk to our economy.

So, to remove the systemic risk of our economy we need to remove most derivatives (similar to parties and associations in politics) and create a marketplace (which is macro-economically not the same as an exchange) in which the meritocracy of ideas meets with as few financial derivatives as possible. That will re-ignite the innovative culture our country was founded upon, as it tears down the artificial arbitration that prevented a meritocracy of ideas from taking shape in the first place.

We need a transparent, trustworthy and flatter economy if we want to protect its vibrant future.

VC is dead, long live VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-09-02T18:20:00-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I read Bill Gurley's article on "What is really happening to the Venture Capital Industry" and submited my reply. While his article provides a decent explanation of the mechanics of Venture Capital (VC) today, especially for entrepreneurs who want to get to know the workings of VC better, it (again) offers no clues as to how it should work. Those of us working in the venture sector know how LP allocations work, the important question is (just like with innovation): what should a brighter future look like. And Bill's article falls very short on that.

VC is not an industry

Far from merely an excusable slip of the pen, the self serving pronouncement in the title of Bill's article is indicative of how many Venture Capitalists see themselves; as the center of the universe of innovation. A balsy statement for VCs to make considering that they hold no assets (I'll explain). Some of them go even further by correlating their, should I repeat dismal performance to the capacity of disruptive innovation and even the lack of great entrepreneurs.

It is true that VC should be the most effective way to get early stage innovation out of the gate. The reality is that in many cases VC is not, and has not proven to deliver the promised value. Some describe the VC sector as broken, others blame it on mechanics, or a too large VC pool, or mega funds, or a sudden lack of exits, or the economy, or anything else they can hang their hat on - with the media having a field day delving into the pros and cons of every argument.

And with money to distribute, the articles from VCs - who created the problem in the first place - gain most of the popular momentum. At this point do we really believe their analysis is credible? But that is why you are now reading this blog too, so lets continue...

Innovation is a marketplace (continued)

Venture Capital is the arbitrator in the marketplace of innovation connecting the assets of Limited Partners (money) with the assets of entrepreneurs (ideas), both collectively referred to as marketplace participants (supply and demand). Simplified, the VC makes choices and investments (and yes, regulates) on behalf of the LP in return for equity in the assets of entrepreneurs (ideas and execution), of which at exit VC gets a commision (the carry and then some).

For any marketplace to thrive, the needs of supply and demand participants have to be satisfied. Only then will each participant come back for more (and tell their friends).

LPs expect the venture sector to outpace their other (often less risky) asset allocations and entrepreneurs want to change the world and get rich while doing it (in that order). LPs have not seen more than 10% IRR over the last 10 years from VCs (there are other measurements of VC failures) and smart entrepreneurs shelve their ideas because of unfavorable funding conditions and fundamental misalignment between VC and entrepreneurs (also read my blog Idiot CEOs).

The self-regulatory nature of marketplaces has started; new LPs and entrepreneurs refuse to enter and many currently active LPs and entrepreneurs will take their losses and leave. If the rules of engagement do not change, money hungry entrepreneurs who continue to submit to sub-prime VC will stay, supported by non-discretionary LPs who have the patience to wait for miracles. Unchanged, the future of disruptive innovation is bleak.

Long live the VC

But although the marketplace (in its current incarnation) may and should die, its participants never will. There will always be a need to deploy high-risk/ high-yield assets and there will always be entrepreneurs that can produce disruptive innovation. All it takes is a new marketplace in which the meritocracy of ideas from entrepreneurs is matched with discretionary support from LPs.

The matchmaker in that marketplace better be a VC who understands that simply serving one participant, while depressing the needs of the other will inevitably lead to removal of the arbitrator status in the marketplace. Only a VC with vision who understands free-market principles, and satifies LPs and entrepreneurs simultaneously can generate the meritocracy of ideas that are priceless.

VC is here to stay, but the overinflated personalities with no authentic value-add will be kicked to the curb. For LPs and entrepreneurs it will take some time to recognize which VC is on his way out and which one is on his way in. 7-10 Year VC fund vintages with lack of transparency will do that to you.

But if you read my blogs carefully (or ask my advice) you will learn to spot them from a mile away.

Why innovation needs regulation

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-08-21T08:17:17-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

A ban on advertisement of healthcare drugs on national television in The Netherlands. Free public phone calls in Singapore, just a one-time 10 cent connection charge. Mandatory health inspections in restaurants in North Carolina, with regularly updated door-posted scorings. Those are great examples of how government regulations provides better quality of life to its citizens.

But in the United States we generally balk at any form of government regulation as if it is poised to erode the freedom we set out to create. It makes for good press to publicly support a free world and anarchy rather than the opposite. Being a freedom fighter is good karma.

Regulation is not an option, but a requirement

But regardless of government involvement our world is riddled with self imposed regulations. We stop when pedestrians cross the road (regardless of whether they should), and show more respect to elderly than we are often given. We raise kids as best as we know how, and send them to the best schools we can afford. Most of us are decent people who respectfully comply to our individual interpretation of the definition of decency; a set of self-imposed regulations.

Regulations, self-imposed or governed, are the foundation of free-market principles (see our extensive coverage on free-market principles in our blog entry Marketplace Rules). And free-markets only function well when they stimulate or enforce behavior that builds transparency and trust, pulling in new participants and thereby allowing the marketplace to grow itself.

Everything in life is a marketplace (in the macro-economic sense of the word). And we have the option to growth those marketplaces based on a meritocracy, or create excessive walled gardens that, when the impact on our economy becomes too big, risks the enforcement of regulations by our government.

Innovation is a marketplace

In large part early-stage innovation in The United States is fueled by the investment dollars from Limited Partners (LPs), allocating their money to invest in the ideas of the entrepreneurs, using Venture Capitalist (VC) as their conduit and decision maker. In the marketplace of innovation the LP and the entrepreneur represent supply and demand with the VC acting as the arbitrator of the marketplace.

The preponderance of evidence makes for a lousy marketplace in which the VC acts as the Emperor with no clothes:

Less than 10% IRR of the venture sector in the last ten years
Few truly disruptive innovations are born
The number of entrepreneurs are declining (according to Kauffman, see attached chart)
The number of LPs and investment dollars are declining

The VC as the systemic risk to innovation

It is ironic that so many VCs who are vehemently against government regulation (and put their efforts at attempting to stave it off) actually are themselves the ones that aggressively use arbitration to regulate (with their peers) the restrictions that are put upon the entrepreneurs. They collectively set standards on deal intake, technology focus, valuations, syndications, geographical proximity etc., and allow for very little deviation that is inherent to a marketplace meritocracy.

Simply put, VCs are the ones that violate many of the free-marketplace rules (stay tuned for a detailed deep-dive) and prevent the innovation marketplace from prospering, thereby inhibiting the creation of disruptive innovation.

Why we need new regulations

Frankly, we messed up and we should be ashamed of ourselves.

Innovation is a crucial ingredient to our economy, as explained in my previous blog entry The Systemic Risk of Venture Capital. We need to remain at the forefront of innovation for our immediate benefit and how we set an example for (not arbitrate) the rest of the world. Innovation has a big impact on GDP growth and spirit.

We, marketplace participants and government should do our part in fixing the innovation marketplace that is so sorely broken. Our government should force VCs to exhibit transparency (one aspect of marketplace rules). LPs should do a better job of hiring VCs with relevant early-stage operating experience to create more trust. The integrity of the new marketplace we create together will improve the integrity and quality of entrepreneurs it attracts.

We are responsible

The point I am making is that every marketplace requires pretty much the same amount of rules and regulations to instill transparency and trust, no matter where you apply that marketplace. The owners of the marketplace, by virtue of their performance, get to decide how much of those regulations they can deploy themselves. Bad performance with big economic stakes is punished by government intervention.

So, rather than to discourage and blame the government, we as marketplace participants should instead re-install the support for free-market principles in innovation that promotes the meritocracy, spirit and entrepreneurial capacity that this country was founded upon.

Stop blaming someone else and join me in this effort for the sake of our global competitiveness.

The Silicon Valley emperor has no clothes

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-08-08T17:24:05-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

In the words of Danish poet and author Hans Christian Andersen, Silicon Valley has become the emperor who wears no clothes. Many Venture Capitalists (VCs) like the emperor will hold their head high and continue their procession for the sake of protecting their management fees.

And even though more than 77% of funds will finagle themselves into the top quartile performance bracket (according to a recent study) and persuade LPs to hang on, the simple fact remains that very little disruptive innovation is born. And without disruptive innovation (and the risks that such innovation incurs) it is just a matter of time before the Limited Partners (LPs) recognize that the emperor's procession is coming to an end.

It continues to amaze me how certain people and organizations (specifically the NVCA, desperately hanging on to the past) continue to protect the failed "dating service" between the assets of the LPs and the assets of the entrepreneurs, and continue to blame external circumstances on the miserable performance (less than 10% IRR) from the last ten years.

A recent conversation with a Mercury News technology journalist confirms again how many VCs still blame their underperformance on anything else but themselves (see how we debunk their excuses). Another reason why the crop of current VCs could never be or align with entrepreneurs, real entrepreneurs would never stop until they get it right. If VCs are so entrepreneurial, why don't they innovate themselves out of this malaise?

How did we get here?

In the early days of VC, originating from Bill Draper's first innovative financing, the sector produced more than 40% IRR. New LPs, attracted by those generous returns, flocked to the sector and deployed massive amounts of money to VC, without properly validating the GPs relevant entrepreneurial credentials. And with VCs improperly calculating risk, the wrong companies are funded - in large numbers. With almost none of them able to fool private or public markets, regardless of the state of our economy. That's where we are today.

Innovation is not the problem

But just because the current VC "dating service" is broken that does not mean the LPs or the entrepreneurs should lose faith in the monetization of disruptive innovation. Both should simply seek to establish a more effective dating service, one that focuses and supports upside, rather than worry about downside risk.

Entrepreneurs should refuse to work with investors that improperly assess business risk, money from the wrong investor is a dead-end street anyway. But most influential will be the immediate action from LPs who should close their underperforming commitments (instead of flee), reset their fund requirements and require more relevant operating credentials from General Partners (Venture Capital requires more relevant early-stage credentials and vision than other Private Equity sectors).

New opportunities abound

With the foundation of technology established (chipsets and the internet) the next wave of innovation comes from platforms and applications (macroeconomic marketplaces), all of which can be developed anywhere. Combine that with the dysfunction of Silicon Valley VCs and you have the perfect storm of starting new entrepreneurial endeavors in other geographies.

Innovation should not and will not just come from Silicon Valley, but it will only thrive in the hands of investors who understand that the cost of disruptive innovation is priceless. So, simply starting technology innovation elsewhere is useless if it is not matched with an investor who has the experience and foresight to see what others don't: a unique innovation he wants to put his all behind.

The procession continues

The sheer size of LP commitments outstanding to the VCs will keep the emperors procession going for a while, and the VCs refusal to criticize themselves is a sign that it is incapable of recovery and self regulation. We need new VCs, with a new mindset and a different DNA to get there.

While there were more important reasons for me to move (with my family) to the East coast, I certainly do not regret not being there when the naked emperor continues his procession through Sand Hill Road. My focus will remain on helping LPs understand how to invest in Venture Capital and how to regenerate the impressive returns the sector is still capable of producing -- or show it to them myself.

We are after all at the beginning, not at the end of technology innovation.

Why VCs need relevant operating experience

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-07-18T16:00:19-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

[The article has been supplemented by a more recent "Why VCs really need relevant operational experience, now"]

I frequently get asked by individual Venture Capitalists (VCs) whether I really think General Partners (GPs) need operating experience to be more effective (as if my blog is not clear about that). And just recently HP's Venture Group seems to agree with me.

That topic was also recently challenged by Daniel Primack from Reuters' PEHub (I know he likes a good debate) who decided to make a statistical point that there is no correlation between fund success and GP operating experience.

Yet my short answer is: "yes, but it depends".

What my answer does not depend on is Daniel's statistical analysis of the Forbes Midas List and loosely matching credentials to his sample. With more than 90% of VC not making a real profit (above the asset class expectation of it), the 10% Midas sample can hardly be called statistically representative. And even if it would, a highly inefficient market (created by the ineffective "dating service" VCs currently provide) does not statistically represent the workings of the efficient market we wish for. And the majority of the Midas List GPs have their "success" firmly rooted in a timeframe when "turkeys could fly". Should I go on?

But most importantly, statistics are derivatives - not drivers - of market behavior, in the same way liabilities and assets are opposites (read "Rich Dad, Poor Dad"). It is unwise to apply a derivative (statistic) as a driver for market decisions. All experienced entrepreneurs know that.

So, my answer depends on whether you reference the actual or supposed workings of VC.

In today's VC

In today's venture capital ecosystem it is very important for every GP to have relevant operating experience, with the emphasis on relevant. Relevant experience as that of an early-stage CEO in tough times, still producing success.

Many GPs can only flaunt past experience from behind the confines of a large brand name conglomerate, rather than the experience of an early-stage CEO, investing his own money, defining a unique company ecosystem, living on borrowed time, raising a few rounds and selling the company. The VCs with that level of operating experience are hard to find and so are their successes.

Why is VC operating experience important:
1/ Many venture funded companies today are built with what I coin as the sub-prime VC model. Amongst many things it means founders need to prove a lot of technological capabilities (see my Khosla reference) before they see an investment dime, and when so, usually receive too little money to hire an experienced CEO. As a result, the board (of investors) runs the startup and thus their relevant operating experience becomes pivotal to the success of the startup.

2/ Relevant operating experience matters, not just any operating experience. Successful startups rely on a clear definition of a unique ecosystem (with divisional expenditures and conversion rates). The last thing an entrepreneur needs is a group of investors who can barely deviate from their business school thesis to meet reality and a world that is in flux.

3/ GPs need to be entrepreneurial to recognize and weigh one. The success of a technology startup is not just dependent on how cool the technology is but requires an operational assessment to figure out whether the business model is sustainable, and whether the application of that technology to a demographic makes economic sense. Operating experience is crucial to validate the combined value of operations and innovation.

I can name probably a hundred other reasons, but that would extend beyond the artificial limit of this blog and your patience.

In new VC

In a new VC structure I would argue for a more balanced makeup of economic managers and operational managers. But that structure can only work when all GPs share responsibility for every deal, rather than today's norm of every GP managing his own subset of companies within the portfolio. Many more things need to change in order for VCs to accurately calculate startup risk, snippets of which I've covered elsewhere in this blog and will cover extensively in my upcoming LP seminar "The Inconvenient Truth of Venture Capital".

Alignment with the entrepreneurs

So, until we change the fundamental workings of VC are we bound to hire GPs with relevant operating experience, those that combine that operating experience with the ability to accurately calculate upside risk and align with the entrepreneur.

But a VC firm without relevant operating experience is a risky investment (for LPs) and a bad strategic partner for the entrepreneur. The great difference between Private Equity and its sub-class Venture Capital is that the latter can create massive returns, albeit with GPs that are capable of recognizing a diamond-in-the-rough and performing a little bit of heavy lifting when needed or desired; by applying experience and influence.

That, as an operator, makes Venture Capital so much fun for me.

Why VC does not line up with innovation

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-07-01T15:04:32-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The biggest complaint I hear and agree with is that Venture Capitalists (VCs) just don't get it and in the words of a VP at Apple, VCs simply don't line up with the needs of entrepreneurs.

Real innovation has no precedent and leaves many VCs, with their platitudes and an army of analytics in the dark in coming up with a reliable reason to invest. I personally had a VC become teary-eyed about the prospect of having to convince the rest of his team about an investment I presented, and I subsequently got it funded elsewhere.

With monetary assets being equal, it takes a visionary or a black swan (whichever classification floats your boat) to separate the good investor from the bad. Great investors have a strong belief that finds solace in an internal compass that is fine-tuned by years of risk-taking. Risk-taking in entrepreneurship or personal life, whichever one shaped that core competency. We have many VCs with strong beliefs, but few of those beliefs are founded on relevant experience.

So, entrepreneurs (and LPs) take note of what is the most important ingredient to look for in the bios of General Partners (GPs). With few exceptions, a GP (General Partner) that has never been a CEO at a startup, responsible for developing and executing its unique ecosystem, is not a great candidate to become a VC. Neither is the GP who has never challenged him/herself personally.

Venture Capital is government

But not only are those investors hard to find, the physical makeup and workings of the current VC construct is diametrically contradicting the decision-making for groundbreaking innovation. As long as the meritocracy at the VC level of the investment pyramid that started Venture Capital is not restored, the artificial arbitration of the current aristocratic model will continue to erode high yield returns.

Here is how VC acts like government:

1/ You (still) need to be in Silicon Valley

Just like you need to be in DC to make an impact on politics, do you need to be within 20 minutes of Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park to be on the radar of investors.

2/ You need an intro to the VC

In DC you need lobbyists to get anywhere, in Silicon Valley you need to find similar lobbyists that can introduce you to the investor you want to talk to. Most GPs simply refuse to talk with entrepreneurs they have not met before. Entrepreneurs who contact VCs directly will find themselves debating the vision with an academic white swan, dramatically improving their chance to get rejected.

3/ Investment decisions require internal consensus

Politics is based on consensus. Likewise, if the entrepreneur is lucky to convince one GP of their proposition, the next monday morning meeting at the VC firm is spent on getting other GPs to agree (except if the first GP is of John Doerr stature). In essence it means a unique invention is shoved through a democratic (government) filter to be validated with chances of a majority vote rapidly approaching zero.

4/ Deal syndication requires external consensus

Many VCs don't have the balls (excusé les mots) to make independent contributions to companies and look for syndication to mitigate the risk. Just like in DC where politicians look for peers to join their charter, before they stick their necks out.

5/ Lack of accountability

VCs can hide behind the size of the portfolio to select one or two successes to brag about. Just like politicians that hide behind a party and associate themselves with many initiatives and get credit for the few that worked. Quite opposite to the devotion of an entrepreneur.

6/ Lack of transparency

To understand politics you need a graduate degree in the subject matter, to understand VC you need to be (or have been) one. Just because the type of businesses VC invests in are private, that doesn't mean VC needs to be.

7/ Far removed from its constituents

Not only physically but spiritually many politicians are far removed from their constituents when they enter into office. So are the VCs who prefer to congregate more with each other than with entrepreneurs to develop unique support for disruptive innovation. VCs are oblivious to the many "false negatives" (as described in my previous blog) they don't even get to see, just as many politicians forget that many americans don't vote at all.

8/ Fewer real innovations are born here

DC (at least before Barack) is not the place to get anything done, and Silicon Valley choking on a vast supply of sub-prime VC is not the place to get anything really disruptive done. The real world is the market, not the current VC interpretation of it.

9/ Long incubation periods

Just like in politics, once the GP secures a fund with the LP the performance of the fund is in limbo for 5-10 years. That is a more secure job than the presidency of the United States. Many GPs stack funds or jump ship before it is about to go under, picking up new management fees under a different fund and LP structure. Another 5-10 years of GP safety lies ahead.

10/ External circumstances

Just like in politics, VCs blame their underperformance on anything else but their own decision making. The state of the economy is their welcome excuse, even though startup economics are quite resilient to macro economic aberrations.

So, the point of this blog is to emphasize that in order to get VC to create high yield returns we not only need to take a close look at the GPs that take the risk but change the mechanics of VC from a "government" based system to a meritocracy at the VC level of the investment pyramid. That is the message I will develop further (and more constructively, I've hammered on VC enough) in helping individual LPs develop new relationships with VC firms.

