Jupiter-Images finally sold to Getty-Images after a similar attempt in February of 2007. With estimated revenues of around $79M (when last tracked) and con-jointed debt of $95M with other Jupiter Media properties, Jupiter-Images sold to Getty-Images for only $96M in cash. Sounds like a fire-sale to me.

Imaging super stores make no economic sense, as described in this blog before.

1/ Images are like art. Taking preferences of buyer and seller into account, they preferably sell only once (or as few times as possible). No buyer wants that image to appear in similar publications and so every transaction is unique. Super-stores, however, are modeled to provide one-to-many sales transactions and are therefor NOT suited to support the image exchange marketplace.

2/ Except when images are produced on a commissioned photography basis (for example by Getty-Images staff photographers), the image super store actually does not own the image, it merely has a right to operate as a reseller. Nothing would stop a photographer from trading his images somewhere else, dramatically deflating the value of the super-store.

Fact remains that $22B of images are exchanged every year, most of it (90%) not through online transactions or the sum of all super-stores. This represents a big opportunity not many Venture Capitalists understand, as it is a market-play rather than a pure technology-play. But established companies may be able to build an iTunes of images to feed their ecosystem of products.

In the meantime, Getty-Images (now private again) keeps on puffing itself up like a puffer-fish. The question is: how long will it be able to hold its breath.

Tags: Photography, Getty-Images, VC, ITunes, Jupiter-images, Revenues, Private Equity

I understand the need for a greener environment (and enjoyed the fantastic video presentation from Google CEO Eric Schmidt at Corporate EcoForum), creating more renewable energy and perhaps making us less dependent on foreign countries.

That promise sounds good, albeit I think it will just redefine what we as countries fight about. Today it is oil, tomorrow it is probably about green technology and resources. In the near future, green technology will also find its core competencies and attractive pricing in countries other than just ours. Yet if we don’t learn how to resolve our differences and respect each others cultures, the subject of our debates is irrelevant. New leadership is key, so go out and vote.

But the part I don’t get is why many investors, like Kleiner Perkins, “flee” from information technology at the shimmer of rising oil prices, financial instability and tax incentives and dive head first into a completely new, and may I add completely different line of business. A line of business that often has more similarities to farming (with all of its intrinsic risk factors) than effortlessly moving bits through thin air.

The reason why information technology remains an interesting investment category to me is:
1/ The innovation of information technology is cheap, a few smart people in a room behind a computer and voila, a new star is born.
2/ The distribution of technology is cheap and immediate, there are virtually no borders (except to China perhaps).
3/ The monetization of technology is well understood, and is either direct or indirect but almost always single source.
4/ The enormous left-over possibilities of information technology that has yet to percolate many other industries.

Contrast that with green technology where I see:
1/ The massive costs associated with early foundational development.
2/ The costly implementation and distribution that requires safety, governmental, social approval processes (literally lasting years).
3/ In most cases the requirement of multi-source monetization, involving grants and many regulatory constructs (requiring a longer sales cycle).
4/ A limited time-to-market benefit for early adopters and therefor lack of urgency to buy. The adoption of green technology is generally believed to lengthen the time-to-market, aiming to produce a return on investment spread out over many years.

Again, I do see an enormous need for green technology to save our planet and a justification for investments supporting it. I am just not confident that the current Venture Capital model (born out of the technology era, and driven by information technologists) will lend itself to that segment. I am very curious to see what vintages will produce viable returns for the Limited Partners in the green-tech funds.

I hope I am wrong, as carefully applied Venture Capital has the potential to change industries, countries and the people in them.

In the meantime I’ll stick to my core competency, creating and managing growth of innovative information technology companies.

Tags: Green Tech, Innovation, Investment, Distribution, VC, Limited Partners

As an entrepreneur, getting to know your Venture Capitalist is important, especially because their life is not as cushy as you may think.

Just imagine the onslaught of business plans they get, and how much time it takes to find that rewarding investment. Eliminating the false positives and false negatives takes time, lots of it. We personally reviewed about 40 companies over the last 7 months, yielding 3 companies that have huge potential for our investors but they need work. Hard, fun work. But life of the VC doesn't end there. Knowing the goals of your VC (in terms of fund composition and exit requirements) will make you better understand why a VC firm behaves the way it does. Its fund needs to end up in the top quartile, with or without you.

