Strategy
Beware of the platform that is not.
Wednesday - August 06, 2008
Case in point: new announcements of Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture tout enhanced interoperability with third party plugins to manage and edit your photographs. Don’t you feel good about that warm open-source-like karma of interoperability?
I don’t. Both vendors have deployed their next trick to customer imprisonment. And plenty of uninformed customers will fall for it. Here is why you shouldn’t:
1/ There is no need for an additional platform for photo management.
Photo editing capabilites of both applications are mediocre (no layer based editing, no advanced local editing etc.) and their asset management capabilities are little more than a replica of file system capabilities (even photographic attributes such as exposure, aperture and other attributes are maintained by the file-system metadata today). So, except for making nice photo albums and calendars, why else would you slug thousands of photographs in a proprietary asset management format that is less reliable than the underlying file-system and requires seperate backup and archiving strategies to maintain.
2/ Plugins have worked for years on file-system based photographs.
The announcement of the interoperability with plugins is really old news as those third party applications have been working with file-system based photographs for years. This is a platform on top of a platform, designed to milk more money out of customers and locks them into a proprietary technology stack. A prison with the windows open is still a prison.
3/ The operating system needs-to and will evolve faster.
The pace of meaningful innovation of the Personal Computer OS is deplorable. Microsoft has not made the PC operating system significantly smarter over the last ten years and that has opened the window of opportunity for Apple to surpass Microsoft in usability (rather than functionality). The ability to easily create and manage user-generated content such as, Photography and Video, has now become important adoption drivers to the platform, OS-vendors have yet to respond to. Photographic capabilities should be built-in (not priced-on). These days the unique media experience of the platform is the differentiation that sells the computer (since they all do internet quite well).
As a consumer, buying into seperate photography management siloes will cost you significant time and money (as the former CEO of a photo software company, researching the alternatives, I tried). My advice is to wait until an agile vendor steps up and turns media management into a core competency of the computing experience.
In the words of Ray Lane (partner at KPCB and former COO of Oracle) who once said customers are better off skipping some steps of innovation (in his case to skip client-server for three-tier internet architecture), I have just presented you with my reasoning to skip-over Adobe Lightroom and Apple Aperture. Not because I don’t like some of its functionality, but because it is strategically a dead-end street.
The next evolution of media management will soon eradicate the old one and deliver lasting differentiation to the vendor that owns it and provides a much, much better media experience to the consumer.
I am planning on having something to do with that.
Cheating platforms; bad for our country
Monday - July 28, 2008
When Facebook decided to integrate
new application capabilities that were first
available as a third-party application from a
marketplace participant, they broke the cardinal
rule of marketplace meritocracy. When Getty Images’
staff-photographers allegedly took new pictures
similar to previously top-selling pictures from
participants they too broke a fundamental
marketplace rule. When Amazon.com optimized
sales results based on margins requirements they
too broke many of the free-market rules as
described in “Look,
but don’t touch”.
By calling themselves platforms or marketplaces those companies misled their participants and engaged in what I would characterize as false advertising. Not only did the suppliers expect to be treated equally and become successful based on a true meritocracy, buyers expected to get an untainted view of that meritocracy to make informed purchasing decisions.
Technology platforms need to obey to a simple macro-economic marketplace definition:
Marketplaces thrive because they support free-market principles, and as a result they level the playing field for all participants. No longer are unfair advantages for participants defined by geographic location, subscriptions, volume or other artificial boundaries, but simply by the value and the price of their products.
Here is what platform vendors, to maintain free-market principles and thrive, should stick to:
1/ Don’t employ sales people that sell marketplace content. Sales people give preference to specific content which violates the integrity of the marketplace. Sell the effectiveness of the marketplace mechanism instead.
2/ Don’t market specific content, but market the effectiveness of the exchange. Unfair advantage is an attribute of a premium market not a free-market.
3/ Don’t arbitrate. Anyone should be able to participate, participation fees (that anone in the target group can afford) are okay.
4/ Don’t hide sales results. Transparency of the effectiveness of the marketplace is crucial to invite new entrants on the supply and buy side.
5/ Don’t participate in the marketplace yourself. Clearly seperate yourself from the participants, platform vendors should just build the platform, not the content.
Technology companies that are building platforms should check out our cardinal marketplace rules and investors should measure their platform companies on the compliance to those rules. Investing in a premium market business is fundamentally different from investing in a free-market platform business. Funding requirements and use-of-proceeds differ dramatically.
I’ll make the point again that investors should understand macro-economics impact before they invest.
Marketplaces are not for-free and still support capitalism, but the money will be made by platform owners from a transparent margin on the exchange (and sometimes carefully applied advertising opportunities). Diligent consumer marketplaces achieve winner-takes-all participation levels and massive exchange volumes and revenues. eBay and the Apple AppStore are great examples of more disciplined marketplaces.
Because of the virtually unlimited global reach of the Internet we have an incredible opportunity and obligation to present the world with free-market platforms that treat all participants fairly and with respect.
Let’s stop whining about the authenticity of our presidents, and instead, as the creators of the technology industry show the world how we turn authenticity, embedded in our technology, into a massively sustainable advantage.
By calling themselves platforms or marketplaces those companies misled their participants and engaged in what I would characterize as false advertising. Not only did the suppliers expect to be treated equally and become successful based on a true meritocracy, buyers expected to get an untainted view of that meritocracy to make informed purchasing decisions.
Technology platforms need to obey to a simple macro-economic marketplace definition:
A marketplace connects unrestricted supply with unrestricted demand through an un-arbitrated and transparent exchange.
Marketplaces thrive because they support free-market principles, and as a result they level the playing field for all participants. No longer are unfair advantages for participants defined by geographic location, subscriptions, volume or other artificial boundaries, but simply by the value and the price of their products.