The systemic risk of Venture Capital

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-06-25T10:18:54-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The debate is heating up about the impending regulations from the government applied to Private Equity (PE) and its sub-class Venture Capital (VC), fought by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) and reluctantly supported by the Private Equity Council (PEC). The latter stating that private equity does not represent a systemic risk. Perhaps not, if the council excludes VC from its membership, but VC as Private Equity poses a systemic risk as the gatekeeper to innovation.

Why the government is forced to step in

The government has decided to step in and we, as participants in the ecosystem should present our government with the facts (good and bad) so it can make informed decisions going forward. If we give the government self-serving information, rather than the facts, we will get punished by regulations that miss their intended target. So, now is the time to separate greed from honesty and shape the regulations that will be bestowed upon us.

The most rational explanation as to why the government is tightening our private equity belts came from Bob Grady, Managing Partner at The Carlyle Group (who worked for the government for a while) at the recent IBF conference. He suspects that the government simply wants to reduce the size of the financial services industry as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

Not unreasonable, considering the collapse of our financial system and the discovery of an endless supply of imploding derivatives (and vice-versa). Simply put, the equilibrium between people who create products and those that capitalize on them is out of whack. We need more innovation with fewer derivatives attached to them.

VC is a systemic risk

The creation and growth of the Internet (and all the components around it) could not have existed without the faith and dollars from Limited Partners (LP), deploying their assets through VC firms. Kudos to people like IBF life-time award winner Bill Draper who started Venture Capital by literally knocking on the door of an interesting company, buying his first shares for $20,000. But the last nine years have been dismal for VC performance, almost 900 U.S. VCs producing less than 10% IRR, tarnishing the technology ecosystem and prompting LPs to look around to reallocate money to a different asset class.

Why VC needs to work

While venture-backed companies represent around 0.02% of GDP prior to exit, post exit they represent about 18% of GDP (according to the NVCA) and 9% of jobs in America. So, the decision-making process by a VC of what company to invest in is vital to building a healthy economic conversion rate. And I predict information technology will claim a larger stake of GDP as it continues to mature from its infancy. So while VC is a small percentage of the total Private Equity pie invested, it has proven its ability to produce a healthy stimulus to the economy.

What has changed

We can look at the statistics from the NVCA and debunk those statistics with reality, but common sense tells us that most of us would be hard pressed to name ten ground-breaking technology innovations in the last ten years. So, if 900 VCs produce this few real innovations, the billowing smoke is sufficient indication of a fire. On top of that companies like Apple show us how to invest in categories (like music) VCs had unsuccessfully invested in for the last 10 years, challenging VC fundamentals to its core.

Proper assessment of investment risk

The problem with VC is that it is inherently risky (more than other forms of Private Equity) and with the wrong people running VC firms, the asset - risk - that produces great returns is being sucked out of the investment equation.

Smaller funds, feverish syndications, easy exits are all instruments that create more rather than less derivatives to the creation of disruptive value. VCs now sell to LPs a similarly ill-fated pattern of risk as sub-prime lenders sold to their investors. Hence our frequent use of the sub-prime VC classification throughout this blog.

As a result of a lack of meaningful segmentation and guard rails by many me-too VC funds, LPs have actually invested deep rather than wide in information technology (as the included chart points out). For the last nine years that has created a massive number of false positives and false negatives and a continued downward spiral that attracts only entrepreneurs that comply with this risk-deflated investment mold, rather than attract entrepreneurs with truly disruptive ideas (that hold their value in any economy). So, for the last 9 years LPs have invested deep in a risk-averse technology sector while they expected their 10-15% venture share of total allocations to be applied to the inverse.

Moving forward

Many LPs are ready to cut all but their top quartile VC funds from their portfolio by flushing them through (i.e. letting them run their course without re-upping new commitments). That means over the next 5 years we are going to see many VC firms disappear, some replaced with new VC firms with more relevant entrepreneurial pedigree and investment models that are as unique as the strategies of the entrepreneurs.

New regulations by the government and tougher practices by LPs will make our industry more transparent and aim to create a platform in which the old aristocratic VC model will be replaced by a model that supports a meritocracy at every level of the investment pyramid. That is a fantastic development for entrepreneurs and VCs who are attracted by - and deserve - the merit.

Big stakes, big returns, fewer players, better innovation

LPs expect bigger returns (before larger commitments) from their allocation in venture and the only way to get it is to deploy risk. VC is designed to be the intermediary between the LP and the entrepreneur to mitigate that risk for LPs. Yet because of the aforementioned commoditization of VC investment strategies the VC model has failed to produce.

With LPs retrenching (to perhaps another asset class), the VC firm that wants to survive better articulate a clearly differentiated investment strategy with new GPs that can recognize and attract more disruptive (and sustainable) innovation, knows how to commit and helps make its portfolio companies work.

A new day

To create better returns for LPs, VCs need to rethink how to pick better companies with more disruptive (and sustainable) innovation and invest in upside rather than downside. The smart entrepreneurs are out there (we talk to them), waiting patiently for the right investment climate to light up their flame. Remember, great innovation can afford to be patient.

Venture Capital as the derivative in the investment pyramid between the assets of the LPs (money) and the assets of the entrepreneur (innovation) needs to provide a better service to both parties (or else it will be tossed out as a "dating service").

Until we fix VC, will it remain a systemic risk to our asset class, economy and frankly our reputation as the most innovative country in the world.

How LPs should deal with VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-06-15T17:17:04-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Last week's 20th anniversary of IBF Venture Capital Investing Conference (congrats to Alex Scott and Christina Riboldi) in San Francisco was a unique opportunity for me to witness the atmosphere between 487 Limited Partners and General Partners (also referred to as Money Managers by LPs).

My first ringing of the closing bell on Nasdaq followed by a packed premier event of the Asian American Association of Investment Managers (AAAIM) at The Harvard Club in New York, with keynotes from Julian Robertson, CEO of Tiger Management and David Rubenstein, founder of The Carlyle Group gave me some great insights into the world - and thinking - of LPs.

It is clear from these sessions that LPs (and Fund-of-funds) are misled and confused about how to improve the performance of Venture Capital (VC). The VC sector of the Private Equity asset-class has been plagued with dismal performance of less than 10% IRR (Internal Rate of Return) for the last 9-years, leading some LPs to question and reduce allocation (US: 10-15% of total assets per firm, Europe: ~4%) in a sector that deserves quite the opposite.

The emerging opportunity in technology VC

The technology sector which is my passion for the last 30-years is at the beginning, not the end of its emergence. Perhaps the top-level indicator of the innovative runway we have ahead of us is the following: more than 5/6 of the world's population does not yet use a computer connected to high-speed/broadband internet today. And all should and will, given the right technology. That's where technology innovation comes in; not just in connecting people to the internet but in deploying innovation that uses the internet as a distribution mechanism. The way we use the internet today is rudimentary, and many new technology stacks will emerge to improve its impact on everyday citizens.

Given the early days in the life-cycle of the technology sector relative to any other sector or asset-class is; low-cost to produce, low-cost to distribute and because of the internet has immediate customer impact with independently short sales-cycles. That means with relatively little money in, a massive impact can be produced, virtually instantly. A great investment allocation opportunity for LPs still lies ahead.

Why the VC sector is not producing

In the words of Cesar Millan, the popular dog whisperer on National Geographic, who states that the behavior of the dog is the responsibility of its owner, so should LPs demand control of the behavior of the VCs. Like dogs, VCs exhibit primal behavior that can make them great money-managers, but only when they are controlled. An issue even The Carlyle Group recognizes by including a code-of-conduct in its recently published annual report. LPs should let go of the leash after VC performance becomes apparent, not before.

-- Risk deflation
VCs sell well upwards to the LP at fundraising time, but they seem to have forgotten that they need to serve the entrepreneurs just as well. In the investment pyramid between the dollars from the LP and the ideas of the entrepreneur, the VC is simply the derivative that should serve both. Today it does neither. The money-tree report further hides the ugly reality under-the-hood as the funding stages have disrupted the equilibrium between entrepreneurs and VCs and steadily turned VC into loan-sharking.

-- Lack of relevant experience
Most VCs in Silicon Valley simply have no relevant operating experience that allows them to service the needs of entrepreneurs adequately (see sub-prime VC). And that in turn creates a massive amount of false negatives and false positives to which no liquidity mechanism (from the NVCA or Tim Draper) will suffice. Beginning in the early 2000s, the VCs have simply consistently invested in entrepreneurs that submit to sub-prime innovation and terms.

-- Lack of vision
No surprise that, according to a conversation with a chinese private equity investor at the AAAIM conference, recently 12 highly successful chinese immigrant entrepreneurs left the U.S. disappointed to go back to China because the VCs did not allow them to take the helm at their own companies. They will in China. Smart entrepreneurs simply won't submit to sub-prime VC, leaving the VC (and therefor indirectly the LP) alone in their spiraling sub-prime demise.

To echo Jessica Reed Saouaf, Managing Partner of Hall Capital Partners (with $17.5B in assets under management) who describes at IBF that the VC business today is too institutionalized with too few visionaries to create promising returns. LPs need to do a better job in sourcing, segmenting, controlling and demanding transparency so the behavior of VCs remains an extension of the LPs investment brand and integrity.

The myths LPs are being told

But the incumbent VCs are not taking this criticism without a fight, a fight to hold on to their cushy management fees and plush existence. From the focus of their rebuttal (by way of pump-and-dump liquidity plans, annex funds etc) you can gleam their true nature, they worry more about protecting their downside than improving their upside.

A welcome exception to the majority of followers of the auto company's plan to fixing VC are the younger VCs like Jason Green (Emergence Partners) and Paul Holland (Foundation Capital) who on the IBF panel proclaim that, unlike the NVCA they do not lie awake at night about the impending increase in capital gains tax on their carry. Instead, just like great entrepreneurs, they worry first about delivering value and returns, trusting that personal wealth will naturally follow.

Here are the most frequent myths I hear VCs attempt to imprint on the LPs that I want to debunk here quickly to prevent a further slide down the sub-prime spiral:

-- It's the economy; new fund - stack fund - annex fund
Nonsense: even the most successful startups do not achieve revenues or market-share above 10% of their total-addressable-market (TAM) during their private funding cycle. That means that 90% of the total-addressable-market is still not served effectively. With a few exceptions it is hard to imagine that a 10% decrease in market will have any affect on the success of the startup. I would argue that in a down-market the opportunities for new technologies improve considering the fact that an early adopter can more effectively compete with 90% of its competitors. So, conversion rates of companies with macro-economic differentiation should improve and so will their market-share and revenues and consequently the opportunities for great exits.

-- We are in a down-cycle, we will bounce back; new fund - stack fund - annex fund
Nonsense: the barrel of a downward spiral is cyclical too, be sure to recognize the difference. Sub-prime investments have no exits and will not yield valuable fund returns, no matter what the liquidity structure is. VC portfolio choices that cannot withstand the test of time simply have no fundamental differentiation and independent future. And a GP that cannot distinguish between prime and sub-prime will never be successful.

-- Companies are cheaper to build; new fund - less money
Nonsense: I have heard LPs echo the term "Capital Efficiency", and it is a trap. Not just for the entrepreneur but for everyone in the technology ecosystem. Unlike in the past, no product can withstand the scrutiny and the power of social networks unless it is really well built, offers fundamental and disruptive value and delivers authenticity and trust. Only then will users adopt it. And since distribution is virtually immediate, more competitors will spring up to provide the noise that makes life harder. So products are actually more expensive to build and requires a different ecosystem makeup and funding trajectory for the company. VCs that look for smaller funds demonstrate further misalignment with reality and therefor exits.

-- There are not enough great ideas; new fund - less money
Nonsense: but sub-prime VC behavior and terms turns off great entrepreneurs. Only idiot CEOs and unsuspecting entrepreneurs submit to terms that hands control and destiny to underperforming VCs. Other forms of artificial arbitration such as geographic distance of 20 minutes moves the VC even further from the meritocracy it should be looking to embrace. The institution on Sand Hill Road is severely limited by its lack of peripheral vision of technology and the world.

-- New (government) regulation is strangling exits; new fund elsewhere
Nonsense: the bar has been raised for technology companies as it should. No longer can public markets be fooled by valuations that have no value. Real value jumps the hurdles of regulations with ease (as witnessed by OpenTable and Rosetta Stone). The current startup inventory, that was subject to sub-prime investment tactics to begin with, may not be able to get to the finish line. Such is the punishment for lack of independent differentiation and value.

-- The grass is greener in green; new fund - hot market
Nonsense: I have witnessed the rush to these "hot-pockets" before but hot-on-supply does not equate to hot-on-demand. Or as Julian Robertson says; "there is a difference between having a bakery and baking bread". Contrary to technology, greentech is expensive to produce, expensive to distribute, relies on long sales cycles and arbitration (subsidies, politics etc. ) that is beyond the control of the startup (and much more complicated in its regulative risk than, for example, healthcare). A dependency on government is very dangerous in meeting the time-to-money milestones for early stage companies and fund returns. I believe in the value of green-tech and energy-tech to create a greener planet, but I don't believe the current VC funding models with former technology GPs looking for greener pastures can support its early financial success within the current funding vintages. It is ironic to see VCs use the capital-efficiency slogan under the same roof as their capital intensive strategies for energy-tech.

-- The grass is greener global; new fund - new fund elsewhere
Not yet: as we move up the technology stack and specifically the investments in software, the origination becomes less relevant, I will yield to that (although I see still see an entrepreneurial quality difference), but startup investments should reside where the execution is, regardless of origination. While other geographies score well on low-cost manufacturing (and programming), real disruptive ideas and the majority of early adopter markets (driven by the frantic pace of unbridled capitalism) still reside in the U.S. So VC funds should be equipped to handle international deal sourcing (and be the first investor in) and only become truly international once the remote exits prove to justify an independent local operation. For that to happen, creation, execution and exit values need to yield appropriate dynamics. Remote execution and exit values remain sporadic today, but that may change as those markets develop and emerge as prominent technology visionaries and consumers.

How to fix VC

Optimizing VC is probably easier than most LPs think, since the issues plaguing VC have to do with regaining fundamental leadership of the investment ecosystem. Simply put, LPs need to become "VC whisperers" (to use the Cesar Millan analogy), those that can control the performance of VC so the leash can be loosened. The good news is that none of the deficiencies in VC are rooted in the complicated micro-economics of technology, contrary to what some GPs may want you to believe. But it is important that LPs hear more than the repetitive sugar-coating from underperforming VCs and keep a close eye on entrepreneurs who actually represent the monetizable assets.

-- No more "duh" PPMs
No more Private Placement Memorandums (PPM) that look remarkably like a wish-list without substance. Yes, I've seen the memorandums produced from brand-name VCs that get replicated by many other VCs in the valley. No right-minded VC would accept a business plan from an entrepreneur that looks like that, neither should an LP. The quality of the PPM is a direct indication of the quality of the VC fund and should help LPs clearly segment the risk associated with technology investments. LPs have invested deep rather than wide in the technology sector, hence the birth of many false positives.

-- Assess the GP's unique vision
Many of the PPMs talk about rearview mirror analyses, but the only advantage one investor has over any other is his forward looking views on the industry, or vision. So LPs need to assess the risk associated with that vision, much of which again is related to macro-economic impact rather than technology waves. GPs should be able to demonstrate that their unbridled vision in the past came true.

-- Assess the GP's relevant operating experience
To become a valuable partner to the entrepreneur the GP needs to be able to prove relevant operating experience related to the investment thesis and specifically to the segmentation. Information technology is a broad sector and experience in consumer technology differs from the application of technology to healthcare. Being able to help entrepreneurs develop a large vision with tangible baby-steps is a skill that GPs need to master to improve the size of disruption and returns. That experience needs to map directly to the investment thesis in the PPM.

-- Assess the GP's track-record for deal sourcing
Getting your hands on real disruption requires a proactive approach to finding the "diamond-in-the-rough". Many early stage entrepreneurs, hurt by sub-prime VC tactics, need help thinking bigger. The size of the disruption, rather than the cost of entry is crucial. Finding deals that can be turned in game changers is fundamental to the success of great returns.

-- Hire an expert
All this deep-diving may be too much for an LP who has nearly 90% of its assets allocated to other asset-classes, so the smart thing to do is to hire an expert that speaks the language of the entrepreneur and ensures that the needs of LPs and entrepreneurs are effectively met through an intermediate VC vehicle.

Conclusion

Crucial to the success of the technology sector is to do the opposite of what most VC funds are currently setup or guided to do. To follow Warren Buffet's advice: when everybody is investing using sub-prime tactics then now is the time to do just the opposite. Venture Capital is a sector that can produce great returns when it takes great risks, not when it becomes risk averse, and fragments and commoditizes investment dollars. Deflating the risk through sub-prime investment tactics has killed the want to innovate, and may lead to an accelerated intellectual exodus that will hurt our economy as a whole.

Apart from fixing what is broken I think the time is right to fundamentally restructure early stage innovation and make its financial support just as innovative as the inventions themselves. Facebook sets a good example of how it taunts with the institutionalized investment "rules of Silicon Valley".

LPs who cannot see the massive opportunity in technology should simply exit from Venture Capital. But continuing to support sub-prime VC funds is a sure way to continue down the spiral of suboptimal returns we have been stuck with for the last ten years and damage the innovative ecosystem our economy depends on.

So dear LP, go big or go home. And when you plan to go big I will make myself available to put words into action. I cannot wait to turn this page.

The auto company's plan to fixing VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-05-18T17:22:00-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) has released its recovery plan (4-pillar plan) to fix Venture Capital that is eerily similar to that of the auto companies. It focuses on the prolongation of (their) life rather than on the quality of its product; the ability to spawn meaningful innovation.

Now I am sure Dixon Doll, from his perch atop a $1.6B Venture firm, means well but his purview is severely limited by his role as chairman as one of the most closely held investment clubs in the nation. Its members, ninety-something percent of the U.S. VCs are simply not incented to present all options for improvement, and certainly not one that would include self-cannibalization.

Nothing in this plan covers the stimulus and meritocracy required to spawn and monetize disruptive innovation. The plan mentions entrepreneurs, as the real value creator in this equation - in passing - only once (slide 11) amongst its thirty slides. The plan seems to forget that the entrepreneur is the real value creator, not the VC.

The plan, like the plan of the auto companies boasts of past accomplishments (count on two hands; poor result coming from 800 VCs, but we all know that) and how it puts a lot of people to work (it better when $28B of LP money is dispersed; what else would you spend it on), yet it offers no clues as to the fundamental resurrection of IPOs and meaningful M&A. Could it be that VCs simply picked the wrong companies to invest in? Could it be that the driver, not the car caused the accident?

Faster and easier liquidity paths, using the suggested liquidity platform, does not make up for ill-defined risk assessment applied by many VCs. I predict, such a platform will then be used by VCs who are stuck with many false positives as the pump-and-dump platform to hide their bad choices. The proposed structure of the NVCA reminds me of an intermediary company/fund that tried very hard to sell me equity in some of Kleiner Perkins (KPCB) later stage companies. I happened to know a little more about those companies and their products and gracefully declined.

We don't need more complexity in the Venture Capital business. We need to flatten, segment and remove derivatives in the same way we are about to remove derivative structures from the banking world. We need Venture Capitalists that can quickly be held accountable for their actions and implement transparency that offers LPs the instruments to do so. After all, the VC is merely a derivative in the process of innovation.

