Photoshop CS4 finally innovates
I still edit all my photographs (thousands) in
LightZone, and have always
vehemently made statements against
Adobe Photoshop. Not because of the lack of
photographic capabilities but primarily because
of the proprietary language it forces you to
understand before you can use Photoshop
effectively.
Photoshop remains the “vi”- editor of photo editing, powerful yet very cumbersome to use. No secretary uses “vi” today, and the future of Photoshop is moving further and further away from the mass market Adobe should be trying to attract. Nothing new there.
But Photoshop CS4, after a long track record of rather meaningless innovation and UI revamps now includes some very nifty innovations worth looking at, as the videos demonstrate. Content aware scaling (from a company Adobe acquired last year), panoramas and the new 3D capabilities are very cool. So, if you’re interested in rudimentary 3D capabilities before you jump into Maya, check out Adobe’s website where the nifty new capabilities of Adobe’s Photoshop Extended are available for roughly $1,000. But, perhaps this time around, the premium price is worth it.
Credit where credit is due.
Photoshop remains the “vi”- editor of photo editing, powerful yet very cumbersome to use. No secretary uses “vi” today, and the future of Photoshop is moving further and further away from the mass market Adobe should be trying to attract. Nothing new there.
But Photoshop CS4, after a long track record of rather meaningless innovation and UI revamps now includes some very nifty innovations worth looking at, as the videos demonstrate. Content aware scaling (from a company Adobe acquired last year), panoramas and the new 3D capabilities are very cool. So, if you’re interested in rudimentary 3D capabilities before you jump into Maya, check out Adobe’s website where the nifty new capabilities of Adobe’s Photoshop Extended are available for roughly $1,000. But, perhaps this time around, the premium price is worth it.
Credit where credit is due.
Beware of the platform that is not.
Wednesday - August 06, 2008 Filed in: Strategy
| Photography
| Positioning
| Consumer
Technology | Media
Case in point: new announcements of Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture tout enhanced interoperability with third party plugins to manage and edit your photographs. Don’t you feel good about that warm open-source-like karma of interoperability?
I don’t. Both vendors have deployed their next trick to customer imprisonment. And plenty of uninformed customers will fall for it. Here is why you shouldn’t:
1/ There is no need for an additional platform for photo management.
Photo editing capabilites of both applications are mediocre (no layer based editing, no advanced local editing etc.) and their asset management capabilities are little more than a replica of file system capabilities (even photographic attributes such as exposure, aperture and other attributes are maintained by the file-system metadata today). So, except for making nice photo albums and calendars, why else would you slug thousands of photographs in a proprietary asset management format that is less reliable than the underlying file-system and requires seperate backup and archiving strategies to maintain.
2/ Plugins have worked for years on file-system based photographs.
The announcement of the interoperability with plugins is really old news as those third party applications have been working with file-system based photographs for years. This is a platform on top of a platform, designed to milk more money out of customers and locks them into a proprietary technology stack. A prison with the windows open is still a prison.
3/ The operating system needs-to and will evolve faster.
The pace of meaningful innovation of the Personal Computer OS is deplorable. Microsoft has not made the PC operating system significantly smarter over the last ten years and that has opened the window of opportunity for Apple to surpass Microsoft in usability (rather than functionality). The ability to easily create and manage user-generated content such as, Photography and Video, has now become important adoption drivers to the platform, OS-vendors have yet to respond to. Photographic capabilities should be built-in (not priced-on). These days the unique media experience of the platform is the differentiation that sells the computer (since they all do internet quite well).
As a consumer, buying into seperate photography management siloes will cost you significant time and money (as the former CEO of a photo software company, researching the alternatives, I tried). My advice is to wait until an agile vendor steps up and turns media management into a core competency of the computing experience.
In the words of Ray Lane (partner at KPCB and former COO of Oracle) who once said customers are better off skipping some steps of innovation (in his case to skip client-server for three-tier internet architecture), I have just presented you with my reasoning to skip-over Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture. Not because I don’t like some of its functionality, but because it is strategically a dead-end street.
The next evolution of media management will soon eradicate the old one and deliver lasting differentiation to the vendor that owns it and provides a much, much better media experience to the consumer.