Here is what platform vendors, to maintain free-market principles and thrive, should stick to:
1/ Don’t employ sales people that sell marketplace content. Sales people give preference to specific content which violates the integrity of the marketplace. Sell the effectiveness of the marketplace mechanism instead.
2/ Don’t market specific content, but market the effectiveness of the exchange. Unfair advantage is an attribute of a premium market not a free-market.
3/ Don’t arbitrate. Anyone should be able to participate, participation fees (that anone in the target group can afford) are okay.
4/ Don’t hide sales results. Transparency of the effectiveness of the marketplace is crucial to invite new entrants on the supply and buy side.
5/ Don’t participate in the marketplace yourself. Clearly seperate yourself from the participants, platform vendors should just build the platform, not the content.
Technology companies that are building platforms should check out our cardinal marketplace rules and investors should measure their platform companies on the compliance to those rules. Investing in a premium market business is fundamentally different from investing in a free-market platform business. Funding requirements and use-of-proceeds differ dramatically.
I’ll make the point again that investors should understand macro-economics impact before they invest.
Marketplaces are not for-free and still support capitalism, but the money will be made by platform owners from a transparent margin on the exchange (and sometimes carefully applied advertising opportunities). Diligent consumer marketplaces achieve winner-takes-all participation levels and massive exchange volumes and revenues. eBay and the Apple AppStore are great examples of more disciplined marketplaces.
Because of the virtually unlimited global reach of the Internet we have an incredible opportunity and obligation to present the world with free-market platforms that treat all participants fairly and with respect.
Let’s stop whining about the authenticity of our presidents, and instead, as the creators of the technology industry show the world how we turn authenticity, embedded in our technology, into a massively sustainable advantage.
The delicacy of european investments
Thursday - April 24, 2008
We can look at Microsoft and Apple and compare them
strategically: Microsoft is the plumbing for a
commoditized desktop computing market where Apple
delivers a unique computing experience based
primarily on its proprietary technology stack.
Microsoft as the complacent market leader, Apple as
the wannabe - fighting hard to win share. Apple, in
tune with today's computing lifestyle as the
innovator, Microsoft as the raw execution machine,
buying innovation where needed.
But for me, in the shoes of an end-user, all of that is summed up in a simple way:
Type in CNN in Safari (without url etc, just as we wrote it here) and then type in CNN (again without any internet "grammar") in Explorer. Here is what you get:
Microsoft (standard installation Windows XP):
Apple (standard installation OS10.4+):
Bottom line: with Apple you get what you expect, with Microsoft you get spun into their web, literally.
Maybe this is Microsoft's tactic to produce page hits to compete with Google: any user that doesn't know how to type in a URL will be rerouted by default to MSN search. I call that cheating, Microsoft. But even with those tricks, you still need Yahoo!
Getting and keeping customers is about integrity and authenticity, not sneaky monetization techniques to squeeze every cent out of every visitor - leading them down the endless path of search. I am glad Apple is around and here to stay. There is nothing better than getting what you want, quickly.
BTW: talking about Microsoft's complacency, does it still not have anti-aliasing sorted out - or is that the big improvement in Vista?
But for me, in the shoes of an end-user, all of that is summed up in a simple way:
Type in CNN in Safari (without url etc, just as we wrote it here) and then type in CNN (again without any internet "grammar") in Explorer. Here is what you get:
Microsoft (standard installation Windows XP):
Apple (standard installation OS10.4+):
Bottom line: with Apple you get what you expect, with Microsoft you get spun into their web, literally.
Maybe this is Microsoft's tactic to produce page hits to compete with Google: any user that doesn't know how to type in a URL will be rerouted by default to MSN search. I call that cheating, Microsoft. But even with those tricks, you still need Yahoo!
Getting and keeping customers is about integrity and authenticity, not sneaky monetization techniques to squeeze every cent out of every visitor - leading them down the endless path of search. I am glad Apple is around and here to stay. There is nothing better than getting what you want, quickly.
BTW: talking about Microsoft's complacency, does it still not have anti-aliasing sorted out - or is that the big improvement in Vista?
The (simple) difference between Apple and Microsoft
Monday - April 21, 2008
We communicate with each other using a common
language and we obviously become more effective when
we all understand that language. However, technology
complicates our lives as each piece of technology we
interact with requires us to learn a new
(proprietary) language; a set of rules, technology
grammar and a unique user-interface experience.
Think about it, when Larry King on national TV stumbles over his own URL (yes, language) and messes up http, semicolon and slash (or was it backslash), I can't help but think about the hell we put users through to use the internet. Only if you understand that language do you get to benefit from its capabilities. That's like forcing anyone that wants to vacation in Mexico to speak Spanish first. The Mexican tourist industry would grind to a halt.
It gets worse, for example, to make photographs look better, Photoshop (and now with Photoshop Express) and many other photo-editing applications deploy a language that requires users to understand the intricacies of color and light and apply that language in the right order.
Here is a synopsis of the skill level my mother-in-law would need to master in order to make her photographs look better: first increase the dynamic range using a histogram, then use curves to change the tonal values to your liking, apply the right white balance and improve saturation and vibrance. Indeed, what I just described is the introduction of yet another language to solve a pretty mundane problem.
To create a web page, we introduce yet another language, a compilation of HTML, Perl, Ajax and Flash usually contained within a desktop product with its own proprietary language. To write a book we wrestle with 90% of Microsoft Word's functionality and language we seldom use, trying to figure out how to create a table of contents. In Excel we use another language consisting of non-intuitive formulas (like sum() ) to derive values from other cells. Should I go on?
So why is it that we seem to get away with it - or are we? For one, lots of people make money understanding a computing language that fewer others do. Web designers don't always create better design, but they understand the language of design, and can implement it. So, web designers don't want you to know there are better ways to do this. Adobe is probably not in a hurry to remove the language and erode its premium market, it could have created much more democratization in the website creation process. Many times have designers, with corporate marketeers in tow, abjected the use of Rapidweaver, a tool that attempts to democratize web design (this site is built with it).
