Angel Investing
Trust is the currency of success
Thursday - November 20, 2008
So given that, trust is the most important denomination in determining the value of a product or a service. And trust builds from consistent delivery on stated promises, which - in turn - requires the unwavering commitment from people with integrity and honesty....do you feel the slide coming?
So:
1/ Why do many companies make promises they don’t keep?
I evaluate a lot of technology companies (about 60 this year alone, public and private) and most are simply lying about, or overstating (decibel marketing) the benefits of their proposition. Because the majority of potential customers and investors are ill-informed about the pros and cons of this specialized industry, technology companies can often get away with sneaky monetization strategies that take advantage of a lesser informed audience.
In Silicon Valley, “success” is often defined by how skilled you are in fooling customers and sucking up to aristocratic investors (to which few have access), rather than the authenticity of your proposition. A mediocre ecosystem is what still remains after the technology bust from 2001 in which self proclaimed “serial entrepreneurs” and investors have been able to dodge real value creation and sell out short.
Not the VC model is broken, but many of the participants are. That noise is severely eroding the trust in an inherently sound technology industry. We need to enforce more transparency and hold ourselves to higher standards to restore the integrity and trust.
2/ Why do we allow short-selling on public company stock?
First, the performance of public stock says nothing about the actual value or outlook of a company, in the same way the dollar offers no guarantee of what you get for it. Public stocks are already a lousy interpretation of the actual performance of a company, as it merely echos popular opinion (and not the company facts).
So, selling short is really a bet on performance of popular opinion and does nothing but undermine the trust in the longevity of a business and cannibalizes shareholder value. Quarterly earnings reports are an absolute joke as many companies move profits around, claim leadership in a market that is defined by themselves and reduce cost rather than improve their marketplace position in order to make quarterly earnings look good. They also force healthy companies to focus on often unpredictable economic aberrations rather than on their long term and macro-economic leadership position.
The ability to sell short creates unrest and undue fear in a system that requires the opposite. Can you imagine holding the president of the United States accountable on a quarterly basis? That would be bad for our country (in most cases).
We should implement a predetermined holding period for the sale of stock, the expiration determined by the company and regulated by the SEC (which can also prevent some nasty insider trader deals) to build back trust.
3/ Why are some allowed to resell securities?
Reselling securities (which was illegal a few years back) based on finagled credit scores are perhaps the double whammy in the erosion of trust in public companies. Company credit scores that are maintained (and marketed) by commercial companies create profit driven scores and unrealistic prices (up and down) for securities. We simply need to stop the resale of securities and regulate the process of maintaining credit scores (both business and personal) vigorously and immediately.
Regulations do not turn us into a socialistic society, but the reality is that no economy operates without rules to protect trust. Free-markets require a basic set of rules to prevent a few bad apples to create insurmountable fear for the rest of us.
For the technologists amongst us: eBay deploys no less than seven dedicated servers to detect suspicious transactions that could challenge the trust in its free-market model.
In the same way we deploy rigid traffic laws to drive a car, should we deploy rules of engagement to protect our economic serenity. As long as we don’t dictate the destination of our travels or where we place our individual economic bets, we should be just fine in our support of a blossoming capitalistic society.
Trust comes from transparency, integrity and authenticity that builds real value, not from taking advantage of the ill-informed. So, building a successful company does not start with a new product strategy but with a leader who has the drive to win that is larger than his greed. Building disruptive products that truly improve people’s lives will yield personal satisfaction and trust that will keep customers coming back for more.
Trust is the only currency that matters, so stop squandering it.
Cheating platforms; bad for our country
Monday - July 28, 2008
When Facebook decided to integrate
new application capabilities that were first
available as a third-party application from a
marketplace participant, they broke the cardinal
rule of marketplace meritocracy. When Getty Images’
staff-photographers allegedly took new pictures
similar to previously top-selling pictures from
participants they too broke a fundamental
marketplace rule. When Amazon.com optimized
sales results based on margins requirements they
too broke many of the free-market rules as
described in “Look,
but don’t touch”.
By calling themselves platforms or marketplaces those companies misled their participants and engaged in what I would characterize as false advertising. Not only did the suppliers expect to be treated equally and become successful based on a true meritocracy, buyers expected to get an untainted view of that meritocracy to make informed purchasing decisions.