Operating on both sides of the isle and getting to know the investors I work with better, I attended the AAMA-AAAIM session in San Francisco called "Fund Management As A Business" (presentation in pdf used with permission from AAMA), moderated by the skilled and jovial Robert Grady, Managing Director of The Carlyle Group with a fantastic group of fund managers (Hamilton Lane, SFERS) and a surprisingly honest VC (Altos Ventures). I wish everyone in the investment community was as transparent as this group so we can remove some of the stigma around VC.

Here are three reasons why VCs don't have it that easy:

1/ Many more VCs need to compete aggressively on a relative steady amount of fundable deals, hovering around 4,000 equity investments in venture backed companies per year. The number of VC firms has grown from 399 in 1990 with $31B under management, to 798 firms in 2006 driving $236B into the US venture marketplace.

2/ Joe Schoendorf (Partner at Accel Partners and board-member of World Economic Forum) confirms that less than 5% of the VCs deliver the goods that sustains technology as an investible asset class. That means 95% of the investors are probably stressed out. So don't take a lack of response or a no from a VC too personal. VCs deal with complicated and sometimes long drawn investment strategies (it took Altos Ventures 3 years to land their last fund). Investment allocations may be another reason why you don't always get a quick response for your technology venture.

3/ VCs are working hard. The exits of about 400 M&A plus IPO transactions per year account for less than 10% of total venture investments made. And in order to get a successful exit, VCs review more than 20 times (and that's a conservative assessment) the amount of business plans before they invest in one. So, south of 0.5% is where their - and your - statistical probability of producing a successful exit lies.

The same criteria that apply to the return of the collective technology investments made by a VC with a fund, applies to their Limited Partners (LPs) trying to find great collective VC returns for their Investors (Pension Funds, Insurance Companies, Endowments/Foundations etc). The VC is sandwiched smack in the middle between the entrepreneur and LPs breathing down their neck. Their only "luxury" is time: 5 years of investing and 5 years of harvesting.

As an entrepreneur you can't worry too much about the statistics, if you did you wouldn't be an entrepreneur. But that the amount of deals is slightly on the rise again, perhaps indirectly spurred by massive influx from sovereign funds, means access to money - to live out your dream is improving slightly.

But be prepared to talk to more VCs and saddle up for an extensive roadshow. Fact remains: the cost of doing business to entrepreneurs and investors has increased dramatically.

Tags: Apple, VC, Investment, Private Equity, Premium, Eco-systems, Google, FaceBook, Long Tail, Hollywood

I just came back from a trip to Europe and let me tell you: Belgian chocolate, raw herring from Holland and ficelle from France - nothing is more authentic and delicious.

But few of these travel well or find a large deserving audience in the United States. Much like technology.

The state of the technology industry and the accompanying investment ecosystem in the US are quite a bit more developed than in Europe, 15 years at least.

In the US, roughly $30B per year is poured into early stage companies by some 300 investors in my backyard in Palo Alto, not including Private Equity deals. In contrast, only a handful European early stage VCs exist and the majority of all european investments are late stage investments done by Private Equity firms.

In Europe, early stage VC valuations hover around $1M, compared to $4-7M in the US. As a result desperate european entrepreneurs often default to Angels that show some flexibility, but those investors are often very inexperienced with the technology sector and early stage investing or the combination. They made their money somewhere else. Because of the young history of technology success in Europe, very few european investors (either VC or Angel) have actually had the personal experience of building an early stage technology company from scratch.

To sum it up, european investors (with a few exceptions) take large early equity stakes, provide limited relevant business insight and push those companies to early profitability (even at 250K euro investment levels). Selling a product or a service too hastily, before it is ready to enter a global marketplace delivers NO validation of the business, good or bad. But it is a sure way to slow down its innovation and differentiation.

So, underdeveloped access to quality early stage money makes life of entrepreneurs in Europe quite difficult.

But, let's assume you passed the bar on all the above and your company is on its way to the United States. No one can stop you in the pursuit of the great early exit opportunities only Silicon Valley can offer.

So here are some things to be aware of:

1/ A cherry, picked by an investor in Europe is not always a cherry in the US. Be sure you understand - or seek advice about the timing differences between continents that attract follow-on investors in the US. Some of that timing has to do with technology, but market timing is even more crucial.