But we are fooling ourselves. The democratization of the internet requires that we make technology more accessible and easier to understand and implement. Only then will it reach real mass adoption.
We could easily build technology that figures out how to make the majority of images look better, or design a web page by drawing it - rather than programming, or have Word make recommendations for a table of contents when it discovers one.
The iPhone is a great example of how packaging existing technologies in a different way, can make people feel that they don't need to learn a new language to communicate with it. My 3 year old daughter uses it. Each of the individual technologies in the iPhone had been around for a while, Apple "just" packaged it so the language became intuitive.
But Apple is not the only vendor that can remove the computing language from the equation, others just need to pay attention to it.
So when you design products, pay attention to the removal of the language, fewer yet intuitive options - rather than more. After all, for thousands of years, we ourselves, have communicated in many other ways than verbal, the majority of our communication remains behavioral.
Innovation has become the art of packaging a flawless user experience, rather than a race to add features. The latter quickly becomes commoditized anyway.
Think about it, when Larry King on national TV stumbles over his own URL (yes, language) and messes up http, semicolon and slash (or was it backslash), I can't help but think about the hell we put users through to use the internet. Only if you understand that language do you get to benefit from its capabilities. That's like forcing anyone that wants to vacation in Mexico to speak Spanish first. The Mexican tourist industry would grind to a halt.
It gets worse, for example, to make photographs look better, Photoshop (and now with Photoshop Express) and many other photo-editing applications deploy a language that requires users to understand the intricacies of color and light and apply that language in the right order.
Here is a synopsis of the skill level my mother-in-law would need to master in order to make her photographs look better: first increase the dynamic range using a histogram, then use curves to change the tonal values to your liking, apply the right white balance and improve saturation and vibrance. Indeed, what I just described is the introduction of yet another language to solve a pretty mundane problem.
To create a web page, we introduce yet another language, a compilation of HTML, Perl, Ajax and Flash usually contained within a desktop product with its own proprietary language. To write a book we wrestle with 90% of Microsoft Word's functionality and language we seldom use, trying to figure out how to create a table of contents. In Excel we use another language consisting of non-intuitive formulas (like sum() ) to derive values from other cells. Should I go on?
So why is it that we seem to get away with it - or are we? For one, lots of people make money understanding a computing language that fewer others do. Web designers don't always create better design, but they understand the language of design, and can implement it. So, web designers don't want you to know there are better ways to do this. Adobe is probably not in a hurry to remove the language and erode its premium market, it could have created much more democratization in the website creation process. Many times have designers, with corporate marketeers in tow, abjected the use of Rapidweaver, a tool that attempts to democratize web design (this site is built with it).
But we are fooling ourselves. The democratization of the internet requires that we make technology more accessible and easier to understand and implement. Only then will it reach real mass adoption.
We could easily build technology that figures out how to make the majority of images look better, or design a web page by drawing it - rather than programming, or have Word make recommendations for a table of contents when it discovers one.
The iPhone is a great example of how packaging existing technologies in a different way, can make people feel that they don't need to learn a new language to communicate with it. My 3 year old daughter uses it. Each of the individual technologies in the iPhone had been around for a while, Apple "just" packaged it so the language became intuitive.
But Apple is not the only vendor that can remove the computing language from the equation, others just need to pay attention to it.
So when you design products, pay attention to the removal of the language, fewer yet intuitive options - rather than more. After all, for thousands of years, we ourselves, have communicated in many other ways than verbal, the majority of our communication remains behavioral.
Innovation has become the art of packaging a flawless user experience, rather than a race to add features. The latter quickly becomes commoditized anyway.
The (technology) language is the problem
Wednesday - April 02, 2008
Since a platform is the technology foundation for a
marketplace, platforms - to achieve extraordinary
growth - need to instill the rules
of marketplaces as we laid them out in our
previous post.
But not all platforms are created equal and some self-proclaimed platform vendors do not adhere to marketplace principles. That could mean you as a provider think you subscribed to a meritocracy - with equal opportunity exposure - yet other participants (your competitors) get pay-to-play advantages. Potential buyers in that tainted market are actually shopping in a premium market, not the free-market they expect to be most economic and trustworthy.
Other synonyms of the same phenomenon abused in the technology industry include: ecosystems, exchanges, communities and networks which all serve identical needs in connecting disparate supply with disparate demand, something a premium market is unable to do.
Consumer companies understand the freedom of choice customers demand. Enterprise software and services vendors have long basked in the glory of premium markets and have a long way to go in order to truly build winner-takes-all free-markets, which in total size are often larger in size than the total size of premium markets in that category.
In the Enterprise space the majority of customers (roughly 80%) buying products or services deviate from its intended design and want to add on, integrate or correlate those off-the-shelve configurations with other ones. Enterprise customers often spend more money on customization than they spend on licensing fees for say, Oracle products. Hence the requirement for a true marketplace of additional enterprise components (check out Serena, great concept but marketplace execution and marketplace compliance - yet to be developed - will be the tell-tale of their real success). Salesforce.com's Appexchange seems to provide the best proximity to a free-market of applications we've seen, although we have yet to verify its integrity against the marketplace rules.
Developer programs from companies like Oracle (with OTN), Microsoft (MSDN) and others use surrogate models of marketplaces to mimic, but not truly deliver on its powerful benefits. Go visit their websites and you'll notice no mention of third party products. There literally is no marketplace, although Microsoft has a link to "a library", if you can find it.
Apple (with the iPhone Developer Network) is experimenting with its rules but apart from compliance to the free-pricing rule, its overall compliance to a free-market is minimal. And, today, they don't need to. Apple still has time to deploy some premium market tricks as long as Google with Android doesn't deliver on a real marketplace for developers early.