Technology platforms need to obey to a simple macro-economic marketplace definition:
Marketplaces thrive because they support free-market principles, and as a result they level the playing field for all participants. No longer are unfair advantages for participants defined by geographic location, subscriptions, volume or other artificial boundaries, but simply by the value and the price of their products.
Here is what platform vendors, to maintain free-market principles and thrive, should stick to:
1/ Don’t employ sales people that sell marketplace content. Sales people give preference to specific content which violates the integrity of the marketplace. Sell the effectiveness of the marketplace mechanism instead.
2/ Don’t market specific content, but market the effectiveness of the exchange. Unfair advantage is an attribute of a premium market not a free-market.
3/ Don’t arbitrate. Anyone should be able to participate, participation fees (that anone in the target group can afford) are okay.
4/ Don’t hide sales results. Transparency of the effectiveness of the marketplace is crucial to invite new entrants on the supply and buy side.
5/ Don’t participate in the marketplace yourself. Clearly seperate yourself from the participants, platform vendors should just build the platform, not the content.
Technology companies that are building platforms should check out our cardinal marketplace rules and investors should measure their platform companies on the compliance to those rules. Investing in a premium market business is fundamentally different from investing in a free-market platform business. Funding requirements and use-of-proceeds differ dramatically.
I’ll make the point again that investors should understand macro-economics impact before they invest.
Marketplaces are not for-free and still support capitalism, but the money will be made by platform owners from a transparent margin on the exchange (and sometimes carefully applied advertising opportunities). Diligent consumer marketplaces achieve winner-takes-all participation levels and massive exchange volumes and revenues. eBay and the Apple AppStore are great examples of more disciplined marketplaces.
Because of the virtually unlimited global reach of the Internet we have an incredible opportunity and obligation to present the world with free-market platforms that treat all participants fairly and with respect.
Let’s stop whining about the authenticity of our presidents, and instead, as the creators of the technology industry show the world how we turn authenticity, embedded in our technology, into a massively sustainable advantage.
By calling themselves platforms or marketplaces those companies misled their participants and engaged in what I would characterize as false advertising. Not only did the suppliers expect to be treated equally and become successful based on a true meritocracy, buyers expected to get an untainted view of that meritocracy to make informed purchasing decisions.
Technology platforms need to obey to a simple macro-economic marketplace definition:
A marketplace connects unrestricted supply with unrestricted demand through an un-arbitrated and transparent exchange.
Marketplaces thrive because they support free-market principles, and as a result they level the playing field for all participants. No longer are unfair advantages for participants defined by geographic location, subscriptions, volume or other artificial boundaries, but simply by the value and the price of their products.
Here is what platform vendors, to maintain free-market principles and thrive, should stick to:
1/ Don’t employ sales people that sell marketplace content. Sales people give preference to specific content which violates the integrity of the marketplace. Sell the effectiveness of the marketplace mechanism instead.
2/ Don’t market specific content, but market the effectiveness of the exchange. Unfair advantage is an attribute of a premium market not a free-market.
3/ Don’t arbitrate. Anyone should be able to participate, participation fees (that anone in the target group can afford) are okay.
4/ Don’t hide sales results. Transparency of the effectiveness of the marketplace is crucial to invite new entrants on the supply and buy side.
5/ Don’t participate in the marketplace yourself. Clearly seperate yourself from the participants, platform vendors should just build the platform, not the content.
Technology companies that are building platforms should check out our cardinal marketplace rules and investors should measure their platform companies on the compliance to those rules. Investing in a premium market business is fundamentally different from investing in a free-market platform business. Funding requirements and use-of-proceeds differ dramatically.
I’ll make the point again that investors should understand macro-economics impact before they invest.
Marketplaces are not for-free and still support capitalism, but the money will be made by platform owners from a transparent margin on the exchange (and sometimes carefully applied advertising opportunities). Diligent consumer marketplaces achieve winner-takes-all participation levels and massive exchange volumes and revenues. eBay and the Apple AppStore are great examples of more disciplined marketplaces.
Because of the virtually unlimited global reach of the Internet we have an incredible opportunity and obligation to present the world with free-market platforms that treat all participants fairly and with respect.
Let’s stop whining about the authenticity of our presidents, and instead, as the creators of the technology industry show the world how we turn authenticity, embedded in our technology, into a massively sustainable advantage.
Mobile is dead, for VC that is
Friday - July 11, 2008
Companies like Digital Chocolate (founded by software gaming pioneer Trip Hawkins) are now painfully aware of that. Recenty switching gears, it is debatable whether they can compete with the endless supply of a new free-market.