I am planning on having something to do with that.
The (technology) language is the problem
Since a platform is the technology foundation for a
marketplace, platforms - to achieve extraordinary
growth - need to instill the rules
of marketplaces as we laid them out in our
previous post.
But not all platforms are created equal and some self-proclaimed platform vendors do not adhere to marketplace principles. That could mean you as a provider think you subscribed to a meritocracy - with equal opportunity exposure - yet other participants (your competitors) get pay-to-play advantages. Potential buyers in that tainted market are actually shopping in a premium market, not the free-market they expect to be most economic and trustworthy.
Other synonyms of the same phenomenon abused in the technology industry include: ecosystems, exchanges, communities and networks which all serve identical needs in connecting disparate supply with disparate demand, something a premium market is unable to do.
Consumer companies understand the freedom of choice customers demand. Enterprise software and services vendors have long basked in the glory of premium markets and have a long way to go in order to truly build winner-takes-all free-markets, which in total size are often larger in size than the total size of premium markets in that category.
In the Enterprise space the majority of customers (roughly 80%) buying products or services deviate from its intended design and want to add on, integrate or correlate those off-the-shelve configurations with other ones. Enterprise customers often spend more money on customization than they spend on licensing fees for say, Oracle products. Hence the requirement for a true marketplace of additional enterprise components (check out Serena, great concept but marketplace execution and marketplace compliance - yet to be developed - will be the tell-tale of their real success). Salesforce.com's Appexchange seems to provide the best proximity to a free-market of applications we've seen, although we have yet to verify its integrity against the marketplace rules.
Developer programs from companies like Oracle (with OTN), Microsoft (MSDN) and others use surrogate models of marketplaces to mimic, but not truly deliver on its powerful benefits. Go visit their websites and you'll notice no mention of third party products. There literally is no marketplace, although Microsoft has a link to "a library", if you can find it.
Apple (with the iPhone Developer Network) is experimenting with its rules but apart from compliance to the free-pricing rule, its overall compliance to a free-market is minimal. And, today, they don't need to. Apple still has time to deploy some premium market tricks as long as Google with Android doesn't deliver on a real marketplace for developers early.
As a software provider you may need to run on and comply to a major vendor's technology, just don't assume a developer network, exchange or community will make you rich - not until the marketplace supports a true meritocracy. And for that, again, real marketplace principles need to be deployed.
But not all platforms are created equal and some self-proclaimed platform vendors do not adhere to marketplace principles. That could mean you as a provider think you subscribed to a meritocracy - with equal opportunity exposure - yet other participants (your competitors) get pay-to-play advantages. Potential buyers in that tainted market are actually shopping in a premium market, not the free-market they expect to be most economic and trustworthy.
Other synonyms of the same phenomenon abused in the technology industry include: ecosystems, exchanges, communities and networks which all serve identical needs in connecting disparate supply with disparate demand, something a premium market is unable to do.
Consumer companies understand the freedom of choice customers demand. Enterprise software and services vendors have long basked in the glory of premium markets and have a long way to go in order to truly build winner-takes-all free-markets, which in total size are often larger in size than the total size of premium markets in that category.
In the Enterprise space the majority of customers (roughly 80%) buying products or services deviate from its intended design and want to add on, integrate or correlate those off-the-shelve configurations with other ones. Enterprise customers often spend more money on customization than they spend on licensing fees for say, Oracle products. Hence the requirement for a true marketplace of additional enterprise components (check out Serena, great concept but marketplace execution and marketplace compliance - yet to be developed - will be the tell-tale of their real success). Salesforce.com's Appexchange seems to provide the best proximity to a free-market of applications we've seen, although we have yet to verify its integrity against the marketplace rules.
Developer programs from companies like Oracle (with OTN), Microsoft (MSDN) and others use surrogate models of marketplaces to mimic, but not truly deliver on its powerful benefits. Go visit their websites and you'll notice no mention of third party products. There literally is no marketplace, although Microsoft has a link to "a library", if you can find it.
Apple (with the iPhone Developer Network) is experimenting with its rules but apart from compliance to the free-pricing rule, its overall compliance to a free-market is minimal. And, today, they don't need to. Apple still has time to deploy some premium market tricks as long as Google with Android doesn't deliver on a real marketplace for developers early.