As a software provider you may need to run on and comply to a major vendor's technology, just don't assume a developer network, exchange or community will make you rich - not until the marketplace supports a true meritocracy. And for that, again, real marketplace principles need to be deployed.
But not all platforms are created equal and some self-proclaimed platform vendors do not adhere to marketplace principles. That could mean you as a provider think you subscribed to a meritocracy - with equal opportunity exposure - yet other participants (your competitors) get pay-to-play advantages. Potential buyers in that tainted market are actually shopping in a premium market, not the free-market they expect to be most economic and trustworthy.
Other synonyms of the same phenomenon abused in the technology industry include: ecosystems, exchanges, communities and networks which all serve identical needs in connecting disparate supply with disparate demand, something a premium market is unable to do.
Consumer companies understand the freedom of choice customers demand. Enterprise software and services vendors have long basked in the glory of premium markets and have a long way to go in order to truly build winner-takes-all free-markets, which in total size are often larger in size than the total size of premium markets in that category.
In the Enterprise space the majority of customers (roughly 80%) buying products or services deviate from its intended design and want to add on, integrate or correlate those off-the-shelve configurations with other ones. Enterprise customers often spend more money on customization than they spend on licensing fees for say, Oracle products. Hence the requirement for a true marketplace of additional enterprise components (check out Serena, great concept but marketplace execution and marketplace compliance - yet to be developed - will be the tell-tale of their real success). Salesforce.com's Appexchange seems to provide the best proximity to a free-market of applications we've seen, although we have yet to verify its integrity against the marketplace rules.
Developer programs from companies like Oracle (with OTN), Microsoft (MSDN) and others use surrogate models of marketplaces to mimic, but not truly deliver on its powerful benefits. Go visit their websites and you'll notice no mention of third party products. There literally is no marketplace, although Microsoft has a link to "a library", if you can find it.
Apple (with the iPhone Developer Network) is experimenting with its rules but apart from compliance to the free-pricing rule, its overall compliance to a free-market is minimal. And, today, they don't need to. Apple still has time to deploy some premium market tricks as long as Google with Android doesn't deliver on a real marketplace for developers early.
As a software provider you may need to run on and comply to a major vendor's technology, just don't assume a developer network, exchange or community will make you rich - not until the marketplace supports a true meritocracy. And for that, again, real marketplace principles need to be deployed.
How developer platforms (should) drive marketplaces
Monday - March 24, 2008
If you've read my previous
blog on marketplace rules, you would agree.
Amazon.com is a Super
Store which, by expanding the relationship with
other premium suppliers mimics the appearance of
a marketplace. And because Jeff Bezos associates
Amazon.com with a marketplace frequently, I
stand to correct him:
Marketplace rules.
Rule #1: Failed. Amazon limits the supplier participation to their premium strategy.
Rule #2: Failed. Limited suppliers means limited transactions are available
Rule #3: Failed. Amazon regulates the process of how a transaction takes place, conforming to Amazon pricing models
Rule #4: Failed. Once you book an order from a different supplier than Amazon, all bets are off with regards to transparency, shipping, returns etc
Rule #5: Failed. There is no way for new buyers to see who bought what at what price and equally for sellers who sold what.
Rule #6: Failed. User opinions are irrelevant if they are not borne out of a transaction.
Rule #7: Perhaps not relevant here.
Rule #8: Failed. Amazon is "competing" in the "marketplace" with its suppliers
Amazon will have a much harder time to sustain growth and meet Wall Street expectations, as a lot of growth through premium suppliers will become non-organic (or sell through revenues). Amazon has plenty of opportunity to migrate to a real marketplace without losing its footing, but it better hurry. In the meantime, Jeff, please call Amazon what it is: earth's premium selection.
Marketplace rules.
Rule #1: Failed. Amazon limits the supplier participation to their premium strategy.
Rule #2: Failed. Limited suppliers means limited transactions are available
Rule #3: Failed. Amazon regulates the process of how a transaction takes place, conforming to Amazon pricing models
Rule #4: Failed. Once you book an order from a different supplier than Amazon, all bets are off with regards to transparency, shipping, returns etc
Rule #5: Failed. There is no way for new buyers to see who bought what at what price and equally for sellers who sold what.
Rule #6: Failed. User opinions are irrelevant if they are not borne out of a transaction.
Rule #7: Perhaps not relevant here.
Rule #8: Failed. Amazon is "competing" in the "marketplace" with its suppliers
Amazon will have a much harder time to sustain growth and meet Wall Street expectations, as a lot of growth through premium suppliers will become non-organic (or sell through revenues). Amazon has plenty of opportunity to migrate to a real marketplace without losing its footing, but it better hurry. In the meantime, Jeff, please call Amazon what it is: earth's premium selection.
Why Amazon is not a marketplace
Monday - March 17, 2008
There is a lot of misconception about
marketplaces and I wanted to summarize my response to
benefit more entrepreneurs.
Real marketplaces are much more powerful than just a collection of stores. Amazon, for example is a Super Store not a marketplace today. EBay, FaceBook and YouTube represent more fundamental marketplace principles - and as a result - fascinating growth.
Marketplaces are a favorite topic these days, perhaps spawned by sky high valuations for social-media platforms such as FaceBook and Bebo. A social-media platform, you know, is nothing more than a marketplace in which personal attributes are traded (through the use of social applications).
Marketplaces are interesting because, if implemented successfully, provide massive user adoption and winner-takes-all leadership positions. Great traits for any investment portfolio. A marketplace is highly disruptive in a market where the premium opportunity, the Super Store model has been exhausted - or simply does not exist. Some markets, because of their highly fragmented nature, cannot be captured by high margin and proprietary access and a marketplace is the only way to leverage its total size.
