I received a lot of feedback and questions on my previous blog posting named Building efficiencies in tough times and the embedded presentation posted there. The danger of attaching a presentation is, that as a reader you may miss the rational that built the words.

Because of that I want to explain my sometimes condensed thinking a little further.



It may have appeared that I only care about the product, but nothing is farther from the truth. The diagram on the left of the chart is what I see a lot in technology companies, early and late stage - across the board. The diagram on the right is what I tried to convey with the words in my presentation. Let me clarify:

Many companies develop incremental innovation (to leapfrog their competitors) without a diligent (re-)assessment of the opportunity to change the battle field. Not surprisingly. Real disruptive innovation requires a certain amount of vision, faith and a compass combined with larger commitments and investments, all seemingly based on untested values.

The path of least resistance therefor is to start with an incremental product and throw inordinate amounts of marketing & sales at it, in order to push it beyond its competitors into the marketplace. That is a highly inefficient model (in any economy). But it is a model to which many companies are forced to comply because of risk adverse management and the stale investment criteria deployed by many Venture Capitalists (VCs).

So, it is somewhat ironic that the VCs are now telling their startups to be more efficient, right after they were pushed through the VC wringer of startup-commoditization.

I believe the market for cheap (bootstrap-to-market) technology companies, that yield a large early exit is gone. That model only worked in a bull market of technology (from the 90s that has not dissipated) and the investors that still cling to that model will get punished for it. The new opportunities are for companies that build real macro-economic value.

The starting point of the next wave of innovation, in my view, is to feed a macro-economic need, as depicted in the diagram on the right. That macro-economic need is directly attached to the way we behave as humans (which is relatively predictable). It is our need to express ourselves, live the life we want and be in control (rather than technology controlling us). Think free-market principles, think social, think benefits, think fundamentals.

The fundamental shift in thinking that needs to occur in Silicon Valley, is to develop technology with a fresh mind, looking from the outside in, and serve a larger, less specialized, constituent.

Apple comes to mind as a company that often completely ignores the current state of the technology industry and connects better to basic human needs than any other technology company. But Apple can improve/be beat at the macro level, but I digress.

We simply need to support human behavior with technology.

With “free” distribution of information through the Internet, psychographics - not demographics - matter. Four-hundred year old free-market principles, The Long Tail, and marketplaces like eBay prove that the traditional rules of marketing do no longer apply. In my thirty years in technology I have never met anyone who truly understands markets. And market definitions have changed, they comprise no longer of buyers that fit an artificial model (I cringe when I hear people debate for hours how many users delineates the SMB segment), but because they subscribe to the pain or gain from which subsequently, marketers can extrapolate a larger pool. Bottom-up.

We do not all need to be economists to create the next successful technology company, the material is all around us. All it takes is a healthy interest in the actual behavior of human beings, compare their offline and online behavior and fill in the gaps. So, stop supporting companies that just build nifty technologies, but focus on companies that create larger macro-economic differentiation. More impact to everyday people.

No company will be more efficient by simply cutting cost (as suggested by the recent doom-and-gloom VC messages), it will just take longer to die. The real efficiency comes from a more disruptive value that attaches more people to better technology. On top of that, macro-economic value is very resistant to economic downturns.

Tags: Performance, Commodity, Consumer, Marketing, Markets, Marketplace, VC, Macro-economics, Psychographics, Apple, Distribution

I understand the need for a greener environment (and enjoyed the fantastic video presentation from Google CEO Eric Schmidt at Corporate EcoForum), creating more renewable energy and perhaps making us less dependent on foreign countries.

That promise sounds good, albeit I think it will just redefine what we as countries fight about. Today it is oil, tomorrow it is probably about green technology and resources. In the near future, green technology will also find its core competencies and attractive pricing in countries other than just ours. Yet if we don’t learn how to resolve our differences and respect each others cultures, the subject of our debates is irrelevant. New leadership is key, so go out and vote.

But the part I don’t get is why many investors, like Kleiner Perkins, “flee” from information technology at the shimmer of rising oil prices, financial instability and tax incentives and dive head first into a completely new, and may I add completely different line of business. A line of business that often has more similarities to farming (with all of its intrinsic risk factors) than effortlessly moving bits through thin air.