2/ Plan ahead. Allocate a larger fundraising runway than you would in Europe. To US investors foreign companies are yet another risk they need to mitigate. By default you are less attractive than a US company.

3/ Modify your operating plan. Change it from a plan to profitability to a plan to market dominance (which could include profitability but can also have other primary denominations as drivers, such as owning a majority of eye-balls in the consumer space).

4/ Move your headquarters to the US. Without it you'll find very few US investors interested.

5/ Assuming you get this far, be open to a recap. US investors understand the equilibrium of shareholdings will provide the best business value, not exorbitant ownership of the initial investor achieved through a low initial valuation. But since the US valuation should increase significantly, the initial investors should not lose too much net value, if at all.

6/ Hire a local management team that understands how to perform in a petri-dish that is quite different from Europe.

My final recommendation is to be prepared before you come over and not put your head in the sand, I can give you a long (and still growing) list of foreign companies that were forced to move back.

For larger US VC firms there is a fantastic opportunity to scout for technologists in Europe and fold them into their US investment model before they've taken in too much local money. I see technologists in Europe building innovation that is at least as good as the in the US. Remember the most delicious chocolates from Belgium?

But, the worlds largest chocolate factory is Hershey's located in the US. The name of the game remains matching sufficient technological capability to a fast growing market, in the same way Hershey's reaches a much larger audience than Belgian chocolates - with a quality that is good enough for most. Market timing, not technology, is key.

Tags: Investment, Innovation, VC, Funds

I bought the Apple TV the moment it came out about 9 months or so ago. Initially surprised by the tethering requirement to a computer running iTunes, I used it quite a bit as a giant picture frame (showing off on a 50" plasma), playing music during parties and watching kids shows with my daughter. Now, with Take 2, Apple has stepped it up and provides HD quality movies (and 5.1 Dolby Digital audio) and, less talked about, removed the need for a separate Airport Express to stream any iTunes audio through your Entertainment center.

But very interesting to see is how a technology called Bonjour (formerly Rendezvous - 13 year old Apple technology, first available in AppleTalk) automatically finds and connects iTunes capable devices on the network and staving off the need for central media management. And it does so quite well and transparently. Movies, music purchased on the Apple TV show up on the iTunes on your laptop and vice versa. When Comcast showed off a central media server for the home at CES 2007 that could stream content to any of your cable connected devices, I thought it was going to give Apple a run for its money on the movie rental business. But more than one year past and still product from Comcast in sight. Don't even start about the current Comcast DVR mess, possibly the worst UI experience I've ever encountered (the Tivo deal may ease the pain a little, but the early news is not encouraging). With Apple TV, no more runs to Blockbuster, or mailing DVDs to and from Netflix, just sit at home and watch whatever you want.

What I admire most about Apple is its ability to not just create new products but that it adjust its business and operating model so those products can succeed. That is a gift bigger companies like Oracle (my former employer) and Microsoft can learn from. Media and content are the new Consumer Packaged Goods of this century and if technology vendors don't invest in the ecosystem around it their technology solutions will continue to yield mediocre user experiences and sub-par adoption.

In converging media markets, the new leaders are going to be the ones that build disruptive business models first and great technology products to support that, second.

Can't wait for Apple to strike a deal with Comcast and similar to the iPhone strategy, replace the Comcast DVR with an Apple TV capable of receiving regular broadcasts as well as tap into the power of iTunes. All Apple needs to do is use its cash war-chest to "threaten" ComCast to go at it alone, just like it "convinced" AT&T it would be better for AT&T not to let Apple become a Mobile Virtual Network Operator.

Tags: Getty-Images, Investment Banks, Revenues, Wall-Street, Debt, Organic growth

Apple has just released Aperture 2.0 today. A nice product to manage your photographs has gotten even nicer. But -- there should not be a need for Aperture.

Digital asset management, which is the predominant function of applications like Aperture and Adobe Lightroom, should not need to exist, especially not if you are Apple. If Steve Jobs were to take his own media hub strategy serious, advanced asset management capabilities should be available right in the file-system, as a function of the OS. Asset management for photographs is why people buy computers today, so why still does a separate application need to deal with our most precious assets. Incremental revenues perhaps?