I have written extensively about marketplace criteria in specific markets and its origination about 600 years back, so I won't cover that specifically here. But so many other markets are ripe for marketplace macro-economics delivered by technology. Virtually any market characterized by unique transactions between large amounts of sellers and buyers is a candidate for free-market principles. The life-cycle of proprietary markets is dramatically shortened by the Internet, a distribution medium that instantly removes artificial boundaries such as geographic location and limited access.
Here are 8 rules that make a marketplace succeed:
1/ Un-arbitrated participation
No seller or buyer should be banned from participating in the marketplace. A key fundamental of a marketplace is that it grows itself and that the quality of the buyer and seller is a reflection of the market, not controlled by the market. After-all, the purpose is to connect The Long Tail of supply with The Long Tail of demand.
2/ Un-arbitrated transactions
Apart from exchanges that are illegal by law, no transactions should be banned. People come to a marketplace to perform a unique transaction, one they could not act on in a premium market.
3/ Free pricing mechanisms
Pricing models and terms are defined either by the seller or buyer or by both. Not by the marketplace. Pricing models can include such transactions as sell, auction, reverse auction or subscription - or even a combination of those. Pricing, including free, is completely and independently determined by or between seller and buyer, predetermined or negotiated. The marketplace takes a simple transaction fee off of the transaction value.
4/ Predictable behavior
Marketplaces need to establish trust in order to survive and thrive. Pricing models and behavior of the marketplace need to be predictable and follow (not dictate) the goals of buyers and sellers. The marketplace should follow the needs of the market not the other way around.
5/ Transparency of transactions
Marketplaces rely on a vast new influx of sellers and buyers to grow to massive size. That means the marketplace must operate with a transparency that shows new buyers or sellers how to become successful as most of its users are greenfield participants.
6/ Meritocracy builds reputation
Trading favors and segmentation can be established but only based on mechanisms that are derived from real transactions, not plainly from user opinions. Opinions are useless if not supported by a proven reputation within the marketplace. Transactions based reputations provides long-lasting stickiness to the marketplace.
7/ Support for intermediaries
For existing markets moving from premium to a free-market, its existing intermediaries need to be able to continue to represent their sellers or buyers. A new technology marketplace should not want to disintermediate or alienate those agents.
8/ Non-compete
The marketplace cannot itself participate in the marketplace by providing its own transactions or even participate in - or act on behalf of - transactions between sellers and buyers. Apart from the fact that the business models don't jive, a marketplace cannot be trusted when it simultaneously participates and facilitates an impartial exchange.
So, a simple method to determine whether a marketplace has massive market potential is to hold it up against the rules provided here. These rules are macro-economic principles that dictate how markets behave and grow, the technology implementation must support those principles to have a chance of making it big. It's a free world after all.
Real marketplaces are much more powerful than just a collection of stores. Amazon, for example is a Super Store not a marketplace today. EBay, FaceBook and YouTube represent more fundamental marketplace principles - and as a result - fascinating growth.
Marketplaces are a favorite topic these days, perhaps spawned by sky high valuations for social-media platforms such as FaceBook and Bebo. A social-media platform, you know, is nothing more than a marketplace in which personal attributes are traded (through the use of social applications).
Marketplaces are interesting because, if implemented successfully, provide massive user adoption and winner-takes-all leadership positions. Great traits for any investment portfolio. A marketplace is highly disruptive in a market where the premium opportunity, the Super Store model has been exhausted - or simply does not exist. Some markets, because of their highly fragmented nature, cannot be captured by high margin and proprietary access and a marketplace is the only way to leverage its total size.
I have written extensively about marketplace criteria in specific markets and its origination about 600 years back, so I won't cover that specifically here. But so many other markets are ripe for marketplace macro-economics delivered by technology. Virtually any market characterized by unique transactions between large amounts of sellers and buyers is a candidate for free-market principles. The life-cycle of proprietary markets is dramatically shortened by the Internet, a distribution medium that instantly removes artificial boundaries such as geographic location and limited access.
Here are 8 rules that make a marketplace succeed:
1/ Un-arbitrated participation
No seller or buyer should be banned from participating in the marketplace. A key fundamental of a marketplace is that it grows itself and that the quality of the buyer and seller is a reflection of the market, not controlled by the market. After-all, the purpose is to connect The Long Tail of supply with The Long Tail of demand.
2/ Un-arbitrated transactions
Apart from exchanges that are illegal by law, no transactions should be banned. People come to a marketplace to perform a unique transaction, one they could not act on in a premium market.
3/ Free pricing mechanisms
Pricing models and terms are defined either by the seller or buyer or by both. Not by the marketplace. Pricing models can include such transactions as sell, auction, reverse auction or subscription - or even a combination of those. Pricing, including free, is completely and independently determined by or between seller and buyer, predetermined or negotiated. The marketplace takes a simple transaction fee off of the transaction value.
4/ Predictable behavior
Marketplaces need to establish trust in order to survive and thrive. Pricing models and behavior of the marketplace need to be predictable and follow (not dictate) the goals of buyers and sellers. The marketplace should follow the needs of the market not the other way around.
5/ Transparency of transactions
Marketplaces rely on a vast new influx of sellers and buyers to grow to massive size. That means the marketplace must operate with a transparency that shows new buyers or sellers how to become successful as most of its users are greenfield participants.
6/ Meritocracy builds reputation
Trading favors and segmentation can be established but only based on mechanisms that are derived from real transactions, not plainly from user opinions. Opinions are useless if not supported by a proven reputation within the marketplace. Transactions based reputations provides long-lasting stickiness to the marketplace.
7/ Support for intermediaries
For existing markets moving from premium to a free-market, its existing intermediaries need to be able to continue to represent their sellers or buyers. A new technology marketplace should not want to disintermediate or alienate those agents.