The future of many companies like Aeroprise, still basking in the glory of a proprietary Blackberry environment and tucked away in the enterprise mobile markets, will be severely threatened by standards-based technlogy running on any internet capable device, very soon.
The premium market of mobile applications protected by walled gardens has been changed to a free-market by Apple’s iPhone and the App Store. Macro-economics, discussed in this blog many times before, at work again.
Rather than single minded companies being able to protect their turf with a collection of proprietary applications (usually aimed at businesses), now individuals will start to create applications for other users. By the people, for the people. N/N :the airplane code for Steve Jobs’ Gulfstream. Get it already?
User-generated-content (one of those awkward Silicon Valley attempts of describing content that resides in a free marketplace) has a brand new companion, it is called: applications.
But these applications are no longer mobile applications, they are internet applications - that happen to run on a great mobile internet device. And they will run on many other internet devices, hard-wired or mobile. Think of them as the big brother of widgets, task oriented applications that remove the need to use a browser to benefit from the Internet. They target regular consumers, not internet savvy technologists and they self-configure, based on location and other user preferences.
So the investment model for mobile has changed dramatically and the recently announced $100M iFund (by top investment firm KPCB) and a similar one by BlackBerry - the vehicle of purportedly investing $1M per application vendor - makes no sense at all. Here is why:
1/ User-generated content does not provide a great foundation for large upside - let alone an acquisition or IPO that is priced to produce interesting VC returns.
2/ The value to the VC is in the “winner-takes-all” platform, not the content (albeit that produces great value and choice to the consumer). Apple, with the App Store platform for distributing applications using free-market principles (although still not perfect, check out our marketplace rules) will again walk away with the same benefits it reaped from the iTunes store, direct and halo.
3/ Application development is a very high cost business, especially in a highly competitive marketplace. The gaming industry wrapped in a slower transition from premium to free-market is finding that out too.
4/ Mobile used to be a proprietary, and protectable, path to the internet. No longer. The intelligence of the backend service, accessed through a mobile of hard-wired computing device is where the value is.
So, i suggest to rename the iFund in Software-As- A-Service fund, agnostic to access paradigm.
Nokia and Blackberry (RIM) will have to follow quickly. But they would need to start hiring people that understand macro-economics, not just technologists that create poor copies of Apple’s implementation.
All phones need to have a real operating system inside, and Roger McNamee’s investment in Palm may make sense in that way, but they better step it up quickly. Nokia is off playing with Symbian, Microsoft has its own concotion. All of them pretty much asleep at the macro-economic wheel.
Yet for individuals, on the supply and buy side, all this disruption leads to new opportunities that are derived from a meritocracy. Fantastic applications are being developed and used in massive numbers. The world is indeed flat after all.
No IPOs in 2Q08, I told you so
Wednesday - July 02, 2008
Finally the market is talking, and I knew it would
have more impact than my blog:
(from VentureBeat)
Years back we suggested the diminishing value of micro-economic innovation (or technology silos) and a stubborn VC club that still operates under old fashioned principles (see “In Search of the Economist VC” written in 2005, “10 Investment lessons learned” and “Invest different” in 2008) as the main reason for this decline.
Alex Haislip on PEHub agrees:
“The VC industry is laboring under a set of outdated assumptions, a structure optimized for conditions no longer applicable and an unwillingness or inability to embrace the tectonic change it is undergoing. The hand wringing about various short term shocks (such as skittish investors) that sunk the second quarter’s IPOs misses any serious discussion of the long-term systemic shifts that many VCs have failed to act on.”
What needs to change is:
1/ VCs need to start investing in businesses rather than technologies
No one outside of Silicon Valley cares about Web2.0, Mashups, UPnP etc unless it proves to deliver a unique experience, deliver substantial competitive advantage or significant cost savings to customers. Indeed, back to fundamentals.
2/ VCs need to embrace different investment models
We need a long-and-short and high-and-low in technology investments, and everything in-between. With a business centric view of the world comes an investment model that is tailored to that business. Every unique company ecosystem has unique financial requirements. History has shown not all businesses benefit from low-ball investments; the majority of seed stage deals go for less than half the price of a regular house in Palo Alto. The superficial categorization of businesses in technology categories is turning new business opportunities into (forced) commodities.