As a software provider you may need to run on and comply to a major vendor's technology, just don't assume a developer network, exchange or community will make you rich - not until the marketplace supports a true meritocracy. And for that, again, real marketplace principles need to be deployed.
Aperture 2.0: nice but unnecessary
Getty-Images appears
to be having trouble getting sold for $1.5B
according to an article in The New York
Times today. Perhaps the 40+ investment
banks on Wall street and an equal amount of
large private companies that visited our website
really took our Puffer
Fish analogy to heart.
So what could be done with Getty-Images? The problem with finding an acquisition partner is Getty-Images' hybrid business model. For a technology acquirer the services business with staff photographers is a burden they will not want to swallow. On the flip side, very few other services companies than perhaps the Associated Press can find solace in the photographer factory that is an integral part of Getty-Images.
1/ Buy company at a decent value
2/ Separate content producer business from content distribution
3/ Privatize each
4/ Sell content production business
5/ Revamp content distribution
ad 1/ To establish a fair price I am eager to see the operating plan metrics separating content production from content distribution in order to find out to what extend both lines of businesses have suffered from being under one roof (there may be some opportunity hidden in there)
ad 2/ Content production is a business model that, in today's world, needs to be separated from distribution. With the internet in place as the conduit for distribution, very few company can still afford to compete with the content produced by a "free-market". There is some remaining value left in the production of "premium" content for a "premium" audience, in the same way the Associated Press is able to provide this service to a confederation or co-op of newspapers.
ad 3/ Build companies that focus on what they do best, one produces content - one distributes it. Not within a single company or P&L or board. Each with its own growth trajectory.
ad 4/ Just like in the "premium" production of news articles (where bloggers compete), the news media will require a "premium" production of editorial photographs that has some trust associated with it. Perhaps a deal can be struck with AP - or a new version of AP can be created with identical goals. Getty-Images already has established a large installed base of agencies who can lease resources on a subscription basis.
ad 5/ Long term, content distribution is where the money is. The Long Tail of photography is massive, much larger in total image exchange than any Super-Store will ever be. Thanks to the Internet. But to build an effective free-market, a core of premium supply is needed to create its initial pull, Getty-Images certainly has that. To make this new company a winner though, it needs to truly support free-market principles, something very few companies can pull off.
We'd be happy to assist in the assessment of the Getty-Images acquisition value along the lines of the aforementioned strategy and even more in the post-acquisition execution. Our passion for photography, the ever increasing reach of the internet, and the value produced by all photographers around the world creates a fantastic new opportunity.
So what could be done with Getty-Images? The problem with finding an acquisition partner is Getty-Images' hybrid business model. For a technology acquirer the services business with staff photographers is a burden they will not want to swallow. On the flip side, very few other services companies than perhaps the Associated Press can find solace in the photographer factory that is an integral part of Getty-Images.
1/ Buy company at a decent value
2/ Separate content producer business from content distribution
3/ Privatize each
4/ Sell content production business
5/ Revamp content distribution
ad 1/ To establish a fair price I am eager to see the operating plan metrics separating content production from content distribution in order to find out to what extend both lines of businesses have suffered from being under one roof (there may be some opportunity hidden in there)
ad 2/ Content production is a business model that, in today's world, needs to be separated from distribution. With the internet in place as the conduit for distribution, very few company can still afford to compete with the content produced by a "free-market". There is some remaining value left in the production of "premium" content for a "premium" audience, in the same way the Associated Press is able to provide this service to a confederation or co-op of newspapers.
ad 3/ Build companies that focus on what they do best, one produces content - one distributes it. Not within a single company or P&L or board. Each with its own growth trajectory.
ad 4/ Just like in the "premium" production of news articles (where bloggers compete), the news media will require a "premium" production of editorial photographs that has some trust associated with it. Perhaps a deal can be struck with AP - or a new version of AP can be created with identical goals. Getty-Images already has established a large installed base of agencies who can lease resources on a subscription basis.
ad 5/ Long term, content distribution is where the money is. The Long Tail of photography is massive, much larger in total image exchange than any Super-Store will ever be. Thanks to the Internet. But to build an effective free-market, a core of premium supply is needed to create its initial pull, Getty-Images certainly has that. To make this new company a winner though, it needs to truly support free-market principles, something very few companies can pull off.