8/ Non-compete
The marketplace cannot itself participate in the marketplace by providing its own transactions or even participate in - or act on behalf of - transactions between sellers and buyers. Apart from the fact that the business models don't jive, a marketplace cannot be trusted when it simultaneously participates and facilitates an impartial exchange.
So, a simple method to determine whether a marketplace has massive market potential is to hold it up against the rules provided here. These rules are macro-economic principles that dictate how markets behave and grow, the technology implementation must support those principles to have a chance of making it big. It's a free world after all.
Marketplace rules: look, don't touch
Sunday - March 16, 2008
Over the last 10 years I've also
been closely involved with early stage
technology funding (advising VC firms and
Angels) and have invested personal time and
money in early stage ventures. That has given me
a unique perspective of the challenges between
entrepreneurs and investors.
I've written about my Top 10 fundraising lessons for entrepreneurs, and dare to follow up with my Top 10 investment strategies that may be useful to investors and entrepreneurs, here:
1) Invest in the founders, but be wary if the company consists of technologists only. The ones that come in without an operating plan clearly do not understand what you as an investor are looking for. Get a real operator in early.
2) Invest in the business, don't invest in technology. The statistics prove it: ninety-nine out of a hundred of the most innovative technologies never turn into successful businesses. Especially investors (both VC and Angels) that made their money in the hay-days of technology have a tendency to underfund the business side, providing a weak foundation for any technology to succeed.
3) Don't invest in an early stage company with more than one product or service. Let the company become the King-of-One, rather than the King-of-None. Multiple products or services require more money to support successfully and dramatically dilutes the focus of the company. Multiple products or services also "invite" a larger group of competitors, making it hard for customers to perceive true differentiation and unknowingly, slows down adoption.
4) Don't invest in an early stage company with more than one business model. Keep it simple. Multiple revenue models sound good, but usually don't yield the projected outcome. The company should make all of its money in advertising or in subscriptions, not in both. Dilution of focus is costly and provides yet another reason for failure.
5) Don't invest in companies that rely heavily on partner support early on. This is the typical David and Goliath phenomenon. Partners sell once the company does in overwhelming numbers. The company should always have direct control of its own business model first, before they allow any partner to reduce its margins.
6) Invest money or time, don't do both. I very much relate to Carl Icahn in an interview with Dan Primack (on PEhub) with regards to CEOs responsibility to make the numbers work, and not to rely on investors to "add value". The CEO is in the driver seat, take him out if he doesn't produce.
7) Look for fundamental changes in customer experience. The Ultimate Driving Experience is what sets BMW apart, not just the timing in their engines. Customer experience is much more than a pretty user interface, it is an overall experience that spawns disruptive purchasing.
8) Watch how professional the team operates pre-funding as an indication of their interaction post-funding and with customers. Real professionals do everything with a purpose and I have mastered the art of detecting them. So well that I can tell from a visit to a trade-show floor whether a company is going places.
9) Don't categorize investment allocations based on past investments or trends. Every company is unique and requires an amount of money unique to their assets: people, timing, market and ecosystem. If you don't think you have a unique scenario, you probably don't have a valuable investment opportunity.
10) Invest with passion but don't fall in love with the company. Investing is the ultimate flirting game, but it is usually a bad idea to get really involved. Your asset value is the selection and performance of all the companies in your fund. Stick with what you do best.
From an investment perspective I see many "sub-optimizations" but not a lot of real great innovations these days. I do blame the current investment model for that sometimes. We, in Silicon Valley, have too many technology investors using the same rearview-mirror investment criteria. Although I have a lot of admiration for Apple, it is a bad sign when we need to leave real innovation in the hands of large companies like theirs.
The landscape for investors is about to change dramatically, no longer can they just continue to invest in proprietary technology silos at single digit valuations. They'll soon need to broaden their experience ("in search of the Economist VC") to understand the macro-economic impact of marketplaces, platforms and the impact of technology to other industries.
A wonderful long road for technology innovation and investing still lies ahead.
I've written about my Top 10 fundraising lessons for entrepreneurs, and dare to follow up with my Top 10 investment strategies that may be useful to investors and entrepreneurs, here:
1) Invest in the founders, but be wary if the company consists of technologists only. The ones that come in without an operating plan clearly do not understand what you as an investor are looking for. Get a real operator in early.
2) Invest in the business, don't invest in technology. The statistics prove it: ninety-nine out of a hundred of the most innovative technologies never turn into successful businesses. Especially investors (both VC and Angels) that made their money in the hay-days of technology have a tendency to underfund the business side, providing a weak foundation for any technology to succeed.
3) Don't invest in an early stage company with more than one product or service. Let the company become the King-of-One, rather than the King-of-None. Multiple products or services require more money to support successfully and dramatically dilutes the focus of the company. Multiple products or services also "invite" a larger group of competitors, making it hard for customers to perceive true differentiation and unknowingly, slows down adoption.
4) Don't invest in an early stage company with more than one business model. Keep it simple. Multiple revenue models sound good, but usually don't yield the projected outcome. The company should make all of its money in advertising or in subscriptions, not in both. Dilution of focus is costly and provides yet another reason for failure.
5) Don't invest in companies that rely heavily on partner support early on. This is the typical David and Goliath phenomenon. Partners sell once the company does in overwhelming numbers. The company should always have direct control of its own business model first, before they allow any partner to reduce its margins.
6) Invest money or time, don't do both. I very much relate to Carl Icahn in an interview with Dan Primack (on PEhub) with regards to CEOs responsibility to make the numbers work, and not to rely on investors to "add value". The CEO is in the driver seat, take him out if he doesn't produce.
7) Look for fundamental changes in customer experience. The Ultimate Driving Experience is what sets BMW apart, not just the timing in their engines. Customer experience is much more than a pretty user interface, it is an overall experience that spawns disruptive purchasing.