The reason why information technology remains an interesting investment category to me is:
1/ The innovation of information technology is cheap, a few smart people in a room behind a computer and voila, a new star is born.
2/ The distribution of technology is cheap and immediate, there are virtually no borders (except to China perhaps).
3/ The monetization of technology is well understood, and is either direct or indirect but almost always single source.
4/ The enormous left-over possibilities of information technology that has yet to percolate many other industries.

Contrast that with green technology where I see:
1/ The massive costs associated with early foundational development.
2/ The costly implementation and distribution that requires safety, governmental, social approval processes (literally lasting years).
3/ In most cases the requirement of multi-source monetization, involving grants and many regulatory constructs (requiring a longer sales cycle).
4/ A limited time-to-market benefit for early adopters and therefor lack of urgency to buy. The adoption of green technology is generally believed to lengthen the time-to-market, aiming to produce a return on investment spread out over many years.

Again, I do see an enormous need for green technology to save our planet and a justification for investments supporting it. I am just not confident that the current Venture Capital model (born out of the technology era, and driven by information technologists) will lend itself to that segment. I am very curious to see what vintages will produce viable returns for the Limited Partners in the green-tech funds.

I hope I am wrong, as carefully applied Venture Capital has the potential to change industries, countries and the people in them.

In the meantime I’ll stick to my core competency, creating and managing growth of innovative information technology companies.

Tags: Green Tech, Innovation, Investment, Distribution, VC, Limited Partners

At The Long Tail Churchill Club event this morning Chris Anderson (Wired Editor in Chief and writer for the Economist), who claims ownership of the term, discussed his research and his upcoming book about The Long Tail. His speech reiterated some well understood findings at Amazon, Netflix, Rhapsody (all of which have been mentioned here before) as well as some esoteric analytical findings in which academia make an attempt to approximate the outcome of Long Tail markets with formulas. The Q&A session lead us into some of the business impacts of Long Tail markets. First he agreed with us, no business should create a Long Tail without a Torso. Second, new search technology customized to every individual usage (vertical search) is essential. Third, new "Taste-makers" of the world or micro-celebrities, vocalized by blogging about niche expertise, will fuel and direct the trust in The Long Tail. Meritocracy with democratic production. Interesting example mentioned was Lego, the toy company that changed its conservative marketing strategy (Pareto based) into a community marketing strategy, realizing better segmentation and margins can be derived from its very loyal community that continues to grow.

Our stance: Long Tail markets can succeed if:
1) The Torso exists and is successful in drawing the crowd
2) Long Tail demand is fed through Long Tail supply, creating a free-market
3) Arbitration is "owned" by the marketplace (not the company)
4) The marketplace offers sufficient transparency, to allow for discovery, not just search
5) The business behind the marketplace makes money on distribution (not aggregation)
6) The marketplace offers integrity, in pricing, use and abuse prevention

Read on for more information on The Long Tail in this blog series...

Tags: Advertising, Media, Adwords, Distribution

Apple switching to Intel is a move that stunned the faithful Mac community, yet most of us knew Mac OS X was derived from a dual core OS Steve Jobs had been running for a while at Next. Had we forgotten?

Did the success of the iPod blur our vision? But more important than the choice for Intel CPU's is the impact on the choice for other hardware components of the computer. The Mac derives its cool look, slim laptop design, unique features and true innovation from a primarily proprietary hardware design process. Low cost and commodity designs from mostly Intel, AMD, and other mass market producers still turns out computer bricks. Intel performance is good, instead of "Intel Inside" just add "Apple Everywhere Else".

Tags: Long Tail, Wired, Amazon, Netflix, Pareto, Meritocracy, Democracy, Lego, Arbitration, Marketplace, Aggregation, Transparency, Distribution, Torso

Nothing has changed. Technology buyers exhibit the same behavior as they did twenty years ago. In spite of our unyielding drive to revolutionize, most customers respond to change in an evolutionary manner. The disconnect between revolutionary culture of the IT provider (technology push) and evolutionary nature of the customer (market pull) may be the most important reasons why the majority of technology startups never sell their products to a large and sustainable market.

Tags: Getty-Images, Photography, Stock, Revenues, Images, Distribution, Markets