Fixing VC will be remarkably easy when you consider the needs of entrepreneurs and I plan to present my entrepreneur focused plan to the LPs soon. A further descent down the sub-prime spiral (in which all participants are entangled) makes it hard for some to see the forest through the trees and find a solution. But the current situation is bad for Silicon Valley, for our leadership position in an increasingly global technology landscape and detrimental to our economy as a whole. That is why I care. I care about the meritocracy we talk about so often but so poorly deliver on, with capitalism as the excuse.

I don't want to see other countries walk away with an optimized model of our technology innovation, like we seem to lose many other innovations, just because they understand that (at least local) meritocracies require some form of regulation, transparency and other aspects of free-market principles. Capitalism, just like football, requires rules in order to flourish.

The NVCA plan is a bad plan because it does nothing to fix the false negatives and false positives VC produce today, one that is currently shutting out meaningful innovation. And it demonstrates how it continues to treat entrepreneurs with remarkable ignorance.

Idiot CEOs

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-05-11T17:36:32-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

That's how one of the many CEOs that contact me recently described his colleagues who submit to Venture Capital (VC).

This alternatively funded CEO describes other CEO’s that seek VC funding as idiots – with a 1 in a 1000 shot at a lousy valuation (52% Round A, 25% Round B and 15% Round C). He continues that many of the serial entrepreneurs trumpeted by VC’s have no money themselves despite “successful” previous exits.

He is not alone about the ineffectiveness of Venture Capital, I frequently hear from other successful entrepreneurs about it. And the situation may get worse before it gets better. The economy is offering VCs even more excuses to turn the screws, and control of companies is gained in more ways than a simple equity stake.

I believe technology investing today is largely a sub-prime asset class as described in a plethora of sub-prime articles in this blog, and find many entrepreneurs discouraged by both the process as well as the outcome of fundraising, even when that yielded a round.

Because of the ineffectiveness of VC and the rampant false positives and false negatives I refuse to believe VCs (and the NVCA collectively), who suggest that the sum of Venture Capital equals the sum of technology innovation. We see great entrepreneurs actively pursuing more creative investment vehicles (high-net-worth individuals, private equity firms, investment bankers, sovereign funds...anyone with money), and rightfully so.

In the meantime, oblivious to recognizing their own flaws, VCs are further descending down the sub-prime spiral by restricting investments to compliant entrepreneurs, evidence that they remain clueless about the fundamental risk management of high yield returns.

Smart CEOs should simply refuse to work with many technology investors for the following reasons:

- Exorbitant loss of upside
Great entrepreneurs are known for their passion to pursue their dreams at virtually any cost, and sub-prime VCs smell their blood and desperation. Those companies become owned by VCs quickly and because of the investors' lack of relevant operating experience yields a further deflation of the valuation of the company. We've seen many companies with end-game founder stock way below 5%, which is unlikely to become life-changing. So, why would you take the scrutiny of the CEO job with that outcome in mind?

- Indirect loss of control
Voting rights as well as other fine print in the termsheet severely impact your ability as a CEO to disrupt a market. While in the beginning the founders may still own the majority of the shares, the dependance on further runway support gives VCs the ammo to press their preferred operational trajectory and leaves operational decisions at the mercy of its first investors.

- Restrictive expenditures
The powers of the CEO are further restricted by clauses on expenditures in either the articles of incorporation, termsheets, voting rights or other legal documents. We've seen restrictions requiring board approval for expenditures as little as $5,000. That means a CEO can't make pressing decisions until a next board meeting or when there is an ability to call an impromptu session. These restrictions are further evidence that a CEO does not have the trust of the board.

- Insufficient ecosystem control
Investors typify investments in technology waves (witnessed by their mindless herding at technology focused events) and blindly allocate certain expenditure expectations to R&D, marketing, business development and sales divisions. But the ecosystem of every company, regardless of segment, is unique to that company. CEOs who let VCs determine or validate the ecosystem expenditures will spend the subsequent board meetings explaining why they deviated from that, a waste of precious time.

- Deal with undeserved authority
Many VCs do not have the credentials and relevant operating experience to lead an experienced CEO. Yet it behooves the CEO to listen to the idiosyncrasies of the VC in order for them to endorse a CEO's leadership. Nothing is worse for a company's future than having to wait for the investor to validate every step along the way.

- Micro-economically sandwiched
Technology founders and VCs are often focused on building technology, very few investors pay close attention to the macro-economic differentiation (and valuation), leaving intelligent CEO left to drive a more sustainable big picture strategy with limited board and back-end support.

- Forced syndicates
Investors with early stakes can essentially force the company to engage with other VCs in subsequent rounds that favor the initial investor, rather than the entrepreneur. Many VCs huddle together in like-minded "vulture" strategies in the hopes of maximizing their often ill-performing portfolio.

- Damaging to reputation
The valley is so small and ignoring the advice from an investor can have detrimental effect on a CEO's future career. The "you will never work in this town again" syndrome is not unique to Hollywood, it is alive and well in Silicon Valley. The word spreads quickly when you challenge VCs and don't accept their terms, a reason why they tell you not to shop valuations around - it will actually hurt you.

- Sticky lawyers
We've inherited bad ones in companies we ran and found some good ones. But in many cases lawyers in Silicon Valley pretend they actually created the companies, simply because they filed their incorporation paperwork or attended board meetings. They mingle with the money sources and make the introduction to VCs that secure their billing runway. They end up getting cosy with the major shareholders and tilting the balance even further away from the CEO who signs their checks. Another entity to keep in check as a CEO.

- Low salary
Opportunity rather than salary is top of mind to entrepreneurs, but that changes quickly when they struggle to support their families and pay mortgages. $175K is not a salary that leaves much on the table, especially not when you live in the expensive area around Sandhill Road. And VCs are challenging those salaries even more while they are raking in astronomical fees associated with their large funds and sitting pretty for the next ten years. The risk/reward equation between VC and entrepreneur is completely out of whack.

- Poor severances
Board-run companies leave CEOs in a vulnerable state once its collective wisdom does not pan out. The blame for that failure is usually generously applied to the CEO, while the decision making power was not. An early stage CEO should consider himself lucky if the company can still honor its pre-negotiated severance obligation.

Pimps and Hoes

The current venture climate reminds me of the fascinating HBO documentary Pimps Up, Hoes Down in which the undeserved authority of Pimps is applied to the Hoes who do all the (dirty) work.

No self respecting CEO should accept the constriction deployed by sub-prime Venture Capital as described above. The outcome of the current entrepreneurial restrictions is not only highly predictable but has thankfully reached the balance sheets of fund-managers and Limited Partners, who fund the VCs and are starting to question the role of the VC as the intermediary.

The downturn in the economy masks the unrelated impending implosion of Venture Capital. No VC should use the economy as the excuse for the restrictions above and as a CEO you should read its deployment for what it is; a diminished faith in you and the company.

So, unless you can reach a great VC independently or with help from others quickly, my suggestion is to wait with testing your CEO skills until Venture Capital, not the economy recovers. If you can.

In the meantime I'll do my best to help fund-managers revive Venture Capital. It is about time the fund-managers hear the entrepreneur's point of view. That has become my new mission.

Your car did not cause the accident

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-05-04T18:50:11-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

What does that title have to do with technology innovation and investing? A lot apparently to my brain.

VC spin doctors
The recent flurry of articles by individual Venture Capitalists (with catchy titles such as "VC rightsizing") along with the help from their association (the National Venture Capital Association, NVCA) spin a wonderful story as to how external circumstances have closed IPO windows and reduced M&A valuations. "Helped" by an ailing economy, Sarbanes-Oxly, and other new regulations VCs blame their inability to spot real innovation on anything else but their own choices. Good luck trying to convince the police officer that your car was really to blame for the accident, and the VC malaise we are in.

Didn't your football coach teach you in school that you can't blame the referee for your loss, even if the referee made the wrong call? He would tell you to man up and just play better so there is no room for error. Isn't that what VCs expect from their entrepreneurs when they go to market?

And that is what I am now telling VCs.

No more excuses
I don't believe for a moment that Google, Facebook, Twitter, Rosetta Stone and OpenTable have or will consider their ability to go public on just the pressure of regulations or the process of going public. Those companies have a macro-economic value that is resistant to - perhaps - cumbersome rules. And companies that can't jump the regulatory hurdle should frankly not be allowed to play in the big league of public markets and offered an opportunity to stain the reputation of technology innovation.

A major issue that great new venture funded companies face now is their ability to overcome the erosion of trust (as the currency of success) caused by its many sub-prime predecessors. For the last 10 years sub-prime VCs have collected sub-prime innovations which, without prior resistance propelled meaningless valuations into unsuspecting public markets. The likelihood of the current VCs (gathered at the NVCA) regaining that trust is as likely as a cheating husband regaining the trust of his wife -- it will take more than blaming everyone and everything else.

What matters is the entrepreneur
Moreover, the efforts of the NVCA described in their recent presentation emphasize the wrong point. The conservation of relentless entrepreneurs, not the VCs, is the real issue at hand. A VC, at best is a derivative, not the creator of disruptive innovation. For too long have inexperienced VCs been allowed to attract and perpetuate false positives and false negatives that have now clogged up the entrepreneurial ecosystem. And the only way to attract better entrepreneurs is to attract VCs with a vision as impressive as their personal entrepreneurial experience.

So, yes, I am in total agreement with Barack Obama's stance on imposing regulations to curtail the erosion of trust in the public markets. The importance of a vibrant technology ecosystem is crucial to our economy (that part of the NVCA pitch I agree with), and fund and endowment managers need to do a better job of sourcing, segmenting and keeping their VCs on a tight leash.

All free-markets require rules
No regulation that embraces the spirit of innovation can be more damaging than a continuation of the current sub-prime VC model greased up with efforts to exit out even easier and faster. Thankfully, fund managers have woken up and realize that moneys are best distributed to people who add value rather than simply extract money.

Instead of greasing the skids for VCs we need to find capable risk managers who measure up to capable drivers, likely to avoid accidents altogether. So stop examining the vehicles, but rather take a close look at who is in the driver seat.

A VC revolution in the making

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-04-19T17:06:37-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Last week I was invited to attend (thank you Brenda Chia, president AAAIM) the panel discussion "Market Changeup: Fund Management as a Business", with Priya Mathur (Board director of CalPERS, California Public Employees' Retirement System; one of the biggest investor in LPs and VC funds), David Fann (President & Chief Executive Officer, PCG Asset Management), Jan Le Chang (Vice President, Centinela Capital Partners), Phil Phleger (Morgan Lewis) and Bob Grady (Managing Director, Carlyle Ventures).

Compared to last year (written up here) the opinion of the people at the top of the innovation food chain was remarkably introspective:

Venture Capital is broken in some fundamental way.

So much so that PCG predicts a revolution and a complete redesign of the Venture Capital model, with CalPERS nodding in agreement. CalPERS has gone from a yearly review of their asset allocation to quarterly and is currently debating new hybrid asset allocation models. That means less dependency on VC, and more on other vehicles. At the same time it is looking to reduce its relationships to only the top quartile VCs and getting out of the mid and bottom tier ones altogether. Annex funds, created to fill the void of fleeing late stage investors, are not found to be interesting as the majority of the funds currently in the pipeline will not produce positive returns anyway.

The sentiment from the fund managers was that they are literally "fed up with the rock star parties from VCs that don't produce returns". A conclusion clearly not received by all funds as we hear (from a trusted source) that general partners at a downtown Palo Alto walking-dead VC firm are still fetching $1M yearly salaries each, this year.

Everything is going to change.

VC is not dead, but everything is under review. Fund managers are now for the first time talking to each other to fundamentally change the outcome of the game, regardless of the state of the economy. They all admitted that none of the widely used mathematical risk models prevented the precarious situation that now forces even CalPERS to pay close attention to its balance sheet and carefully manage available investment cash.

Limited Partners are looking for full transparency of the VC funds, going as far as wanting to see their balance sheets and who is holding their securities. Under the magnifying glass are VC management fees (no more 25%), splits, as well as exorbitant fees gained through stacked funds. Co-investment with endowment funds are debated as they are too over-allocated in the equity vehicle to provide sustainability. We may see more monolithic investments in VC as a result.

All fund managers think clean-tech and health-tech are interesting asset classes, but think the fleeing from technology is somewhat worrisome, they have become weary to over-allocate anywhere. Globally, no economy has proven to show any disparate advantage, the asian and china plays fell equally as hard as the US and elsewhere.

Moving forward, but not so fast.

New VC funds will need to come up with a better story. The creators of the new VC funds will likely be experienced operators (just like at the start of technology evolution), removing the pure money managers who failed to add substantial value. They are expected to, as a team, have demonstrated an ability to warehouse deals before, deliver a unique value proposition to the investment climate and provide substantial value to the disruptive proposition of their portfolio companies.

CalPERS is eagerly looking to invest in emerging money managers who in due time (2-3 years expectancy to close a new fund) can expect their renewed support. So far, in the first quarter of 2009, 3 new funds have been invested in (compared to 47 all of last year) and no significant uptick is expected until this summer.

Clearly fund managers are licking their wounds, in a holding pattern for some positive news on the economy and perhaps some much needed regulation with regard to transparency. Rest assured, no fund manager seems to debate the value of venture capital as an investment vehicle, it is here to stay.

Help is on the way.

The great outcome for entrepreneurs is that fund managers (as we predicted) from now on will pay close attention to the type, behavior and performance of VCs that allows entrepreneurs to build new companies more effectively.

Good times are coming.

The trap of "Capital Efficiency"

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-04-15T13:42:36-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

More than 10 years ago I read an article in the San Jose Mercury News in which many complained that Venture Capital (VC) funded companies rarely produce viable and sustainable businesses. To no real surprise we find ten years later that the public markets have no appetite for technology companies and the majority of its VC firms are under water, soon to drown.

With angel investments (left to support the idea-stage of company formation) severely depressed by economic downturn, new VC funds (from an ex-Googler, Marc Adreessen, Manu Kumar etc.) spring up to fund the early stages of technology innovation with $250K injections and fill the gap.

Capital Efficiency is the popular buzzword some of these new investors claim as the new investment category (after outsourcing has failed to live up to similar promises). Sounds promising doesn't it?

It is not. "Capital Efficiency" is a trap.

1/ Companies are not significantly cheaper to build these days
The macro-economics of bringing products to market have not changed at all, mainly because customer behavior has not fundamentally changed.

While new marketing and distribution channels such as social networking promise to provide more effective ways to reach targeted customers, the high noise-level in those channels erases the temporal benefits gained from its early adopter stage. What remains as an advantage is "merely" the quality of the technology proposition in the eye of the beholder, regardless of how that proposition reached its prospective buyer.

So, rather than spending lots of money on old-school decibel marketing, technology companies now need to spend more money on building products that have fundamental macro-economic differentiation and a customer experience that delivers real (disruptive) value. As a result, and I know from experience, it is actually more expensive to build a successful technology company today, because no company can make the false promises it could get away with in the past. Social networking kills false promises really quickly.

2/ Tippy-toe loans yield investor lock-in
A $250K loan (convertible note, usually with restrictions) is an investment that provides no ability to hire professional management that has the experience and ability to turn technology into a macro-economic game-changer early on - or better yet - manage an effective company ecosystem through its life-cycle.

Now the unsuspecting technology entrepreneurs, proud of their newly acquired capital infusion, are dependent on the investor and his pool of syndicates (necessary to provide sufficient runway) to determine when and how that critical conversion (from technology to a business) occurs.

That determination is not the expertise of an investor but worse, has moved the control of a company's business strategy from the entrepreneur to the investor. Relinquishing that kind of control is counter to the fiduciary responsibility in developing a company's independent and most valuable future.

3/ Investors should not run companies
The majority of Silicon Valley investors have never personally ran a company, or if they did, grew up in strong winds that made even turkeys fly. Great investors invest in companies, not in technologies. They are known for their ability to spot the combination of a unique idea, the right timing and an experienced management team to allow that company to operate on its own accord.

In the end, few investors have the time or experience to manage anything beyond milestones established through board control. As a famous investor once said: "I am a better investor than an operator, otherwise I would have become one - you can make more money that way."

Building technology proves nothing

Don't get me wrong, I am excited that new investors with a better pedigree enter the investment fray. I just wished that instead of creating small fragmented funds, they had formed a larger early-stage investment fund with like-minded peers through which they could deliver on the original promise of Venture Capital, and that is: generate big returns from taking big risks.

An investment strategy that keeps entrepreneurs on a leash with micro-investments looks an awful lot like loan-sharking to me. To those who take it, don't be surprised if the bite is deep and quality of life will be severely diminished.

Consider yourself warned.

Why "ServiceForce" is a bigger deal than SalesForce

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-04-07T19:57:21-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As I was about to write about one of the many deceptions in the technology industry, such as the creation and herding behind hollow acronyms like CRM (Customer Relationship Management), SalesForce.com appears to have beaten me to a much more holistic implementation of that definition.

Many times in this blog have I written about the notion that companies are actually selling a customer experience, rather than a product. Needless to repeat here that most are not.

But Salesforce.com CEO Marc Benioff, (in full disclosure, was one of the Oracle executives who wrote an e-mail to Larry Ellison inviting me to come work at Oracle headquarters some 14 years ago) perhaps realized (or read here) his short-sighted attachment to CRM by which he implied that sales would actually create a lasting relationship with a customer after the deal is closed. We know better from our Oracle days.

But great entrepreneurs out-innovate themselves and Salesforce.com recently stitched together a comprehensive proposition (on their beta website) designed to pay close attention to whether in essence, a sales promise - in actuality - is met in a satisfactory manner.

Now, I have not reviewed SalesForce.com's specific technology proposition, but merely their entry in the market is a big deal and here is why:

This SaaS (software-as-a-service) strategy will enable the meritocracy of customer satisfaction and create better value for consumers, directly or indirectly.
Not all companies rely on a sales force, but all companies rely on managing the experience related to their brand.
Companies with new products should probe their conversion rates through this new service, before turning on the marketing floodgates. Marketing a product that has unacceptable user satisfaction, spurred by the negative power of social networking, has the potential to damage its reputation forever.
High conversion rates from trial-to-buy (especially in this economy) are key to lowering the cost-of-sale and dramatically improves operational efficiency.
Many companies rely on happy return customers to grow at a sustainable rate. Companies that don't keep their customers happy will not be able to sustain the cumulative growth its investors and shareholders are banking on.
The satisfactory customer experience is the real market differentiator of any product or service in a competitive industry, products with great service win over products with bad service anytime.
The investment in call-center equipment finally makes sense now. Companies now have access to a killer application (and platform) that runs on the telephone hardware that moves support from an afterthought to an integral part of the brand experience.

I advise any company, and especially cash conscious startups, to verify SalesForce's new proposition in this space and gain immediate clarity of their product-promise early on. I bet that the way developers look at a product will dramatically differ from how consumers perceive it. Now is the time to cost-effectively validate product assumptions and use marketing and sales to extrapolate the successful validation of your promise.

I get excited by the surprising discovery of a technology proposition that can actually make this world a better place.

BTW: I have no relationship with SalesForce.com that prompts me to write this. As most of you know, I only write what I truly believe in.

The new HP way; the inverse of now

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-04-07T11:04:52-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I owe HP (Hewlett-Packard) a debt of gratitude; in the mid 70s (when I was 14 years old) the HP-41C, the worlds first alphanumeric programmable calculator is what sparked my interest in technology. From a beautiful but too quiet medieval village in Holland (Woudrichem) I wrote applications for it that won awards (and was paid in new accessories) and found a mental connection with some of the developers who wrote about their role (and hobbies) in a monthly newspaper distributed to all owners (think of it as a Facebook group before Facebook).