8) Watch how professional the team operates pre-funding as an indication of their interaction post-funding and with customers. Real professionals do everything with a purpose and I have mastered the art of detecting them. So well that I can tell from a visit to a trade-show floor whether a company is going places.
9) Don't categorize investment allocations based on past investments or trends. Every company is unique and requires an amount of money unique to their assets: people, timing, market and ecosystem. If you don't think you have a unique scenario, you probably don't have a valuable investment opportunity.
10) Invest with passion but don't fall in love with the company. Investing is the ultimate flirting game, but it is usually a bad idea to get really involved. Your asset value is the selection and performance of all the companies in your fund. Stick with what you do best.
From an investment perspective I see many "sub-optimizations" but not a lot of real great innovations these days. I do blame the current investment model for that sometimes. We, in Silicon Valley, have too many technology investors using the same rearview-mirror investment criteria. Although I have a lot of admiration for Apple, it is a bad sign when we need to leave real innovation in the hands of large companies like theirs.
The landscape for investors is about to change dramatically, no longer can they just continue to invest in proprietary technology silos at single digit valuations. They'll soon need to broaden their experience ("in search of the Economist VC") to understand the macro-economic impact of marketplaces, platforms and the impact of technology to other industries.
A wonderful long road for technology innovation and investing still lies ahead.
10 Investment lessons learned over 10 years
Wednesday - March 12, 2008
I visited the entrepreneurs week
at Stanford this week where many MBAs were
walking around with new business ideas. Since we
raised a fair amount of money ourselves
in the last 10 years we've been focused on
startups, I wanted to give some advice that may
be helpful to any first time entrepreneur:
1) Define the end goal of the company in a newly defined market
The determination of pre-money valuation, even for the first round, should be based on the disruptiveness of the company when it grows up. The goal is to find the investor that understands the path to that goal, not an assessment of the current value of the company. The starting valuation then becomes a reverse calculation from that goal.
2) Don't set a valuation, but have one in mind
The valuation is usually suggested by the investor, but ofcourse, you don't have to take it. Ask your potential investor to value the company after you give them the pitch, the outcome of that tells you whether the investor really understands your unique proposition. If it is too low, it may be because the clarity of your pitch. If not: walk away.
3) Have an operating plan ready
An operating plan defines how you turn technology into a business, without it there is simply too much room for debate and depreciation. Show investors you know how to run the business. The more you do the easier it is to cement your use-of-proceeds.
4) Find an investor you truly like
Every entrepreneur deserves to be treated with respect. Waste no time talking to deep pockets with awful personalities, but don't be afraid to get some straight talk. Check TheFunded.com for war stories and ask around. Later, when business gets tough bad guys usually get a lot worse.
5) Define business disruptiveness
Building technology is one thing, but yielding a disruptive business value is even more relevant. The latter is defined by macro-economics, not just a more clever way to improve existing technology.
6) Take passion over domain expertise any-day
Find a lead investor that has passion for the business problem you are about to solve. An investor that claims to have domain expertise is usually the one that doesn't understand disruption within or across that domain.
7) Don't get squeezed
Investors like to put investments into past investment categories and make an assessment of how much it costs to build your business. Don't let them stray too much from what is in your operating plan, if you do you will get punished for it later, both on the execution side as well as in excessive dilution.
8) Know the investment allocation
Usually a little harder to do with angels but VCs should have a total investment amount allocated to the business. Ask them for the total allocation upfront, so you know when you need to go shopping somewhere else. Also, don't be afraid to ask who else needs to sign off on this deal within the VC firm, in most cases it is a very democratic process internally with a primary sponsor. After your first meeting you should get in front of a General Partner, talking terms.
9) Control your own eco-system
Investors like to wiggle around and determine how much money should go into R&D, Sales, Marketing, Business development, Support and G&A. Too much money in marketing is usually an indication the product or service lacks real viral adoption and that should be avoided. If the balance of this eco-system is not guarded heavily by the entrepreneurs the result is an excessive bleeding and further dilution in subsequent rounds.
10) Balance your board
A board without a balance of technical and business expertise can really bring a company down when the going gets tough. The technical board members will spend too much time validating deep technology progress without real affinity for the bottom-line. On the flip side a demand for too early revenues can have disastrous effects on product or service readiness and customer experience. Keep them both in check.
Be honest and transparent, too much talk without real interaction with a prospective investor is a bad sign. Paint a realistic risk-management picture, in which you describe both the pluses and minuses, not unlike the way a VC sells their risks in a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) to its limited partners. Feel free to e-mail us if you need help.
1) Define the end goal of the company in a newly defined market
The determination of pre-money valuation, even for the first round, should be based on the disruptiveness of the company when it grows up. The goal is to find the investor that understands the path to that goal, not an assessment of the current value of the company. The starting valuation then becomes a reverse calculation from that goal.
2) Don't set a valuation, but have one in mind
The valuation is usually suggested by the investor, but ofcourse, you don't have to take it. Ask your potential investor to value the company after you give them the pitch, the outcome of that tells you whether the investor really understands your unique proposition. If it is too low, it may be because the clarity of your pitch. If not: walk away.
3) Have an operating plan ready
An operating plan defines how you turn technology into a business, without it there is simply too much room for debate and depreciation. Show investors you know how to run the business. The more you do the easier it is to cement your use-of-proceeds.
4) Find an investor you truly like
Every entrepreneur deserves to be treated with respect. Waste no time talking to deep pockets with awful personalities, but don't be afraid to get some straight talk. Check TheFunded.com for war stories and ask around. Later, when business gets tough bad guys usually get a lot worse.
5) Define business disruptiveness
Building technology is one thing, but yielding a disruptive business value is even more relevant. The latter is defined by macro-economics, not just a more clever way to improve existing technology.