3/ VCs need to change how they find deals
The problem starts at first encounter. The Ivy League kids fresh out of business school that are the first point of contact for most entrepreneurs are just not capable and experienced enough to spot disruptive technologies that have macro-economic impact. A first time pilot right out of school is not allowed to take the helm of a commercial airliner, neither should an MBA graduate be allowed to veto an investment. False negatives are rampant and deflating overall market value. We need unconventonal companies, not more conventional ones.
But the great thing about the demise of the current VC model is the need to create a new one that, in turn, spawns a new more exciting asset class.
(from VentureBeat)
Years back we suggested the diminishing value of micro-economic innovation (or technology silos) and a stubborn VC club that still operates under old fashioned principles (see “In Search of the Economist VC” written in 2005, “10 Investment lessons learned” and “Invest different” in 2008) as the main reason for this decline.
Alex Haislip on PEHub agrees:
“The VC industry is laboring under a set of outdated assumptions, a structure optimized for conditions no longer applicable and an unwillingness or inability to embrace the tectonic change it is undergoing. The hand wringing about various short term shocks (such as skittish investors) that sunk the second quarter’s IPOs misses any serious discussion of the long-term systemic shifts that many VCs have failed to act on.”
What needs to change is:
1/ VCs need to start investing in businesses rather than technologies
No one outside of Silicon Valley cares about Web2.0, Mashups, UPnP etc unless it proves to deliver a unique experience, deliver substantial competitive advantage or significant cost savings to customers. Indeed, back to fundamentals.
2/ VCs need to embrace different investment models
We need a long-and-short and high-and-low in technology investments, and everything in-between. With a business centric view of the world comes an investment model that is tailored to that business. Every unique company ecosystem has unique financial requirements. History has shown not all businesses benefit from low-ball investments; the majority of seed stage deals go for less than half the price of a regular house in Palo Alto. The superficial categorization of businesses in technology categories is turning new business opportunities into (forced) commodities.
3/ VCs need to change how they find deals
The problem starts at first encounter. The Ivy League kids fresh out of business school that are the first point of contact for most entrepreneurs are just not capable and experienced enough to spot disruptive technologies that have macro-economic impact. A first time pilot right out of school is not allowed to take the helm of a commercial airliner, neither should an MBA graduate be allowed to veto an investment. False negatives are rampant and deflating overall market value. We need unconventonal companies, not more conventional ones.
But the great thing about the demise of the current VC model is the need to create a new one that, in turn, spawns a new more exciting asset class.
The sweet taste of success
Sunday - May 18, 2008
Nothing is sweeter than success, real success,
hard earned success. That is what my grandfather
achieved when he helped create the company (van
Melle) that still makes the Mentos candy today
and, in the early 1900s turned it into a
worldwide company and brand. Every day, I strive
to live up to his achievements. Not just to make
a buck, but to fundamentally challenge the
establishment and contribute to improving the
world we live in. Albeit my sweet spot is
technology.
Building a business is all about people; entrepreneurs and investors working hard together towards achieving the common goal. Too many times do I see or hear from investors how entrepreneurs finagle their way into the money pot, with damaging consequences.
While I do not consider myself in the league of Donald Trump in terms of inspirational speaking, I do want to emphasize how important the evaluation of personal skills are to support a great company. I learned some valuable lessons from my grandfather early on - not by asking him many questions (I was too young to do so intelligently) - but by watching him operate. My grandfather did not have access to the funds we have at our disposal in Silicon Valley, but the rules of success have not changed.
1/ Have an opinion.
Unless you are ill informed, having an opinion and expressing it is vital. Vital to you personally - in achieving what you want, and vital to the company you work for - to provide the best quality of service. If you can't see the flaws around you (and in yourself from time to time), you won't be able to detect or imagine true innovation.
2/ Have guts.
The world is full of artificial rules to keep us all in check. Throw them out from time to time, just to see what happens. I run a stoplight litmus test with most entrepreneurs, to demonstrate how tucked-in we still are. And you'll be amazed.
3/ Have integrity.
The goal of creating a lasting personal brand should outweigh the short-term obsession of making money. "Nice" people don't make great impressions, what they stand for does. I bet you'll make more money sticking to your personal brand, then you ever will chasing dollars.
4/ Be transparent.
Transparency is the fair assessment of capabilities, good and bad, combined with the ability to expose them. The companies we create together inherit our good and bad, yet no one will suffer if they are exposed properly. Quite the opposite, transparency builds fairness and trust.
5/ Find your passion.