The members of the development team wrote passionately about their incredible innovations explaining why they designed the HP-41 the way they did, its extensibility, its use in space etc. I read that magazine and all other publications related to it from cover to cover. In my eyes, HP was synonymous with great design, groundbreaking innovation and flawless execution of marketplace models.

A lot has changed since then, not surprising since HP chose to move from a technology specialist to a technology generalist to keep Wall-street happy. With a big hammer it stuffs the market with massive marketing vigor and manages to stay just ahead of its competitors, for now. But HP has lost its vision, agility and enthusiasm to innovate and fundamentally change the computing landscape.

1/ Longevity by association doesn't work
HP never grew up to own a part of the evolving technology stack from hardware, to software to services (or better yet, the consumer experience) and still today is making little more than me-too gestures with large manufacturers to suggest they own a unique proposition in the application and services technology segments. HP has become a master of associating itself to many things it does not own or add value to (just like the behavior of the many parasites in our industry).

To give some examples: HP rode the gold rush of the PC evolution (driven by Microsoft) and then had to buy Compaq to win the battle in a market that is still 40% owned by no-brand suppliers. HP rode (and lost) the database war by buying a stake in Informix (rather than buying it) even though it sold more servers with Oracle as the primary database (HP's stance propelled Oracle bed-fellow Sun then). HP partnered with Apple to deliver an iPod with no value add, only to kill the program one year later. HP acquired Snapfish in the consumer photography space and never made any attempt to improve its convoluted photography strategy. Examples abound.

So, the key for HP is to own identify and own certain technology ecosystems (from beginning to end) and redirect its massive R&D budgets to build proprietary technologies that attach customers to HP and HP only.

2/ Lacks product vision and execution
Mark Hurd is a great operational CEO with a proven ability to optimize an engine so it consumes as little gas as possible, but sustainability comes from engineering new engines only HP can produce that run faster and better. Mark can continue to hold as many fire-side chats as he desires but that vision is unlikely to come from employees that have been with the company for more than twenty years. Innovation from within is likely to produce nothing more than the same.

With all of HPs fragmented and discombobulated assets in many segments such as document management, printing, imaging it should have developed by now a cohesive customer facing experience that ties these products together like Apple does with music. The company needs a CTO with business experience and an aptitude to fundamentally tap into continuously changing consumer behavior and be open to outside counsel rather than adhere to a stifling "process for investigating outside ventures to allow equal access to these firms and inventors."

3/ Treat people differently
For more than 10 years I've heard stories about how people took advantage of a one-sided aspect of "The HP Way", the ability to stay with the company for many years and move from one division to another to escape being confronted with the outcome of their own decision making. Some people left HP only to make three times the money as an independent consultant working for the exact same group. But "The HP Way" also describes a high level of achievement and contribution that because of todays large and hierarchical org-chart (with many dotted lines) is hard to measure and manage. HP needs to reorganize just once, not based on product - but simply based on ecosystems that align with customer experiences.

Many of HP executives have disclosed to me that the company does not have the engineering talent to build its own product strategy and that probably isn't helped by rampant stories of how HP (a profitable company that should not have a need to layoff employees) is now allegedly laying off people that have worked at the company for 20-years, challenging their severance payments and disallowing them to ever work for HP again. Can you imagine how fast that news spreads to Silicon Valley developers? Not too smart HP. No surprise that it can only attract the talent that favors a paycheck over a challenge.

Start with a compelling vision
But amazing things happen when you drive a company with strong leadership, vision and execution. As a CEO I have experienced that the original assessment of employees fundamentally change when they are confronted with visionary leadership. They wake up and become energized, feel part of a common cause. So, the way to optimize a business is not to simply layoff people but to deliver a compelling vision to which people can either subscribe or not. The employees that don't will walk themselves to the door, especially when you turn up the volume.

So, turning HP around is actually very easy. It requires the innovative mind that "believes nothing it hears but anything it sees". It requires a visionary who cares about nothing but customer adoption, and an ability to model a company towards its purchasing power. Everything else is simply irrelevant.

I know HP despises it when I reference Apple (only to whisper their name in a restaurant), but the company simply has a much better DNA than HP. It is not too late for HP to change but it should start by reading "How to compete with Apple" in order to assess whether it wants to make the real sacrifices that are inherent to innovation (rather than resort to business process optimization).

Call me for a fireside chat, Mark. I would enjoy repaying my debt of gratitude.

Don't take TheFunded serious

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-31T13:35:29-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I am fervent proponent of transparency in the Venture Capital business which before TheFunded (a website that rates Venture Capitalist firms) did not exist. And I admit that I peruse the site on occasion to see how well my network of VCs stacks up against the interpretations of individual entrepreneurs.

But apart from the publicity prank they pulled for April Fools Day, I am as much against any system (subprime investing) that treats entrepreneurs unfairly as I am against a system that treats VCs unfairly. The latter, in my view, is what TheFunded represents, and here is why:

1/ Lack of transparency
The premium market model that describes the VC community accurately (supply-side) is inversed at TheFunded, and only the demand-side of the fundraising equation has an opportunity to vent their opinion. That can never yield to an objective view of venture behavior and economics, in a similar way just the opinions of VCs cannot.

2/ Lack of trust
Who are these entrepreneurs, are they disgruntled copycats of investment waves that have just passed them by? I don't know, but I do not recommend blindly trusting the opinions from people we don't know. I would not recommend eating at Zagat rated restaurants for the same reason. Simply put: if the trust of the source cannot be established, the trust of the opinion cannot be established.

3/ Statistically irrelevant
Something in the order of less than 1% of the business plans get funded, and therefor is the representation on TheFunded really relevant? It is human nature to emphasize the dismay rather than the success of a fundraising experience (which may only prove to be really successful years later at exit time).

TheFunded should be a marketplace as outlined in our marketplace rules and definitions, and representing the VC and entrepreneur side with equal opportunity. And since it does not, the contents of the site are highly questionable and provides additional distraction, both in terms of false positives and false negatives, to an already in-transparent fundraising process.

How not to raise money, real world examples

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-24T22:44:28-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

We write frequently about sub-prime investors who delay and suppress the risk associated with technology investments, which in-turn only attract entrepreneurs that are willing to submit themselves to those sub-prime tactics.

Today sub-prime investments occur primarily because of underfunding, but the opposite - overfunding - happened in the bubble days. Here are two real world examples of how both types of investments deflate returns for entrepreneurs (and indirectly all parties involved):

OuterBay Technologies raised too much money.

The company was acquired by HP for triple digits in 2006, but the deal was not as good for the entrepreneurs as it appeared to be for the investors, as we predicted back then.

In the words of its then CTO; OuterBay Technologies would not have existed without the strategic vision, direction and execution of The Venture Company. We tell our story here for the first time:

During christmas in 1999 I ran, through a friend, into four developers from OuterBay Technologies with a horrible business plan. I gave them the bad news but to my pleasant surprise, they responded with open ears. I incubated the management team, refocused the company on a single product and led the company to launch and initial market traction. We secured many early stage customers at around $160K a pop to which no self-respecting investor could say no. Even though many analysts still did, we un-wavingly continued to brake new ground.

Success has many fathers, and I smirked after reading this "fathers" proclamation of his role.

Because of the early success we created as a team and swayed by the ample amount of money available to startups in the late 90s, early 2000s, OuterBay Technologies raised an $11M series A in 2001. About $6M too much in my humble opinion. As a board member I approved the deal (I did not want to hold the founders' dream hostage), but not before warning them of the consequences of such a large round (at double digit pre-money), selling my founder shares (at a discount) back to the company and relinquishing my board seat.

The net of this story is that with more than $48M in, and such a large series A the company was quickly being "run" by the investors who put in a CEO we would not have picked, and expected revenue run rates way above the organic growth of the enterprise space that this invention relied on. As a result and after almost 6 years of hard work, the entrepreneurs did not walk away with the life-changing money they deserved. They should have continued to listen to my advice and they would have walked away with more.

No company should be majority owned by non-founding investors, it is simply not the investors expertise to run companies, directly or indirectly. So, do not raise the money that relinquishes control to investors.

SoftKinetic raised too little money.

SoftKinetic, a company that developed 3D gestural recognition software, contacted us in 2006 (from Belgium) to build a US business and raise money in the Valley. Within 6 months I validated the proposition against the laboratory developments at Sony, Microsoft, HP and others and assessed its technological leadership - before Nintendo launched the Wii.

I invited 20 well known VCs one-by-one over to downtown Palo Alto, demonstrated Quake driven by marker-less full-body movement, still leaving the majority of investors clueless about how the "input device" in the gaming industry fundamentally changes the adoption to the platform. Nintendo sure proved them wrong only a few months later.

I lined up two angels (including many other friends who wanted to participate in any financial way possible) ready to wire a double digit pre-money $2.5M pre-revenue round, only to kill the deal because of growing conflicts with one of the original board members (who has since been removed).

I moved on and the company emerged one year later with a new CEO and a licensing strategy that, in our view, is the wrong business model for the company. As the new CEO explained it, "at this point we are not able to raise more money to deploy a different strategy."

The real solution to the success of SoftKinetic may have faded, but I believe the company could have deployed a premium game station PC platform strategy (not unlike Voodoo, with one of the independent PC OEMs and part of the 40% of the fragmentation in that market) and deployed a growing number of existing 3D enabled games on that platform initially. Since the majority of new games are deployed on PCs first to test their viability, the premium gaming experience by SoftKinetic could have provided a much better immersive experience than the Wii - immediately - and as 3D cameras further commoditize, the software that drives the experience would amplify the core competency of SoftKinetic and be deployed at very low cost, with hundreds of game titles.

But the latter strategy requires big thinkers at both the company (the board) and the investor side. Years of complacent investing by VCs (thank God for Angels) who can't see the forest through the trees sucks the gusto out of disruptive business strategies.

Now, the company is forced to tip-toe into the market and adopt a licensing strategy similar to GestureTek and shuttered Reactrix and yield to suboptimal traction that can be expected from niche game-play and home entertainment interaction. That is a pity for the entrepreneurs and me (as I am still a shareholder of the company).

So, raising too little money is forcing many companies to phase-in disruption, and presents many new obstacles at a higher overall cost to gain significant market-share, and at the immediate expense of its founders.

Get help

The point I am making with these two examples is that entrepreneurs who model their business after the direction of the investors are almost certain to lose out, spiritually and financially, on the level of disruption they aimed to ignite. These examples are representative of an alarming Silicon Valley trend, one we wish we did not need to counter. But we care too much about groundbreaking innovation to let it slide.

It is for reasons like these that entrepreneurs partner with experienced venture catalysts (like us) who raise the disruptive bar on both sides, put the investor's feet to the fire and raise the right amount of money at the right terms and with the real passion to support disruptive innovation.

Both parties, the entrepreneur and the investor will benefit from our game-changing attitude.

Entrepreneurs will retain more equity and investors are exposed to deals that actually have the potential to single-handedly impact fund performance.

Not so fast, US defectors

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-21T15:49:35-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As regular readers of my blog you are aware of my criticism towards the current operators of the Venture Capital (VC) microcosm.

I often liken todays Venture Capital business to the sub-prime lending business where too many people without the skills to assess risk accurately, put the whole technology ecosystem at risk.

My comments can be perceived as negative, yanking the chain of 700+ U.S. venture capitalists of which many use sub-prime tactics. Or they can be perceived as positive, with the majority of those investors looking the other way now is a great time to start a new investment vehicle (more on that later) that returns to Limited Partners (LPs) the allocation in the technology asset class they were promised.

A new group I see springing up are the people who use the negative interpretation to chastise the US as a whole, extrapolating that the US is "losing ground internationally on multiple technological fronts". That is where, with my international experience (an expat ready to naturalize) in tow, I need to put a full-stop to the criticism against this country.

Here is why:

1/ Not only does the U.S. represent a great breading ground for investing in innovation but more importantly, the US represents a societal curiosity to adopt and purchase those unproven innovations like no other country in the world. Technology investments will collagulate where the early buyers are.

2/ The U.S. has the uncanning ability to bounce back because in essence, every citizen is an entrepreneur (forced perhaps by the lack of safety nets). It may not be easy to bounce back but adaptability is part of this country's DNA - not so elsewhere.

3/ Investors in the U.S. have a short term memory, they need to put their money "to work". Technology remains a very interesting asset class because of its early potential, low cost, quick impact and large scale. So, with new risk assessment criteria for VC funds in place, new investments will flow again quickly. BTW: those investors (LPs) are not just american, the amount of sovereign funds investing in U.S. technology is significant and growing (not in the least because of bullet 1).

The United States will remain at the forefront of technology innovation if it acts on critical opinions that lead to improved self-regulation. We, collectively need to turn the current technology "investment club" into a free-market that embraces the curiosity and meritocracy that this country was founded upon.

The VC business will re-invent itself, either by people like me who aim to expose and correct its current flaws or (a few years later) by the Limited Partners who invested in VC firms with suboptimal returns. Either way, no innovation exists without induction of significant pain or gain.

Have no doubt that like many other innovations globally, the reinvention of the VC business will start right here in the U.S. and produce a whole new batch of disruptive and exciting innovations.

How to compete with Apple

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-18T18:21:39-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Apple is fundamentally different from any other company in Silicon Valley, but certainly not perfect. Its photography strategy is flawed (in the same way its competitor's are) and its iTunes Store needs to adopt true meritocracy if it does not want to alienate the record labels (movie subscriptions anyone?), its wireless Networked Storage strategy needs work as well as Apple TV and the MobileMe service. But in many ways Apple is ahead of the pack but not immune to the inherent risks.

Here is how technology companies, such as HP, Dell, Nokia, Symantec, Cisco need to change in order to compete:

1/ Innovate from the top, then continuously out-innovate themselves
Innovation is about taking a look from the outside-in with a fresh perspective and the purity of a new-born. The way to innovate is using my mantra of "believe nothing you hear, believe anything you see" (SM), meaning, the only thing that matters is how many people that you want using your product, are using your product. Analysts are useless in this assessment, as they simply use artificial market definitions to tell companies what they want to hear. Once you define real innovation, the next step is to continuously out-innovate yourself, ensuring that the pace of innovation is untouchable by others, and thus sustainable.

2/ Build irresistible products
Many of the aforementioned companies are in the technology commodities business. I wouldn't want to be in the business of building a car where the rest of the auto business is forced to use the same engine. There is only so much a pretty exterior can do to hide the ugliness of aging underperformance. As the dependency on operating systems shifts from the desktop to the web, now is the time for these vendors to escape commoditization and build their unique web-operating-experience.

3/ Develop a unique experience and maintain it
Too many technology companies in the Valley are "stocking stuffers", they stoically stuff a "market" (see markets don't exist) as defined by analysts and predecessors with incremental point products to eek out a larger percentage market-share than their competition. They "trade" market-share numbers as if they are the currency, that is - until "market" definitions change. But products don't sell, the experience does. People buy an iPhone, iPod because of the ecosystem behind it. Additionally with the lifecycle of many technology products being so short - around 3 years - renewals by recurring customers are vital to sustain growth. A one off product that made a promise and told many lies is devastating to the renewal rate and even the return to the brand. So, the emphasis should be on the experience -say music or photography - and innovate from the top around those.

4/ Change the culture: incent continuos innovation, punish stability
Corporate culture is fundamental to creating sustained innovation and for many large companies that means the CEO needs to exhibit that exemplary behavior. (it is somewhat humorous to see how VPs often mimic even the dress code of their CEOs). CEOs whos core competency is operational efficiency (HP, Cisco, Dell) need a right-hand man with executive privileges to cut through the bureaucracy and fundamentally realign the company along new macro and micro economic differentiation. Divisions need to be realigned to match customer experiences (not product groups) and be reduced into a one-level hierarchy. That ensures there is no place for employees to hide.

5/ Invest in innovation
Innovation as defined by bullet 1 is sustainable, spending money on stuffing markets is not. But the advantage large companies have over external innovation sponsored by Venture Capitalists is that they can think big, they are in a unique position to redefine customer experiences that ties seemingly disparate products into a cohesive offering that is much larger than the sum of all parts. Unlike startups, large companies are uniquely positioned to focus on the value of disruption rather than be restrained by the cost of entry. Large companies can build solid platforms upon which an ecosystem of independent software vendors can thrive.

Most of Apple's competitors are now simply chasing the iPhone strategy or music strategy, as they've chased market leaders for so many years. But that will never work. Every company has its own core competencies and its challenge is to become the innovator in the category they can make theirs.

Tough choices lie ahead for the technology titans. Those that change will survive.

The economy is not the problem

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-06T13:55:10-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Pierre Lamond, a Silicon Valley legend who has been a Sequoia partner at the Menlo Park, Calif.-based Venture Capital (VC) firm since 1981 has decided to join Khosla Ventures, primarily to do what Venture Capital was designed to do, take risks again.

Having hit on subprime VC for a few years now, his reasoning resonated with me and I looked back at Vinod Khosla's "New old-fashioned" model for Venture Capital, he describes in his 2002 presentation as "Funding to Milestones", as depicted below:

Now compare the above chart with the one right below, the VC model practiced by the majority of current Venture Capitalists today, which I refer to as subprime VC:

What quickly becomes apparent from the latter chart (derived from actual pitches between entrepreneurs and VC) is that supported by the excuse of lower development costs related to web2.0 technologies, the investors have pushed down the majority of the risk onto the entrepreneur.

We all know by know that Web2.0 is not a business and still requires the definition of a disruptive business that does not fundamentally yield lower operating cost, but much more disturbing is how investors have reduced their risk and delayed their active participation with a company that, in the end, actually produces lower exits (investors are now satisfied with a 2x rather than 10x return) and no IPOs. We explained in our previous blog how that strategy cannot save Venture Capital funds.

While statistically we can time-shift the sub-prime chart to the left and assume nothing has changed by holding up the Moneytree reports, anyone who has walked around in Silicon Valley as long as I have, knows what is really going on under the hood.

Unlike people like Vinod Khosla who can assess technology risk before it is build, the majority of investors can't envision an opportunity until they spot it in their rearview mirror. Today, investors demonstrate by their actions (or lack thereof) what is fundamentally flawed in Venture Capital; the lack of people that can accurately assess risk. In 5-years our economy will be in better shape than it has been, leaner and meaner. Technology opportunities are and will be abound, as it is in the early stages of penetration. This is indeed a time for aggressive investing, rather than a time for crawl-back we see some VCs do.

The sub-prime VC problem will remain when the economy recovers, if it is not aggressively perforated by people with real early-stage operating experience who understand that risk is the lifeline of Venture Capital - and join the investment fray.

Stop blaming the economy and take a risk, everyday. Only then will you get better at it.

(I will explain the sub-prime chart in more detail later)

How LPs invested deep, not wide in technology

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-05T17:37:07-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

About one year ago I attended a great session with Limited Partners (LPs) to VC firms, the Carlyle Group's Bob Grady and fund managers from Hamilton Lane and SFERS in San Francisco.

At the time I was impressed with the rationale behind a deliberate slowdown in new VC fund investments, yet every fund manager assured that the technology asset class remained an interesting one that LPs cannot afford not to participate in. The group as a whole emphasized that the new VC funds being deployed must prove substantial differentiation in its investment strategy, not unlike an entrepreneur needs to prove a similar aggressive differentiation to win market share.