We'd be happy to assist in the assessment of the Getty-Images acquisition value along the lines of the aforementioned strategy and even more in the post-acquisition execution. Our passion for photography, the ever increasing reach of the internet, and the value produced by all photographers around the world creates a fantastic new opportunity.
Fleeting assets of the imaging Puffer Fish
I have recieved a lot of inquiries from
Wall-street personalities and companies due to the
gracious blog
posting in PE Week Wire on the imaging
marketplace, so I wanted to dive deeper to
clarify beyond just the financials.
1/ Getty-Images does not clearly distinguish between total addressable market and "market", probably to puff itself up as the owner of the imaging marketplace. More than 50% of (traceable corporate) images produced (by about 17,000 commercial Photography companies in the US) are generated by suppliers making less than $5M in revenues and have less than 10 employees. Very few of those (less than 1%) use Getty-Images as their distribution channel. In fact the majority of images sold in the world are traded offline, yes, offline (Getty-Images started its online presence in 2000, after going public on NASDAQ in July of 1996 and re-listing on NYSE in 1998). In addition, the peer-to-peer exchange of digital images, we estimate, is at least twice the size of the traceable exchange. It is quite irrelevant if Getty-Images is performing better than its peers, but Getty-Images by no means owns more than 10% of the addressable market. The risk for Getty is that a new kid on the block will be more successful in emptying out the market with a new business model, rather than outperform the existing players.
2/ Getty-Images is not a marketplace, it is a Super-Store in the economic sense of those definitions. A large part of the images in their store are produced by their own photographers (organic and non-organic) and sold to their existing, primarily agency customers. But the real definition of a "free-market" marketplace is that customer own their product which they sell, un-arbitrated and completely transparent, to buyers. Getty-Images charges exorbitant commissions (known to be in the range of 60%), which can't hardly be considered a marketplace transaction fee. It is suggested on the internet that Getty-Images plays unfair, even include changing photographs and forcing the original photographers to hand Getty-Images an additional 100% of the delta. True or not, that is not the kind of trust that makes anyone believe that Getty-Images will become a true marketplace.
3/ The photo acronyms are meaningless. Stock photography does not exist. It is an artificial definition, used mostly to identify a low priced photograph. But a "stock" photograph can be sold rights-managed, royalty free or exclusive and in the new world of publishing even be published as editorial. And therefor, being the leader in stock photography means absolutely NOTHING. Did you know an exclusive photograph is really not exclusive (it is only exclusive to a certain usage), that a buyer has no guarantee that the photo does not show up somewhere else. So, the only measure of success is how many photographs the company has sold and how many times over.
4/ Getty-Images has very restrictive policies to let users participate in their Super-Store, another sign it does not meet a true marketplace definition. WIth dSLR sales growing last year at 60% rate and 9B images produced on those cameras (18B cumulative dSLR images since 2003), Getty-Images is clearly not successful in monetizing the exchange of those images (even if you argue the majority of images have no re-sale value). The number of professional photographers is estimated to be around 36,000 according to PPA and D&B numbers. We believe Getty-Images falls short on counting the majority of those as their suppliers. We believe the unincorporated semi-pros that produce at least one sellable image to be much, much larger (cumulative roughly around 9M dSLR have been sold since 2003).
So, regardless from which angle you slice the business, Getty-Images by no means, has amassed critical penetration in the Total Addressable Market of image exchange. But if you artificially constrict the size of the market by calling it stock, rights-managed, royalty free, editorial or creative, perhaps you can swing it. Undoubtedly someone will buy into it.