You will not see me go-green anytime soon, even though there is a lot of money to be made there. My passion is technology, specifically consumer technology and has been since I was twelve years old. I was lucky in that way, but it hasn't been easy, extricating myself from common beliefs. Explore your own true passion (not that of someone else), and don't rest until you've found it.
Many times is the path to success cut short, not by the market, but by the entrepreneurs themselves. As a CEO I have left companies where major shareholders lack or infringe on those fundamental principles, and I killed investments for similar reasons.
The real sweet taste of success is being true to yourself. So, next time you knock on your investors' doors, pay a little more attention to yourself - rather than the business plan.
(In memory of my hero and grandfather Simon de Smit, I miss him in more ways than one)
Building a business is all about people; entrepreneurs and investors working hard together towards achieving the common goal. Too many times do I see or hear from investors how entrepreneurs finagle their way into the money pot, with damaging consequences.
While I do not consider myself in the league of Donald Trump in terms of inspirational speaking, I do want to emphasize how important the evaluation of personal skills are to support a great company. I learned some valuable lessons from my grandfather early on - not by asking him many questions (I was too young to do so intelligently) - but by watching him operate. My grandfather did not have access to the funds we have at our disposal in Silicon Valley, but the rules of success have not changed.
1/ Have an opinion.
Unless you are ill informed, having an opinion and expressing it is vital. Vital to you personally - in achieving what you want, and vital to the company you work for - to provide the best quality of service. If you can't see the flaws around you (and in yourself from time to time), you won't be able to detect or imagine true innovation.
2/ Have guts.
The world is full of artificial rules to keep us all in check. Throw them out from time to time, just to see what happens. I run a stoplight litmus test with most entrepreneurs, to demonstrate how tucked-in we still are. And you'll be amazed.
3/ Have integrity.
The goal of creating a lasting personal brand should outweigh the short-term obsession of making money. "Nice" people don't make great impressions, what they stand for does. I bet you'll make more money sticking to your personal brand, then you ever will chasing dollars.
4/ Be transparent.
Transparency is the fair assessment of capabilities, good and bad, combined with the ability to expose them. The companies we create together inherit our good and bad, yet no one will suffer if they are exposed properly. Quite the opposite, transparency builds fairness and trust.
5/ Find your passion.
You will not see me go-green anytime soon, even though there is a lot of money to be made there. My passion is technology, specifically consumer technology and has been since I was twelve years old. I was lucky in that way, but it hasn't been easy, extricating myself from common beliefs. Explore your own true passion (not that of someone else), and don't rest until you've found it.
Many times is the path to success cut short, not by the market, but by the entrepreneurs themselves. As a CEO I have left companies where major shareholders lack or infringe on those fundamental principles, and I killed investments for similar reasons.
The real sweet taste of success is being true to yourself. So, next time you knock on your investors' doors, pay a little more attention to yourself - rather than the business plan.
(In memory of my hero and grandfather Simon de Smit, I miss him in more ways than one)
Invest Different
Saturday - May 17, 2008
Just imagine the onslaught of business plans they get, and how much time it takes to find that rewarding investment. Eliminating the false positives and false negatives takes time, lots of it. We personally reviewed about 40 companies over the last 7 months, yielding 3 companies that have huge potential for our investors but they need work. Hard, fun work. But life of the VC doesn't end there. Knowing the goals of your VC (in terms of fund composition and exit requirements) will make you better understand why a VC firm behaves the way it does. Its fund needs to end up in the top quartile, with or without you.
Operating on both sides of the isle and getting to know the investors I work with better, I attended the AAMA-AAAIM session in San Francisco called "Fund Management As A Business" (presentation in pdf
Here are three reasons why VCs don't have it that easy:
1/ Many more VCs need to compete aggressively on a relative steady amount of fundable deals, hovering around 4,000 equity investments in venture backed companies per year. The number of VC firms has grown from 399 in 1990 with $31B under management, to 798 firms in 2006 driving $236B into the US venture marketplace.
2/ Joe Schoendorf (Partner at Accel Partners and board-member of World Economic Forum) confirms that less than 5% of the VCs deliver the goods that sustains technology as an investible asset class. That means 95% of the investors are probably stressed out. So don't take a lack of response or a no from a VC too personal. VCs deal with complicated and sometimes long drawn investment strategies (it took Altos Ventures 3 years to land their last fund). Investment allocations may be another reason why you don't always get a quick response for your technology venture.