With that in mind you may just be as amused as I am to see the "duh" investment strategy explained in this private placement memorandum (PPM) from a triple digit fund in early 2000:

Market capitalization at IPO of $1 billion or more
Rapid growth and very large potential market size
Leveraged customer acquisition strategies: the business is able to take advantage of established customer bases, “network” economics, or powerful “viral” strategies to acquire customers at modest up-front cost
Scalable business models
Robust economic models: significant margin generation with potential for self-funding in year 3 or before.
Significant competitive advantages based on such factors as proprietary technology, establishment of industry standards, customer investment in applications and/or user interfaces, or winner-take-all economics (i.e., the market is a natural monopoly)
The opportunity to create leverage vis-à-vis suppliers and customers by virtue of efficiency advantage, neutrality, scope of business, and hard-to-replicate investments

I have seen quite a few other PPMs since and the resemblance is remarkable. No surprise that VCs have had the flexibility to latch-on to every new technology acronym, using whatever allocation per company they desire and invest in virtually any technology company that comes their way. And so they did.

They all did. In pretty much the same way, as lemmings are known to do. So now, we are over-invested in the same deal constructs (deep, see the investment atrophy described here), and under-invested in the full scope of technology innovation. As a result, large technology companies (such as Apple) are eating early-stage disruptive innovation for lunch, leaving the little deals for the bottom-feeder (sub-prime) VCs that count themselves blessed investing in "capital efficient" deals with little disruptive value, let alone IPO prospects.

No longer can fund investments be made using a single yard-stick.

LPs need to take better control of the segmentation in the technology asset class especially since maturing technology evolution will have its feet in every market segment, including crossovers to other asset classes.

VC funds need to be pushed apart to yield less overlap and provide complementary investment strategies rather than an 80% overlap. That, with the requirement to start new VC funds with GPs that actually have had early-stage CEO operating success, allows VCs to better align with the needs of the entrepreneur and fundamentally improve the chances for high-yield returns.

How sub-prime VC stings twice

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-03-04T13:37:24-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Sub-prime Venture Capital is akin to the sub-prime lending market and we predict the bottom will soon fall out of sub-prime VC too, spurred by the fear of economic pressure and the depressing returns of expiring post 911 venture funds.

Just like working for Carnival Cruise looks glamorous but is not the way to explore the world, unsuspecting young entrepreneurs who fall for sub-prime investors will soon find out that building those technologies has all the glamour but few of the rewards associated with innovation. Regardless, many chasing the mighty dollar will fall for it.

Here is how entrepreneurs can recognize a sting from subprime VC:
Step 1: We like the idea, but before we invest please finish the product some more, then come back
Step 2: 6 Months later, you finished the product. Great, now prove it works by getting 100,000 daily users, then come back
Step 3: Fantastic, now we'll take 60% of your company for $1M

Ouch, that hurts.

Here is why sub-prime tactics hurt our innovative ecosystem, just like sub-prime lendings have a negative effect on the housing market as a whole.

ad 1/ Technology development is the investment risk we understand quite well, timely applicability to a market is the real issue. So, proving that the entrepreneur can build a product can easily be derived from the entrepreneur's vision, knowledge and credentials in that space, juiced up with some kitchen-sink prototyping. On top of that a 6-month self-funded development timeframe with 2-3 developers can hardly yield a sustainable competitive advantage anyway, so R&D development proves nothing.

ad 2/ In many cases it is impossible to land 100,000 users before you have a critical mass of product capabilities. That critical mass comes from an R&D investment that generates substantial differentiation, and rarely from tip-toeing into the marketplace. Marketplaces, for example, only grow when a critical mass of both supply and demand are lured in and participate, which often requires a bolstering of technology to support all constituents, rather than minimizing it. Already, too many technology products enter the market unfinished as a result of underfunding and yield false negatives.

ad 3/ Control and valuation of the company are a direct indication of the future success of an early-stage company. The vast majority of technology success stories are derived from retained majority control by its founders and CEO (Facebook, Google, Twitter, eBay etc). Investors are terrible operators (no surprise given their background and experience) and should not want to own a majority stake in their companies, simply out of self-preservation.

Additionally, the danger of these tactics deployed by sub-prime investors (many of the large venture funds deploy fashionable sub-prime tactics too) is that it marginalizes technology innovation and provides a very unstable breeding ground for the fund performance as well:

a/ Venture Capital is meant to stimulate the high-risk / high-yield asset class as defined by its Limited Partners, the sub-prime strategy described here (anecdotally) serves nothing more than low-risk / low-yield segment of the technology asset class.

b/ No fund larger than $100 Million can support the management attention needed to spur these tiny injections along. As a result sub-prime investors just constricted what they thought of interesting innovation with too little time and too little money to provide critical market entry.

c/ Very few low cost entry deals yield the disruption that prices out favorably to makes any dent in the return of the fund as a whole. Venture funds need few big returns to keep LPs coming back for more.

The only early-stage investors who may be able to turn sub-prime deals into prime are the investors who:
- have proven to be successful operators themselves
- support the vision before the product is there
- have great syndicates to support the full runway of a disruptive market entry going forward.

Investors that can turn sub-prime into prime can be counted on one, maybe two hands. People like Marc Andreessen with his new AZ (Andreessen-Horowitz) fund come to mind. But entrepreneurs who are not stung by these visionary investors may just as well hop on that cruise ship and enjoy life some more.

The economics of big technology plays have not suddenly changed, the cost of developing technology may have declined slightly but simultaneously competition has increased exponentially. So, we prefer to focus on plays that are high-risk and high-yield simply because only they create the disruptive innovation that can keep VC firms in business.

The challenge for early-stage entrepreneurs remains the same, to create unbridled and disruptive innovation that finds only one investor that believes in it. If many more do, believe me, the technology is just not disruptive enough. So, be ready for some controversy.

Finding the right investor, amongst 700+ firms in the U.S. requires that entrepreneurs understand and can read the dating game. If they don't, we'll be happy to help. But get to us before you've been stung 217 times.

Introducing the new VC blacklist: 217 and counting

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-02-23T23:13:48-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Retail store decorations reminded me that easter is approaching and that set off the memory of an easter egg chart (on the right) I received from an early stage entrepreneur who had been trying to raise money over the past 12 months. In many ways the chart indicates how the Venture Capital (VC) world is filled with the wrong operators (not a lack of money), incapable of assessing risk; I will clarify later.

The enclosed chart includes the names of every investor (VC and Angels) the entrepreneur has spoken to face-to-face (in dark green), conversed through e-mail (in light green) and is scheduled to connect with (in orange).

Needless to say the 217 investors (whom I will not disclose yet, to protect the entrepreneur) that bothered to meet face-to-face include pretty much anyone who means anything in the VC business.

Helped by a tiny amount of seed money and introductions from a well known and respected investor, most investors responded enthusiastically (according to the entrepreneur), yet virtually none have bothered to provide the valuable feedback (or responded back with a decent no) that could lead to a line-of-sight of a term-sheet.

So, we conclude from this painstaking process the entrepreneur went through the following:

- Fundraising takes time, a lot of time
Even with the introduction from a well known VC, carve out one year of your life to raise virtually nothing (a million or so). Most entrepreneurs chase a dream that is chiseled from years of experience dealing with inefficiencies, only to discover that at fundraising time they don't understand (and don't want to understand) the VC microcosm that holds "innovations" hostage. We recommend entrepreneurs to start socializing the idea with VCs the minute they start writing code, to establish a clear target list of investors that can and should do the deal 9 months to a year later. One year ago I would have recommended the entrepreneur to sell his house and raise money that way, easier and better retention of control in the company.

- Investors don't treat entrepreneurs with the respect they deserve
Not responding to the entrepreneur (even when they share valuable connections together) as the majority of the investors on the enclosed chart did is the lowest form of disrespect imaginable. I have written about obnoxious VCs in this blog many times before (reinventing VC, subprime VC, LPs fooled, curse of subprime VC, investors to avoid) and would tell you that those over-inflated personalities contribute that I have no interest to belong to the current VC club (I have been asked). Clearly not everyone was raised by a grandfather (and co-founder of the Mentos candy) who taught us early on that you can be hard-nosed, respectful and successful all at the same time.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are numb
As you notice from the linkages in the chart (hard to see at 6% of original size), many investors have provided referrals to others. But referrals only happen when investors believe "there is something there" (one of their favorite phrases) and pass it along to another investor who may better understand the proposition. In an effective investor ecosystem and regardless of their belief in the proposition, the chart would never grow to be as large as it is. When investors don't like the proposition they will not pass it on, and when they do they will keep it to themselves and work out a deal. So, the sheer size of this chart communicates really well how clueless our current VC microcosm is.

- The current crop of early-stage investors simply don't understand the technology business
The fact that this entrepreneur is thrown around like a rag-doll by some of the biggest "experts" in the VC business says it all. The investor's indecisiveness is an indication of their lack of knowledge and vision that has earned them such a prominent role in the innovation of our industry. But, the best investors weigh risk, they do not need to deliver vision. Experienced entrepreneurs do not need investors to hold their hands in understanding the technology business and just need their investors to get out of the way.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are cowards
There is nothing, I repeat, nothing wrong with a VC saying no, whatever the investor's rational. But this chart shows how none of them can decide on their own - either way. These investor cannot stand to lose a deal they may miss out on (and not saying no will keep that door open), and don't have the guts to take the risk if they thought otherwise. It takes a strong character to be a VC, not an insecure and arrogant one.

- The current crop of early-stage investors are lemmings in rudeness
We knew that they were lemmings already, but now we know they will not only decide to jump off the cliff together but also share incredible rudeness. A sad state of being. No entrepreneur should sign any of these people on to their boards, because if they were not rude to them yet, that behavior will undoubtedly pop up when they least expect it.

- Entrepreneurs need a professional agent
Talking to this many investors and not yielding any takers is creating the smell of a dead fish in the venture community. While great successes like Skype required talks with reportedly about 40 investors and I did 20 on one of mine, the entrepreneur should have forced an early feedback loop with some investors before proceeding to talk to any more. The entrepreneur should pick an advisor or agent that does not allow this to go on for so long. It is sad that we are beginning to look an awful lot like Hollywood to become effective.

Now, notice that I have not discussed the specific proposition of the entrepreneur here and we may actually side with the VCs unable to extract razor-sharp focus from this entrepreneur's broad tale (but we will have the courtesy to tell him that directly). But the validity of the proposition is beside the point made here. Entrepreneurs, while they eat away their family's life savings and make considerable personal sacrifices, deserve the straight talk to help them plan their resources.

It is even more appalling that without any serious feedback the only response from a few VCs is to come back later, build the base technology first (which the entrepreneur has done) and get a critical number of customers. As if at that time the entrepreneur is in need of any fair-weather friends. The true character of the sub-prime VC is shining through again, but I am surprised it includes so many investors I thought better of. No wonder people like Umair Haque become even more enraged, describing VCs asleep at the wheel of creative destruction.

I would suggest the LPs (Limited Partners) to pull back from 80% of their current VC commitment (that are not producing returns anyway) and re-allocate the majority of that money to the creation of new VC firms that target more fundamental diversification in the technology asset class. I hereby offer my services to the LPs that want to take a hard look at that. And I would love to see the remainder of the current "prime VCs" be forced to re-invent themselves by this new influx in the same way entrepreneurs are all the time.

The only way to grow technology innovation is to force the VC business out of its current sub-prime mode and challenge the behavior of the crypt-keepers by making them highly accountable for their performance.

In the words of Ron Conway (a prominent angel investor) who recently stated "it is time for a new crop of entrepreneurs", we surmise "it is time for a new crop of investors" that attracts better innovation.

Fotonauts: a smooth piece of the photography puzzle

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-02-23T18:56:15-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As the creator of my own personal photography and blog website for over ten years that publishes new photographs on a weekly basis, I have experimented with many tools, none of which serve my purpose with ease.

Opportunity
Roughly 50 million semipro camera users (including dSLR and semipro hybrids, growing at a rapid pace) are just like me and cherish no less than 25 Billion photographs per year that they seek to publish and share. A nice big opportunity of which Fotonauts (now fotopedia) aims to capture a piece.

Complicated independent workflows
As one of those semipro users I keep my photographs in my file-system (where no vendor can lock my thousands of photographs in), use LightZone to edit, Rapidweaver for web authoring with embedded HTML photo libraries created by JetPhoto Studio. That whole process takes quite a few steps and is not for the faint at heart. Rapidweaver is not great at managing lots of photographs and JetPhoto lacks the web authoring capabilities to become more than a companion to a photographic workflow. That seems to be indicative of many of the technology solutions in the digital photography arena, that is littered with hundreds of fragmented software and services tools in which none provide full support for the complete photography workflow.

Smooth operator
Fotonauts is an improvement in terms of its ability to create an instant (while you work) and good looking web site with some powerful social media capabilities that promise to increase traffic to your photographs. It blends offline and online capabilities (in which it cleverly avoids recreating the strategically flawed asset management repositories of both Apple, Adobe and others) and live-to-the-web authoring with superb smoothness, even in this beta version.

Web pages created by fotonauts can incorporate photographs from offline repositories such as the file-system and proprietary iPhoto, Aperture and Lightroom photo databases, and fotonauts can also tap directly into online photo libraries at Yahoo! FlickR, Facebook and Google's Picasa. The technology promise is sound, as can be expected from former Apple developers.

More fragmentation
But Fotonauts does not erase the complicated digital photography puzzle that aims to reduce complexity for the semipros or professionals, nor does it seem to target amateurs that care less about optimizing traffic through viral capabilities. For semipros it does not contain any white-labeing options nor a way to make images available for sale. The uniform layout applied to all albums is slick but off-putting to photographers who want to create their own brand and separate themselves from the pack.

The fragmented state of the current photography technology reminds me of the state of MP3 music before Apple introduced a better player (mobile and desktop), a store and the availability of premium content all wrapped in a single compelling user experience. In photography that is an opportunity too large and too complicated for VCs to understand and can only be captured by an established company with the vision and the financial wherewithal to wrap its arms around the complete photography experience. It is time for the photography puzzle to become whole.

Until then, Fotonauts is a smooth and beautiful new piece.

Why Comcast still does not deserve my triple play

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-02-19T11:26:34-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Every week I receive a new offer to convert my analog AT&T telephone service to Comcast's Voice-over-IP at a very affordable price of around $30 per month, combining Television, Internet and Phone (hence triple play) from a single provider. And I have been very close to switching over. But nothing makes it more clear to say no to them after having spent another frustrating hour at 5am in the morning on the phone trying to restore my repeatedly disconnected internet connection.

I do not usually use my own circumstances to highlight a vendor but this example emphasizes a much bigger issue: how destructive the experience can be to the acceptance of a product or service. Vendors need to learn that what sells is the experience, not the product or service.

Case in point. From the old days of Palo Alto's Cable CoOp (and MediaCity), the original provider of broadband some 10 years ago and final acquisition had landed my Television and Broadband service under one roof with Comcast. Fed up with receiving two separate bills for about 5 years I called in to Comcast to merge the two accounts into one. Four endless calls (one each month) and cumulative no less than ten hours later, I decided to throw in the towel and visit the Comcast store, one week before the inauguration. There, a helpful gal quickly assessed the situation, merged the two accounts and gave me a new cable-modem to serve my needs. Proud of my newfound face-to-face experience I returned home, installed the new modem and went on with life...so I thought.

Returning home from the inauguration in Washington DC a week later, expecting to relive the event we had witnessed in-person, I could not be more disappointed to find my Comcast DVR empty. A call in to Comcast led to the quick discovery and admission that they had disconnected ALL my cable activities by installing a physical terminator on the side of our house. Eager to reconnect and four hours later, with the help of a knowledgeable service technician my service was restored. Since then, consistently every month around billing time my service is being disconnected, requiring me to put in another 2 hour call to Comcast to repeat the saga and reconnect the service.

That gives new meaning to their Comcastic slogan, doesn't it. Needless to say I am not going to entrust Comcast with my phone service, or any other service.

But this case is symptomatic for many other consumer technology experiences we encounter.

We confirm again that:

In this automated world face-to-face interaction still trumps phone support
Customer relationship management does not come from an automated system (nor does it come from sales)
Support is crucial to selling more services (or losing them) and should have profit and loss responsibility

But to Comcast specifically it proves it has no business in penetrating our life with consumer products of any kind. Let alone your most sacred connection to the outside world, your telephone. We named the Comcast DVR the most horrid consumer device ever built and combined with their incapable support provides for an unacceptable user-experience.

Just like AT&T in mobile telephony we expect (and demand) a consumer vendor like Apple to reduce Comcast to its core competency, providing nothing more than a reliable network connection.

I have high hopes for that new Apple TV coming our way soon, that with the help of the government mandate for cable-cards that is already in place, will make the choice for best-of-breed back-end provider very easy. I'll be the first one to take a hard look at the network provider.

Radically reinventing Venture Capital

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-02-04T00:12:21-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I am responding to an article written by Dan Primack at Reuters PEHub (where some of my articles are syndicated), pondering the question as to how to radically reinvent Venture Capital. To start offering a solution, we should look at the original promise of Venture Capital (VC).

Let’s not forget: Venture Capital exists by virtue of great entrepreneurs building highly monetizable innovations.

With that in mind it may sound weird that many VCs are obnoxious, pompous, rude and anything but transparent to entrepreneurs (even after they invest).

But it is really not such a big surprise. Subprime VC attracts subprime entrepreneurs ready to cash in on the hype and hence an overwhelming amount of pitch noise drowns out the music, leaving investors numb and unable to separate the two. And now, most of those VCs are debating whether a new VC firm structure or deal mechanics can fundamentally change the outcome of the game. It will not.

Since the beginning of 2000 VC performance is under water and that hurts. But just like un-inspirational politicians who can’t get legitimate voters to vote for them, un-inspirational VCs waiving an outdated rule-book around cannot attract great entrepreneurs. But don’t for a moment think the american entrepreneurial spirit is dead. It is not.

My top 3 (but I could easily list more) ways of how VC should change:

1/ Invest in macro-economics
Rather than invest in mindless technology classifications, certain macro-economic behaviors engrained in society for hundreds of years can be harvested with technology. Think premium “market” and free-market models, each has great potential depending on which product or service is being sold. The cyclical behavior of adoption can prohibit the success of either, no matter how good the technology. Studying the model and the reason for its receptiveness will be the first clue towards a fundable business.

2/ Invest in inefficient supply and demand
Regardless of technology, many technology segments that we discard off-hand as too difficult have not even reached maturity or dominance by a single player (achieving over 30% “market” share). Even the well publicized Personal Computer segment consists of over 40% fragmented ownership, let alone an untapped market of roughly 5B people on this planet that don’t use a computer today. But fragmentation is the ultimate indicator of under-served potential, it simply means the current capability is ineffective, opening new opportunities for a new solution (iPhone computer anyone?). So, get your facts straight.

3/ Invest in the application of technology
Many new lines of businesses can benefit from the infusion of technology innovation. If the application of technology yields dramatic bottom-line impact, and provides a sustainable roadmap, then how it is build (with what flavor of technology) at the moment of entry merely indicates the cost to improve the upward trajectory further. So, stop investing in technology, but invest in application of technology.

Those three points alone require a completely different assessment of the risk factors associated with innovation than the one I see Silicon Valley VCs apply today. Most investors have become risk adverse and invest based on cost rather than opportunity.

So, to reinvent venture capital we need to reinvent the people behind it. The mechanics and size of government is irrelevant if it does not affect the behavior of politicians that inspires people to vote. Similarly, the effectiveness of VC will not improve by changing fund size, deal staging, etc. (or escaping to a green-tech “bull” market, for that matter) unless the investors change their behavior that inspires the right people to innovate.