6) Take passion over domain expertise any-day
Find a lead investor that has passion for the business problem you are about to solve. An investor that claims to have domain expertise is usually the one that doesn't understand disruption within or across that domain.
7) Don't get squeezed
Investors like to put investments into past investment categories and make an assessment of how much it costs to build your business. Don't let them stray too much from what is in your operating plan, if you do you will get punished for it later, both on the execution side as well as in excessive dilution.
8) Know the investment allocation
Usually a little harder to do with angels but VCs should have a total investment amount allocated to the business. Ask them for the total allocation upfront, so you know when you need to go shopping somewhere else. Also, don't be afraid to ask who else needs to sign off on this deal within the VC firm, in most cases it is a very democratic process internally with a primary sponsor. After your first meeting you should get in front of a General Partner, talking terms.
9) Control your own eco-system
Investors like to wiggle around and determine how much money should go into R&D, Sales, Marketing, Business development, Support and G&A. Too much money in marketing is usually an indication the product or service lacks real viral adoption and that should be avoided. If the balance of this eco-system is not guarded heavily by the entrepreneurs the result is an excessive bleeding and further dilution in subsequent rounds.
10) Balance your board
A board without a balance of technical and business expertise can really bring a company down when the going gets tough. The technical board members will spend too much time validating deep technology progress without real affinity for the bottom-line. On the flip side a demand for too early revenues can have disastrous effects on product or service readiness and customer experience. Keep them both in check.
Be honest and transparent, too much talk without real interaction with a prospective investor is a bad sign. Paint a realistic risk-management picture, in which you describe both the pluses and minuses, not unlike the way a VC sells their risks in a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) to its limited partners. Feel free to e-mail us if you need help.
10 Fundraising lessons learned over 10 years
Thursday - February 28, 2008
Getty-Images pulled it off as we indicated would
happen, and sold itself to private equity
group Hellman & Friedman LLC in San
Francisco (and the "network of the private
equity group" which apparently includes the
Getty empire) for a little over 2x revenues,
assuming also an additional $300M in debt.
Someone clearly felt that was an accurate price
for its organic growth business: "Wall Street
was paying more attention to the stagnating core
business than to its emerging segments."
Indeed, non-organic growth is hardly ever a sustainable endeavor, lacks core competency and focus and often hides many skeletons in the closet. Now the fun part of discovering its real value starts, although the company does not forecast a lot of changes according to this interview with Jonathan Klein, Getty-Images' CEO and PDN. We could suggest a few fundamental changes along the lines of my blogs and then some.
But anyway you cut it, this will turn out to be good for photographers and the market. New competitors will spring up and VCs will now perhaps see the value in supporting imaging marketplaces. So for that, we need to congratulate Getty-Images.
Indeed, non-organic growth is hardly ever a sustainable endeavor, lacks core competency and focus and often hides many skeletons in the closet. Now the fun part of discovering its real value starts, although the company does not forecast a lot of changes according to this interview with Jonathan Klein, Getty-Images' CEO and PDN. We could suggest a few fundamental changes along the lines of my blogs and then some.
But anyway you cut it, this will turn out to be good for photographers and the market. New competitors will spring up and VCs will now perhaps see the value in supporting imaging marketplaces. So for that, we need to congratulate Getty-Images.
Loving Apple TV even more
Sunday - February 24, 2008
We could debunk every statement Getty-Images
made with regards to its recent earnings
call but we've essentially done so in our
extensive
blogs about the company. Apart from the
negative outcome of the call, we instead want to
highlight the systemic attitudinal problem of
the company.
First off, Getty's success is based on the fact that it believes it can predict how images (or other media assets) are going to be used by the buyer. It continuously re-purposes images and image rights to meet a supposed buying trends it is never going to be able to predict. With massive changes in photography Getty has frequently trailed trends rather than enabled them. The usage of the image should be determined between seller and buyer, with Getty's infrastructure merely supporting that transaction.
Second, the usage and type classification in the earnings call is the kind of double dipping I've seen many companies in trouble do. There is a dramatic overlap between editorial, creative, rights managed, royalty free, royalty ready and a myriad of other popular image definitions. The sole metric of success for the company is number of images sold at what ASP, and at what cost. No Wall-Street investor will be able to make sense of the fog Getty has put up in the conference call to hide the fact that organic growth is miserable.
Third, Getty arrogantly describes their (lackluster) performance as the market trend, as if they are the market. No, Getty, the market of image usage is actually growing faster than you are able to support. The real news is that Getty is losing market-share.
The lack of transparency makes Getty-Images an un-investable business, both from a market and acquisition perspective. The bottom line from the call simply confirms that, forget about everything in-between.
First off, Getty's success is based on the fact that it believes it can predict how images (or other media assets) are going to be used by the buyer. It continuously re-purposes images and image rights to meet a supposed buying trends it is never going to be able to predict. With massive changes in photography Getty has frequently trailed trends rather than enabled them. The usage of the image should be determined between seller and buyer, with Getty's infrastructure merely supporting that transaction.
Second, the usage and type classification in the earnings call is the kind of double dipping I've seen many companies in trouble do. There is a dramatic overlap between editorial, creative, rights managed, royalty free, royalty ready and a myriad of other popular image definitions. The sole metric of success for the company is number of images sold at what ASP, and at what cost. No Wall-Street investor will be able to make sense of the fog Getty has put up in the conference call to hide the fact that organic growth is miserable.
Third, Getty arrogantly describes their (lackluster) performance as the market trend, as if they are the market. No, Getty, the market of image usage is actually growing faster than you are able to support. The real news is that Getty is losing market-share.
The lack of transparency makes Getty-Images an un-investable business, both from a market and acquisition perspective. The bottom line from the call simply confirms that, forget about everything in-between.