Today's proprietary photo management systems eat disk space like nothing else. Non-destructive editing is supported by making superfluous copies of originals (especially when using an external editor). The derivatives are usually many times larger in size than their originals (especially when stored in TIFF or PSD), which forces you to stock up on hard disk space. I will keep using LightZone as my main photo editor and save precious disk space by leaving my photographs right where they are. Can't wait till the operating system innovates and supports photographs natively.

Tags: Getty-Images, Free-market, Funds, Photography, Long Tail, Marketplace, Markets, Revenues

So, if you've read my blogs on the imaging market here .... why would you plunk down $1.5B to acquire an Image Super Store like Getty-Images (alias Getty).

Consider this:
1/ Non-agency images are always owned by photographers not by Getty
2/ Getty's assets can vaporize quickly, photographers can switch their assets to a better marketplace instantly
3/ The vast majority of images in the world are not transacted through Getty
4/ Getty qualifies premium photographers not premium images
5/ Getty needs to cannibalize its business model in order to meet the Long Tail market requirements
6/ Getty is diluting focus to higher margin media like film and music, fat chance
7/ Getty has the expensive overhead of an agency, with declining image ASPs
8/ Hundreds of new and competing sites indicate Getty's non-supremacy

There is value in Getty-Images, as an agency or as an image store, but I would not put two diametrically opposing business models on the same P&L. Neither one is worth $1.5B. The imaging Puffer Fish is about to deflate.

Tags: Getty-Images, Wall-Street, Investment Banks, Associated Press, puffer fish, Hybrid, Business Model, Content, Premium, Bloggers, Free-market, Super-Store, Long Tail

The Puffer Fish of the imaging market, as described in my previous blog have large volumes of fleeting image assets. Yes, dear Wall-street analyst, they may have been experiencing double-digit growth temporarily but we believe that originates from non-organic growth and growth attributable to the incorporation of that non-organic supply into the global brand, in Getty-Images' case for example. If you keep buying stock photography companies you delight existing buyers with an ever increasing supply, but the novelty of that supply wears off real fast. In the end that apparent growth comes at a high cost. So witnessed by the most recent disappointing earnings reports.



Jupiter-images is literally pursueing an image super-store strategy, a copy of Getty-Images' strategy. They too have been buying stock companies. Stock companies strike deals with photographers to create a good looking selection. Yet most images have a value that is completely photographer agnostic. The value is in the photograph, not the photographer. So, a super-store of images by definition contains a small amount of sellable images.

But the real interesting fact about the imaging industry (and many related to it) is that all images have fleeting value, especially after they have been sold for the first time. Photography is the ultimate Long Tail market, with a very, very long tail and a tiny body. A great reason why any player with a "premium" imaging strategy is relegated to selling to very small and concentrated set of buyers.

Not unlike the music industry where we are used to buying music collections on CDs, a large part of the stock photography market still sells collections of photographs to artificially increase the number of images sold and the average sales price (ASP) per image. As a result, investors may think the ASP is somewhat stable and predictable and the value of the super-store may not be as grim as it seems. But Super-stores will never contain enough image variations to meet Long Tail demand. As a result, commissioned photography is still going strong.

Most photographers that produce sellable images still sell their images offline and commissioned. The ones that do sell online, literally use a total of hundreds of photo-sites today to tap into a Long Tail demand. All these factors are hardly evidence that Getty Images is indeed meeting the needs of the photography market.

On a side note: MacNN reported this week that Adobe has halted its stock photo library, perhaps it is getting ready to buy Getty-Images? I think they are smarter than that.

Tags: Getty-Images, Super-Store, ASP, Agency, Images, Photographers, Media, Margin

I have recieved a lot of inquiries from Wall-street personalities and companies due to the gracious blog posting in PE Week Wire on the imaging marketplace, so I wanted to dive deeper to clarify beyond just the financials.