We need to bottom up VC. Investors need to become truly complimentary to great entrepreneurs and practice similar ethics, transparency, and perseverance traits to become valuable contributors to the innovative process that allows them to reap the rewards. Teams that can consistently yield a path to trustworthy IPOs will be charmed into even more lucrative acquisitions along the way.

It is a “buyer’s market” only for those investors who buy mediocre innovation. And mediocre innovation will not produce great fund returns. So, in the end, innovation remains a “seller’s market” - or no market at all.

Let’s not sit back and wait to find out which one it is going to be, as the writing is already on the wall. The time for VC to change and attract different innovation and entrepreneurs is now.

While Steve Jobs is away; 10 priorities

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-28T16:07:49-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I am not going to add to the craze about Steve Jobs (Apple CEO) health rumors on the internet, and I seriously hope he recovers quickly and in excellent health.

Anyone trying to sue Apple or its board for inconsistent information, should back-off and be glad they are not faced with a similar diagnosis. One of my friends (much younger than Steve) was recently diagnosed with the same type of (a rare) cancer and is apparently being treated by the same doctor at Stanford. Having heard his stories first hand, I side with Steve that he cannot project with accuracy what is going to happen as 1/ what causes cancer is still fairly misunderstood (follow the cancer series on Charlie Rose and you’ll understand) 2/ his rare type of cancer (with about 8 known derivatives) is even less understood. So, give the man some space.

Steve has proven to be the best guy to ever run Apple, but that doesn’t mean the company can’t improve. Here is what I would do, given the chance:

1/ Making the current OS work “as promised”.
Snow leopard is on its way and without knowing any of the details the OS needs some fundamental improvements in Expose and Spaces that are simply not working correctly, those (and many other) flaws have been in OS X for quite a while and since it affects the user experience, that is simply not acceptable within Apple standards. It is clear, in many other areas, that the rapid pace of innovation in other areas has taken its toll on the focus on the OS. In addition, the OS needs an Applications Store similar to the iPhone App Store.

2/ Consumer OS, major OS overhaul.
It is time for Apple to define a new trajectory for the OS. The current OS trajectory is too technology centric and focuses primarily on local operating capabilities. Today’s use of computers requires a transparent blend between offline and online capabilities. I have formulated new specifications of what this new hybrid OS should look like, that is more powerful and easier to use (and gesture ready) than any of its predecessors. This new OS is a continuum of the iPhone experience yet dramatically exposes the increased power of a personal computer platform. This OS will provide similar experiences across the Apple TV, iPhone and computer platforms.

3/ Increased focus on digital photography.
Music and photography are the two most important applications consumers use. Digital photography needs fundamental new focus and a new application that manages photographs across offline and online repositories. Think of iTunes and the iTunes Store for digital photography. We have formulated the specs for these new capabilities. In addition, Apple should explore new camera technologies as well (for inclusion in later devices), the current dSLR vendors are leaving behind unique software opportunities that can improve the quality of images dramatically (even without changing the hardware).

4/ Put support in product group P&L.
Apple’s support is better than other vendors’, but a little better is simply not good enough. The organizational structure of Apple separates support from product groups, which, in every company, disconnects the product promise from its realities. I would make product groups responsible for their own support P&L, ensuring implementation of innovation is a closed loop. No longer will product groups be able to ignore the 5000+ complaints about a single bug in Apple TV, for example.

5/ Network backup (Time Capsule) needs an overhaul.
The Airport wireless base station is a fantastic, no hassle, device that just works. The backup capabilities with Time Machine that uses a USB connected disk (to the Airport) is fundamentally flawed. These networked storage devices have no fsck (file-system-check) built in that prevent disks becoming unstable because of lost network connections or other aberrations that can occur. Based on the documentation I assume Time Capsule also does not include fsck and is therefor also unreliable as a backup drive.

6/ Broaden adoption of Professional Applications.
Most of the professional applications for photography and movie editing simply provide tools to edit, requiring the operator to understand the often complex language and methodologies involved. But the power of professional tools becomes really obvious when the application provides methodologies that hide the underlying composition of tools. Through the use of styles, derived from a marketplace, both Aperture and Final Cut Pro can be dramatically enhanced to provide new capabilities that expedites new editing techniques for experienced users and enthousiasts.

7/ Implement movie rental subscriptions.
The iTunes store needs a movie rental subscription model to adopt the ‘old’ Blockbuster and Netflix model, many americans are used to. A fixed monthly rate allows you to watch a certain number of movies per month, perhaps with rollover credits to compete with alternative distributors that can’t follow due to their dependence on low-usage profits.

8/ Apple TV needs a tuner, make that two.
Apart from a new “front-row” user interface (supported by a new OS as described in 2), the Apple TV needs to embrace DVR capabilities. Similar to the iPhone and AT&T, Apple should take a swing at giving customers a better end-user experience (and integrated with iTunes content) with Comcast, or else threaten to take the business from under their noses. The cable-card mandate makes it possible for virtually any vendor to displace the current set-top-box and DVR experience, and I would bet customers would pay a premium to get rid of the Comcast experience.

9/ Build Apple TV server.
Longer term (preferably after a deal with Comcast) I would like to see an Apple TV with tuner capabilities feeding all my TVs, rather than having individual AppleTV and DVR tethered to each to TV. Record once, playback anywhere (for traditional and new media).

10/ Deep dive into enterprise server sales.
The enterprise server strategy of Apple is a mystery to me. Having built a couple of new business revenues in large business (Oracle, HP) and SMB segments (Symantec) I don’t see Apple apply the pressure that warrants building products for this segment.

Again, as a 15-year empathetic Apple user I would like nothing but to see Steve return soon and hope this blog will consequently void itself.

Innovating back to the future

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-22T12:36:18-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Real innovation relies on a myriad of macro and micro-economic benefits to succeed. The key to a lasting technology business is not just the introduction of snazzy new technology, but more importantly, how well macro-economic improvements address the needs of everyday consumers.

Below are three examples of a misrepresentation of the benefits of innovation that will strike early adopters.

1) Digital Photography
We all instinctively believe the innovation from analog to digital is fantastic, and for some (like me) it is. But when you look closely, the conversion from analog to digital suddenly requires everyday users to tether a camera to a computer, buy and learn about digital asset management systems and figure out which service to use to get images printed (not even a trip to Walmart erases the Do-It-Yourself paradigm). So, rather than a more streamlined process we’ve actually complicated the process, increased the initial cash outlay and forced users to learn, often complicated computing skills for novices.

Kodak’s biggest challenge is to convince users that their camera is not broken when it gives the cryptic message “Error: CF card is full” (check out EyeFi, for another technology “solution” to that). So, the reduction of expenses in printing that digital photography promised, has simply shifted to an upfront expense in computer technology and knowledge that has so far amassed less market penetration than traditional cameras. That, to many, is a step back, rather than forward.

2) Internet Television
Many broadcasters now provide internet based viewing to anyone with a web browser. But the protocols and video players of each of those providers (CNN, ABC, NBC etc.) is different. So, for years the FCC has regulated the creation of a standards compliant way of watching TV with any NTSC television (or PAL in Europe), suddenly, thanks to our border-less innovation we find ourselves with as many video players and playback encodings as there are content providers. While companies like Boxee attempt to provide a TV portal, the playback mechanisms are unique to each source, and thus delivering a confusing user experience. That, to many, is a step back, rather than forward.

3/ Mobile telephony
While GSM (the underling technology for most mobile phones) was designed and implemented in its early days to provide free-market access to mobile telephony network, companies like AT&T (that support GSM protocols), artificially restrict the use of other (competing) networks (such as T-Mobile) by locking the SIM cards that are pre-installed in the phone. As a consequence consumers are restricted to a proprietary brand and narrower network coverage while there is no technology reason to do so. That, to many, is a step back, rather than forward.

Ample other examples exist. The role of technology is to disappear, not to expose itself. Few companies (big and small) achieve that objective today.

As gambling-style exits and IPOs disappear it becomes more important for technology companies to keep both macro and micro-economics in check. More investors should screen companies for these more impact-ful innovations that focus on making technology less, rather than more prominent to consumers. That is where the real big bucks are.

How subprime Venture Capital fools Limited Partners

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-12T13:22:33-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

The subprime investment tactics by Venture Capitalists has a damaging impact on the returns provided to Limited Partners (those who provide the funds to the Venture Capital firms, such as pension-funds, university endowments, insurance companies etc.) and on the technology asset class as a whole.

We predict that as a result - and within 2 years, when the gestation period of the post 911 VC funds has expired LPs will dramatically reduce the inflow of moneys in the technology asset class, disappointed by unfavorable returns. To no fault of great entrepreneurs in this great country.

Here is how subprime VC fools LPs:
1/ The LPs believe they are investing in a premium technology asset class but in reality they are investing in an artificially constricted commoditized asset class we call bootstrapped innovation.
2/ The LPs believe they are investing in a high-risk high-yield asset class yet the VCs operate using low-risk (almost investment banking style) tactics with inherently low yields.
3/ The LPs believe they are spreading the risk by investing in multiple VC firms, not realizing that the majority of them invest using the same rule-book and therefor identical risk patterns. The LPs unknowingly are investing deeper rather than wider.

So, just like when my daughter behaves badly (rarely) and I need to take control of the situation, so must the LPs take control and tighten the leash with VC firms that are behaving “badly”. The behavior of my daughter (or dog if you consider that your child) is my responsibility, the behavior of VCs is an LP responsibility.

Here is what every LP should do right now:
1/ Bring every invested VC firm in and re-assess whether the invested amounts, category and valuations per portfolio company match the initially stated investment thesis and more importantly, your current risk profile across all assets.
2/ Ensure the spread between the investment in technologies versus the application of technologies to markets aligns with renewed opportunities and your current risk profile. The impact of technology has dramatically changed (rather than reduced), and many VCs are still stuck in the past.
3/ Hire an operational partner that establishes continuous oversight into the VC investment allocations (get one here) based on the risk and identity associated with each participating fund. That oversight should prevent the fund from investing outside the pre-established criteria.

Now is the time to reassess the investment opportunities in our technology industry. We believe the opportunities are abound, just not with the current investment tactics.

As Cesar Milan, a.k.a. the dog whisperer teaches us: its not too late to rescue any dog - as long as we can change the behavior of its caretaker. Similarly, it is not to late to improve entrepreneurialism if we change the behavior of its investors.

Mobile is dead, continued

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-09T19:56:41-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I wrote about the death of mobile application investments a while back and the recently leaked e-mail (posted by Tech Crunch) from Tapulous shines more light on those unattractive economics for investors. Investing in the Long Tail of content (the games category) is not a good idea.

Now I want to preface that selling 100,000 copies of a game is a great accomplishment (good job Bart and thank you Apple), but the $1M or so this very popular game generated can hardly be called a venture funded business that is going to emerge with a billion dollar market cap anytime soon.

Here is what needs to be accomplished to generate a little over $1M:

#1 most popular game for iPhone & iPod touch for 2008
#3 most popular app overall for the US
5 million unique installs on Tap Tap Revenge! (that doesn’t double-count when a user upgrades TTR)
100,000 paying customers

So, if being the #1 most popular game on iPhone means you make $1M, I can’t see how:
1/ This initial success is going to continue with an avalanche of other attractive games entering the market
2/ The company is going to be able to produce a consistent stream of similar “winners”

And so here is another example if subprime investing, this time provided by a long tail of angels.

Tap Tap Tap.

How to spot subprime VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-08T01:58:06-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Subprime VC, as described in a previous blog is easily recognizable, here are some of my metrics. Run for the hills when the investor...:

1/ ...seems more interested in how it is built rather than what the disruptive business proposition is.
Innovation becomes successful when it marries macro-economic value with micro-economic (technology) execution. Technology risk is the least of our worries in Silicon Valley, yet fundamental disruption is crucial and should take up the majority of the discussion.

2/ ...seems more worried about cost of development than cost of greenfield customer acquisition.
Capital efficiency is a buzz-word investors love to throw around. In most cases they want you to be as cheap as possible. But capital efficiency is relative to the cost and value of customer acquisition. Not all venture capital deals start with a seed round below $250K, more disruptive innovation usually costs more to build well (think iPod, iPhone, iTunes, eBay, etc).

3/ ...talks about valuations before you’ve explained the value of becoming the market leader.
A favorite trick of investors is to value the company based on its present accomplishments and many entrepreneurs fall for it. Their companies become undervalued and underpriced which leads to early loss of control to investors. And when investors run a company, statistically the chances of success have diminished significantly. Early stage companies should be priced based on the value of the idea and accomplishments along the trajectory of market leadership. Your glass should be seen as half-full not half-empty.

4/ ...seems more occupied with categorizing the investment than understanding its unique business value.
When investors start categorizing investments in technology categories and subsequently base their investment decisions on them, that means they clearly missed the fact that you business proposition could have value regardless. Again, technologies are not the business, application of technology to a market segment is.

5/ ...talks about capital efficiency without probing market inefficiency.
Again, capital efficiency is a relative term. When a large market is extremely inefficient it probably means that the absolute cost to enter is high (otherwise someone else would have entered it before you). So, the cost to enter the market is a function of its current inefficiency. Many investors are less versed in inefficiencies than you and therefor misjudge the price it takes to enter. As the entrepreneur you will be faced with the inequitable consequences if you decide to bow down and take the investors’ word for it.

6/ ...doesn’t question market entry risk, but focuses on cost.
Investment risk is what should be top of mind to investors, but many of them think they have the operational experience to challenge the assumptions of the entrepreneurs. In many scenarios market entry risk can be mitigated by developing a better product, but a better product costs more money to build. At any time would I rather spend a dollar on R&D to make the product better, than spend a dollar on marketing expenses to try and make a “cheap” product land better. So, the right amount of money (not cost) is imperative to disrupt a market.

7/ ...doesn’t ask about the runway to profitability, but the initial round to get in.
Most companies require multiple rounds of funding. Those rounds are not there for you as the entrepreneur, but for the investor to establish milestones to make him more comfortable. An investor that does not allocate sufficient runway, is effectively selling short on the promise of your company and will cost you months of fundraising efforts at every round.

8/ ...asks you which other investors you’ve spoken to.
Investors are lemmings, and so you should not disclose who you talk to until you have all their term-sheet on the table. Force them to make their assessment of your company independently. Usually each investor has a different risk analysis of your company and last thing you want to do is add up all the negatives before there is a buying signal on all sides. Herd the positives.

9/ ...asks you to talk with his associates first.
As discussed in this blog many times over, associates are graduates that should be used to perform due diligence, not to discover a black swan. Many investors will use associates as a way to offload the workload created by the noise inherent to our industry. The minute you get the associate, you have become noise.

10/ ...asks you more about your education than your work experience.
Building innovation that is truly unique requires an analytical mind and ignorance to anything else but bottom-line results. Education teaches you how to respond to prescribed scenarios, innovation requires the opposite; an ability to respond adequately to a myriad of circumstances that have never presented itself to you, in that composition before. Any investor that focuses on your (or his) business school accomplishments has a warped view of what innovation really is.

Never forget that a great entrepreneurial idea sponsored by the wrong investor yields nothing but failure. Keep searching for the right partner and don’t bow down to subprime investment tactics.

The curse of subprime VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2009-01-06T10:47:09-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

It continues to amaze me how VCs point to the economic downturn as a reason for sluggish investing. We all know that at this point they should do exactly the opposite (and a few good ones do).

Information Technology is here to stay as we clearly have not reached the saturation point of its practical implementation, even though short-term M&A and IPO windows have pretty much closed - for now.

But I am especially dismayed by the fact that VCs seem to completely ignore responsibility for the fact that their investments strategies can’t seem to weather the storm and how they continue to hide behind the economic downturn to avoid the disclosure of their bad choices. Reminds you of anyone?

I don’t believe the VC model is broken, in the same way I don’t believe mortgage lending is broken. We will continue to buy new houses - and technologies. Both represent sizable investment returns for years to come. But the risk profile associated with lending money for a home has been miscalculated and I contend the majority of VCs are fundamentally miscalculating the risk of early-stage investing. Birds of a feather.

Here are some of the similarities:

1/ The sheer number of lenders entering the mortgage arena forced an artificial expansion into the low-end. In the technology industry about 790 US investors force a similar artificial expansion down into the low-end. Most entrepreneurs are forced to comply to the “capital efficiency” rule-book or, as I call it, subprime VC.

2/ The majority of people working at the mortgage bank cannot accurately assess the risk profile, neither can the majority of people working at a VC firm. The associate in a VC firm (or worse the General Partner), fresh out of school is simply not able to detect disruption. Schools are, by design, setup to teach students about white-swans, not the black swan that usually spawns real innovation.

3/ The lenders took advantage of uneducated buyers, without sufficiently reminding them that buying a house yields a debt, not an asset. Similarly, entrepreneurs are often made to believe they are successful when they land a round of funding, mistaking that for an asset (instead of a liability) and subsequently not paying enough attention to the acquisition of its real assets; new paying customers.

4/ The majority of home-buyers should not have qualified. Similarly, most technology ideas should not. Innovation is only meaningful when it monetizes ideas. So investing based on technology classifications is the wrong qualification of innovation.

As the included chart attempts to depict, the investment strategies in the 1990s and even the exuberance in 2000 produced better variance and returns than the atrophy created by the current VC rule-book. Now, too many investors herd (syndicate) around the same investment strategy, diminishing its returns and making it increasingly less attractive for smart entrepreneurs who refuse to submit themselves to subprime investment rules.

An artificial VC rule-book, subprime valuations, lower founder salaries, fewer M&A and zero IPO makes for a very unattractive entrepreneurial playground. If we don’t throw the VC rule-book out of the window, we should expect nothing more than sub-prime M&A and subprime IPOs, even when the economy recovers.

The concern is that we are creating fewer companies that someday have the financial wherewithal to acquire its smaller innovative brethren and like the lending market, are stuck with “innovation” that no-one wants to buy. I wrote about that starting more than 3 years back (here, here, here). We need VCs with the ability to spot disruptive business opportunities rather than perpetuate technology gimmickery.

Perhaps we can put the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) to work on something better than mindless self congratulating statistics of the past and misleading videos of the actual workings of venture capital today. It could instead create more transparency of its members, to stave off tougher selection and regulation from the Limited Partners (pension funds etc.) that are otherwise unavoidable.

We, as collective contributors to the technology ecosystem - not the elusive economy - are responsible for the performance of our industry and our ability to produce real value that can weather any storm, and that means we need to get out of subprime VC quickly.

I'm just not that into you

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-16T13:16:02-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Not for a second do I buy into the doom-and-gloom spread by early stage investors citing the state of the economy as the reason for cutbacks. While the economic situation is worrisome, much of it is generated by supposed financial and business experts that are not. To say the least.

Sounds familiar? We have a few of those in Silicon Valley too. When money is involved, some people just can’t help themselves (or rather the opposite).

Investors still have plenty of overhang to invest with and their portfolio companies are on a 5-7 year trajectory to exit, meaning the viability of their choices is determined by the value at the end, not the value in the middle or the trajectory. The macro-economic value of a startup should remain intact in an economic downturn. So, the behavior of your investor will tell you whether you “married” well.

Very few startups should be materially impacted by the state of the economy, because:

1/ Their early stage market penetration is immaterial to the overall addressable “market”, leaving enough room for growth in any economy.