1/ Getty-Images does not clearly distinguish between total addressable market and "market", probably to puff itself up as the owner of the imaging marketplace. More than 50% of (traceable corporate) images produced (by about 17,000 commercial Photography companies in the US) are generated by suppliers making less than $5M in revenues and have less than 10 employees. Very few of those (less than 1%) use Getty-Images as their distribution channel. In fact the majority of images sold in the world are traded offline, yes, offline (Getty-Images started its online presence in 2000, after going public on NASDAQ in July of 1996 and re-listing on NYSE in 1998). In addition, the peer-to-peer exchange of digital images, we estimate, is at least twice the size of the traceable exchange. It is quite irrelevant if Getty-Images is performing better than its peers, but Getty-Images by no means owns more than 10% of the addressable market. The risk for Getty is that a new kid on the block will be more successful in emptying out the market with a new business model, rather than outperform the existing players.
2/ Getty-Images is not a marketplace, it is a Super-Store in the economic sense of those definitions. A large part of the images in their store are produced by their own photographers (organic and non-organic) and sold to their existing, primarily agency customers. But the real definition of a "free-market" marketplace is that customer own their product which they sell, un-arbitrated and completely transparent, to buyers. Getty-Images charges exorbitant commissions (known to be in the range of 60%), which can't hardly be considered a marketplace transaction fee. It is suggested on the internet that Getty-Images plays unfair, even include changing photographs and forcing the original photographers to hand Getty-Images an additional 100% of the delta. True or not, that is not the kind of trust that makes anyone believe that Getty-Images will become a true marketplace.
3/ The photo acronyms are meaningless. Stock photography does not exist. It is an artificial definition, used mostly to identify a low priced photograph. But a "stock" photograph can be sold rights-managed, royalty free or exclusive and in the new world of publishing even be published as editorial. And therefor, being the leader in stock photography means absolutely NOTHING. Did you know an exclusive photograph is really not exclusive (it is only exclusive to a certain usage), that a buyer has no guarantee that the photo does not show up somewhere else. So, the only measure of success is how many photographs the company has sold and how many times over.
4/ Getty-Images has very restrictive policies to let users participate in their Super-Store, another sign it does not meet a true marketplace definition. WIth dSLR sales growing last year at 60% rate and 9B images produced on those cameras (18B cumulative dSLR images since 2003), Getty-Images is clearly not successful in monetizing the exchange of those images (even if you argue the majority of images have no re-sale value). The number of professional photographers is estimated to be around 36,000 according to PPA and D&B numbers. We believe Getty-Images falls short on counting the majority of those as their suppliers. We believe the unincorporated semi-pros that produce at least one sellable image to be much, much larger (cumulative roughly around 9M dSLR have been sold since 2003).
So, regardless from which angle you slice the business, Getty-Images by no means, has amassed critical penetration in the Total Addressable Market of image exchange. But if you artificially constrict the size of the market by calling it stock, rights-managed, royalty free, editorial or creative, perhaps you can swing it. Undoubtedly someone will buy into it.
Image catalogs in peril
Bose is a great example of a company that
delivers a unique experience. I have had a few after
sales experiences with Bose and they've all been very
positive and consistent. Most recently I purchased
the new iPhone adapter for
Bose's QuietComfort 2 Noise
Canceling headphone, only to find out that the
adapter didn't fit my QC2 headset. After a call
into Bose, we found out that 2 versions of the
QC2 exist and the adapter packaging did not
specify this distinction.
Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.
Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.
Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.
Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.
The new photo-editing era, a me-too service
Many times I am asked to help a foreign (usually
European) company to make it in the United States.
But the pursuit of the American dream requires that
sacrifices be made. Everyone wants to be a star like
Elvis Presley, yet few have the real determination to
do so.
So, why are US companies so different. The internet is releasing the fictional boundaries of technology, making its usage and its future development available to anyone. Universities in Europe are doing a much better job teaching technology, yet we don't see a significant amount of European companies become successful. What is going on?
While I don't have all the answers, I can offer a few personal observations of why the American way - and - dream is alive and well:
1/ More entrepreneurs are bred by a capitalistic society than a socialistic society. Entrepreneurs with a personal stake and drive for success boost investor deal flow and premium supply. A significantly larger investor pool yields higher valuations for premium supply.
2/ Solid early-stage business acumen. While technology and programming skills can be acquired by virtually anyone, the European petri-dish, the ecosystem that supports the early-stage exchange of technology products and services is missing. As a result people with the business skills needed to bring those early stage products to market rapidly is virtually non-existent in Europe.