1/ Getty-Images does not clearly distinguish between total addressable market and "market", probably to puff itself up as the owner of the imaging marketplace. More than 50% of (traceable corporate) images produced (by about 17,000 commercial Photography companies in the US) are generated by suppliers making less than $5M in revenues and have less than 10 employees. Very few of those (less than 1%) use Getty-Images as their distribution channel. In fact the majority of images sold in the world are traded offline, yes, offline (Getty-Images started its online presence in 2000, after going public on NASDAQ in July of 1996 and re-listing on NYSE in 1998). In addition, the peer-to-peer exchange of digital images, we estimate, is at least twice the size of the traceable exchange. It is quite irrelevant if Getty-Images is performing better than its peers, but Getty-Images by no means owns more than 10% of the addressable market. The risk for Getty is that a new kid on the block will be more successful in emptying out the market with a new business model, rather than outperform the existing players.

2/ Getty-Images is not a marketplace, it is a Super-Store in the economic sense of those definitions. A large part of the images in their store are produced by their own photographers (organic and non-organic) and sold to their existing, primarily agency customers. But the real definition of a "free-market" marketplace is that customer own their product which they sell, un-arbitrated and completely transparent, to buyers. Getty-Images charges exorbitant commissions (known to be in the range of 60%), which can't hardly be considered a marketplace transaction fee. It is suggested on the internet that Getty-Images plays unfair, even include changing photographs and forcing the original photographers to hand Getty-Images an additional 100% of the delta. True or not, that is not the kind of trust that makes anyone believe that Getty-Images will become a true marketplace.

3/ The photo acronyms are meaningless. Stock photography does not exist. It is an artificial definition, used mostly to identify a low priced photograph. But a "stock" photograph can be sold rights-managed, royalty free or exclusive and in the new world of publishing even be published as editorial. And therefor, being the leader in stock photography means absolutely NOTHING. Did you know an exclusive photograph is really not exclusive (it is only exclusive to a certain usage), that a buyer has no guarantee that the photo does not show up somewhere else. So, the only measure of success is how many photographs the company has sold and how many times over.

4/ Getty-Images has very restrictive policies to let users participate in their Super-Store, another sign it does not meet a true marketplace definition. WIth dSLR sales growing last year at 60% rate and 9B images produced on those cameras (18B cumulative dSLR images since 2003), Getty-Images is clearly not successful in monetizing the exchange of those images (even if you argue the majority of images have no re-sale value). The number of professional photographers is estimated to be around 36,000 according to PPA and D&B numbers. We believe Getty-Images falls short on counting the majority of those as their suppliers. We believe the unincorporated semi-pros that produce at least one sellable image to be much, much larger (cumulative roughly around 9M dSLR have been sold since 2003).

So, regardless from which angle you slice the business, Getty-Images by no means, has amassed critical penetration in the Total Addressable Market of image exchange. But if you artificially constrict the size of the market by calling it stock, rights-managed, royalty free, editorial or creative, perhaps you can swing it. Undoubtedly someone will buy into it.

Tags: Getty-Images, Wall-Street, Non-organic, Stock, Earnings, Long Tail, Premium, Images, ASP, Adobe, Stock, Super-Store

A Puffer Fish is a fish that blows itself up to dramatically change its appearance and size: not unlike Getty-Images (GYI), Corbis and Jupiter-Images (JUPM) in the imaging market. All three have hybrid business models that disguise the money they really make in the exchange of digital photography. But we know better, we've analyzed empirical data and studied their reports carefully.

That does not mean these "Three Bandits" are failures: Getty-Images is very successful as a photography agency (doing about $805M in revenues per year), Corbis is a very rich catalog of historic photographs stashed away in a bunker in Pennsylvania, slowly being digitized at a cost of about $25 per photograph (revenues around $250M). Jupiter-Images is the division of JupiterMedia, formerly a magazine publishing and events company, now morphing into a content acquisition company.

But they are not a successes either. Organic growth of these companies is well below the growth of the image exchange market and their combined market share is less than 10% of the image exchange addressable market. So, while the $1.5B asking price for Getty-Images doesn't sound outrageous (less than 2x revenues), what you're buying is an outsourced photography agency. Getty-Images is in essence a people factory with ever eroding profit margins.

Twenty years ago Getty-Images started with a $20M investment from grandpa Getty and has continued to purchased a wide array of photo agencies (hence the Puffer Fish) and large libraries of photographs that over time become stale rather than increase in value. The average sales price of those, primarily editorial, photographs is declining steadily (more so than creative photography), leaving the company with a large family of complacent celebrity photographers and mainstream content only the a select few publishing agencies are interested in.