2/ The majority of (consumer focused) startups generate income through indirect monetization such as click-thru advertising, which is somewhat resilient to economic aberrations (even though purchasing may not).

3/ In early stage development, monetization is secondary to land-grab, and smart operating plans have very conservative and immaterial income projections built-in.

So, the fact that investors strike fear in the minds of entrepreneurs is the same as a president of a country at war expressing similar fear; not productive. Sure you need to be cautious and count your chickens, but great investors see this as a fantastic opportunity to double-down on their investments and amplify the market differentiation rather than restrict it.

Access to capital is a serious barrier to entry that can keep competitors out. So, if you are being restricted by your investor at this point it means he’s just not that into you and is doing you more harm than good.

Silicon Valley believes all swans are white

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-15T21:03:37-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I recently watched an interview on Charlie Rose with Nassim Nicholas Taleb and decided his “Black Swan” theory accurately describes the fundamental problem in early-stage technology investing (and innovation in general).

To paraphrase Taleb; the cultural assumption is that all swans are white (and therefor black swans could not exist). So you think.

Taleb (a partner at an investment firm) believes that scientists, economists, historians, policymakers, businessmen, and financiers are victims of an illusion of pattern; they overestimate the value of rational explanations of past data, and underestimate the prevalence of unexplainable randomness in that data.

The proof that Silicon Valley suffers from the white swan syndrome lies amongst many in the foolish behavior of investors, the predetermined investment allocations based on the tagging with ambiguous acronyms (such as web2.0, SOA, Cloud computing, CRM etc.) and the mindless herding of primarily unsuccessful ideas (or copies of a few successes) at the many popular technology conferences.

I am inclined to take Taleb’s theory a bit further: I believe the majority of people are victims of an illusion of pattern, established by years of (often irrelevant) education infused with the technology Kool-Aid that confined their thinking to a predetermined direction and scope. It prevented entrepreneurs and investors from ever being able to identify true innovation until it had become part of their past. Hence the rampant number of false positives and false negatives.

Taleb further adds that black swans are actually the ones that change the industry, and that the so-called “unexplainable” events (that have no single precedent in time) redefine the future of the whole industry. And so, the search is on, not just for the investor with the right macro-economic views, morals and personality, but also the vision to spot innovation that has no precedent - the black swan.

The noise in our industry is still drowning out the music. We need to change the way we invest and improve our ability to spot black swans or otherwise we will lose the entrepreneurs that can build them. Our excuse today is not the economy but our own performance in producing truly disruptive value that can withstand the test of time. We need to put real entrepreneurs on a pedestal and throw the copycats to the curb, quickly.

Albert Einstein was right all along: imagination is more important than knowledge. That applies to investors too.

Lessons to learn from Obama

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-10T00:17:17-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Silicon Valley is not dissimilar from the politics in Washington DC in the sense that its existence today is regulated by aristocratic people (investors) who are not up for re-election for another 7-10 years and have created an ecosystem that spawns more false positives and false negatives than any politician could ever get away with.

So, it is not without a smile on my face (as I have been preaching and practicing for years) that I quote Barack Obama’s innovative approach to politics that we in Silicon Valley could learn from:

Strong personalities and strong opinions
Obama looks for strong personalities and strong opinions, while the venture business is often afraid to hire people who challenge its popular opinion. Many technology companies over the years have been invaded by managers who akin to the gold-rush are looking for the gold that is no longer easy to find. We need to change too and cultivate managers that have real experience, strong vision and strong abilities to rally a team around achievable results. Let’s get rid of managers that just like politicians prefer to feed their sex drive (my first boss in the US spent his days watching porn-videos as we prepared feverishly for a major launch) and their 401K with the least resistance possible.

Think anew and act anew
Obama is shaking things up. We should too. The really new ideas in technology are few and far between. We need to build and feel responsible for an ecosystem of new financiers that fund technology ideas that do not fit the mold, rather than continue to create clubs that mindlessly perpetuate businesses that copy few successes or popular acronyms.

Extreme transparency
Obama teaches us how the disclosure of governmental documents is the floor and not the ceiling. Compared to that metric, early-stage performance disclosure is probably more than 6 feet under, or in the cellar. We have no transparency in the venture business to discover who has integrity, and who is poisoning the technology ecosystem. We need to deliver transparency in order to improve the trust in technology companies that keeps private and public investor interested.

High integrity and moral
Obama, when moving back to Chicago, took a job doing what he believed in, not what made him the most money. We need to stimulate people in Silicon Valley with a passionate desire to fundamentally improve technology adoption, rather than continue to feed people who hone their skills just to get rich.

Use it or lose it
Obama evaluates and then commits quickly. And then, when the money is forked over, you are expected to make things happen. That’s how real savvy businessmen run their companies, quite different from the puppet role many startup CEOs play to appease their boards, the source of perpetual mediocrity. We need to grow a culture of buy-in and commit, risk and reward that holds people accountable for the results.

Either we regulate the early-stage technology ecosystem ourselves or the market will do it for us - with much less grace. Already, it is predicted that 25% of the VCs will go out of business soon, freeing up LP overhang for a new crop or reallocation to a new segment. Other countries (such as China) are not sitting still, the performance of our technology ecosystem will now be challenged on a global basis.

The only way not to lose grip globally is to hold the values, that made our country vote for Obama high, and aggressively reward integrity, passion and sincerity over greed. Real capitalism rewards the good and punishes the bad. And the American dream flourishes again.

Three rules for successful consumer technology companies

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-08T17:26:34-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

We spend a lot of time with consumer technology companies and developed the following rules for success:

1/ Undeniable benefit.
The majority of companies accept the path of evolution developed by the first entrant in that segment and use manufacturing optimization to drive down cost and price as the basis for greater customer adoption. While that is a viable business strategy for some, real disruptive innovation is less price sensitive as it triggers new behavior. New behavior in turn, taps into new allocation of disposable income.

So, rather than looking at the competition, technology companies need to have a sound strategy as to how they will reach 30% adoption rates of the total-addressable-market that the current vendors have not. Macro-economics, the buying decisions and experience beyond just the scope of technology are important to assess.

2/ Impeccable product quality and user experience.
Consumers are both demanding and often uninformed about the technology language that many vendors impose on the use of their products. The combination is a battleground from which only well developed products emerge. Simplicity is key (and too many usability options are NOT good).

Many technology companies develop products with an engineering centric view of the world, insufficiently realizing that no consumer wants to learn a new language to understand how to use a technology product. Consumer centric interfaces and methods are just as important as product intelligence.

3/ Great support experience.
Support is no longer just a painful cost center to a business, great support can be an asset that recovers the mounting cost of product returns and prevent market adoption issues from spiraling out of control. So, great support helps perfect product quality, but only if it provides a direct closed-loop back into development. Great consumer companies engage with their customers directly and get better at defining what a market-ready product really means.

Technology companies with thousands of entries in their support and third-party forums are ignoring free research that will make their product better. Support cost should be captured in the product P&L and managed by a single manager, responsible for R&D and support. Runaway support cost is often the result of a product that simply isn’t ready for prime-time.

So, macro-economics, product quality and product experience are the main ingredients to create success for consumer technology companies and in turn will provide incredible loyalty for the next version.

Which investors to avoid

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-08T13:46:30-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

For over 10 years I’ve built and managed growth for early stage innovation in Silicon Valley and more than ever do I believe that building real disruptive customer value is more important than trying to time an acquisition opportunity. You may too, unless of course you are a gambler and firmly believe that the $3 red-white-blue slot machines in Vegas consistently yield the greatest returns. I will not argue the outcome.

Acquisitions remain nothing more than a welcome diversion on your way to building the largest technology empire. And even now when IPOs have dried up any focus away from building your empire is damaging. Real disruptive innovation is resistant to economic aberrations and a consistent focus on customer value remains your only rescue.

I believe that IPOs for technology companies will return (and subsequently spur more pre-IPO acquisitions), albeit not with the same players. Real companies can only be built by real entrepreneurs, with real disruptive products supported by real investors. New participants (on both sides) with higher moral values will be the ones to restore trust in the technology industry and subsequently public stock markets that want a piece of it.

Today, the VCs are stuck with a product of their own aristocratic making. Commoditization of investment philosophies since the 1990s has generated technologies that can best be described as sexy-cool rather than disruptive and meaningful (with a few exceptions). It paved the way for get-rich-quick entrepreneurs that are skilled in feeding the dogs the dog-food, rather than support the real entrepreneurs that have a dissenting view of the world.

So, assuming you as an entrepreneur are for real, how would you recognize an investor that is not. Here are some of my anecdotal recommendations:

1/ Avoid an investor who blames his quick response on ADD
Attention Deficit Disorder is an illness, not a skill. Recommend the investor to consult a doctor.

2/ Avoid an investor who does not carry (or seriously considers) an iPhone
The iPhone is the biggest innovation in consumer electronics in my lifetime (so far) and if your potential investor does not understand its ramification to the technology ecosystem as a whole, it is unlikely he will get yours.

3/ Avoid an investor who cannot price your company ahead of you.
Any technology investor should be able to price the value of your disruption. Ask the investor for the valuation and if he is close to your target, you can share with him your cost model and where you are today on the trajectory. Cost model and stage (the risk) are a discount to the disruptive value, the ability to build the technology is merely a commodity. In Silicon Valley technology is not the risk, but market entry with sufficient disruption is. Walk away from investors that incorrectly evaluate the risk model.

4/ Avoid an investor whose partners you can’t stand
Investors in a fund make decisions collectively, they need partner consensus before they can invest - just like in politics (more on that later). A firm with a partner you don’t like should be taken off your VC prospect list, as you cannot risk the influence of the bad apple to your company’s future. Develop your personal blacklist (as we did) based on fundamental people principles.

5/ Avoid an investor who wears his education on his sleeve
Wearing a Super Bowl ring means you made it in the real world, wearing an Ivy League ring does not. I wholeheartedly agree with Craig Venter that later stage education (without operating experience) in general is a deterrent to creativity and innovation or the ability to spot and spawn it. The majority of Silicon Valley investors are remnants from a bull market, echoing beliefs that are founded on skewed business principles.

6/ Avoid an investor who asks really dumb questions and is proud of it.
I never thought dumb questions existed until I ran into one investor who proudly blogged about how other entrepreneurs simply walked away from him, making his life easier. We walked away from him too.

7/ Avoid an investor who thinks he knows your industry better.
Even in the unlikely scenario he does, you should still walk away. Investors that know industries better than the entrepreneur should have become one. So either the investor is better informed (which should send you back to the drawing board) or he thinks he does (which becomes a pain in board meetings). Investors see a lot of things that don’t work, rather than discover the opportunities that do.

The bottom line is that we recommend entrepreneurs not to squander their great ideas with the first investor that waves money in their face. Real disruption does not become extinct quickly and so you literally have years to find a great investor out of the 790 firms that exist in the United States.

Thankfully the get-rich-quick money schemes in technology are drying up, so make sure you, as the entrepreneur, also have the integrity to build real disruption that spawns real and lasting customer value for years to come.

I look forward to helping develop new investor 2.0 and entrepreneur 2.0 strategies with you.

cooliris is cool

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-12-01T18:35:09-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I recently ran into a great new application called cooliris (funded by Kleiner Perkins) from a similar named company in Palo Alto. But much more than just a cool application cooliris is the pre-cursor to a new way of accessing the internet, if the company plays its cards right.

I ran into cooliris when it first launched because of its initial focus on photography, and since then the company continued to dramatically improve its scope and has quickly become an appealing application to get news presented visually.

Stronger put, I predict that in 5 years from now the browser (like Safari, Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer) will not be the predominant way we access the internet. But that perhaps is an easy prediction. The majority of applications on an iPhone already use non-browser access (Facebook, Plaxo, eBay etc) and so do a few others on the PC (such as iTunes).

The browser is a very technological way of accessing data on the Internet, with poor navigational attributes. The URL language is certainly not one everyone understands and that relegates the dependency on search, which is still the primary way to navigate the Internet. And as the internet continues to grow in size, search will yield ever diminishing navigational success.

Clearly more companies are looking to improve Internet navigation. AT&T’s new Pogo browser, Google Chrome and enhancements to Firefox are an indication of the awareness of the pain. We will see more examples of improved navigational capabilities, some of which I can’t divulge at this point. But until then - enjoy cooliris.

Trust is the currency of success

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-11-20T15:41:36-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

As any economist will tell you, a dollar bill is not worth a dollar. And so the real value of that paper bill is defined by the trust we put in it. The trust that you will receive a certain (yet fluctuating; some days a dollar is worth more than others) amount of goods and services in exchange. Simple right?

So given that, trust is the most important denomination in determining the value of a product or a service. And trust builds from consistent delivery on stated promises, which - in turn - requires the unwavering commitment from people with integrity and honesty....do you feel the slide coming?

So:
1/ Why do many companies make promises they don’t keep?
I evaluate a lot of technology companies (about 60 this year alone, public and private) and most are simply lying about, or overstating (decibel marketing) the benefits of their proposition. Because the majority of potential customers and investors are ill-informed about the pros and cons of this specialized industry, technology companies can often get away with sneaky monetization strategies that take advantage of a lesser informed audience.

In Silicon Valley, “success” is often defined by how skilled you are in fooling customers and sucking up to aristocratic investors (to which few have access), rather than the authenticity of your proposition. A mediocre ecosystem is what still remains after the technology bust from 2001 in which self proclaimed “serial entrepreneurs” and investors have been able to dodge real value creation and sell out short.

Not the VC model is broken, but many of the participants are. That noise is severely eroding the trust in an inherently sound technology industry. We need to enforce more transparency and hold ourselves to higher standards to restore the integrity and trust.

2/ Why do we allow short-selling on public company stock?
First, the performance of public stock says nothing about the actual value or outlook of a company, in the same way the dollar offers no guarantee of what you get for it. Public stocks are already a lousy interpretation of the actual performance of a company, as it merely echos popular opinion (and not the company facts).

So, selling short is really a bet on performance of popular opinion and does nothing but undermine the trust in the longevity of a business and cannibalizes shareholder value. Quarterly earnings reports are an absolute joke as many companies move profits around, claim leadership in a market that is defined by themselves and reduce cost rather than improve their marketplace position in order to make quarterly earnings look good. They also force healthy companies to focus on often unpredictable economic aberrations rather than on their long term and macro-economic leadership position.

The ability to sell short creates unrest and undue fear in a system that requires the opposite. Can you imagine holding the president of the United States accountable on a quarterly basis? That would be bad for our country (in most cases).

We should implement a predetermined holding period for the sale of stock, the expiration determined by the company and regulated by the SEC (which can also prevent some nasty insider trader deals) to build back trust.

3/ Why are some allowed to resell securities?
Reselling securities (which was illegal a few years back) based on finagled credit scores are perhaps the double whammy in the erosion of trust in public companies. Company credit scores that are maintained (and marketed) by commercial companies create profit driven scores and unrealistic prices (up and down) for securities. We simply need to stop the resale of securities and regulate the process of maintaining credit scores (both business and personal) vigorously and immediately.

Regulations do not turn us into a socialistic society, but the reality is that no economy operates without rules to protect trust. Free-markets require a basic set of rules to prevent a few bad apples to create insurmountable fear for the rest of us.

For the technologists amongst us: eBay deploys no less than seven dedicated servers to detect suspicious transactions that could challenge the trust in its free-market model.

In the same way we deploy rigid traffic laws to drive a car, should we deploy rules of engagement to protect our economic serenity. As long as we don’t dictate the destination of our travels or where we place our individual economic bets, we should be just fine in our support of a blossoming capitalistic society.

Trust comes from transparency, integrity and authenticity that builds real value, not from taking advantage of the ill-informed. So, building a successful company does not start with a new product strategy but with a leader who has the drive to win that is larger than his greed. Building disruptive products that truly improve people’s lives will yield personal satisfaction and trust that will keep customers coming back for more.

Trust is the only currency that matters, so stop squandering it.

Educating pictures

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-11-09T20:29:00-05:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I was flattered last week by a visit from Rick Smolan, the creator of some very creative photo-projects, such as From Alice to Ocean, America 24/7, Blue Planet Run and his latest America At Home. Since the early 90s, From Alice to Ocean stuck with me when it was first introduced and distributed with Apple computers and the clever use of multimedia capabilities built into the Mac early on. But the great thing about these projects is not just the stunning imagery but rather what they evoke. Again, the value of photography is in the eye of the beholder.

Rick approaches photography in the same way I look at business; by simply surfacing the facts. So much in our lives is influenced by mountains of politics and rhetoric that reduce the chance of quick resolution and success. How do you think we can ensure a vibrant global economy and peace if 1.1 Billion people - 1 in every 6 - worldwide have no access to clean water. The book Blue Planet Run displays that with chilling accuracy.

But Rick Smolans projects shed light on reality, good and bad. America at Home is a compelling compilation of how American families live at home, rich and poor, photographed by the families themselves and complemented by photographs from professional photographers. The pictures and their captions are so inspiring that a country decided to buy more than 200,000 books to educate their children on who Americans really are. Transparency works both ways.

I would like to see Rick do a book of “The World at Home”, so I can continue to sit down with my daughter and give her a peek into the living rooms across the world.

Our welfare greatly depends on our ability to become a citizen of this world. To achieve that every school should at least purchase one of Ricks books so our children receive an objective view of the opportunities and problems in our global eco-system and thrive.

Update: For readers of my blog, Rick has graciously offered a discount of $10 off his book America At Home, which you can customize with your own image on the cover. Just enter the code GEORGES at checkout.

Markets don't exist

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-28T17:37:46-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

With that title I just pulled the pacifier out of the mouths of many marketers...and many of them will start crying.

But smart business people know better. Compartmentalization is very fundamental human behavior, in our personal life and business. In business the definition of “The Market” is the currency that aims to provide quick answers to everyday questions. The problem with market categorizations is that they are often incorrect, irrelevant, stale and frankly, the antagonist of innovation.

Here is why:

1/ People buy products, markets don’t.
No matter what the scenario, in the end people (not businesses) make purchasing decisions. And since people are unique, so are their complex reasons to buy. A unique mix of psychographics and demographics aided by free-market access to the Internet further emphasizes the power of “You” over the power of “The Market”.

2/ Markets are bad type-castings.
Customer surveys show that the compelling-reasons-to-buy rarely match up with the predetermined definition of “The Market”. And since many purchasing decisions rely on factors unrelated to the product (such as budgets, approvals, personal relationships, operational planning, risk mitigation etc.) a prospect qualification or disqualification within that market means absolutely nothing.

3/ Market definitions are bad currencies.
Since there are no rules for defining markets and everyone gets to dream up their own, the value of that market definition is meaningless. Imagine the value of the dollar if everyone gets to define how much it is worth and print theirs at home. Market segmentation and negotiations on market positions with analysts further deflate the significance and trust in traditional market definitions.

4/ Time changes everything (but markets).
Market definitions (in technology) change slowly yet products that attract new buyers change quickly. That means the definition of “The Market” (to which much decision-making is attached) is always far behind the adoption rate of new products and therefor far behind the identification of a new set of buyers. The minute “The Market” is defined, it has become irrelevant and ripe for disruption.

So, where does that leave marketing? Is marketing dead?

No, but it is time for technology marketers to grow up. The pacifier is being replaced by something else. Something more substantial and meaningful. Food becomes the new pacifier and customers will be feeding it to you.

1/ Listen before you speak.
Literally. Forget about what you as the marketer think of the product, early-adopter purchasing decisions are much more valuable in determining how the product is perceived and received. The credibility of new customers counts, more so than the ability of a marketer to spin a story. Spend time with your VP of Sales, in online forums, setup a Google Alert and figure out how to market customer perception.

