Digital Railroad
Imaging sales market broken from the top
I have received quite a few comments on my previous
post (like this) on the imaging
marketplace and I am making an attempt to
clarify my condensed writing.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
Image catalogs in peril
Here is my take: the imaging markets consists of demi-cartels that produce "premium" supply that does not meet the requirements of an ever growing and changing market of buyers. No longer is the size of the buyer's market dictated by agencies nor is the new seller's market defined by the old definition of pro-photographers. As a result sell side content does not find enough buyers and the only way to make money is to make sellers believe that if their work is good enough, it will sell.....nice promise. Out of desperation most photographers post their images on multiple websites to get maximum visibility, a true testament of an inefficient market.
Getty Images is really a hybrid business, it has about 3,000 photographers on staff and does editorial projects for its main customers and in armored trucks if it needs to, providing news worthy photography on location. The side-business of Getty is the stock photography business which yields ever declining average sales prices for royalty free and rights managed photography. So, in essence, Getty Images was trying to become a "record" company with its own supply while on the side playing the independent party with a transparent image store; i.e. the "free-market" supply is competing with Getty's core business model. Over the years, many photographers have complained of unfair practices that gives better treatment to Getty's images than to the supply from individual photographers.
The Digital Photography market is in the same state as the music industry (albeit condensed in time) , premium supply doesn't turn out to be premium, demand has changed and the "record" companies in this space have no other option but to erode their premier status business model. I was right three years ago, let that be noted.
As for Digital Railroad, I doubt that they'll develop the macro-economic strategies that determine the success of any real "free-market" marketplace at this point. It would take a sizable investment in technology to turn a super-store into a "free-market". Adobe is rumored to be working on an image marketplace, but here too, the devil is in the details.
We don't need another Amazon.com of the photography business but a real free-market in which YOU the photographer and buyer make decisions on what transactions you want to engage in.