3/ VCs are working hard. The exits of about 400 M&A plus IPO transactions per year account for less than 10% of total venture investments made. And in order to get a successful exit, VCs review more than 20 times (and that's a conservative assessment) the amount of business plans before they invest in one. So, south of 0.5% is where their - and your - statistical probability of producing a successful exit lies.
The same criteria that apply to the return of the collective technology investments made by a VC with a fund, applies to their Limited Partners (LPs) trying to find great collective VC returns for their Investors (Pension Funds, Insurance Companies, Endowments/Foundations etc). The VC is sandwiched smack in the middle between the entrepreneur and LPs breathing down their neck. Their only "luxury" is time: 5 years of investing and 5 years of harvesting.
As an entrepreneur you can't worry too much about the statistics, if you did you wouldn't be an entrepreneur. But that the amount of deals is slightly on the rise again, perhaps indirectly spurred by massive influx from sovereign funds, means access to money - to live out your dream is improving slightly.
But be prepared to talk to more VCs and saddle up for an extensive roadshow. Fact remains: the cost of doing business to entrepreneurs and investors has increased dramatically.
10 Investment lessons learned over 10 years
Wednesday - March 12, 2008
I visited the entrepreneurs week
at Stanford this week where many MBAs were
walking around with new business ideas. Since we
raised a fair amount of money ourselves
in the last 10 years we've been focused on
startups, I wanted to give some advice that may
be helpful to any first time entrepreneur:
1) Define the end goal of the company in a newly defined market
The determination of pre-money valuation, even for the first round, should be based on the disruptiveness of the company when it grows up. The goal is to find the investor that understands the path to that goal, not an assessment of the current value of the company. The starting valuation then becomes a reverse calculation from that goal.
2) Don't set a valuation, but have one in mind
The valuation is usually suggested by the investor, but ofcourse, you don't have to take it. Ask your potential investor to value the company after you give them the pitch, the outcome of that tells you whether the investor really understands your unique proposition. If it is too low, it may be because the clarity of your pitch. If not: walk away.
3) Have an operating plan ready
An operating plan defines how you turn technology into a business, without it there is simply too much room for debate and depreciation. Show investors you know how to run the business. The more you do the easier it is to cement your use-of-proceeds.
4) Find an investor you truly like
Every entrepreneur deserves to be treated with respect. Waste no time talking to deep pockets with awful personalities, but don't be afraid to get some straight talk. Check TheFunded.com for war stories and ask around. Later, when business gets tough bad guys usually get a lot worse.
5) Define business disruptiveness
Building technology is one thing, but yielding a disruptive business value is even more relevant. The latter is defined by macro-economics, not just a more clever way to improve existing technology.
6) Take passion over domain expertise any-day
Find a lead investor that has passion for the business problem you are about to solve. An investor that claims to have domain expertise is usually the one that doesn't understand disruption within or across that domain.
7) Don't get squeezed
Investors like to put investments into past investment categories and make an assessment of how much it costs to build your business. Don't let them stray too much from what is in your operating plan, if you do you will get punished for it later, both on the execution side as well as in excessive dilution.
8) Know the investment allocation
Usually a little harder to do with angels but VCs should have a total investment amount allocated to the business. Ask them for the total allocation upfront, so you know when you need to go shopping somewhere else. Also, don't be afraid to ask who else needs to sign off on this deal within the VC firm, in most cases it is a very democratic process internally with a primary sponsor. After your first meeting you should get in front of a General Partner, talking terms.
9) Control your own eco-system
Investors like to wiggle around and determine how much money should go into R&D, Sales, Marketing, Business development, Support and G&A. Too much money in marketing is usually an indication the product or service lacks real viral adoption and that should be avoided. If the balance of this eco-system is not guarded heavily by the entrepreneurs the result is an excessive bleeding and further dilution in subsequent rounds.
10) Balance your board
A board without a balance of technical and business expertise can really bring a company down when the going gets tough. The technical board members will spend too much time validating deep technology progress without real affinity for the bottom-line. On the flip side a demand for too early revenues can have disastrous effects on product or service readiness and customer experience. Keep them both in check.
Be honest and transparent, too much talk without real interaction with a prospective investor is a bad sign. Paint a realistic risk-management picture, in which you describe both the pluses and minuses, not unlike the way a VC sells their risks in a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) to its limited partners. Feel free to e-mail us if you need help.