2/ Manage the promise.
Crucial to the impact of marketing is the credibility of the company promise. Marketing, and specifically Product Marketing is vital in establishing that the promise is fulfilled to the satisfaction of the customer. A few bad words from customers on the internet can cost the company millions of dollars to repair, if it can recover from it at all. So, it is important that the promise to customers does not consist of blatant lies, leads to frustration or bleeds hundreds of support calls. Manage the critical success factors of your promise.

3/ Enable the dialog.
Orchestrate the interaction between customers and prospects and be sure to listen in. They will give you the marketing messages that truly resonate - on a silver platter.

4/ Manage the conversion rate.
Getting crowds to listen or visit the company website is rather simple, getting them to buy the product is more difficult. The company is only measured on the latter and since marketing is usually the scape goat and the first to be questioned when results are down, implementing a mechanism that detects, manages and reports on conversion rates yields invaluable metrics for improvement.

As long as there is macro-economic benefit to using your product, marketing is a very straightforward process. It requires a new class of people that are not afraid to throw the old-class of market definitions overboard and focus on the extrapolation of existing sales success, by simply listening for and consistently reverberating an honest and effective marketing message.

As Don Draper, the biggest ad man at the Sterling Cooper Advertising Agency of the TV series Mad Men explains; I don’t tell stories - I sell product.

Demise of image Super-Stores continues

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-24T14:35:29-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Jupiter-Images finally sold to Getty-Images after a similar attempt in February of 2007. With estimated revenues of around $79M (when last tracked) and con-jointed debt of $95M with other Jupiter Media properties, Jupiter-Images sold to Getty-Images for only $96M in cash. Sounds like a fire-sale to me.

Imaging super stores make no economic sense, as described in this blog before.

1/ Images are like art. Taking preferences of buyer and seller into account, they preferably sell only once (or as few times as possible). No buyer wants that image to appear in similar publications and so every transaction is unique. Super-stores, however, are modeled to provide one-to-many sales transactions and are therefor NOT suited to support the image exchange marketplace.

2/ Except when images are produced on a commissioned photography basis (for example by Getty-Images staff photographers), the image super store actually does not own the image, it merely has a right to operate as a reseller. Nothing would stop a photographer from trading his images somewhere else, dramatically deflating the value of the super-store.

Fact remains that $22B of images are exchanged every year, most of it (90%) not through online transactions or the sum of all super-stores. This represents a big opportunity not many Venture Capitalists understand, as it is a market-play rather than a pure technology-play. But established companies may be able to build an iTunes of images to feed their ecosystem of products.

In the meantime, Getty-Images (now private again) keeps on puffing itself up like a puffer-fish. The question is: how long will it be able to hold its breath.

Digital Railroad in trouble?

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-20T19:00:31-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Apparently Digital Railroad, another storage provider of the digital photography market is in trouble. No surprise again, because the company never supported a free-market model for photographers and buyers. We blogged about that topic many times, and recently Dan Heller adds to that fundamental thinking (even though I remain in disagreement with the artificial classification of stock photography).

Since its founding, Digital Railroad primarily supported supply-side photographic capabilities, which if not seamlessly connected to the buy-side provides really nothing more than storage space and website make-up for photographers. A nice service, but similar services from Smugmug or Photobucket already exist to do just that. All these technologies fail to solve the most pressing issue for every commercial photographer: sell, sell, sell.

Photographers are not empowered by a storage service or nice looking web pages, they are empowered when they sell. Photography is an expensive job and if it does not yield $70,000 in yearly revenues (based on 2006 PDA numbers), you will not be able to make a living from it. We have yet to find a true marketplace that connects any seller with any buyer, using free-market principles that truly empowers photographers.

Free-markets are more than a fashion statement or a label you suddenly slap on the website. The implications of free-market principles (as listed in this blog) change a company, its execution and its funding strategy to the core. The devil is in the detail.

Digital Railroad’s and Photoshelter’s demise are examples of why investing in technology, without macro-economic impact - no longer works. The 150-year old photography marketplace, with the introduction of digital photography and the internet, has moved from a premium market model (with many walled gardens) to a free-market model.

Akin to Ratatouille (the movie), where a five-star chef, Anton Gusteau, declares that “Anyone Can Cook”, the photography market and its technology providers need to get used to the fact that in this new age, “rats” will take and purchase great photographs ($22B of them).

The irate response to my recent blog about Photoshelter from a Vice President of the American Society of Media Photographers reminded me of the angry cook in Ratatouille that hires Linguini, a clumsy youth hired as a garbage boy, who can still not accept that great taste in food is like the beauty of photography - in the eye of the buyer.

We should embrace all photography that move people to buy, regardless of who shot it and build a real marketplace to facilitate that exchange.

Building efficiencies - continued

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-16T15:34:03-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I received a lot of feedback and questions on my previous blog posting named Building efficiencies in tough times and the embedded presentation posted there. The danger of attaching a presentation is, that as a reader you may miss the rational that built the words.

Because of that I want to explain my sometimes condensed thinking a little further.

It may have appeared that I only care about the product, but nothing is farther from the truth. The diagram on the left of the chart is what I see a lot in technology companies, early and late stage - across the board. The diagram on the right is what I tried to convey with the words in my presentation. Let me clarify:

Many companies develop incremental innovation (to leapfrog their competitors) without a diligent (re-)assessment of the opportunity to change the battle field. Not surprisingly. Real disruptive innovation requires a certain amount of vision, faith and a compass combined with larger commitments and investments, all seemingly based on untested values.

The path of least resistance therefor is to start with an incremental product and throw inordinate amounts of marketing & sales at it, in order to push it beyond its competitors into the marketplace. That is a highly inefficient model (in any economy). But it is a model to which many companies are forced to comply because of risk adverse management and the stale investment criteria deployed by many Venture Capitalists (VCs).

So, it is somewhat ironic that the VCs are now telling their startups to be more efficient, right after they were pushed through the VC wringer of startup-commoditization.

I believe the market for cheap (bootstrap-to-market) technology companies, that yield a large early exit is gone. That model only worked in a bull market of technology (from the 90s that has not dissipated) and the investors that still cling to that model will get punished for it. The new opportunities are for companies that build real macro-economic value.

The starting point of the next wave of innovation, in my view, is to feed a macro-economic need, as depicted in the diagram on the right. That macro-economic need is directly attached to the way we behave as humans (which is relatively predictable). It is our need to express ourselves, live the life we want and be in control (rather than technology controlling us). Think free-market principles, think social, think benefits, think fundamentals.

The fundamental shift in thinking that needs to occur in Silicon Valley, is to develop technology with a fresh mind, looking from the outside in, and serve a larger, less specialized, constituent.

Apple comes to mind as a company that often completely ignores the current state of the technology industry and connects better to basic human needs than any other technology company. But Apple can improve/be beat at the macro level, but I digress.

We simply need to support human behavior with technology.

With “free” distribution of information through the Internet, psychographics - not demographics - matter. Four-hundred year old free-market principles, The Long Tail, and marketplaces like eBay prove that the traditional rules of marketing do no longer apply. In my thirty years in technology I have never met anyone who truly understands markets. And market definitions have changed, they comprise no longer of buyers that fit an artificial model (I cringe when I hear people debate for hours how many users delineates the SMB segment), but because they subscribe to the pain or gain from which subsequently, marketers can extrapolate a larger pool. Bottom-up.

We do not all need to be economists to create the next successful technology company, the material is all around us. All it takes is a healthy interest in the actual behavior of human beings, compare their offline and online behavior and fill in the gaps. So, stop supporting companies that just build nifty technologies, but focus on companies that create larger macro-economic differentiation. More impact to everyday people.

No company will be more efficient by simply cutting cost (as suggested by the recent doom-and-gloom VC messages), it will just take longer to die. The real efficiency comes from a more disruptive value that attaches more people to better technology. On top of that, macro-economic value is very resistant to economic downturns.

Building efficiencies in tough times

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-14T13:13:43-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

With the Venture Capital high society dropping doom and gloom economic messages onto the CEOs of their portfolio companies, I wanted to help out and at least do my part to deliver some more operational substance.

Great companies and their resilience is defined by the quality of their products.

Great products make up for an endless amount of sales and marketing deficiencies, but in most cases sales and marketing spend too much time making up for lost product opportunity and becomes an endless money drain. Product definition (from a buyer’s perspective) and quality are the most important drivers for consistent business success, as Larry Ellison and Steve Jobs (both product gurus) have proven time and time again.

But when money is plentiful, yet guarded by aggressive milestones we tend to throw products over the fence early and have sales, marketing and support compensate tirelessly for its in-market deficiencies. Both startups and established companies (trust me, I’ve seen a few) make those same fundamental mistakes. The results are slow sales traction, excessive marketing expenses and runaway support costs. Not things any company can afford these days.

This morning I put together a presentation (in pdf, named TVC_building_efficiencies) that identifies some of the deficiency symptoms, emphasizes the benefits of great products to the cost model, and pulls together new ways to build amazing new products. Thus creating a more resilient company, no matter what the economic conditions.

So, to directly affect company efficiency, keep a close eye on the definition and implementation of the product, its macro-economic impact and how it grows and where it bleeds. Or simply contact us if you need some help.

Update: more on building efficiencies.

Why I don't buy into green VC

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-08T15:24:42-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I understand the need for a greener environment (and enjoyed the fantastic video presentation from Google CEO Eric Schmidt at Corporate EcoForum), creating more renewable energy and perhaps making us less dependent on foreign countries.

That promise sounds good, albeit I think it will just redefine what we as countries fight about. Today it is oil, tomorrow it is probably about green technology and resources. In the near future, green technology will also find its core competencies and attractive pricing in countries other than just ours. Yet if we don’t learn how to resolve our differences and respect each others cultures, the subject of our debates is irrelevant. New leadership is key, so go out and vote.

But the part I don’t get is why many investors, like Kleiner Perkins, “flee” from information technology at the shimmer of rising oil prices, financial instability and tax incentives and dive head first into a completely new, and may I add completely different line of business. A line of business that often has more similarities to farming (with all of its intrinsic risk factors) than effortlessly moving bits through thin air.

The reason why information technology remains an interesting investment category to me is:
1/ The innovation of information technology is cheap, a few smart people in a room behind a computer and voila, a new star is born.
2/ The distribution of technology is cheap and immediate, there are virtually no borders (except to China perhaps).
3/ The monetization of technology is well understood, and is either direct or indirect but almost always single source.
4/ The enormous left-over possibilities of information technology that has yet to percolate many other industries.

Contrast that with green technology where I see:
1/ The massive costs associated with early foundational development.
2/ The costly implementation and distribution that requires safety, governmental, social approval processes (literally lasting years).
3/ In most cases the requirement of multi-source monetization, involving grants and many regulatory constructs (requiring a longer sales cycle).
4/ A limited time-to-market benefit for early adopters and therefor lack of urgency to buy. The adoption of green technology is generally believed to lengthen the time-to-market, aiming to produce a return on investment spread out over many years.

Again, I do see an enormous need for green technology to save our planet and a justification for investments supporting it. I am just not confident that the current Venture Capital model (born out of the technology era, and driven by information technologists) will lend itself to that segment. I am very curious to see what vintages will produce viable returns for the Limited Partners in the green-tech funds.

I hope I am wrong, as carefully applied Venture Capital has the potential to change industries, countries and the people in them.

In the meantime I’ll stick to my core competency, creating and managing growth of innovative information technology companies.

Photoshop CS4 finally innovates

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-10-03T18:37:55-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

I still edit all my photographs (thousands) in LightZone, and have always vehemently made statements against Adobe Photoshop. Not because of the lack of photographic capabilities but primarily because of the proprietary language it forces you to understand before you can use Photoshop effectively.

Photoshop remains the “vi”- editor of photo editing, powerful yet very cumbersome to use. No secretary uses “vi” today, and the future of Photoshop is moving further and further away from the mass market Adobe should be trying to attract. Nothing new there.

But Photoshop CS4, after a long track record of rather meaningless innovation and UI revamps now includes some very nifty innovations worth looking at, as the videos demonstrate. Content aware scaling (from a company Adobe acquired last year), panoramas and the new 3D capabilities are very cool. So, if you’re interested in rudimentary 3D capabilities before you jump into Maya, check out Adobe’s website where the nifty new capabilities of Adobe’s Photoshop Extended are available for roughly $1,000. But, perhaps this time around, the premium price is worth it.

Credit where credit is due.

The odd face of Facebook

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-09-17T14:17:25-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Facebook, one of the fastest growing social network sites has really screwed up User Interface (UI) design with its new look. Take a look at the screen capture above. Now you tell me in 5 seconds the intuitive difference between clicking on: [Facebook] and [home], [home] and [profile], [profile] and [Georges van Hoegaerden], [settings] and [profile], and [settings] and [Georges van Hoegaerden].

But more importantly, Facebook has clearly not read my blog on removing the technology language to appeal to consumers, an issue that prevents many consumer technology companies from maximizing their growth potential. But who’s counting at Facebook these days?

Facebook is a technology company that exposes social networking capabilities in a very technological fashion. The examples are plenty: the workings of the UI described above, the categorization of data optimized to suit their internal data-models and the very complicated way to add applications to the platform, and we can keep going on. But for now, they’ll get away with it. Other consumer technology companies won’t be that lucky.

A great user interface can never be an objective by itself as that just presents a pretty face, try living with a person that only has that. The ultimate user experience (and this is where I politically depart from the previous analogy), is defined by an ecosystem of capabilities, cost and ease-of-use that creates the real and sustainable appeal.

BMW figured out early on that the Ultimate Driving Experience™ is what sells cars albeit their engine capabilities and timing was their initial core strengths. Today they sell the sum of all parts, The Ultimate Driving experience: great engine capabilities, spiffy performance, practical design and excellent comfort - a thrilling way to drive from A to B.

Facebook currently has a horrible “Ultimate Social Experience”: good (but no longer unique) social networking, so-so performance, impractical design and pretty bad comfort. Those are probably the reasons why 90% of my Facebook friends never use any Facebook features but simply create an account.

Many of Facebook’s recent poor decisions (including ad network issues etc) are evidence that user growth is outpacing their ability to grow up. And that could be catastrophic. Facebook is a great social networking platform with a lot of potential that many people rely on.

Facebook better watch out and prevent that too many people will start hating it. Those same users may use Facebooks own social networking capability to turn it off as fast as they initially turned it on.

Photoshelter, another one bites the dust

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-09-13T14:04:11-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

Two days ago we got word about the demise of the Photoshelter collection marketplace. Not surprising because Photoshelter was not a marketplace. Technologists have a tendency to slap the marketplace label on anything they build, without understanding what it truly means.

Marketplace models, criteria, funding and execution are fundamentally different from premium market models. Photoshelter was really nothing more than a replica of Getty Images without Getty’s money to buy inorganic growth.

Here is how Photoshelter failed to meet marketplace rules:

Marketplace violation 1: Photoshelter artificially arbitrated supply, through a lengthy subjective signup process in which Photoshelter arbitrators determine whether you get to play.

Marketplace violation 2: Photoshelter artificially arbitrated demand, as it aimed to sell it to “the industry’s top buyers”, not to everyone.

Marketplace violation 3: Photoshelter gave preference to images they liked, rather than simply connecting any supply with any demand.

Marketplace violation 4: Photoshelter deployed a sales-force (from Getty and other photo agencies) that promoted a premium market model, like any sales-force driven by quotas would.

But CEO Allen Murabayashi makes a few damaging statements in his blog on why they failed and tries to blame that on the market as a whole:

“Licensing photography is fraught with clearance issues”
150 Years of photography exchange has resolved the fundamental issues of rights management quite effectively. Getty-Images, Corbis and others have gone through a well defined process in order to clear rights in their move from analog to digital exchange. Photoshelter has relied too much on a model that requires people intervention, while the majority of rights and enforcement can be embedded in and enforced by technology and made the responsibility of the asset owner. In the same way eBay sellers are responsible for the fulfillment of transactions. That enforcement guarded by a true meritocracy will quickly weed out bad behavior (that plagues any marketplace).

“Stock photography is a slow growing market dominated by a single player”
Nonsense, the term stock photography is an artificial classification (made up by its current participants) that bares no value. Today $22B of photography is exchanged of which less than 10% is transacted electronically. Growth through the premium market model of Photoshelter is limited because the photography market requires a free-market.

“Research Requests move too quickly for individuals to react in a timely fashion”
Perhaps they do in the “top buyer” segment, but certainly not in all. Since Photoshelter artificially limited the demand characteristics, any assessment of market traction and behavior should be taken with a grain of salt.

“Buyers desire more diversity, but convenience (aka subscription deals) triumphs this desire”
Absolutely, buyers deserve diversity, and buyers should be presented with the ultimate experience (subscriptions are not the answer). What has fundamentally changed in a 150 year old analog photography market is that demand does not come from a few buyers, but a highly fragmented buyer market that will want to use an image for any purpose (not just for your average advertising purposes).

“A crowd-source model for stock will likely never work”
Absolutely disagree. Photoshelter deployed a premium market model on a market that requires free-market principles. It failed for the same reason Getty Images fails to become a market-leader in the un-arbitrated exchange of digital photography (identified by roughly 30% market ownership). Getty Images grew by inorganic growth and acquiring other photo agencies with staff photographers that create the majority of images it sells (less than 7% come out of third party supply according to a statement by its CEO in 2006).

Photoshelter, as lovers of photography, seemed to have their hearts in the right place but not their execution. And they neglected to respond to our offer for help one year ago, when we saw their demise coming.

The Google argument.

info@venturecompany.com — 2008-08-07T11:25:03-04:00

By Georges van Hoegaerden

From time-to-time I hear from investors: what if Google decides to build it?

My replies are as follows:

1/ Google is the king of web-based advertising derived from search, and it does so extremely well and profitably. Yet Google is a pretty monolithic animal. While the company is capable of building virtually any technology outside of its core competency and brings a bright sparkle of innovation to Silicon Valley, it is consistently unsuccessful in turning that innovation into great Billion dollar businesses (which reminds me of Oracle, before Chuck Phillips came on board).

2/ Google is not a true marketplace, nor does it seem to understand free-market principles as witnessed by their actions. Google is a premium market for search-based advertising placements and it will continue to drive premium market DNA to the adoption of technology. Nothing wrong with that, unless they portray a more liberal character. So, you’ve got little to fear if a free-market platform is what you are building.

3/ Google does not understand any software category that doesn’t derive its revenue from advertising. While there may be a great future for software (as a service) that no consumer ever pays for directly, today that is not the reality. Desktop software, proprietary enterprise applications, software-as-a-paid-service are examples of what Google is highly inexperienced and generally unsuccessful with.

4/ It would be a great sign if Google decides to build a similar product or service, as it would produce a rhetorical blessing of the proposition and an impromptu acquisition play by its competitors. Isn’t that what you want as an investor.

Google’s relatively young age, massive growth and company DNA are probably the best reasons why it hasn’t succeeded financially in many areas it operates in. But I greatly admire their drive to invest a large part of the difference between their (Wall-street) valuation and real value in new technology development.

Beyond search, Google is in essence a giant research institute with the limited financial successes that come with that model. But Google lays important development groundwork that has and will continue to do us all good. They also provide valuable incubation of new technology ideas a commoditizing VC market rarely picks up on.

My startups have a different charter; turning great technologies into great businesses, now!