With publishers (of all kind) looking for original content, the imaging Super Store approach (as described here) from the Three Bandits is fundamentally flawed. But the reason why we don't believe in the longevity of their business models (and their asking price) is that they ignore and suppress the massive influx of new digital photographers that create phenomenal high quality and original content most publishers would be dying to get their hands on.

So anyone buying these companies will soon find out how small Puffer Fish really are.

Tags: Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, PE Week, Wall-Street, PE Week, Images, Revenues, Stock, Super-Store, Cameras

I have received quite a few comments on my previous post (like this) on the imaging marketplace and I am making an attempt to clarify my condensed writing.

The market of selling photographs is fundamentally different than that of selling music, books or other goods. Rather than selling "premium" supply as defined by the number of people that buy the same product, the value of a photograph is defined by how little it sells (just like art). Fundamentally a photography superstore (like Getty Images, Corbis, Jupiter Images and even Digital Railroad) that sell the same image the way Amazon sells books yields the wrong value to the buyer.

A buyer doesn't want the photograph he is about to purchase see appear in deep circulation, yet a reader of a book makes a buying decision based on popular opinion (Oprah, iTunes) and purchases it too. Selling images (and art) requires an inverted superstore that derives its value from the massive distinctive images it sells. Coincidentally the imaging marketplace has changed dramatically from a monolithic market (between agency and pro-photographer) to a Long Tail of supply and demand (between anyone and anyone).

A fantastic opportunity lies ahead to create a new marketplace for photography that caters to new and high growth audiences. Don't get discouraged by the puffer fish of the imaging industry, that portray they own the market. They don't.

Tags: Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, Photography, puffer fish, Photographers, Margin, Editorial, Super-Store

Bose is a great example of a company that delivers a unique experience. I have had a few after sales experiences with Bose and they've all been very positive and consistent. Most recently I purchased the new iPhone adapter for Bose's QuietComfort 2 Noise Canceling headphone, only to find out that the adapter didn't fit my QC2 headset. After a call into Bose, we found out that 2 versions of the QC2 exist and the adapter packaging did not specify this distinction.

Clearly I was an early adopter of their Noise Canceling technology (I also own the QC1) but they did not punish me for it. With a little bit of tugging they offered to replace my 4-year old headset with a brand new set for free. Gladly my new headset arrived before a 5 hour plane ride to the east coast. Another experience like this with Bose came when I moved from Europe to the US about 12 years ago, I wanted to exchange my 901 equalizer with a 110 volt one (so I did not need to down-convert my 220 volt european equalizer). Again, here Bose offered to replace the equalizer free of charge.

Whether you like the sound of Bose is your own decision, but the flexibility of this, still private company to balance earnings with a sincere interest in keeping its customers happy is admirable. More fundamentally, successful companies understand that building a lasting brand means they pay attention to customer retention. Apple is doing similar things by turning part of their retail store into a support center. Great businesses don't look at support as a cost center but as a way to satisfy customer experience and have them coming back for more.

Tags: Digital Railroad, Getty-Images, Corbis, Jupiter-images, Premium, Photography, Amazon, Adobe, Stock

Investors are getting flooded with Long Tail startups. The Long Tail is the well documented phenomenon in which Amazon.com makes more money in selling books that are not(!) in the top 10,000 and creates controversy about traditional sales principles. Hundreds of examples exist before the introduction of the internet. But the Long Tail really only exists when there is a body attached to it. You go to Amazon because you find the most well known books, then you'll explore its creative variety. The body represents the highly targeted top quality that draws in the audience in the first place. So stop pitching Long Tails, where you rely on some undefined creative variety. Focus on making your numbers in the identifiable market, then benefit from the Long Tail to expand your selection beyond the traditional and constricted marketplace. More on the Long Tail here.

Tags: LaserCard, Security, Homeland Security, Biometrics, IDentity

Nothing has changed. Technology buyers exhibit the same behavior as they did twenty years ago. In spite of our unyielding drive to revolutionize, most customers respond to change in an evolutionary manner. The disconnect between revolutionary culture of the IT provider (technology push) and evolutionary nature of the customer (market pull) may be the most important reasons why the majority of technology startups never sell their products to a large and sustainable market.

Tags: Getty-Images, Photography, Stock, Revenues, Images, Distribution, Markets