1) Define the end goal of the company in a newly defined market
The determination of pre-money valuation, even for the first round, should be based on the disruptiveness of the company when it grows up. The goal is to find the investor that understands the path to that goal, not an assessment of the current value of the company. The starting valuation then becomes a reverse calculation from that goal.
2) Don't set a valuation, but have one in mind
The valuation is usually suggested by the investor, but ofcourse, you don't have to take it. Ask your potential investor to value the company after you give them the pitch, the outcome of that tells you whether the investor really understands your unique proposition. If it is too low, it may be because the clarity of your pitch. If not: walk away.
3) Have an operating plan ready
An operating plan defines how you turn technology into a business, without it there is simply too much room for debate and depreciation. Show investors you know how to run the business. The more you do the easier it is to cement your use-of-proceeds.
4) Find an investor you truly like
Every entrepreneur deserves to be treated with respect. Waste no time talking to deep pockets with awful personalities, but don't be afraid to get some straight talk. Check TheFunded.com for war stories and ask around. Later, when business gets tough bad guys usually get a lot worse.
5) Define business disruptiveness
Building technology is one thing, but yielding a disruptive business value is even more relevant. The latter is defined by macro-economics, not just a more clever way to improve existing technology.
6) Take passion over domain expertise any-day
Find a lead investor that has passion for the business problem you are about to solve. An investor that claims to have domain expertise is usually the one that doesn't understand disruption within or across that domain.
7) Don't get squeezed
Investors like to put investments into past investment categories and make an assessment of how much it costs to build your business. Don't let them stray too much from what is in your operating plan, if you do you will get punished for it later, both on the execution side as well as in excessive dilution.
8) Know the investment allocation
Usually a little harder to do with angels but VCs should have a total investment amount allocated to the business. Ask them for the total allocation upfront, so you know when you need to go shopping somewhere else. Also, don't be afraid to ask who else needs to sign off on this deal within the VC firm, in most cases it is a very democratic process internally with a primary sponsor. After your first meeting you should get in front of a General Partner, talking terms.
9) Control your own eco-system
Investors like to wiggle around and determine how much money should go into R&D, Sales, Marketing, Business development, Support and G&A. Too much money in marketing is usually an indication the product or service lacks real viral adoption and that should be avoided. If the balance of this eco-system is not guarded heavily by the entrepreneurs the result is an excessive bleeding and further dilution in subsequent rounds.
10) Balance your board
A board without a balance of technical and business expertise can really bring a company down when the going gets tough. The technical board members will spend too much time validating deep technology progress without real affinity for the bottom-line. On the flip side a demand for too early revenues can have disastrous effects on product or service readiness and customer experience. Keep them both in check.
Be honest and transparent, too much talk without real interaction with a prospective investor is a bad sign. Paint a realistic risk-management picture, in which you describe both the pluses and minuses, not unlike the way a VC sells their risks in a Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) to its limited partners. Feel free to e-mail us if you need help.
10 Fundraising lessons learned over 10 years
Thursday - February 28, 2008
Getty-Images pulled it off as we indicated would
happen, and sold itself to private equity
group Hellman & Friedman LLC in San
Francisco (and the "network of the private
equity group" which apparently includes the
Getty empire) for a little over 2x revenues,
assuming also an additional $300M in debt.
Someone clearly felt that was an accurate price
for its organic growth business: "Wall Street
was paying more attention to the stagnating core
business than to its emerging segments."
Indeed, non-organic growth is hardly ever a sustainable endeavor, lacks core competency and focus and often hides many skeletons in the closet. Now the fun part of discovering its real value starts, although the company does not forecast a lot of changes according to this interview with Jonathan Klein, Getty-Images' CEO and PDN. We could suggest a few fundamental changes along the lines of my blogs and then some.
But anyway you cut it, this will turn out to be good for photographers and the market. New competitors will spring up and VCs will now perhaps see the value in supporting imaging marketplaces. So for that, we need to congratulate Getty-Images.
Indeed, non-organic growth is hardly ever a sustainable endeavor, lacks core competency and focus and often hides many skeletons in the closet. Now the fun part of discovering its real value starts, although the company does not forecast a lot of changes according to this interview with Jonathan Klein, Getty-Images' CEO and PDN. We could suggest a few fundamental changes along the lines of my blogs and then some.
But anyway you cut it, this will turn out to be good for photographers and the market. New competitors will spring up and VCs will now perhaps see the value in supporting imaging marketplaces. So for that, we need to congratulate Getty-Images.