3/ Resilient attitude. Young Americans (and ex-pats like me who never felt at "home") are taught to make money and make themselves happy, young Europeans are taught to get a job at a reputable company and be happy. Taking risk and thinking different is a requirement of being a successful entrepreneur, in addition to withstanding a great amount of adversity.
4/ More risk-taking buyers. Customers, partners and acquirers are more entrepreneurial too. Aggressive competitive cultures force buyers to be more entrepreneurial. Technology innovation is accepted as the instrument of differentiation in many US businesses and customers will buy products that give them competitive edge and better quality-of-service.
5/ Continuous focus. Focus on success, short and long. Building a business that goes through several transformations to meet continuous market milestones is crucial to success, rather than a formal majestic plan with many dependencies that never materializes.
So, is there no hope for foreign technologists? Au contraire, I've seen some great technologies that, if unlocked, can find early traction and impressive valuations. It's time to judge a technology not by the country it comes from but the content of its innovation. The american dream is waiting for you. Are you up for the ride?
[In remembrance of Martin Luther King]
So, why are US companies so different. The internet is releasing the fictional boundaries of technology, making its usage and its future development available to anyone. Universities in Europe are doing a much better job teaching technology, yet we don't see a significant amount of European companies become successful. What is going on?
While I don't have all the answers, I can offer a few personal observations of why the American way - and - dream is alive and well:
1/ More entrepreneurs are bred by a capitalistic society than a socialistic society. Entrepreneurs with a personal stake and drive for success boost investor deal flow and premium supply. A significantly larger investor pool yields higher valuations for premium supply.
2/ Solid early-stage business acumen. While technology and programming skills can be acquired by virtually anyone, the European petri-dish, the ecosystem that supports the early-stage exchange of technology products and services is missing. As a result people with the business skills needed to bring those early stage products to market rapidly is virtually non-existent in Europe.
3/ Resilient attitude. Young Americans (and ex-pats like me who never felt at "home") are taught to make money and make themselves happy, young Europeans are taught to get a job at a reputable company and be happy. Taking risk and thinking different is a requirement of being a successful entrepreneur, in addition to withstanding a great amount of adversity.
4/ More risk-taking buyers. Customers, partners and acquirers are more entrepreneurial too. Aggressive competitive cultures force buyers to be more entrepreneurial. Technology innovation is accepted as the instrument of differentiation in many US businesses and customers will buy products that give them competitive edge and better quality-of-service.
5/ Continuous focus. Focus on success, short and long. Building a business that goes through several transformations to meet continuous market milestones is crucial to success, rather than a formal majestic plan with many dependencies that never materializes.
So, is there no hope for foreign technologists? Au contraire, I've seen some great technologies that, if unlocked, can find early traction and impressive valuations. It's time to judge a technology not by the country it comes from but the content of its innovation. The american dream is waiting for you. Are you up for the ride?
[In remembrance of Martin Luther King]
In search of the Economist VC
Wednesday - June 15, 2005 Filed in: Venture
Capital
As a fervent Macintosh user (I
have never bought a Windows PC in my life, but
been "forced" to use one), the Treo650 is about
the only game in town to get your office with
you on the road. The success of the Palm in 1997
started with a simple concept, provide business
users with four simple buttons that gives them
access to everything they need. No more, no
less. Since then the Palm platform has grown in
all directions, except the one I need; better
support for the business user. I like access to
e-mail and a decent browser, I don't like the
fact that many of the phone software
capabilities are not truly integrated with the
original Palm software capabilities. Bluetooth
performance of the Treo is below par, calls
sometimes do not get sent to the Treo headset,
regardless of the button you press (the headset
works fine with my Powerbook and Skype).
Categories don't work with the Mac. Call log
can't be scrolled through using navigation keys.
No keystroke consistency between applications.
No global hot button consistency. Inconsistent
user interface behavior between applications.
Should I go on?Opinion: I wish Apple made a phone, using a proprietary device that serves the needs of a business user very well (a key target considering its $500 price point) , instead of trying to appeal to a broad software market. In the same way the iPod did that for music players. Proprietary platforms competing with "open-source" will yield better customer value, Apple please bring it on.





