Corbis
Diving deep with imaging Puffer Fish
A Puffer Fish is a fish that blows itself up to
dramatically change its appearance and size: not
unlike Getty-Images (GYI), Corbis and Jupiter-Images
(JUPM) in the imaging
market. All three have hybrid business models
that disguise the money they really make in the
exchange of digital photography. But we know
better, we've analyzed empirical data and
studied their reports carefully.
That does not mean these "Three Bandits" are failures: Getty-Images is very successful as a photography agency (doing about $805M in revenues per year), Corbis is a very rich catalog of historic photographs stashed away in a bunker in Pennsylvania, slowly being digitized at a cost of about $25 per photograph (revenues around $250M). Jupiter-Images is the division of JupiterMedia, formerly a magazine publishing and events company, now morphing into a content acquisition company.
But they are not a successes either. Organic growth of these companies is well below the growth of the image exchange market and their combined market share is less than 10% of the image exchange addressable market. So, while the $1.5B asking price for Getty-Images doesn't sound outrageous (less than 2x revenues), what you're buying is an outsourced photography agency. Getty-Images is in essence a people factory with ever eroding profit margins.
Twenty years ago Getty-Images started with a $20M investment from grandpa Getty and has continued to purchased a wide array of photo agencies (hence the Puffer Fish) and large libraries of photographs that over time become stale rather than increase in value. The average sales price of those, primarily editorial, photographs is declining steadily (more so than creative photography), leaving the company with a large family of complacent celebrity photographers and mainstream content only the a select few publishing agencies are interested in.
With publishers (of all kind) looking for original content, the imaging Super Store approach (as described here) from the Three Bandits is fundamentally flawed. But the reason why we don't believe in the longevity of their business models (and their asking price) is that they ignore and suppress the massive influx of new digital photographers that create phenomenal high quality and original content most publishers would be dying to get their hands on.
So anyone buying these companies will soon find out how small Puffer Fish really are.
That does not mean these "Three Bandits" are failures: Getty-Images is very successful as a photography agency (doing about $805M in revenues per year), Corbis is a very rich catalog of historic photographs stashed away in a bunker in Pennsylvania, slowly being digitized at a cost of about $25 per photograph (revenues around $250M). Jupiter-Images is the division of JupiterMedia, formerly a magazine publishing and events company, now morphing into a content acquisition company.
But they are not a successes either. Organic growth of these companies is well below the growth of the image exchange market and their combined market share is less than 10% of the image exchange addressable market. So, while the $1.5B asking price for Getty-Images doesn't sound outrageous (less than 2x revenues), what you're buying is an outsourced photography agency. Getty-Images is in essence a people factory with ever eroding profit margins.
Twenty years ago Getty-Images started with a $20M investment from grandpa Getty and has continued to purchased a wide array of photo agencies (hence the Puffer Fish) and large libraries of photographs that over time become stale rather than increase in value. The average sales price of those, primarily editorial, photographs is declining steadily (more so than creative photography), leaving the company with a large family of complacent celebrity photographers and mainstream content only the a select few publishing agencies are interested in.
With publishers (of all kind) looking for original content, the imaging Super Store approach (as described here) from the Three Bandits is fundamentally flawed. But the reason why we don't believe in the longevity of their business models (and their asking price) is that they ignore and suppress the massive influx of new digital photographers that create phenomenal high quality and original content most publishers would be dying to get their hands on.
So anyone buying these companies will soon find out how small Puffer Fish really are.
The Puffer Fish of the imaging market
I have received quite a few comments on my previous
post (like this) on the imaging
marketplace and I am making an attempt to
clarify my condensed writing.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.
A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).
A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.
Imaging sales market broken from the top
Here is my take: the imaging markets consists of demi-cartels that produce "premium" supply that does not meet the requirements of an ever growing and changing market of buyers. No longer is the size of the buyer's market dictated by agencies nor is the new seller's market defined by the old definition of pro-photographers. As a result sell side content does not find enough buyers and the only way to make money is to make sellers believe that if their work is good enough, it will sell.....nice promise. Out of desperation most photographers post their images on multiple websites to get maximum visibility, a true testament of an inefficient market.
Getty Images is really a hybrid business, it has about 3,000 photographers on staff and does editorial projects for its main customers and in armored trucks if it needs to, providing news worthy photography on location. The side-business of Getty is the stock photography business which yields ever declining average sales prices for royalty free and rights managed photography. So, in essence, Getty Images was trying to become a "record" company with its own supply while on the side playing the independent party with a transparent image store; i.e. the "free-market" supply is competing with Getty's core business model. Over the years, many photographers have complained of unfair practices that gives better treatment to Getty's images than to the supply from individual photographers.
The Digital Photography market is in the same state as the music industry (albeit condensed in time) , premium supply doesn't turn out to be premium, demand has changed and the "record" companies in this space have no other option but to erode their premier status business model. I was right three years ago, let that be noted.
As for Digital Railroad, I doubt that they'll develop the macro-economic strategies that determine the success of any real "free-market" marketplace at this point. It would take a sizable investment in technology to turn a super-store into a "free-market". Adobe is rumored to be working on an image marketplace, but here too, the devil is in the details.
We don't need another Amazon.com of the photography business but a real free-market in which YOU the photographer and buyer make decisions on what transactions you want to engage in.
Image catalogs in peril
Bose is a great example of a company that
delivers a unique experience. I have had a few after
sales experiences with Bose and they've all been very
positive and consistent. Most recently I purchased
the new iPhone adapter for
Bose's QuietComfort 2 Noise
Canceling headphone, only to find out that the
adapter didn't fit my QC2 headset. After a call
into Bose, we found out that 2 versions of the
QC2 exist and the adapter packaging did not
specify this distinction.
Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.
Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.
Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.
Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.




